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CREATING A PRACTICAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE  
COMMERCIAL EXPLOITATION OF MINERAL RESOURCES IN OUTER SPACE 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis addresses the legal and policy issues relating to what may be the most exciting 
prospect in the history of the human civilisation: the commercial exploitation of natural 
resources in outer space.  The thesis is based on the hypothesis that such ventures are 
inhibited not by physical, technological and economic factors, but by the inadequacies and 
uncertainties present in the current body of space law and policy. Consequently, a new 
international legal framework and a policy consensus are required to provide a legal 
environment favourable for such a valuable and necessary development. 
To substantiate this hypothesis, the thesis begins by establishing the economic necessity 
and technical feasibility of space mining today, an estimate of the financial commitments 
required.  This is followed by a risk analysis of a typical commercial mining venture in 
space, identifying the economic and legal risks.  This leads to the recognition that the legal 
risks must be minimised to enable such enormous financial commitments to be made.   
What then follows is a detailed analysis of the legal framework for such activities as well 
as identifying the inadequacies of space law for the commercial exploitation of celestial 
resources.  This is achieved through a discussion of the general principles of international 
space law, particularly dealing with state responsibility and international liability, as 
well as some of the issues arising from space mining activities.  Much detail is devoted to 
the analysis of the content of the “common heritage of mankind” doctrine in international 
law and the effect of international disagreement over its application to celestial bodies. 
Having established the relevant legal issues, the thesis then turns to consider the past 
failures in reach similar agreements and the competing policy interests that have 
prevented the success of such agreements.  It attempts to balance such interests in creating 
a legal and policy compromise that may be acceptable to a majority of the international 
community and provide some practical proposals on the structural, procedural, 
administrative and judicial aspects of creating and implementing a new legal framework. 
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GLOSSARY 
TERM  MEANING 
Absolute visual 
magnitude (H) 
A measure of a celestial body’s intrinsic brightness, measured in the 
standard V phometric band. 
Amor Asteroid  Asteroid with perihelion 1.017 AU < q ≤ 1.3 AU 
Aphelion (Q)  The point on an orbit that is most distant from the Sun 
Apollo Asteroid  Asteroid with perihelion q < 1.017 AU and semi major axis a > 1.0 AU 
Arjuna Asteroid  Asteroid with Earth-like orbits with low inclination, low eccentricity 
and orbital periods close to one Earth year 
Astronomical 
Unit (AU) 
Unit of length equal to the mean distance between the Earth and the 
Sun, estimated in 2009 at 149,597,870,700 metres. 
Aten Asteroid  Asteroid with semi major axis a < 1.0 AU and aphelion Q > 0.983 AU 
Carbonyl  Compound of a metal with carbon monoxide (CO) 






Minimum distance between closest points on the orbit of the Earth and 
the orbit of an asteroid or comet, usually given in astronomical units 
(AU).  Potentially hazardous objects to the Earth have an Earth MOID 
of less than 0.05 AU. 
Eccentricity (e)  Measure of the circularity of the orbit where the more eccentric an 
orbit, the more oval shaped the orbit is 
Ecliptic  The orbital plane on which the Earth orbits the Sun 
Escape Velocity  Minimum speed an object without propulsion needs to have to move 
away infinitely from the gravity of an object 
Hohmann 
Transfer Orbit 
Elliptical orbit that is tangential to two coplanar orbits that is most 
energy efficient transfer trajectory 
Hyperbolic 
Velocity 
The velocity (∆v  ) of an object relative to Earth or another celestial 
object when it is outside that body’s gravity well 
Impulsive  Change in velocity (∆v  ) that is given to an object in a short period of 
time relative to the total duration of the trajectory 
Inclination (i)  The angle between the orbital plane of a particular object and the 
ecliptic 
Kerogen  Solid hydrocarbons found in crude oil Glossary 
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TERM  MEANING 
Opposition  Where one object is at perihelion and the other is at aphelion 
Perihelion (q)  The point on an orbit which is closest to the Sun 
Planetesimal  One of a class of bodies that are theorised to have formed the planets 
after condensing from diffuse matter early in the history of the solar 
system 
Pyrolysis  Generation of chemicals or free metals by heat decomposition 
Regolith  The fragmented rocky debris blanketing the surface of the Moon, some 
asteroids and other small objects in the Solar System 
Semi-major Axis 
(A) 
The longest diameter of an elliptical orbit. 
Synodic Period  Period of a body relative to the Earth 
Transfer Orbit  The trajectory for an object travelling from one body to another 
Trojan  An object which is trapped in a stable orbit 60° ahead of or behind the 
object as it orbits the Sun 
Volatiles  Gases that can be released from comet cores by heating, producing gases 
such as water, carbon dioxide (CO2), carbon monoxide (CO), methane 
(CH4), ammonia (NH3) and hydrogen cyanide (HCN) 
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TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS 
TERM  DEFINITION 
AAS  American Astronomical Society 
ACP  African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States 
AIAA  American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
AN  Ascending node 
ARABSAT  Arab Corporation for Space Communications 
AU  Astronomical Unit 
COPUOS  Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
COSPAR  Committee on Space Research 
DN  Descending node 
ECAS  Eight Colour Asteroid Survey 
ECSL  European Centre for Space Law 
EEC  European Economic Community 
ENPV  Expected Net Present Value 
ESA  European Space Agency 
EUMETSAT  European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites 
EUTELSAT  European Telecommunication Satellite Organisation 
GATT  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GEO  Geostationary Earth Orbit 
HEEO  Highly Elliptical Earth Orbit 
IAU  International Astronomical Union 
IBA  International Bar Association 
IBRD  International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
ICC  International Chamber of Commerce 
IISL  International Institute of Space Law 
ILC  International Law Commission 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
INMARSAT  International Mobile Satellite Organisation Table of Abbreviations 
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TERM  DEFINITION 
INTELSAT  International Telecommunication Satellite Organisation 
ISA  International Seabed Authority 
ISRO  Indian Space Research Organisation 
ITLOS  International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
ITU  International Telecommunication Union 
LEO  Low Earth Orbit 
NASA  National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NEAR  Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous 
NIEO  New International Economic Order 
NPV  Net Present Value 
OPEC  Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
RLV  Reusable Launch Vehicle 
ROI  Return on Investment 
SSI  Space Studies Institute 
SSPS  Space Solar Power Satellite 
UN  United Nations 
UNCLOS III  Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
UNCTAD  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
UNESCO  United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
UNIDROIT  International Institute for the Unification of Private Law 
USA  United States of America 
USACERL  United States Army Construction Engineering Research Laboratory 
WIPO  World Intellectual Property Organisation 
WTO  World Trade Organisation 
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From the early moments of my interest in space law, the concept of prospecting, 
extracting and exploiting natural resources on the Moon and other celestial bodies in 
the Solar System has always fascinated me and captured my imagination.  After all, 
this is not exactly pure fantasy.  Scientists and entrepreneurs have all dreamt of a 
world and a time where humankind has established itself in the far-reaching corners of 
this our own galaxy.  At the same time, economists and environmentalists have all 
heralded the coming of a time when mineral resources on Earth are depleted and led 
us to imagine the remnants of the ruined planet that would remain from our quest for 
more resources.  It must be clear that the future of human civilisation must lie in outer 
space and exploitation of mineral resources must be a part of these developments.  
Consequently, if space lawyers are motivated by a desire to contribute to the building 
of the solid legal foundations necessary for this future advancement and expansion of 
human civilisation into outer space, then the law for space mining must be one of the 
fundamental issues that must be resolved.  The absence of a legal framework for 
regulating human extraction and exploitation of mineral resources from celestial 
bodies may result in such ventures disregarding their effects on international 
economics, the space environment, social needs and long-term sustainability, all in the 
pursuit of short-term wealth and profit.  This would resemble a lawless realm not 
unlike the USA in the days of Manifest Destiny.  Indeed, one prominent legal scholar 
once suggested to me in a private discussion that a space law principle similar to the 
Homestead Act, whereby settlers are granted land ownership after “working” and 
“living off” the land for seven years, may be workable when applied to celestial bodies. 
Creating a legal framework for future mining activities in space may not be a pressing 
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In a closed society Malthusianism 
has the appearance of self-evident 
truth, and herein lies the danger.  
It is not enough to argue against 
Malthusianism in the abstract - such 
debates are not settled in academic 
journals.  Unless people can see 
broad vistas of unused resources in 
front of them, the belief in limited 
resources tends to follow as a 
matter of course.  And if the idea 
is accepted that the world’s 
resources are fixed, then each 
person is ultimately the enemy of 
every other person, and each race or 
nation is the enemy of every other 
race or nation. The extreme result 
is tyranny, war and even genocide.  
Only in a universe of unlimited 
resources can all men be brothers. 
— Robert Zubrin and Richard Wagner* 
                                                           
 
* Robert Zubrin and Richard Wagner, THE CASE FOR MARS: THE PLAN TO SETTLE THE RED PLANET 
AND WHY WE MUST (1997), at 303.  
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1.1  THE PROBLEM 
1.1.1  The Context 
Since time immemorial, human civilization has evolved through the history of the 
world by the continuing development and use of mineral resources from the Earth’s 
crust.  The rapid pace of technological development and the exploding human 
population make the exhaustion of non-renewable mineral resources on Earth only a 
matter of time. 
In recent years, the increasing pressure placed upon governments, international 
organisations and international lawyers to produce regulatory frameworks for the 
exploitation of mineral resources in the deep seabed and the Polar Regions are further 
evidence of this approaching phenomenon, though such efforts must be balanced with 
an increasing consciousness of the need to preserve the global environment.  Given all 
of the above, it is only the logical progression of human development that the 
exploitation of mineral resources from celestial bodies becomes a necessity. 
This thesis aims to highlight the absence of an appropriate regime in the existing body 
of international law for the commercial exploitation of mineral resources from 
celestial bodies and proposes a new regulatory framework in anticipation of such 
ventures becoming feasible, desirable and even necessary.  In assessing the need for Introduction and Overview 
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such a regulatory framework, as well as to determine the appropriate legal and 
administrative aspects of such a framework, it is prudent to consider that: 
(1)  while presently not feasible, the economic conditions for the exploitation 
of mineral resources from celestial bodies will eventuate from the 
continuing depletion of natural resources and the increasing need for 
environmental conservation on Earth; 
(2)  technological capabilities for activities in space will continue to evolve to 
enable the extraction and exploitation of mineral resources from celestial 
bodies to be a feasible alternative to extracting mineral reserves from 
logistically difficult and environmentally detrimental areas on Earth; 
(3)  the existing body of international space law does not provide a regulatory 
framework for the commercial exploitation of mineral resources on 
celestial bodies, in particular, the freedoms of exploration and use, the 
principle of non-appropriation and the concept of the common heritage of 
mankind together create much inconsistency and uncertainty in their 
application to such commercial activities; 
(4)  various existing models of international regulation and the competing 
policy interests of the stakeholders must be considered in determining the 
appropriate international regulatory framework, even though presently no 
single existing model is or will be appropriate as a precedent; and Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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(5)  accordingly, a new regulatory framework is proposed with legal and policy 
considerations taken into account along with the financial, practical and 
administrative aspects of implementing such a framework. 
1.1.2  Structure of the Thesis 
In pursuit of the creation of a comprehensive, appropriate and viable international 
regulatory framework, this thesis is divided into the following chapters: 
(1)  Chapter 1 is an introduction and overview of the thesis, which outlines 
the structure and the hypothesis of this thesis; 
(2)  Chapter 2 explores the increasing economic and technical feasibility of 
the commercial exploitation of mineral resources on celestial bodies, 
especially from Near Earth Asteroids, and considers the financial 
commitments required for such activities, recognising that the principal 
obstacle to such commitments being made is the legal uncertainty over 
such activities; 
(3)  Chapter 3 outlines the general principles in the existing body of 
international space law as applicable to all space activities, particularly on 
issues of state responsibility and international liability; Introduction and Overview 
6  |  Page     
 
Figure 1.1-1. Outline of the Contents and their Correlation with the Hypothesis Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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(4)  Chapter 4 provides an analysis of the legality of commercial exploration 
and extraction of mineral resources on celestial bodies, in particular the 
freedoms of exploration and use, and the principle of non-appropriation; 
(5)  Chapter 5 discusses the legal and policy aspects of the common heritage 
of mankind concept as applicable to celestial bodies and the international 
impasse over the application of this concept to celestial bodies and 
considers the failure of previous intergovernmental negotiations over 
similar legal regimes; 
(6)  Chapter 6 attempts to balance the various competing interests to create a 
legal and policy position that may be acceptable to most members of the 
international community; and 
(7)  Chapter 7 contains some concluding observations. 
1.2  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
1.2.1  Technological Evolution 
From the beginning of recorded history, human civilisation and its gradual evolution 
have been characterised and driven by the natural resources utilised for the 
production of tools to increase the productivity of each economic unit of society.  For Introduction and Overview 
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example, the epochs in which humans attained the knowledge and technical skills to 
produce tools with stone, bronze and iron have been referred to as the Stone Age, 
Bronze Age and Iron Age respectively.  Although such labels have become obsolete in 
describing civilisations, the technological advancement of different cultures is defined 
through the use of various resources, such as steel or plastics, to produce tools 
essential for the prosperity and development of human civilisation. 
The computing revolution at the end of the last century has caused the contemporary 
world to be described as being in the “Information Age”.1  Doing so conceals the fact 
that this “Information Age” relies on the ability of the human civilisation to utilise the 
underlying resources.  Such resources include the silicon used in the production of 
computer chips and electronic circuitry, the copper and aluminium used in cabling 
and wiring, the steel and magnesium used in computer casings and satellites, along 
with the various resources used to generate the electricity required to fuel this 
information superhighway, such as coal, natural gas and uranium.  Indeed, to refer to 
contemporary times as the “Information Age” would be akin to calling the Iron Age 
the “Spear Age” or the “Axe Age”.  The growing global population and the 
corresponding growth in the production of various materials have significantly 
increased the use of and demand for mineral resources found in the Earth’s crust. 
                                                           
 
1 See, for example, David S. Alberts and Daniel S. Papp (eds.), THE INFORMATION AGE: AN 
ANTHOLOGY ON ITS IMPACTS AND CONSEQUENCES (1998). Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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In addition to being in the “Information Age”, the present world has also been 
described as the “Space Age”.2  Since the launch of Sputnik-1 by the Soviet Union on 4 
October 1957, the rivalry between the antagonists of the Cold War has caused the 
technological advancements in our space capability to increase exponentially.  It is 
difficult to comprehend that the first artificial satellite was launched just over half a 
century ago and that it was no more than a steel sphere containing a transmitter that 
was producing beeps continuously while in orbit.3  Since then, the Cold War provided 
the impetus for human civilisation to cross the final frontier into space by launching 
manned spacecrafts, landing on the Moon, inhabiting orbital space stations and 
sending unmanned orbital probes and landing crafts to explore the other planets of 
the Solar System.  By the end of the Cold War, the civilian space businesses have 
replaced governments as the primary actors in outer space.  The commercial 
applications of space, such as telecommunications, weather forecasting, remote 
sensing, global positioning and direct television broadcasting, are now being taken for 
granted by most members of the global community.  The recent wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq would have been fought very differently if the space technology utilised in 
these conflicts had not been available to the military in identifying enemy bases, al-
Qaeda training camps, tracking troop movements and special operations units, missile 
                                                           
 
2 See, for example, Martin Collins, AFTER SPUTNIK: FIFTY YEARS OF THE SPACE AGE (2007). 
3 John S. Gibson, Five Days in October: “Tracking” Sputnik I at Redstone Arsenal (2001), Cold War 
Museum, at <http://www.coldwar.org/text_files/gibson.pdf>, last accessed on 7 December 2004. Introduction and Overview 
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targeting and telecommunications.  Further, satellites were of key importance in 
transmitting live television pictures to the anxious world watching outside 
Afghanistan and Iraq. 
1.2.2  The Post-Cold War World 
That is not to say that, since the end of the Cold War, government actors no longer 
play a significant role in the exploration and use of outer space.  After all, there is a 
continuing debate within the United States of America between the need to engage or 
compete with the space program of China.4  The present emphasis on private and 
commercial use of outer space cannot hide the fact that, to date, the governments of 
the United States of America, the former Soviet Union, Europe and Japan are the only 
entities that have substantially explored the Moon and other celestial bodies.  This 
governmental exploration has been done traditionally through human missions to the 
Moon or unmanned probes to the Moon and other celestial bodies in the Solar 
System.5  In 2004, the United States of America committed itself to a return of human 
                                                           
 
4 See, for example, Fred Stakelbeck, Jr., Inconsistent U.S. Policy (2 June 2006), The Washington Times, 
at <http://washingtontimes.com/op-ed/20060601-085037-6169r.htm>, last accessed on 11 July 2006; 
James C. Moltz, Moonstruck: What’s Up with U.S. Space Policy? (2 February 2004), Centre for 
Nonproliferation Studies, at <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/040202.htm>, last accessed on 11 July 
2006; and Leonard David, Space Cooperation: The China Factor (5 January 2003), at 
<http://www.space.com/news/china_cooperation_030121.html>, last accessed on 11 July 2006. 
5 See David R. Williams, Chronology of Lunar and Planetary Exploration (2006), NASA Goddard Space 
Flight Centre, at <http://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/planetary/chrono.html>, last accessed on 11 July 2006. Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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missions to the Moon, although this commitment by President George W. Bush 
showed strong commercial motives for the new venture: 
Returning to the Moon is an important step for our space program. 
Establishing an extended human presence on the Moon could vastly 
reduce the costs of further space exploration, making possible ever 
more ambitious missions.  Lifting heavy spacecraft and fuel out of the 
Earth’s gravity is expensive.  Spacecraft assembled and provisioned on 
the Moon could escape its far lower gravity using far less energy, and 
thus, far less cost.  Also, the Moon is home to abundant resources.  Its 
soil contains raw materials that might be harvested and processed 
into rocket fuel or breathable air.  We can use our time on the Moon 
to develop and test new approaches and technologies and systems 
that will allow us to function in other, more challenging 
environments.  The Moon is a logical step toward further progress 
and achievement.6 
To the casual observer, three trends are increasingly evident in studying the modern 
history of human civilisation from the viewpoint of resources.  Firstly, the continuing 
growth of the human population and the corresponding economic development of the 
Earth, together with technological advances, have increased the consumption of 
natural resources at an exponential rate.7  It makes sense that, because the majority of 
the resources that are utilised are not renewable resources, there must be a finite point 
in time when the mineral resources of this planet are exhausted.  Technological 
                                                           
 
6 The White House, President Bush Announces New Vision for Space Exploration Program (14 January 
2004), at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040114-3.html>, last accessed on 
11 July 2006. 
7 Herman E. Daly and Kenneth N. Townsend, VALUING THE EARTH: ECONOMICS, ECOLOGY AND 
ETHICS (1993), at 267. Introduction and Overview 
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advances in processing techniques, recycling and human innovation in finding and 
using substitutes have largely alleviated the onset of this physical exhaustion of 
resources.8  However, eventually the moment will be reached when extraterrestrial 
sources of minerals must be found to supplement or even replace the existing deposits 
known or to be discovered in the crust of the Earth. 
Secondly, the expansion of the human race into outer space has continued after the 
end of the Cold War, though principally due to of commercial interests playing a more 
prominent role in financing and operating space ventures.  The majority of satellites 
orbiting the Earth today are now used for commercial applications and there are 
already several multinational private ventures to build and operate orbital space 
stations and even interplanetary probes for mineral prospecting purposes.9  The 
increased development of orbital and lunar infrastructure, as well as installations or 
even settlements on celestial bodies, must necessitate the increased use of mineral 
resources in outer space.  Due to the strong gravity of the Earth and the energy 
required to transport materials from the surface of the Earth to low Earth orbit 
(“LEO”) and beyond, a strong commercial and technical case can be made for the 
                                                           
 
8 Judith Rees, NATURAL RESOURCES: ALLOCATION, ECONOMICS AND POLICY (2nd ed., 1990), at 39. 
9 See, for example, SpaceDev, Inc., Near Earth Asteroid Prospector (2004), at 
<http://www.spacedev.com/newsite/templates/subpage3.php?pid=191&subNav=11&subSel=3>, 
last accessed on 6 December 2004. Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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extraction and processing of mineral ores either in situ or in LEO.  This would provide 
the necessary materials to reduce the construction costs of orbital space structures. 
Thirdly, the global community is becoming increasingly conscious of the impact that 
increasing industrialisation and mineral extraction activities have on the natural 
environment of this planet.  Global climatic and environmental phenomena, such as 
acid rain, ozone layer depletion, global warming, desertification and deforestation 
have intensified the call for mineral resources to be extracted and developed in an 
ecologically sustainable way.  As the mineral deposits found at comparatively more 
accessible and ecologically less sensitive areas are being depleted, the global 
community is likely to be more vocal in resisting the extraction of resources from 
national parks and other international ecological treasures such as the Great Barrier 
Reef, the deep seabed and from Antarctica.  In recent times, the continuing debate in 
the United States of America over exploration and prospecting in Alaska has 
highlighted this increasing consciousness of humanity to its environmental impact.10  
This resistance would be particularly strengthened when the technology for extracting 
                                                           
 
10 See materials on, for example, Save Alaska, at <http://www.savealaska.com/sa_headlines.html>, last 
accessed on 6 December 2004; and Thomas M. Power, The Role of Metal Mining in the Alaskan 
Economy (13 February 2002), Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, at 
<http://www.seacc.org/Publications/MetalMiningReport.doc>, last accessed on 27 January 2007.  
Further, see generally Earle A. Ripley, ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF MINING (1996); Jerrold J. Marcus 
(ed.), MINING ENVIRONMENTAL HANDBOOK: EFFECTS OF MINING ON THE ENVIRONMENT AND 
AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS ON MINING (1997); and George Ledec, Minimising 
Environmental Problems from Petroleum Exploration and Development in Tropical Forest Areas, paper 
presented at the Proceedings of the First International Symposium on Oil and Gas Exploration and 
Production Waste Management Practices, 10-13 September 1990 in New Orleans, United States. Introduction and Overview 
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and processing mineral resources in space become increasingly available, allowing for 
the retention of such environmentally sensitive areas to be preserved as global 
sanctuaries for the benefit of present and future generations of the human civilisation. 
1.2.3  The Hypothesis 
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the exploitation of natural resources from 
celestial bodies would occur inevitably as a result of a combination of different factors.  
There is an increasing number of private firms that have invested heavily into the 
design, development and construction of asteroid prospecting probes as well as 
automated robotic mining mechanisms.11  Research is also gathering pace on the 
potential infrastructure for deployment on asteroids and other celestial bodies in the 
Solar System.12  The recent mineralogical and geological studies conducted on various 
comets and asteroids have contributed valuable data that may assist in the selection of 
                                                           
 
11 See, for example, Island One Society, LMF Mining Robots (25 July 1999), at 
<http://www.islandone.org/MMSG/aasm/AASM5D.html>, last accessed on 7 December 2004. 
12 See, for example, Mark J. Sonter, Near Earth Objects as Resources for Space Industrialisation (2001) 1:1 
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suitable targets for resource extraction, especially when combined with Earth-based 
mineralogical investigations.13 
With the future exploitation of mineral resources in outer space a given certainty, the 
central hypothesis of this work is that one of the major inhibiting factors of this 
development is the absence of an appropriate legal framework to govern mining 
activities in outer space.   The existing body of space law already has been subjected to 
heavy criticism for its failure to provide for the commercial realities of the global 
space industry.14  Space law, as a lex specialis of international law, was formulated in 
the 1960s and 1970s and did not anticipate the commercialisation that has now taken 
place in outer space or the possibility of future commercial exploitation of mineral 
resources from space.  In order for such mining activities to become a practical reality, 
it is essential for significant reform to take place in international space law. 
Accordingly, this work explores the current body of space law and its implications on 
commercial space mining ventures, taking into account their economic and technical 
                                                           
 
13 See, for example, Clark R. Chapman, S-Type Asteroids, Ordinary Chondrites and Space Weathering: 
The Evidence from Galileo’s Fly-bys of Gaspra and Ida (1996) 31 METEOR. & PLANET. SCI. 699.  
Consider also the deficiencies in Earth-based mineralogical studies as identified in Robert Jedicke, 
David Nesvorny, Robert J. Whiteley, Zeljko Ivezic and Mario Juric, An Age-Colour Relationship for 
Main Belt S-Complex Asteroids (2004) 429 NATURE 275. 
14 See, for example, Bin Cheng, The Commercial Development of Space: The Need for New Treaties (1991) 
19 J. SP. L. 17; Hanneke L. van Traa-Engelman, COMMERCIAL UTILISATION OF OUTER SPACE: LAW 
AND PRACTICE (1993); and Patrick Q. Collins, Implications of Reduced Launch Costs for Commercial 
Space Law, in Kunihiko Tatsuzawa (ed.), LEGAL ASPECTS OF SPACE COMMERCIALISATION (1992). Introduction and Overview 
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aspects, and then considers the necessary reforms and developments to overcome such 
legal obstacles to the exploitation of mineral resources in outer space. 
1.3  ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL PROSPECTS OF SPACE MINING 
One of the requisite assumptions in the hypothesis of this work is that commercial 
space mining is both an economic and a technical possibility, though not necessarily a 
reality.  As a result, the first and most fundamental question to be answered is the 
feasibility of mining resources on celestial bodies within the Solar System.  In this 
regard, it is interesting to note that the Moon, other planets and their satellites, comets 
and asteroids in the Solar System are rich in elements, minerals and hydrocarbons that 
are either abundant or rare on Earth.15  However, the gravity of large celestial bodies 
such as the Moon and Mars makes them somewhat expensive and unattractive targets 
for exploitation, even though the proximity and the size of the Moon does present 
ideal qualities as an advance base for human expansion within the Solar System. 
                                                           
 
15 See, for example, Jonathan R. Tate, Near Earth Objects — A Threat and an Opportunity (2003) 38 
PHYSICS EDU. 218; and Brad R. Blair, The Role of Near-Earth Asteroids in Long-Term Platinum Supply, 
paper presented at the Second Space Resources Roundtable, Colorado School of Mines, 8-10 
November 2000, in Boulder, Colorado, United States of America, as at 
<http://www.mines.edu/research/srr/Presentations/blair-platinum.PDF>, last accessed on 8 
December 2004. Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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Within the orbit of Jupiter, there is a large number of asteroids orbiting around the 
Sun of various shapes, eccentricities and distances.  Most asteroids are concentrated in 
the main Asteroid Belt between Mars and Jupiter, which are referred to as the Main 
Belt asteroids.  The precise origins of the Asteroid Belt remains a mystery, though 
there is speculation that it may have been formed as a result of a collision of two large 
planetesimals during the creation of the Solar System or the failure of a large 
planetesimal to form due to the gravitational tidal forces caused by the proto-Sun, 
Mars and Jupiter.16  In addition to the Main Belt asteroids, there are some classes of 
asteroids that have orbits near, or even crossing, the heliocentric orbit of the Earth.  
They are collectively referred to as the Near Earth Asteroids.  The Apollos, Amors and 
Atens are groups of asteroids that, along with some other minor classes, belong to the 
family of Near Earth Asteroids that present themselves as strong candidates for future 
mining activities as the mineral resources on Earth are being gradually depleted.17 
The two most important considerations in determining the viability of mining a 
particular asteroid are the time factor and the energy cost required for the mission, 
assuming that the existing human technology for propulsion, spacecraft design and 
                                                           
 
16 See George W. Wetherill and Stephen J. Kortenkamp, Asteroid Belt Formation with an Early Formed 
Jupiter and Saturn, paper presented at the 30th Annual Lunar and Planetary Science Conference, 15-
29 March 1999, in Houston, Texas, United States of America; Alessandro Morbidelli, William F. 
Bottke, Christiane Froeschlé and Patrick Michel, Origin and Evolution of Near-Earth Objects, in 
William F. Bottke, Alberto Cellino, Paolo Paolicchi and Richard P. Binzel (eds.), ASTEROIDS III (2002) 
at 409-422; and Makiko Nagasawa, Shigeru Ida and Hidekazu Tanaka, Origin of High Orbital 
Eccentricity and Inclination of Asteroids (2001) 53 EARTH PLANETS & SP. 1085. 
17 See generally Charles T. Kowal, ASTEROIDS: THEIR NATURE AND UTILISATION (1988). Introduction and Overview 
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construction, as well as mining infrastructure, can be adapted for asteroid mining 
purposes.  The ideal asteroid for mining purposes would be one that is close to the 
Earth and allows for a long mining season without requiring large amounts of energy 
to reach it or to return to Earth.  In this context, the mining of some Near Earth 
Asteroids would be preferable to other celestial bodies in the Solar System as the 
utilisation of some energy efficient trajectories, such as Hohmann transfer trajectories, 
would only allow for very short mining seasons on the asteroid.18  However, these 
asteroids would nonetheless make better candidates than the Moon and the Martian 
satellites or even short period comets in terms of the energy requirements and the 
associated mass limitations imposed by such requirements on the spacecraft. 
1.4  LIABILITY AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR COMPLIANCE WITH 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES 
1.4.1  Phases of a Commercial Space Mining Venture 
It is conceivable that in the near future, the depletion of terrestrial resources and the 
continuing technological innovation in spacecraft design, propulsion systems and 
robotic mining equipment would provide the financial incentives for the technical 
                                                           
 
18 Mark J. Sonter, The Technical and Economic Feasibility of Mining the Near-Earth Asteroids, paper 
presented at the 49th International Astronautical Congress, 5-9 October 1998, in Melbourne, 
Australia. Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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obstacles and associated costs to be overcome.  When that reality eventuates, a 
commercial mining venture in outer space will have to confront the legal issues based 
on the present body of international and domestic space law.  Fundamentally, this is 
because the enormous financial commitments that would be needed to invest in the 
technological advances required for such ventures cannot be done in an environment 
of legal uncertainty. 
Therefore, it is prudent to consider the existing corpus of international space law and 
consider what adaptations, if any, are needed in order to provide the legal certainty 
essential to making space mining a reality.  In considering the international legal 
framework applicable to space mining ventures, it is prudent to note that the typical 
commercial space mining operation can be divided into seven segments: 
(1)  the planning segment that involves the mineralogical and technical study 
of the feasibility of mining certain selected celestial bodies; 
(2)  the exploration segment which entails the use of spacecrafts to analyse 
mineralogical samples and, with the use of remote sensing technology, 
assess the viability of various deposits; 
(3)  the launch segment which encompasses the operation from conception 
to the launch of the mining spacecraft or, if the operation involves 
multiple launches, the last of those launches; Introduction and Overview 
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Figure 1.4-1. Segments of a Commercial Space Mining Venture19 
(4)  the transit segment which encompasses the operation from the launch 
segment to the arrival of the mining craft to its target celestial body; 
(5)  the extraction segment which begins from the landing of the mining 
craft on the target celestial body to the full recovery of all mined ores; 
(6)  the return segment which involves the return of mined ores to the Earth, 
whether with ore processing in situ or otherwise, which may involve the 
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transport of the celestial body being mined or a large portion thereof into 
the Earth or lunar orbit; and 
(7)  the exploitation segment when the mined ores are sold with a view to 
profit, in their unprocessed, processed or utilised form. 
1.4.2  Applicable Legal Issues 
The legal issues arising in the launch, transit and return segments are similar to those 
of any commercial payload launch and can be divided into issues arising from 
international law and those arising from domestic law.  For example, the absence of a 
definitive delimitation between airspace and outer space, liability caused to foreign 
third parties and the use of trajectories that requires flyovers of foreign territories are 
all legal issues that arise from the operation of international law.  On the other hand, 
legal requirements arising from domestic regulatory frameworks and the application 
of export controls stem from the operation of domestic law.  However, it must be 
noted that the return segment, if involving the movement of celestial bodies from 
their natural orbit to the Earth or lunar orbit, may invoke the application of some legal 
principles in relation to the appropriation of celestial bodies. Introduction and Overview 
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1.4.3  State Responsibility and International Liability 
It has been acknowledged by some commentators that the existing body of space law 
is very ill-adapted to the commercial realities in the space industry today.20  When the 
legal principles contained in the 1967 Treaty on the Principles Governing the 
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon 
and other Celestial Bodies (hereinafter the “Outer Space Treaty”) were drafted and 
adopted in the early 1960s, the present commercialisation and development in space 
was inconceivable to all except the most devoted science fiction writers and 
filmmakers.21  It was not until the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States 
on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (the “Moon Agreement”) that the possible 
mineral exploitation of other celestial bodies was considered.  However, even in the 
Moon Agreement it is quite apparent that its drafters did not anticipate the 
development of space mining ventures until the distant future, as Article 11 of the 
Moon Agreement deferred the creation of a specific intergovernmental organisation 
until such time as deemed necessary by the parties to the Moon Agreement when 
space mining activities become imminent. 
                                                           
 
20 See, for example, Nina Tannenwald, Law Versus Power on the High Frontier: The Case for a Rule-Based 
Regime in Outer Space (2004) 29 YALE J. INT’L. L. 363; Andrew T. Park, Incremental Steps for Achieving 
Space Security: The Need for a New Way of Thinking to Enhance the Legal Regime for Space (2006) 28 
HOUSTON J. INT’L. L. 871; and Charles M. Dalfen, Andre Bissonnette, Pierre Juneau and Ivan Vlasic, 
International Legal Problems of Direct Satellite Broadcasting (1970) 20 U. TORONTO L. J. 314. 
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The fundamental principles of space law also pose significant problems for the launch 
and transit segments of a commercial mining venture in outer space.  The United 
Nations space treaties do not define some important terms, such as “space object”, 
“launching State” and “appropriate State” with sufficient clarity, with important legal 
ramifications.22  For example, the 1972 Convention on the International Liability for 
Damage Caused by Space Objects (the “Liability Convention”) imposes liability on 
“launching States” of space objects for damage caused on the surface of the Earth, in 
outer space and to aircraft in flight.23  There is no existing legal demarcation of the 
boundary between airspace and outer space in international law.  Further, the 
definition of launching States does not reflect the current commercial realities of the 
launch industry, where more than one State is often involved in the launch process 
and the parties involved may be multinational corporations with complicated 
ownership and incorporation structures.  These fundamental issues must be resolved 
before sufficient investor confidence can be found in such inherently risky and 
unproven ventures. 
                                                           
 
22 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (the “Outer Space Treaty”), opened for signature on 
27 January 1967, 610 U.N.T.S. 205; 18 U.S.T. 2410; T.I.A.S. 6347; 6 I.L.M. 386 (entered into force on 
10 October 1967), Articles VI and VII. 
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Further, with the rapid commercial development experienced in space throughout the 
1980s, significant legal issues new to the field of space law arose that need to be 
clarified.  For example, the absence of international patent protection for inventions 
and discoveries that occurred in orbit and for technological developments in space 
systems, have been a source of significant concern for the commercial space industry.24  
The lack of specialised binding mechanisms for settling disputes between States and 
between commercial entities from different States in the Liability Convention also has 
been referred to as a possible source of future problems.25  In the field of private or 
commercial space financing, for example, the problems associated with executing and 
recovering security interests over satellites and other space-based assets have already 
been highlighted following the recent collapse of some high profile satellite 
                                                           
 
24 See, generally, Anna Maria Balsano, Industrial Property Rights in Outer Space in the International 
Governmental Agreement (IGA) on the Space Station and the European Partner (1992) 35 PROC. COLL. 
L. OUTER SP. 216; Sa’id Mosteshar, Intellectual Property Issues in Space Activities, in Sa’id Mosteshar 
(ed.), RESEARCH AND INVENTION IN OUTER SPACE: LIABILITY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
(1995), at 189-198; Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Legislative Comment: The Patents in Space Act (1990) 3 
HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 13; René Oosterlink, The Intergovernmental Space Station Agreement and 
Intellectual Property Rights (1989) 17 J. SP. L. 31; and Bradford L. Smith, Intellectual Property Rights in 
Outer Space Activities – Aid or Impediment?, paper presented at the ISRO-IISL Space Law Conference 
2005, 26-29 June 2005 in Bangalore, India. 
25 See generally Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, Settlement of Disputes Regarding Space Activities (1993) 21 J. SP. 
L. 1; Philip D. Bostwick, Going Private with the Judicial System: Making Creative Use of ADR 
Procedures to Resolve Commercial Space Disputes (1995) 23 J. SP. L. 1; Alexis Goh, Coping with the Lack 
of a Mechanism for the Settlement of Disputes Arising in Relation to Space Commercialisation (2001) 5 
SINGAPORE J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 180; Particia M. Sterns and Leslie I. Tennen, Resolution of Disputes in 
the Corpus Juris Spatialis: Domestic Law Considerations (1993) 36 PROC. COLL. L. OUTER SP. 172; and 
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telecommunications ventures, though some measures have been taken to provide 
some international legal rules for such matters.26 
1.5  EXPLORATION AND EXTRACTION RIGHTS 
Despite the legal issues already encountered in the launch and transit segments of a 
commercial space mining venture, it is the exploration and extraction segments of the 
mining operation that would encounter most of the legal obstacles.  In the exploration 
segment, ore samples are either robotically analysed in situ or are returned to the 
surface of the Earth for further and more detailed analysis.  While this exercise of 
gathering samples may arguably be no different to the collection of lunar rocks during 
the Apollo Program missions of the United States, the crucial distinction is that in the 
case of mineral prospecting, the samples are collected for ultimate private commercial 
rather than public scientific gain.  Accordingly, this raises issues on the lawfulness of 
such activities in outer space. 
                                                           
 
26 See generally Martin Stanford, The Cape Town Convention and the Preliminary Draft Space Protocol: 
An Update, paper presented at the ISRO-IISL Space Law Conference 2005, 26-29 June 2005 in 
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In the extraction segment, the legal obstacles involved are more complex and difficult 
to resolve.  The freedom of access and the principle of non-appropriation found in 
Articles I and II of the Outer Space Treaty, in particular, makes mineral extraction 
activities on celestial bodies difficult, if not impossible, to justify in law.  This is 
because the conduct of mineral extraction activities must have, as a necessary 
requirement, some degree of exclusionary right in the area of asteroid being mined, a 
right that would be contrary to those legal principles set out in the Outer Space 
Treaty.  Without the ability to exclude third parties, a commercial miner would have 
no protection for its financial investment as it would be unable to prevent a third 
party from extracting mineral resources from the same site.  Further, the act of 
extraction itself, by its very nature, may contravene the principle of non-
appropriation, assuming that the principle extends to prohibit the existence of 
exclusive property rights.  These tensions are symptomatic of the fundamental conflict 
between the principles of international space law and contemporary commercial 
applications of space technology. 
The idea that States may not own a particular spatial area to the exclusion of other 
States is not a new one, for as far back as the seventeenth century it was recognised 
already that the sovereignty of States does not extend to the high seas.  However, the 
idea that a spatial area may be subject to the universal ownership of humankind is Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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certainly a new concept.  For example, it was proposed in the early twentieth century 
that the Antarctic continent should be a sanctuary for all humankind.27  Although the 
Antarctic Treaty does not stipulate this explicitly, it is certainly the intention of the 
Antarctic Treaty System for some form of common management to take place over 
the exploration and scientific work conducted in Antarctica by deferring the 
territorial claims of the interested States.28 
1.6  EXPLOITATION RIGHTS: THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND 
In the 1970s, as the number of developing States increased, the idea of a New 
International Economic Order emerged whereby the industrialised States were 
assigned responsibility to equalise the economic inequality between the “North”, or 
                                                           
 
27 Thomas W. Balch, The Arctic and Antarctic Regions and the Law of Nations (1910) 4 AM. J. INT’L. L. 
265.  See also David E. Marko, A Kinder, Gentler Moon Treaty: A Critical Review of the Current Moon 
Treaty and a Proposed Alternative (1992) 8 J. NAT. RES. & ENVT’L. L. 293 at 310-313; and Grier C. 
Raclin, From Ice to Ether: The Adoption of a Regime to Govern Resource Exploitation in Outer Space 
(1986) 7 J. INT’L. L. & BUS. 727 at 737-738. 
28 Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty provides for consultative meetings in relation to the use of 
Antarctica for peaceful purposes, the facilitation of scientific research, cooperation and inspection, 
the exercise of jurisdiction and the preservation and conservation of living resources: Antarctic 
Treaty, opened for signature on 1 December 1959, 402 U.N.T.S. 71; 12 U.S.T. 794; 19 I.L.M. 860 
(entered into force on 23 June 1961).  In particular, separate treaties dealing with environmental 
issues have been formulated, including the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, 
opened for signature on 1 June 1972, 29 U.S.T. 441; 11 I.L.M. 251 (entered into force on 11 March 
1978); the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, opened for 
signature on 20 May 1980, 1329 U.N.T.S. 47; 33 U.S.T. 3476 (entered into force on 7 April 1982); the 
Wellington Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, opened for 
signature on 2 June 1988, 21 I.L.M. 859 (not in force); and the Madrid Protocol on Environmental 
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the industrialised States, and the “South” or developing States.29  As a result, when it 
was proposed that the deep seabed and celestial bodies be declared as the common 
heritage of mankind, the industrialised and developing States took very different 
views as to the content of this doctrine.  The industrialised States saw the concept as 
providing that all States shall have access to the benefits derived from the resources 
contained in those spatial areas and nothing more.30  The developing States, on the 
other hand, believed that the industrialised States would be required to share their 
profits derived from the exploitation of these spatial areas with the developing States 
on an equitable basis, as was adopted in the case of the deep seabed under the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.31  This is because, by exploiting 
resources in the common property of humankind, the industrialised States are 
depriving the developing States of the resources of which they are proud part owners. 
Due to this differing opinion among the international community, both the Moon 
Agreement and the original Convention on the Law of the Sea received very little 
                                                           
 
29 See, for example, Jagdish N. Bhagwati (ed.), THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: THE 
NORTH-SOUTH DEBATE (1977); and Robert Gilpin and Jean M. Gilpin, GLOBAL POLITICAL 
ECONOMY: UNDERSTANDING THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (2001). 
30 See, for example, Raclin, supra note 27, at 738-739; and Harminderpal Singh Rana, The “Common 
Heritage of Mankind” & the Final Frontier: A Revaluation of Values Constituting the International 
Legal Regime for Outer Space Activities (1994) 26 RUTGERS L. J. 225 at 231. 
31 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature on 10 December 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 3; 21 I.L.M. 1261 (entered into force on 16 November 1994).  See, for example, Gennady M. 
Danilenko, The Concept of the “Common Heritage of Mankind” in International Law (1988) 13 ANN. 
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support among States and, consequently, the world reached an impasse over the law 
relating to both the deep seabed and celestial bodies.32  The industrialised States 
refused to be part of any intergovernmental system that set a precedent for 
international taxation, while the developing States did not want any agreement that 
did not clarify the extent of their rights and benefits derived from the common 
heritage of mankind.   
1.7  MEETING THE CHALLENGES AND BALANCING THE COMPETING 
INTERESTS IN CREATING A LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
1.7.1  Meeting the Challenges 
Having identified the applicable legal issues to commercial mining activities in outer 
space and clarifying the scope and content of the application of the common heritage 
of mankind doctrine to celestial bodies and their mineral resources, the next step is to 
                                                           
 
32 As at 1 January 2010, the Moon Agreement has 13 ratifications while the Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, before the adoption of the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI, had 63 
ratifications: United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs, Status of International Agreements 
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<http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/publications/ST_SPACE_11_Rev2_Add3E.pdf>, last accessed 
on 22 April 2010; and United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, 
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resolve the present impasse on the Moon Agreement by finding possible common 
ground between the two polarised positions.  In this context, two steps are necessary: 
(1)  analysing and learning from the past failures in intergovernmental 
negotiations over similar regimes; and 
(2)  then identifying and harmonising the relevant competing interests. 
It is pertinent to note that the three previous attempts by the international 
community to negotiate a legal framework for a minerals regime for areas considered 
to be global commons, namely the deep seabed, Antarctica and celestial bodies in 
outer space, have all ended in failure.  The 1984 Convention on the Law of the Sea 
failed to win acceptance by industrialised States as they refused to accept the common 
heritage of mankind provisions in relation to mining activities on the deep seabed.  
Similarly, the international community refused to accept the terms of the Moon 
Agreement, even though the implementation of the common heritage of mankind 
provisions was deferred until such time as the international community considered 
the mining of celestial bodies to be imminent.33  The 1988 Wellington Convention on 
the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities failed to attain sufficient 
support among the international community even though there was no designation of 
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Antarctica, or any part of it, as the common heritage of mankind with similar 
doctrinal obstacles as those in relation to the deep seabed and celestial bodies.34 
When the Convention on the Law of the Sea was about to enter into force in the early 
1990s, strenuous diplomatic efforts were made to reach a compromise.  In 1994, this 
resulted in the adoption of the Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI 
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (the “Implementation 
Agreement”), which was acceptable to both industrialised and developing States by 
significantly reducing the obligations of the deep seabed mining States.35  No similar 
efforts have been made yet with the implementation of the Moon Agreement.   
Meanwhile, views continue to differ over the legal ramifications of the present Article 
11 in this interim period before it is implemented.36 
It is through a detailed analysis of the failures of the minerals regimes relating to the 
deep seabed, Antarctica and celestial bodies and the eventual acceptance of the 
Implementation Agreement for the deep seabed that a starting point can be found in 
                                                           
 
34 Wellington Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, opened for 
signature on 2 June 1988, 27 I.L.M. 868 (not presently in force). 
35 Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea of 10 December 1982, opened for signature on 28 July 1994, 1836 U.N.T.S. 3; 33 I.L.M. 
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36 See, for example, Ricky J. Lee, Property and Mining Rights for Lunar Mining Operations in the Absence 
of International Consensus on the Moon Agreement (2003), paper presented at the 54th International 
Astronautical Congress, 29 September 2003 to 3 October 2003, in Bremen, Germany; and Marko, 
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the search for a compromise position on such legal and policy issues, especially on the 
subject of property rights and the common heritage of mankind doctrine.  
1.7.2  Balancing the Competing Interests 
The next step on the path towards an acceptable legal framework for mining activities 
in outer space is to consider the competing interests of various stakeholders on the 
issue and attempt to reconcile and balance their divergent concerns.  In particular, it is 
pertinent and prudent to consider and address the five principal sets of competing 
interests as follows: 
(1)  the polarised positions of the industrialised States and the developing 
States over the application of the common heritage of mankind principles 
and the non-appropriation principle on celestial bodies; 
(2)  the continuing economic need for mineral resources for human 
development on the one hand and the need to impose sufficient 
environmental safeguards for the protection of the environment of the 
Earth and that of outer space and the celestial bodies; 
(3)  the commercial objectives of private mining ventures to maximise their 
commercial gain and the need to provide baseline public services to the Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
  Page |  33 
international community, particularly the least developed States in 
furtherance of the global public interest; 
(4)  the desire to maintain a free market approach to the regulation of the 
space industry while ensuring that a number of commercial issues, such as 
the avoidance of harmful interference, the “paper tenement” problem, 
protection of intellectual and industrial property rights and the 
application of anti-trust or competition principles are adequately 
regulated in outer space; and 
(5)  the need for sufficient dispute settlement mechanisms to adequately settle 
commercial and administrative disputes and enforce the rules of the 
regulatory framework without creating an overly litigious environment in 
the development of space activities. 
Through balancing such interests, it will be possible for new legal principles to be 
adopted in regulating the exploration and exploitation of mineral resources from 
celestial bodies.  This is particularly the case in relation to the resolution of the present 
impasse over the common heritage of mankind doctrine and the provision of 
temporary property rights for such purposes notwithstanding the non-appropriation 
principle, which are the two legal principles that pose the greatest barriers to the 
creation of a new framework. Introduction and Overview 
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1.8  CREATION AND PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF AN 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
1.8.1  Structure and Composition 
The creation of an international legal framework for commercial mining activities in 
outer space would not be complete without also resolving the practical issues in 
relation to the implementation and operation of such a new framework.  It would 
become apparent, for example, that the practical implementation of this new legal 
framework cannot be achieved without the establishment of a new intergovernmental 
organisation that would administer the framework.  Such an organisation, referred to 
in the interest of convenience hereinafter as the International Space Development 
Authority (the “Authority”), would need to have within its structure the following 
types of organs: 
(1)  a quasi-legislative body; 
(2)  an administrative secretariat; and 
(3)  one or more judicial mechanisms for dispute settlement and enforcement. 
The elements of the structure, composition, functions and powers of each of these 
organs will need to be considered in turn to enable the establishment of the Authority 
and the implementation of revised legal principles in the new framework.  This is in Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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addition to considerations that must be taken into account in relation to the financing 
and budgetary requirements of creating and operating such an authority, potentially 
even prior to any revenues being generated from the exploitation of resources from 
celestial bodies. 
1.8.2  Procedures 
After determining the appropriate structural and operational aspects of the Authority, 
attention must be focused on the appropriate procedures to be implemented.  This is 
particularly pertinent in relation to the following administrative functions: 
•  determining applications for “Exploration Permits” for prospecting and 
exploration activities to take place on various celestial bodies; 
•  determining applications for “Mining Permits” for extraction activities to 
take place on celestial bodies; 
•  determining applications for “Occupation Permits” for the provision of 
temporary property rights for purposes incidental to the exploration and 
mining activities on celestial bodies; and 
•  adopting the appropriate conditions and processes for the “equitable 
sharing” of the “benefits derived” from the exploitation of mineral 
resources from outer space, including the means by which the quantum of Introduction and Overview 
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the benefits to be shared is to be determined and how such benefits are to 
be distributed. 
1.8.3  Judicial Mechanisms 
After the adoption and implementation of administrative processes for the operation 
of the Authority, it is prudent to then turn to the need for dispute settlement 
mechanisms within the Authority.  This is because disputes will inevitably arise 
between applicants or permit-holders and the Authority as well as between permit-
holders themselves.  There is also the additional need for judicial accountability in the 
operation and administration of the Authority.  Accordingly, it is clear that judicial 
mechanisms must be created to enable the peaceful, effective and judicious settlement 
of such disputes. 
To that end, it is probably preferable to create separate arbitral panels for the 
resolution of different types of disputes, allowing for different specialist expertise to 
be employed in the determination of different types of disputes.  It is envisaged that 
the following bodies would be created within the Authority, each to be vested with 
judicial and quasi-executive functions relevant to their area of specialist expertise: 
•  the “Licensing Oversight Panel” to hear and resolve disputes between the 
Authority and applicants or permit-holders in decisions relating to the 
grant or refusal of applications, the enforcement of conditions of permits Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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and considerations of contraventions of legal or regulatory provisions of 
the relevant international law; 
•  the “Environmental Protection Panel” to provide for surveillance, 
monitoring and enforcement of environmental protection safeguards in 
the protection of the Earth environment, the mitigation of space debris, 
contamination and pollution as well as the remediation works required on 
celestial bodies;  
•  the “Financial Duties Panel” for the assessment and settlement of disputes 
over the quantum of financial duties payable to the Authority arising from 
the requirement for the equitable sharing of benefits derived from the 
exploitation of mineral resources; 
•  the “Dispute Settlement Panel” for the settlement of commercial disputes 
between applicants or permit-holders in relation to activities subject to the 
premises of the Authority; and 
•   the “Space Development Appeals Tribunal” that hears appeals from the 
four abovementioned Panels. 
It is envisaged that the resolution of the practical issues arising from the 
implementation of a new international legal framework would improve the 
acceptability of this proposed framework by the international community.  Further, Introduction and Overview 
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this would also reduce the legal uncertainty relating to commercial space mining 
ventures and incidentally provide an administrative framework for the regulation of 
other future activities in outer space. 
1.9  CONCLUSIONS 
The worsening scarcity of mineral resources on the Earth means that the future 
extraction and exploitation of mineral resources on celestial bodies is a mere question 
of when.  With the economic, physical and technical feasibility in outer space having 
been assessed, the remaining major inhibiting factor for space mining ventures is the 
legal uncertainty arising from the absence of an internationally accepted legal 
framework.  It is clearly necessary for a new legal framework to be created in order to 
enable the commercial mining of celestial bodies to take place in the near future. 
Through learning from past failed negotiations and balancing competing interests, it 
may be possible to find a compromise position on the legal and policy controversies to 
develop a new legal framework.  Once this position can be found, its implementation 
through a practical international framework will shepherd the commercial 
exploitation of mineral resources in outer space into the realm of present reality. 
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2.1  INTRODUCTION 
The current prosperity of the human civilisation has relied heavily on the exploitation 
of natural resources on the Earth, particularly minerals and fossil fuels, which are not 
renewable.  Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the world has become 
heavily dependent on oil, coal, natural gas and nuclear fission for its energy needs.1  
This dependency is highlighted by the Middle East oil crisis of the 1970s and the 
sudden increases in oil prices in the early 1980s after the revolution in Iran and again 
the early 1990s after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and since 2001 when the United 
States of America began its campaign against international terrorism.  It has been 
suggested that oil prices will continue to increase in the future as demand continues to 
increase despite depleting reserves.2  The recent trend towards the development of 
renewable energy, such as solar energy and hydrogen fuel cells, nevertheless requires 
                                                           
 
1 U.S. President George W. Bush stated in his 2006 State of the Union Address that “America is 
addicted to oil, which is often imported from unstable parts of the world.  The best way to break this 
addiction is through technology.”: The White House, President Bush Delivers State of the Union 
Address (31 January 2006), at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/01/20060131-
10.html>, last accessed on 27 January 2007.  See also David Suzuki, THE SACRED BALANCE: 
REDISCOVERING OUR PLACE IN NATURE (1997). 
2 Stephen Leeb, THE OIL FACTOR: HOW OIL CONTROLS THE ECONOMY AND YOUR FINANCIAL FUTURE 
(2004).  See also earlier works such as Colin J. Campbell, THE COMING OIL CRISIS (1997); and Roger 
W. Bentley, R. H. Booth, J. D. Burton, Max L. Coleman, Bruce W. Sellwood and George R. Whitfield, 
Perspectives on the Future of Oil (2000) 18 ENERGY EXPLOR. & EXPLOIT. 147-206. Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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the use of various rare or non-renewable mineral resources, such as platinum and 
related metals, that require extraction from the Earth’s crust. 
Consequently, logic dictates that the continuing survival and development of 
humanity will eventually require the exploitation of the same mineral resources in the 
Solar System.  In any event, it is clear that the development of space technology in the 
last century has allowed human activity to be no longer restricted to the confines of 
the Earth.  Demonstrating the increasing economic and technical feasibility of 
exploitation mineral resources on celestial bodies is necessary to show that the stage is 
set for the next step in the human utilisation of outer space and, accordingly, legal 
regulation of this next human endeavour is essential. 
Resource economists have long argued over the future of mineral resource 
exploitation on the Earth and its implications on the future of the world economy.  
The optimists are of the opinion that the increasing scarcity of resources would 
catalyse technological innovation in conservation, recycling and the development of 
substitutes along with the exploitation of previously uncommercial deposits.3  The 
more pessimistic economists have suggested that the resources available on the Earth 
are limited and this absolute scarcity effectively imposes an expiry date on human 
                                                           
 
3 Judith Rees, NATURAL RESOURCES: ALLOCATION, ECONOMICS AND POLICY (2nd ed., 1990), at 39. Economic and Technical Prospects of Space Mining 
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civilisation.4  The continuing technical developments in space technology leave open 
the possibility of development mineral resources from celestial bodies, providing 
human civilisation with the potential to overcome resource scarcity and achieve some 
of the possibilities created by limitless energy and resources. 
As the abundance of mineral resources on the Earth continues to decline, the resultant 
economic conditions will promote the exploitation of natural resources from celestial 
bodies in outer space.5  The concept of mining the Moon or Near Earth Asteroids for 
minerals to be used on the Earth is not new and there has been a substantial amount of 
scientific studies undertaken regarding the technical feasibility of such an endeavour.6  
It is generally believed to be only a matter of time before the technical and economic 
conditions exist for the mining of asteroids or other celestial bodies to take place.7 
In addition to satisfying demand on Earth, the prospect of constructing large 
structures in the Earth orbit or on the Moon has also highlighted the desirability of 
developing mineral resources in space.  In the 1970s, the concept of a space solar 
                                                           
 
4 Edward Goldsmith, Robert Allen, Michael Allaby, John Davoll and Sam Lawrence, BLUEPRINT FOR 
SURVIVAL (1972), at 4. 
5 Dennis Wingo, MOONRUSH: IMPROVING LIFE ON EARTH WITH THE MOON’S RESOURCES (2004), at 90. 
6 See Brian T. O’Leary, Mining the Apollo and Amor Asteroids (1977) 197 SCIENCE 363; Samuel Herrick, 
Exploration and 1994 Exploitation of Geographos in Tom Gehrels (ed.), ASTEROIDS (1979) at 212-221; 
David Morrison and John C. Niehoff, Future Exploration of the Asteroids in Tom Gehrels (ed.), 
ASTEROIDS (1979) at 227-249; and David L. Kuck, Near-Earth Extraterrestrial Resources (1979), paper 
presented at the 4th Princeton / AIAA Conference on Space Manufacturing, May 1979, in Princeton, 
New Jersey, United States of America. 
7 See, for example, Wingo, supra note 5. Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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power satellite (“SSPS”) was developed where a giant array of solar power cells would 
orbit the Earth and transmit solar power by microwave transmission to collecting 
antennae on the Earth that would convert it to usable electricity for domestic and 
industrial consumption.8 
 
Figure 2.1-1. Artist’s Impression of a Solar Power Station in Orbit9 
 
                                                           
 
8 Lara Farrar, How to Harvest Solar Power?  Beam it Down From Space! (2008), CABLE NEWS NETWORK, 
at <http://edition.cnn.com/2008/TECH/science/05/30/space.solar/index.html>, 1 June 2008, last 
accessed on 13 November 2009; and Peter E. Glaser, SPACE INDUSTRIALISATION (1982). 
9 Takahiro Fukada, Japan Plans to Launch Solar Power Station by 2040 (31 January 2001), SPACE DAILY, 
at <http://www.spacedaily.com/news/japan-meti-space-01a.html>, last accessed on 12 August 2001; 
and G. Jeffrey Taylor, Mining the Moon, Mars and Asteroids, Planetary Science Research Discoveries, 
21 November 2000, at <http://www.psrd.hawaii.edu/Nov00/mining.html>, last accessed on 4 
November 2009. Economic and Technical Prospects of Space Mining 
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While the technology for a solar power satellite is considered to be already at hand, 
there are significant factors inhibiting the development and deployment of such a 
satellite.  Nevertheless, Japan is currently studying the possible development of a full-
scale solar power satellite in geostationary orbit by 2030 that can generate around five 
gigawatt of electricity.10  One of the main inhibiting factors for this development is 
that such a structure would have the mass of several thousand tonnes, making the 
launch costs somewhat prohibitive.11  The costs of constructing such large-scale 
structures in outer space would be significantly reduced if the materials were derived 
and processed from non-terrestrial sources, eliminating nearly 99% of the Earth-
launch costs.12 
The prospect of space tourism is also contributing to the imminent need for 
construction and materials-gathering capability in space.  Much media attention had 
focused on the recent exploits by Dennis Tito, Greg Olsen, Anousheh Ansari, Charles 
Simonyi and Richard Garriott of the United States of America, Mark Shuttleworth of 
South Africa and Guy Laliberté of Canada, who all paid U.S. $20,000,000.00 or more 
                                                           
 
10 Makoto Nagatomo, An Approach to Develop Space Solar Power as a New Energy System for Developing 
Countries (1996) 56:1 SOLAR ENERGY 111; Tim Hornyak, Farming Solar Energy in Space (2008), 
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, <http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=farming-solar-energy-
in-space>, July 2008, last accessed on 13 November 2009; and Tom Chivers, Japan Plans Giant Solar 
Power Station in Space (2009), THE TELEGRAPH (United Kingdom), at 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/energy/solarpower/6536752/Japan-plans-solar-power-station-
in-space.html>, 10 November 2009, last accessed on 13 November 2009. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Space Research Associates, Report of Satellite Solar Power Systems (1986) 6 SPACE POWER 1. Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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each to the Russian Space Agency to visit the International Space Station.13  These 
pioneering, albeit prohibitively expensive, tourism ventures have fuelled the 
imagination of many that tourism in space is now only a matter of time, even for the 
less wealthy and less technically trained members of society.  This was especially the 
case after the successful award of the Ansari X Prize and the launch and promotion of 
commercial space tourism ventures.14  The development of various proposed space 
tourism vehicles can increase both the supply and the demand of tourism structures in 
low-Earth orbits in the not-too-distant future.15 
                                                           
 
13 Laura Woodmansee, Opinion: Space ‘Adventurers’ Paving the Way for the Rest of Us (18 September 
2006), at <http://www.space.com/adastra/060918_woodsmansee_ansari.html>, last accessed on 27 
January 2007; and Clare Moskowitz, Space Clown Comes Back Down to Earth (11 October 2009), at 
<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/33262374/ns/technology_and_science-space/>, last accessed on 
26 October 2009.  Past space tourists that have flown to the International Space Station include: 
Dennis Tito (2001), Mark Shuttleworth (2002), Gregory Olsen (2005), Anousheh Ansari (2006), 
Charles Simonyi (2007 and 2009), Richard Garriott (2008) and Guy Laliberté (2009): Space 
Adventures Ltd, Our Clients, at 
<http://www.spaceadventures.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=orbital.Clients>, last accessed on 1 
October 2009. 
14 Cable News Network, SpaceShipOne Captures X Prize (4 October 2004), at 
<http://edition.cnn.com/2004/TECH/space/10/04/spaceshipone.attempt.cnn/>, last accessed on 
21 December 2004; and Jeff Foust, Virgin Galactic and the Future of Commercial Spaceflight (23 May 
2005), Ad Astra, at <http://www.space.com/adastra/050523_virgin_nss.html>, last accessed on 27 
January 2007; and Peter B. de Selding, Virgin Galactic Customers Parting with their Cash (3 April 
2006), Space News, at <http://www.space.com/spacenews/businessmonday_060403.html>, last 
accessed on 27 January 2007. 
15 Patrick Q. Collins, Yoichi Iwasaki, Hideki Kanayama and Misuzu Ohmuki, COMMERCIAL 
Implications of Market Research on Space Tourism (1994), paper presented at the 19th International 
Symposium on Space Technology and Science, May 1994, in Yokohama, Japan; and Partick Q. 
Collins and Kohki Isozaki, JRS RESEARCH ACTIVITIES FOR SPACE TOURISM (1995), paper presented at 
the 6th International Conference of Pacific Basin Space Societies, December 1995, in Marina del Rey, 
California, United States of America. Economic and Technical Prospects of Space Mining 
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The establishment of such large-scale space projects in Earth orbit are inhibited by 
two significant factors.  Firstly, as indicated above, the cost of launching anything 
from the surface of the Earth to orbital space remains prohibitively high.  Present 
expendable launch systems available cost between U.S. $11,000.00 and U.S. 
$22,000.00 per kilogram of payload for low Earth orbit (“LEO”) systems.16  F o r  
geostationary orbit (“GEO”) systems, the cost of launch ranges from U.S. $16,000.00 
to U.S. $50,000.00 per kilogram in 2000 values.17  For this reason, the development of 
unmanned reusable launch vehicles (“RLV”) that are designed to be cost efficient for 
launching payloads into LEO has tremendous potential for future space applications.  
It is also worth noting that the space elevator concept, which involves the construction 
of a carbon fibre cable between the surface of the Earth to beyond the GEO, has the 
potential for reducing the cost of transfer into orbit to a sum that is negligible when 
compared to launch costs using expendable launch vehicles.18 
                                                           
 
16 Robert Hickman and Joseph Adams, Future Launch Systems (2003) 5:1 CROSSLINK 42, as at 
Aerospace Corporation, <http://www.aero.org/publications/crosslink/pdfs/V5N1.pdf>, last 
accessed on 23 April 2007. 
17 Futron Corporation, Space Transportation Costs: Trends in Price Per Pound to Orbit 1999-2000 (2002), 
at <http://www.futron.com/pdf/resource_center/white_papers/FutronLaunchCostWP.pdf>, 6 
September 2002, last accessed on 24 April 2007. 
18 See Bradley C. Edwards and Eric A. Westling, THE SPACE ELEVATOR: A REVOLUTIONARY EARTH-TO-
SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM (2003); and Leonard David, The Space Elevator Comes Closer to 
Reality (2002), at <http://www.space.com/businesstechnology/technology/space_elevator_020327-
1.html>, last accessed on 15 July 2006.  This optimism may be contrasted with the discussion of the 
technical and conceptual difficulties in Vladimir V. Beletskii, M. B. Ivanov and E. I. Otstavnov, Model 
Problem of a Space Elevator (2005) 43 COSMIC RESEARCH 152-156; and David Brody, Thinking 
Differently with Space Elevators (2006) AD ASTRA, Summer 2006, at 34.  Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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When considering the costs of designing propulsion systems on transportation 
vehicles between the Earth and other celestial bodies, it is important to consider also 
the energy required for a soft landing on the surface as well as the energy required to 
escape the gravity of the object.  Generally, the heavier the mass of the object, the 
more energy would be required to counter the gravitational forces to slow its descent 
for a soft landing on and a takeoff from the surface of the object, as indicated in 
Figure 2.1-2 below.  It is apparent from Figure 2.1-2 that the energy required for a 
landing or take off from the Moon would be far more than that required from an 
average Near Earth Asteroid, though it would nonetheless be significantly smaller 
than that required to escape the gravity of the Earth or Mars.  Only Ceres, the largest 
known asteroid, has a comparable escape velocity to that of the Moon.19 
                                                           
 
19 See Charles Jaffé, Shane D. Ross, Martin W. Lo, Jerrold Marsden, David Farrelly and T. Uzer, 
Statistical Theory of Asteroid Escape Rates (2002) 89 PHYS. REV. LETTERS 11001-1. Economic and Technical Prospects of Space Mining 
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Figure 2.1-2. Change in Velocity Needed for Soft Landing on Selected Objects20 
Before considering the technical feasibility of exploiting mineral resources from outer 
space, although, it is prudent to keep in mind that the present world is driven 
predominantly by commercial interests, which are in turn driven by the demands of a 
global market economy.  Accordingly, it is clear that sufficient developments in 
                                                           
 
20 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Solar System Exploration (2006) at 
<http://solarsystem.nasa.gov/index.cfm>, last accessed on 15 July 2006, for the escape velocities for 
Mercury (4.25km/h), Venus (10.361km/h), Earth (11.18km/h), Mars (5.02km/h) and the Moon 
(2.38km/h); Calvin J. Hamilton, Phobos (2000), at 
<http://www.solarviews.com/french/phobos.htm>, last accessed on 15 July 2006 for the escape 
velocity for Phobos (0.0103km/h); Calvin J. Hamilton, Deimos (2000), at 
<http://www.solarviews.com/french/deimos.htm>, last accessed on 15 July 2006 for the escape 
velocity for Deimos (0.0057km/h); Bruce McClure, Escape Velocity on the Moon, at 
<http://www.idialstars.com/evme.htm>, last accessed on 15 July 2006 for the escape velocity for 
Ceres (0.4505km/h); and David Whitehouse, Scientists Get Near the Real Eros (21 September 2000), 
British Broadcasting Corporation, at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/936149.stm>, last 






























Earth Moon Mars Venus Mercury Phobos Deimos Ceres Eros
Escape Velocity of Selected Celestial BodiesCreating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
  Page |  51 
spacecraft design, propulsion systems and robotic mining systems as outlined in Table 
2.1-1 below already exist to enable some form of robotic prospecting and mining of 
asteroids.  However, further advancements and definitive developments are unlikely 
to take place until the economic conditions have ripened and space mining is at least 
lucrative, if not a necessary requirement for future of economic survival.  It is 
therefore imperative to investigate the likelihood of the onset of resource exhaustion 
under present economic and technological conditions. 









































                                                           
 
21 John E. Tilton, THE FUTURE OF NONFUEL MINERALS (1977) at 12-13. Economic and Technical Prospects of Space Mining 
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2.2  ECONOMIC FEASIBILITY OF SPACE MINING 
2.2.1  The Study of Resource Economics 
2.2.1.1  Overview 
Resources on Earth are generally divided into stock (non-renewable) and flow 
(renewable) resources.  The essential difference is the timeframe in which they 
develop by natural processes.  Since both stock and flow resources are developed by 
natural cycles on Earth, they are all technically renewable but at grossly different rates.  
Stock resources, such as all minerals, fossil fuels and the land itself, are substances that 
have taken millions of years to form and therefore, from a socio-economic 
perspective, are fixed in supply.  In addition, the ultimate quantity of such resources 
on Earth is physically limited. 
In relation to fossil fuels, because they are consumed by use, they will therefore 
eventually be exhausted by consumption.  With metallic minerals and some non-
metallic minerals, on the other hand, the technology exists for most metals to be 
reused many times over with little loss of quality.22  However, even the best optimists 
                                                           
 
22 The Nickel Institute, Economics of Recycling (2004), at 
<http://www.nickelinstitute.org/index.cfm/ci_id/121.htm>, last accessed on 21 December 2004. Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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would concede that the full and total recovery of all used metals is likely to remain a 
theoretical, rather than a practical, possibility.  Price suggested in 1955 that the 
thermodynamic law of entropy indicates that unavailability is the ultimate tendency of 
recurring mineral usage as they eventually become too dispersed or impure during 
each use to be recoverable.23  In any event, recycling is often an energy-intensive 
activity that requires heavy reliance on the use of fossil fuels or other sources of energy 
on Earth.24 
Many attempts have been made to estimate the ultimate level of available resources 
using a variety of assessment techniques and assumptions about the future rate of 
resource consumption, as well as future economic and technological changes.25  
Economists consider the potential availability of a mineral resource by referring to its 
“resource base”, defined as the total quantity of that mineral resource within the 
geosystem of the Earth. 
Among different approaches, the best attempt to calculate the resource base for 
particular non-fuel minerals is by multiplying their elemental abundance measured in 
grams per metric ton by the total weight of the Earth’s crust to the depth of one 
                                                           
 
23 Edward T. Price, Values and Concepts in Conservation (1955) 45:1 ANN. ASSOC. AM. GEOG. 65. 
24 David W. Pearce and Ingo Walter, RESOURCE CONSERVATION: THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
DIMENSIONS OF RECYCLING (1977). 
25 See, for example, discussion in Wladimir S. Woytinsky and Emma S. Woytinsky, WORLD 
POPULATION AND PRODUCTION: TRENDS AND OUTLOOK (1953) at 326-333. Economic and Technical Prospects of Space Mining 
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kilometre or mile.26  Calculated in this way, the available resources remaining are vast 
and would be available for millions of years if human consumption levels remained 
static.  However, the availability of resources falls dramatically if there is any increase 
in human consumption.  Even at a growth rate of 10% in consumption levels, all 
minerals would be exhausted in less than 300 years, as shown in Table 2.2-1 below. 
The life expectancies of the various minerals listed in Table 2.2-1 below are affected 
by two factors that alter the reliability of the data.  Firstly, life expectancies are 
calculated on the basis that technological advancements will allow all available 
elements to be exploited at costs low enough to maintain demand levels or, in other 
words, that the cost of extraction of the more difficult deposits will not increase to 
affect demand levels.  This is most certainly untrue as only a small fraction of all 
mineral resources may be extracted at a tolerable financial or environmental cost, 
resulting in the estimates determined in this way to be overly optimistic.  On the other 
hand, with the exception of uranium, which is used in nuclear fission, elemental 
minerals are not destroyed by use and therefore they are recyclable, making the 
estimates determined to be unduly pessimistic. 
                                                           
 
26 Tan Lee and Chi-Lung Yao, Abundance of Chemical Elements in the Earth’s Crust and its Major 
Tectonic Units [1970] INT’L. GEOL. REV. 778. Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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1947‐74  0%  2%  5%  10% 
ALUMINIUM  2.0 × 10
18  166 × 10
9  1107  468  247  9.8% 
CADMIUM  3.6 × 10
12  210 × 10




9  861  368  196  5.3% 
COBALT  600 × 10
12  23.8 × 10
9  1009  428  227  5.8% 
COPPER  1.5 × 10
15  216 × 10
6  772  332  177  4.8% 
GOLD  84 × 10
9  62.8 × 10
6  709  307  164  2.4% 
IRON  1.4 × 10
18  2.6 × 10
9  898  383  203  7.0% 
LEAD  290 × 10
12  83.5 × 10
6  724  313  164  2.4% 
MAGNESIUM  672 × 10
15  131.5 × 10




9  906  386  205  6.5% 
MERCURY  2.1 × 10
12  223.5 × 10
6  773  333  178  2.0% 
NICKEL  2.1 × 10
12  3.2 × 10
6  559  246  133  6.9% 
PHOSPHORUS  28.8 × 10
15  1.9 × 10
9  881  376  200  7.3% 
POTASSIUM  408 × 10
15  22.1 × 10
9  1005  427  226  9.0% 
PLATINUM  1.1 × 10
12  6.7 × 10
9  944  402  213  9.7% 
SILVER  1.8 × 10
12  194.2 × 10
6  766  330  176  2.2% 
SULPHUR  9.6 × 10
15  205.3 × 10
6  769  331  177  6.7% 
TIN  40.8 × 10
12  172.2 × 10
6  760  327  175  2.7% 
TUNGSTEN  26.4 × 10
12  677.2 × 10
6  829  355  189  3.8% 
ZINC  2.2 × 10
15  398.6 × 10
9  1151  486  256  4.7% 
 
                                                           
 
27 John E. Tilton, THE FUTURE OF NONFUEL MINERALS (1977) at 12-13. 
28 Calculated by multiplying its elemental abundance measured in grams per metric tons times the total 
weight of the Earth’s crust in metric tons. 
29 Calculated based on the average annual production figures for 1972-1974 and these were taken from 
the U.S. Bureau of Mines, COMMODITY DATA SUMMARIES 1972-1976 (1977); and U.S. Bureau of 
Mines, MINERALS YEARBOOK (1974). 
30 Production figures assume concentrates are 46% chromium. 
31 Production figures assume concentrates are 46% manganese. Economic and Technical Prospects of Space Mining 
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2.2.1.2  Proven Reserves 
Proven reserves are defined as the deposits of mineral resources that are already 
discovered and known to be economically extractable under present or similar 
demand, price and other economic and technological conditions.32  Despite its label, 
there is much variance and subjectivity in the data of proven reserves, for what may be 
considered economically extractable depends on the commercial value, economic 
conditions, logistical requirements and environmental concerns.  When proven 
reserves are used to estimate the entire life of a physical resource, there is always the 
implicit assumption in doing so that there would be no new discoveries, no 
technological advancement and no price changes.  Further, as reserves are proved only 
after considerable expenses are incurred in surveys and borings, investments in 
exploration is unlikely if sufficient reserves are already held.  In fact, there would be an 
economic incentive on firms to reduce their proven reserves as they may still be taxed 
in certain countries as company assets even though their actual extraction and 
exploitation may not be feasible in the short-term to medium-term future.33 
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(4)  the price of the product; and 
(5)  the availability and price of viable substitutes and recycled products.35 
One other problem with the use of proven resources included in estimating total 
resource availability levels is that such estimates are skewed heavily towards advanced 
countries, as exploration activities in most developing countries have not taken place 
to the same scale as the industrialised States.  For example, Jamaica is considered to 
have sufficient reserves to meet half of its oil requirements.36  However, it has been 
dependent totally on large oil companies from industrialised States for whom the 
emphasis was on establishing large enough deposits for export markets rather than 
merely satisfying the domestic demand of small Caribbean States.37 
2.2.1.3  Conditional Reserves 
Conditional reserves are deposits that have been discovered but are not economically 
viable to extract under current demand and price levels or with existing mining 
technologies and methods.38  The relationship between economic and uneconomic 
deposits is a very complex one and is heavily dependent on various social, political and 
                                                           
 
35 Rees, supra note 3, at 21. 
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37 Rees, supra note 3, at 22. 
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economic factors.  For example, in the 1900s, copper ores with less than 10% copper 
content could not be used in most smelters and were therefore useless.  However, 
major demand increases and technological advances have allowed ores with less than 
1% copper content to be smelted and thus have dramatically increased the proven 
reserves for copper.39  By the 1990s, ores with as little as 0.4% copper content could be 
exploited with financial feasibility.40 
Similar to proven resources, the determination of conditional reserves is nevertheless 
dependent on the industrial strength of the State in which the reserves are located.  
For example, ore grades in developing States must be higher than those in 
industrialised States for the reserves to be economically viable resulting from the 
additional infrastructure costs required to exploit them in those countries.  Further, as 
with proven reserves, data relating to the abundance of conditional reserves contains 
much variance and subjectivity.  This is because of different methodologies used to 
estimate the size of reserves and the practical difficulties involved in their extraction. 
                                                           
 
39 Kenneth Warren, MINERAL RESOURCES (1973). 
40 Telephone conversation between the author and an unnamed representative of the Australian 
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2.2.1.4  Inferred Resources 
Measured reserves are those that have been explored intensively and a margin of error 
on the size of the deposit is estimated to be around 20%.41  Both proven reserves and 
conditional reserves are measured reserves as they are verified after exploration.  Less 
intensively measured deposits with data derived from surveys and geological 
projections are known as indicated reserves.42  In such cases where deposits have been 
located but not explored, they are known as inferred reserves.  As a result, the nature 
of the reserve would carry with it the error margin in its determination, making the 
calculation of global reserves a challenging and dynamic problem. 
2.2.1.5  Hypothetical Reserves 
Hypothetical reserves are deposits that may be discovered in the future in the areas 
that have only been partially surveyed and developed.  For example, the North Sea is 
producing significant quantities of oil and natural gas but not all layers of oil-bearing 
strata have been test drilled and as a result, there may be hypothetical reserves 
contained therein.43  The common means of determining hypothetical resources is to 
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extrapolate past rates of growth and production and proven reserves, assuming all past 
conditional determinants would continue to affect future production of such mineral 
resources in the same way.44 
One of the ways to determine hypothetical reserves has been to call together a panel of 
experts and average their forecasts of reserves.45  However, this is intrinsically biased 
because of the expert’s perspective of the likely future conditions, causing the estimate 
to be either overly conservative or optimistic.46  There is also the suggestion that it 
would be in the best interests of the oil and other resource businesses to be 
conservative in their estimates, as this would produce an outlook of scarcity and 
therefore high prices can be maintained, resulting in higher profit margins for the 
mining companies.47 
                                                           
 
44 See, for example, M. King Hubbert, Energy Resources, in National Academy of Sciences, RESOURCES 
AND MAN (1969), 157-242. 
45 Exxon Mobil Corporation, Exploration in Developing Countries (1978), paper presented at the Energy 
Committee Seminar, Aspen Institute of Humanistic Studies, 16-20 July 1978, in Boulder, Colorado, 
United States of America. 
46 For example, see Peter R. Odell, Optimal Development of the North Sea’s Oil Fields — A Summary 
(1977) 5:4 ENERGY POLICY 282; C. G. Wall, D. C. Wilson and W. Jones, Optimal Development of the 
North Sea’s Oil Fields — The Criticisms (1977) 5:4 ENERGY POLICY 284; and Peter R. Odell and 
Kenneth E. Rosing, Optimal Development of the North Sea’s Oil Fields — The Reply (1977) 5:4 ENERGY 
POLICY 295. 
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2.2.1.6  Speculative Resources 
Speculative resources are the deposits that may be found in areas that have not been 
explored but where favourable geological conditions exist.  For example, there are 
more than six hundred sedimentary basins where oil and gas are believed to exist but 
only around two hundred have been explored or developed.48  Once drilling does take 
place in explored areas, their potential status may change markedly.  For example, the 
North Sea contained only speculative resources for most of the last century and these 
were converted to proven, conditional and hypothetical reserves by the end of the 
1990s as exploration and exploitation activities were carried out in earnest.49 
In determining speculative reserves, which is based entirely on the extrapolation from 
past discovery and development patterns in similar geological conditions, there is the 
assumption that the future deposits would be equally productive physically and as 
financially rewarding as past reserves.50  Of course, there is every possibility that the 
most profitable reserves are already exploited and as a result, the financial returns on 
capital may fall over time because of development in the more difficult areas of the 
Earth for mineral resource exploitation. 
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2.2.2  Economic Scarcity of Mineral Resources 
2.2.2.1  Theoretical Constructs 
Because of the problems and inherent uncertainties in estimating hypothetical and 
speculative reserves with each mineral resource, there are large divergent estimates on 
the ultimately recoverable reserves of each resource.  For example, one significant 
problem with using claims from the industry is that they would be subject to the 
company’s willingness to disclose resource expectations in each case.51  However, it is 
generally not doubted that mineral resources on the Earth will eventually be exhausted 
and the future of humankind would depend ultimately on our ability to recover 
mineral resources through recycling or from outside the confines of this planet.52  A 
series of popular books published in the 1970s predicted an apocalyptic view on the 
future of the human civilisation, which coincided with the Arab-Israeli conflict, the 
1973 oil crisis and the attempt by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(“OPEC”) to reduce oil supply in order to hike global oil prices.53  It was believed that 
stock resource scarcity would be a major barrier to the future development of 
                                                           
 
51 Barnet, supra note 36. 
52 See, for example, Stephen P. A. Brown and Daniel Wolk, Natural Resource Scarcity and Technological 
Change [2000:1] EC. & FIN. REV. 2. 
53 See, for example, Jay W. Forrester, WORLD DYNAMICS (1970); Dennis L. Meadows, Donnella L. 
Meadows, Jørgen Randers and William W. Behrens III, THE LIMITS TO GROWTH (1972); and 
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civilisation and result in the collapse of the developing world or even human society in 
its entirety.54 
The concept of the exhaustion of resources being a limit on civilisation growth is not a 
new one.  Although at the time referring only to agricultural production and with 
particular emphasis on population growth, Malthus wrote as early as 1798 that, as 
resources are ultimately limited, the exponential growth in population would result in 
falls in income per capita until poverty and starvation would result as a constricting 
factor on population.55  In his view, increasing population would require the 
cultivation of lower-quality fields that require more capital and labour for same or less 
output, thus imposing a physical constraint on population growth and subsistence.56 
Ricardo, in his studies on the concept of resource exhaustion, concluded that as lower 
grade ores are being exploited, labour costs must increase and productivity must 
continue to decrease correspondingly.57  In other words, rather than reaching a 
threshold of physical constraint as Malthus suggested, Ricardo was of the view that 
this is a gradual process, stating “every increase of the quantity of labour must 
                                                           
 
54 Dennis L. Meadows, Donnella L. Meadows and Jørgen Randers, BEYOND THE LIMITS: CONFRONTING 
GLOBAL COLLAPSE ENVIRONING A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE (1992) at 120. 
55 Thomas Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population (1798), in Garrett Hardin (ed.), 
POPULATION, EVOLUTION AND BIRTH CONTROL (1969) at 4-17. 
56 Thomas Malthus, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY: CONSIDERED WITH A VIEW TO THEIR 
PRACTICAL APPLICATION (1820), at 300. 
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augment the value of that commodity on which it is exercised”.58  This was 
complemented by the analysis made by Mill that technological improvements have the 
effect of postponing the effects of resource scarcity on growth and that the physical 
dependence of the economy on mineral resources generates a scarcity effect that is 
independent of population increases.59 
Marshall, on the other hand, recognised that the study of mineral resource scarcity 
cannot be compared perfectly with that of agricultural production, for agricultural 
produce are “perennial streams” while mines are exhaustible “reservoirs”.60  As a result, 
the cost involved in the production from mines relates not only to the difficulty 
involved in extracting the reserves as they are mined near exhaustion, but also to the 
rate of production itself.61  Accordingly, even though mining of natural resources 
would thus not strictly conform to the law of diminishing returns, market prices do 
increase as a reflection of the reduction in the resources available to be extracted from 
the mines.62 
                                                           
 
58 Ibid., at 7. 
59 John Stuart Mill, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY WITH SOME OF THEIR APPLICATION TO SOCIAL 
PHILOSOPHY (1909).  See discussion in, for example, Herman E. Daly, STEADY-STATE ECONOMICS 
(1977); and Harold J. Barnett and Chandler Morse, SCARCITY AND GROWTH: THE ECONOMICS OF 
NATURAL RESOURCE AVAILABILITY (1963), at 69-71. 
60 Alfred Marshall, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY VOLUME (8th ed., 1949), at 138-
139. 
61 Ibid. 
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perspectives on what this means for the future in terms of our continued consumption 
of natural resources, which are considered below. 
The most well known of modelling methodologies on predicting the eventual 
exhaustion of fossil fuels, particularly oil, is that of Hubbert, who published a paper in 
1956 predicting the peak and decline of oil production in the United States.65  The 
peak of global oil production when half of the ultimately recoverable reserves of oil 
will have been produced is expected to be reached sometime between 2010 and 2020, 
with some analyses suggesting that it may even occur before 2010.66  Some of the most 
pessimistic analyses estimate that the United States, for example, has already 
produced 169 billion barrels of its 195 billion barrels of ultimately recoverable 
reserves.67  Meanwhile, even in oil-rich Saudi Arabia, it is estimated that it has already 
produced 91 billion barrels of its ultimately recoverable reserves of 300 billion barrels 
by the end of the previous century.68  In the meantime, the rate of depletion of oil 
reserves may be increasing, with Saudi Arabian oil production, for example, increasing 
from 9.5 million barrels per day in 2002 to 12.5 million barrels per day in 2009, with a 
further potential one million barrels per day in reserve capacity.69  This increase in 
                                                           
 
65 M. King Hubbert, Energy from Fossil Fuels (1956) 109 SCIENCE 103. 
66 Jeremy Rifkin, THE HYDROGEN ECONOMY (2002), at 23-24. 
67 Ibid., at 17. 
68 Ibid.  See also Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, WORLD OIL OUTLOOK 2009 
(2009), at <http://www.opec.org/library/World%20Oil%20Outlook/pdf/WOO%202009.pdf>, last 
accessed on 5 November 2009. 
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production capacity, coupled with declines in worldwide demand growth for oil, has 
led to the world price of oil fall from its peak at around U.S. $ 150.00 per barrel in July 
2008 to around U.S. $60.00 per barrel in July 2009, a price level at which it has been 
predicted to remain for the near future.70 
2.2.2.2  The Optimistic Perspective 
Perfect Market 
In a perfect market economy, the price of any mineral resource that was becoming 
scarce would inevitably rise.  The increased production cost associated with 
diminishing revenue returns would result in producers being willing to supply less 
resources for the same price or to supply the same quantity at a higher price.  This 
increase in prices would result in several social, economic and technological responses.  
Firstly, consumers would turn to cheaper substitutes or introduce conservation 
measures, such as recycling, to reduce the demand on the scarce mineral resource.  
Secondly, the scarcity of the resource and the rising prices would provide strong 
incentives for technological innovation that would improve production, decrease the 
cost of substitutes and provide for better and more energy efficient recycling methods.  
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Thirdly, the price rise would make it economically viable to exploit less concentrated 
ores at difficult locations, encouraging increased exploration and production. 
As a result, the rise in prices and the corresponding fall in demand do not imply a 
lowering of living standards for the economic unit.  Although there may be a short-
term fall in living standards as fewer consumers are able to afford the higher prices of 
the commodities, suitable substitutes or recycled products would ensue in time.  These 
reactionary developments have the effect of returning the price and demand for the 
resource to a level similar to its original level.  In the long term, there would be 
increases in the marginal cost of production as prophesised by Ricardo, but this would 
be cushioned by the reactionary factors to allow for an economic and social 
adjustment to take place. 
In the context of minerals, substitution can take place at three levels: the primary 
extraction level, the secondary production level and the tertiary end-use level.  At the 
primary level, the diminishing reserves for a particular ore may result in the 
development of suitable extraction methods from alternative ores.  For example, the 
decline in the availability of bauxite, or aluminium oxide (Al2O3), has spurred Economic and Technical Prospects of Space Mining 
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development for processing techniques to extract aluminium from kaolin clays, 
carbonaceous shales, nemeline and nephelite.71 
At a secondary level, one metal may directly replace another in the production of 
consumer products.  In the production of high-voltage transmission lines, aluminium 
has already quite successfully replaced copper.  Similarly, stainless steel has also 
become a good substitute for copper in kitchen pots and pans.  The diversity of 
minerals found on Earth has caused suggestions that there are conceivable substitutes 
for almost all mineral products, making the scarcity of mineral products a non-issue.72  
However, there remain many strong cases where the costs involved in substitution 
continue to be too high economically for any effective substitution to take place.  For 
example, the use of manganese in steel production continues to account for 90% of all 
manganese produced from the crust of the Earth.73 
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Figure 2.2-3. The Perfect Market Response to Resource Scarcity74 
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At a tertiary level, substitution can also take place where the demand for a particular 
mineral product is reduced by the utilisation of a different technology.  For example, 
one major use of copper is for undersea transmission cables that are utilised for 
telecommunications and data transmission.75  This demand has significantly reduced 
because of developments in microwave transmission technologies as well as 
communication satellite constellations.76  Another example of this is the reduced use 
of silver in photographic film due to the increased use of digital cameras. 
The optimistic view on resource depletion is that the onset of resource exhaustion 
would be largely, if not totally, offset by the use of substitutes at all three levels of 
production and consumption.77  The increase in marginal production costs would 
cause technological innovations and increased exploration to counteract these market 
forces and cushion their effects.  This perfect market model of resource depletion has 
                                                           
 
75 See Arthur H. Tuthill, Guidelines for the Use of Copper Alloys in Seawater (May 1987), U.S. Copper 
Development Association, at 
<http://www.copper.org/applications/marine/seawater/seawater_corrosion.html>, last accessed on 
27 January 2007.  See, for example, the recent disruption to communications services resulting from 
damage to the copper undeasea cable as caused by an earthquake in Taiwan: see W. David Gardner, 
Telecom Cable Repairs Under Way in Wake of Asian Earthquake (3 January 2007), Information Week, 
at <http://www.informationweek.com/management/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=196800845>, last 
accessed on 27 January 2007; and Sumner Lemon, Earthquake Disputes Internet Access in Asia (27 
December 2006), at 
<http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleId=900681
9 >, last accessed on 27 January 2007. 
76 Raymond F. Mikesell, THE WORLD COPPER INDUSTRY: STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
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been subject to several criticisms, most of which target the basis of the perfect market 
economy on which the model is based. 
Reality Checking the Optimists 
The main problem with the view that perfect market forces would rectify any 
problems of resource scarcity is that the market forces that are relied upon are not 
perfect.  For example, in order to produce the demand, technological and supply 
responses as indicated in the perfect market model, the market would have to be 
perfectly competitive, with all participating economic units functioning in a perfectly 
rational way to maximise profits, not to mention having managers with crystal balls 
capable of accurately predicting the future resource demand and price levels.78  
Because of the impossibility of these factors, the model may be overly optimistic for 
the purposes of safeguarding our future.  On the other hand, the fact that the resource 
sector tends to be dominated by large firms that engage in monopolistic competition 
rather than perfect competition may in fact have the opposite effect of producing 
overly pessimistic projections in contrast.  The nature of monopolistic competition in 
this sector may mean that the resources are currently underexploited because of the 
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desire to restrict production and control artificially high price levels.79  Consequently, 
one of the factors that may not have been taken into account is the potential for 
developing conditional reserves that cannot be exploited profitably except at such 
high price levels, thus expanding the resource base available. 
However, the existence of other market conditions gives rise to the reverse suggestion 
that the firms are nonetheless overexploiting the resources.  After all, it is not possible 
for any firm to be able to predict perfectly the market conditions that are going to 
exist in the future.  As a result, firms may wish to overproduce in order to sell as much 
of a mineral resource as possible at ascertained prices before cost or technological 
changes reduce the value of their proven reserves.80  Additionally, the prevalence of 
futures trading in commodities gives further support to the fact that mineral resource 
prices have remained extremely volatile, with mineral prices rising far more slowly 
than manufactured goods in world markets.81  In situations where there is a significant 
level of uncertainty in the future market, firms would also increase current output at 
known price levels and then invest the surplus revenues in anticipation of a time when 
economic conditions worsen.82  For resources where there are viable or potential 
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substitutes, firms would have an even stronger incentive to exploit and market as 
much of the resources as they can effectively produce.83 
The paradoxical problem with the perfect market model is that the market cannot 
impose restrictions to prevent the exhaustion of specific mineral resources or rectify 
the social and economic problems that would arise when that happens.84  In fact, the 
sad reality is that market forces are likely to cause an economic exhaustion of 
resources before a physical exhaustion of resources would take place.  This is because 
there will eventually be a point when consumers refuse to pay the high prices caused 
by diminishing resources and increasing costs of extraction, or the producers refuse to 
sell at government-imposed low prices, even though significant reserves may remain 
to be exploited.85  Figure 2.2-4 below illustrates the determination of economic 
exhaustion of a particular mineral resource. 
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MC curve, the prices would have lagged behind again, quickening the onset of 
economic exhaustion of that particular resource as well as introducing the effects of 
resource scarcity at an earlier time than the market would have generated.89 
Some commentators have also warned against over-confidence in the ability of 
technological innovation to overcome resource shortages on Earth.  For example, 
Meadows and his fellow researchers were of the view that: 
The hopes of the technological optimists centre on the ability of 
technology to remove or extend the limits to growth of population 
and capital.  We have shown that … the application of technology to 
apparent problems of resource depletion or pollution or food 
shortage has no impact on the essential problem, which is exponential 
growth in a finite and complex system.  Our attempts to use even the 
most optimistic estimates of the benefits of technology in the model 
did not prevent the ultimate decline of population and industry and 
in fact did not in any case postpone the collapse beyond the year 
2100.90 
Even in more recent times, when it is apparent that the projected depletions of the 
early 1970s have not taken place, the same caution concerning confidence in 
technology continues to be given, in this case by then Senator Gore: 
We have also fallen victim to a kind of technological hubris, which 
tempts us to believe that our new powers may be unlimited.  We dare 
to imagine that we will find technological solutions for every 
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technologically induced problem.  It is as if civilisation stands in awe 
of its own technological prowess, entranced by the wondrous and 
unfamiliar power it never dreamed would be accessible to mortal 
man.  In a modern version of the Greek myth, our hubris tempts us to 
appropriate for ourselves — not from the gods but from science and 
technology — awesome powers and to demand from nature godlike 
privileges to indulge our Olympian appetite for more.91 
One further inhibitor on the ability of the perfect market being able to solve the 
resource scarcity problems is the lack of concern by the market forces for the 
sustainable maintenance of the global environment.  There are authors that have 
suggested that the perfect market model of avoiding resource exhaustion would cause 
the destruction of the global environment that would render the efforts of the market 
somewhat futile.92  Even if such apocalyptic predictions of global destruction do not 
eventuate, some scholars have nonetheless suggested that there would be a significant 
cost to human welfare even though the market forces may successfully protect the 
material resources of the Earth.93  As most environmental factors are considered free 
goods and discounted by the market, environmental damage can be contained in 
mining processes only through consumer activism or political intervention to 
highlight the impact of the environment as a negative externality to be factored into 
                                                           
 
91 Albert Gore, Jr., EARTH IN THE BALANCE (1992) at 207. 
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the consideration of economic supply and demand.94  Consequently, as the 
environmental cost to the extraction of the scarce mineral resources from the crust of 
the Earth increases, the environmental conscience of the community may pose as 
another factor that could cause the social exhaustion of mineral resources. 
2.2.2.3  The Pessimistic Perspective 
The most pessimistic view available on the issue of resource exhaustion is to simply 
take the current proven reserves and then measure the resource availability by 
assuming an increase in the consumption level of a particular mineral resource.  In this 
way, it is inferred that a physical or absolute exhaustion of mineral resources would 
take place regardless of possible interventions of the market to alleviate its effects. 
For example, the proven reserves of bauxite would last less than 100 years if human 
consumption remained at the same level as it was in the 1970s.95  However, if the 
consumption of bauxite increases at the annual rate of around 10%, the proven 
reserves would be exhausted in the beginning of the present century.  These types of 
estimates almost inevitably indicate that most mineral resources would be exhausted 
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within 30 years.96  For instance, as detailed in Table 2.2-2 below, some researchers in 
1971 had projected the imminent exhaustion of most important mineral resources in 
the crust of the Earth. 
Table 2.2-2. Estimated Reserves and Depletion Dates97 
Resource  1971 Reserves  Years to Depletion from 1971 








































There is a significant number of resources listed in Table 2.2-2 above that, if correct, 
would have been depleted already or dangerously close to being depleted, even though 
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this is clearly not the case.  The fact is that new discoveries and technological 
innovation have slowed the onset of exhaustion to the extent that there have been no 
significant increases in price levels.98  However, the trend of sharp peaks in the price 
for crude oil and other mineral resources since 2003 may indicate either the effect of 
the usual volatility and fluctuations of market prices or the progressive depletion and 
exhaustion of oil and other mineral resources.99  In particular, Hubbert predicted that 
there would be a point in time, referred to as Hubbert’s Peak, when the maximum 
production of oil would be reached and beyond which there will be a continuing 
decline in global oil production.100  There are a number of commentators who suggest 
that the world has now reached, if it has not already done so, the Hubbert’s Peak and 
so the supply of crude oil will continue to decline.101   In turn, this will raise the price of 
crude oil and all other mineral resources that require substantial energy for extraction, 
processing and exploitation. 
                                                           
 
98 Brown and Wolk, supra note 52, at 11-13. 
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scarcity of resources, thus rendering the economic concepts of supply and demand as 
nothing more than an artificial means of price regulation.105 
Table 2.2-3. Cumulative Reserves, Production and Increases in Selected Minerals106 
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In any event, it is clear from a study of the rise in production rate and the additional 
discoveries made in the reserves over a fixed period of time that mineral resources 
nevertheless are being consumed at a faster rate than additional reserves are being 
found to replace them.  Consequently, it only stands to reason that physical 
exhaustion must follow as a matter of course, although it may be preceded by the 
onset of economic exhaustion, namely, the point at which the consumers refuse to pay 
the high prices or when the producers refuse to sell at government-imposed low prices, 
even though significant reserves may remain to be exploited. 
2.2.3  Implications of the Hydrogen Economy 
One further factor that must be considered in assessing the mineral resources need of 
the near future is the impact that increasing popularity in hydrogen fuel cells has on 
the demand for mineral resources.  Modern fuel cells rely on the chemical oxidisation 
of hydrogen and oxygen to produce electric power and are far more efficient than 
modern energy generation techniques with far fewer environmental concerns, such as 
the production of greenhouse gases or radioactive waste.110  Moreover, the “fuel” used 
to generate power is hydrogen and oxygen, which are readily available in abundance 
on Earth and can theoretically be recycled from the water produced from the fuel cells. 
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Figure 2.2-6. Different Types of Hydrogen Fuel Cells111 
Although fuel cells are far more efficient and environmentally friendly than traditional 
means of power generation, the electrodes of a fuel cell are produced from platinum 
and other platinum group metals, such as iridium, osmium, rhodium, ruthenium and 
palladium.112  There are several types of fuel cells, each type being deployed for 
specific uses, as described in detail in Figure 2.2-6 above. 
The high cost of hydrogen fuel cells lie predominantly in the cost of platinum group 
metals, which are extremely rare in the Earth’s crust and occur in very low 
concentrations, with a global average of around four grams per ton.113  Considering a 
                                                           
 
111 U.S. Department of Energy, Types of Fuel Cells (2004), at 
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112 Ibid., at 83. 
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small fuel cell car would require 50 kilowatts of power to be generated and, 
correspondingly, 57 grams of platinum as the catalyst, 14 tons of ore would have to be 
mined in order to produce sufficient platinum for one small fuel cell car.114  Even 
without fuel cells, the automobile industry remain the largest users of platinum and 
palladium in catalytic converters and this is only likely to increase with tightening 
environmental controls worldwide.115  To some extent, this is ironic as the production 
of platinum is a heavily polluting process, involving the release of chlorine, ammonia, 
hydrochloric acid and various heavy metals such as iron, zinc and nickel.116 
In any event, some industrialised States have already formulated ambitious plans for 
the implementation of a “hydrogen economy” in order to increase global energy 
efficiency and reduce the dependence on oil and other fossil fuels.  The United States 
of America, for example, published a plan for implementation of the hydrogen 
economy by 2050.117  This would dramatically increase the global demand for 
platinum and platinum group metals, to the extent that one million kilograms may be 
needed each year purely for fuel cell cars alone.118  Considering the estimated total 
                                                           
 
114 Wingo, supra note 5, at 83. 
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planetary reserves for platinum and platinum group metals lie somewhere between 43 
and 100,000,000 kilograms and the heavy environmental cost in extraction and 
refining, the adoption of a “hydrogen economy” may well be simply replacing one rare 
non-renewable resource for another.119  The only logical solution would be to extract 
such resources from places other than the crust of the Earth, such as celestial bodies. 
 
Figure 2.2-7. Government-Industry Roles in the Transition to a Hydrogen Economy120 
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2.3  EXPANDING THE ECONOMIC RESOURCE BASE 
There is one possibility that the pessimists and doubters of the economic 
sustainability of resource consumption have not considered.  So far, the economic 
analyses of resource consumption have assumed that available resources are confined 
to the crust of the Earth.121  If the increasing consumption of resources on the Earth 
would catalyse technological innovation and additional resource exploration, 
eventually the technology required to explore and exploit resources from other 
celestial bodies of the Solar System would be available.  As mineral discoveries are 
made on the Moon, the asteroids, comets and other planets, these additions to the 
proven or conditional reserves of the minerals on Earth can ultimately support a 
market-driven resource economy on the Earth virtually into the infinite future.  As 
Lewis suggested somewhat ambitiously: 
Let us recapitulate what we have already found.  Shortage of resources 
is not a fact; it is an illusion born of ignorance.  Scientifically and 
technically feasible improvements in launch vehicles will make 
departure from Earth easy and inexpensive.  Once we have a foothold 
in space, the mass of the asteroid belt will be at our disposal, 
permitting us to provide for the material needs of a million times as 
many people as Earth can hold.  Solar power can provide all the 
energy needs of this vast civilisation (10,000,000 billion people) from 
now until the Sun expires.  Using less than one percent of the helium-
3 energy resources of Uranus and Neptune for fusion propulsion, we 
could send a billion interstellar arks, each containing a billion people, 
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to the stars.  There are about a billion Sun-like stars in our galaxy.  We 
have the resources to colonise the entire Milky Way.122 
O’Neill, in his testimony before Committee on Science and Technology of the U.S. 
House of Representatives, said that: 
The fatalism of the limits-to-growth alternative is reasonable only if 
one ignores all the resources beyond our atmosphere, resources 
thousands of times greater than we could ever obtain from our 
beleaguered Earth.  As expressed very beautifully in the language of 
House Concurrent Resolution 451, “This tiny Earth is not humanity’s 
prison, is not a closed and dwindling resource, but is in fact only part 
of a vast system rich in opportunities, a high frontier which 
irresistibly beckons and challenges the American genius”.123 
It is pertinent to investigate the economic effects of this potential development in 
closer detail.  As marginal production cost increase, the perfect market model dictates 
that increased technological innovation and mineral exploration will take place.  In 
addition to developing viable substitutes and improved recycling techniques, the 
improvements in technology will also lead to evolution of propulsion systems, 
spacecraft design and robotic mining technology that make mining of the Moon and 
asteroids more feasible.  In other words, the cost of extracting mineral resources, 
especially platinum group metals, will continue to increase while the cost of extracting 
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the same mineral resources from celestial bodies will decrease over time, as illustrated 
in Figure 2.3-1 below. 
 
Figure 2.3-1. Relative Cost of Producing One Ounce of Platinum 2005-2030124 
 
Combined with increased exploratory and scientific studies into the geology and 
mineralogy of celestial bodies, the inclusion of asteroidal or lunar resources promises 
to reduce or even eliminate the onset of economic resource exhaustion on Earth.   
Consequently, the development of extraterrestrial mineral reserves has particular 
attraction to a world population that is increasingly conscious of the impact of human 
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activities on the environment.  For example, the demand for electricity generated 
from renewable resources has exceeded what one would expect in a market driven 
mostly by cost to the consumer.125  By exploiting resources from other bodies in the 
Solar System, the pristine environmental balances of the deep seabed and Antarctica 
can be preserved.  Further, the development of space resources would also increase the 
need for additional infrastructure in the Earth orbit or the surface of the Moon, in 
turn increasing the demand for mineral resources from space.  This need for the 
development of resource exploitation in outer space appears, according to either the 
optimistic or the pessimistic school of resource economics, to be only a matter of time. 
This need to exploit resources from celestial bodies is particularly pertinent in 
contemplating the needs for the implementation of the hydrogen economy, when the 
following factors are considered together: 
(1)  the increasing demand for platinum and platinum group metals; 
(2)  that platinum and platinum group metals are non-renewable and thus 
finite resources in the Earth’s crust; 
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(3)  that platinum and platinum group metals occur rarely and do so in very 
low concentrations, requiring a large amount of ore to be processed to 
extract small amounts of the metals; 
(4)  there is a heavy environmental cost associated with mining large 
quantities of ore as well as the processes involved in extracting and 
refining such metals; and 
(5)  the Moon and most Near Earth Asteroids have platinum group metals in 
concentrations higher than those contained in the Earth’s crust.126 
In addition to the demand on Earth, the prospect of constructing large space stations, 
laboratories, factories and hotels in orbit around the Earth and on the Moon creates a 
substantial demand for mineral resources in outer space.  With launch costs being 
prohibitive, there would logically be a market for various mineral resources in outer 
space for construction, propellants, manufacturing and material processing.127  
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For the above reasons, the increasing demand and associated production and 
environmental costs for the terrestrial mining of platinum group metals will in the 
near future make the mining of the Moon and other celestial bodies, especially Near 
Earth Asteroids, increasingly appealing.  The additional costs involved in transport 
between the Earth and the celestial bodies concerned are largely offset by the higher 
concentrations of platinum group metals in the extracted ore as well as rising prices 
caused by increased production and environmental costs on Earth.128  This makes 
mining of celestial bodies in outer space an inevitable and not altogether long-term 
development.  As Levinson suggested: 
We of course have our problems, to say the least, in comportment 
towards ourselves and our environment, but admittance to the 
cosmos and the spatial infinity and temporal immortality it provides 
may well be just the remedy for these age-old problems.  Access to the 
boundless resources of the universe may once and for all puncture the 
pressure of population and politics of scarcity which have generated 
war, oppression, and plagued our species from the start.129 
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2.4  THE RICHES OF SPACE 
2.4.1  Mining the Moon 
The relatively deep gravity well of the Moon vis-à-vis Near Earth Asteroids requires a 
comparatively higher escape velocity to launch materials from the Moon’s surface and, 
similarly, a high amount of thrust to enable a soft landing on the Moon from lunar 
orbit.  As a result, the propulsion system used for any transportation vehicle between 
the Moon and the Earth orbit must rely on a chemical or nuclear proponent, imposing 
a severe constraint on the costs of transport.130  However, this heavy gravity also 
means that the design of structures and materials handling processes on the Moon 
would not have to be dissimilar from that of the Earth and civil engineering would be 
simpler, making it possible for us to apply the engineering principles as that applied on 
the Earth.131  This means that large-scale commercial mining operations can take place 
on the Moon in order to take advantage of potential economies of scale. 
One clear advantage of the mining of lunar resources is its proximity to the Earth.  
The fact that it is orbiting the Earth rather than the Sun or another planet in the Solar 
System means that it is accessible at any time.  The short distance between the Earth 
                                                           
 
130 Wingo, supra note 5, at 163. 
131 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Proceedings of a Workshop on Extraterrestrial Mining and Construction 
(1990) USACERL SPECIAL REPORT M-92/14. Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
  Page |  95 
and the Moon means that communications are virtually instantaneous, allowing for 
real-time remote control of robotic mining operators from the Earth.  The substantial 
water deposits on the Moon that were discovered in the 1990s make the Moon 
potentially a good location for a permanent lunar settlement as well as providing for in 
situ production of hydrogen and oxygen that are to be used as fuels for propulsion, 
provided that a means of replenishing or recycling such water supplies can be found.132 
As the only celestial body outside the Earth that has been physically visited by 
humans, there is a large amount of information available about the geology and 
mineral composition of the Moon.  Analysis of lunar soil samples collected from the 
Apollo missions revealed that the lunar soil contains oxygen, silicon, aluminium, iron, 
calcium, magnesium and titanium in various compounds.133  Even though the Moon 
has hardly any free metal available for mining purposes, the processes for producing 
iron and oxygen from ilmenite, as well as aluminium and oxygen from feldspar, have 
been studied in scientific circles.134  If solar cells can be manufactured on site, the 
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production of solar cells for the deployment of a solar power satellite in the Earth orbit 
is also a possibility for lunar export.135 
In the short term, it is likely that the most valuable resource to be exploited from the 
Moon would be the collection of helium-3 (He-3), which is used for various medical 
and nuclear applications.136  Helium-3 is extremely rare on Earth as it is lost through 
dissipation in the upper reaches of the atmosphere, but is collected in abundance from 
the solar wind in the Moon.  In the longer term, the proximity of the Moon and the 
abundance of mineral resources available would make it a very attractive candidate 
for exploitation, especially during the development of large-scale infrastructures in the 
Earth orbit.  These infrastructures may form the foundations for future exploration 
and utilisation of the more distance parts of the Solar System, such as Mars, its 
satellites, and the Near Earth Asteroids. 
2.4.2  Resources from Mars and other Planets 
There is no doubt that the planets close to Earth, namely Mars, Venus and Mercury, 
may be candidates for exploration and extraction of mineral resources considering the 
resources that may be available in abundance on these planets.  It was recently 
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discovered, for example, that the surface of Mercury is rich in oxides of iron and 
titanium.137  Venus has been thought to have similar mineralogy, though there has 
been no direct evidence based on surface mineralogical analysis by landing probes on 
Venus.138  Mars, on the other hand, appears to contain abundant reserves of sulphur, 
potassium, titanium, nickel, zinc, iron and other rare metals.139  The gas giants, namely 
Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus and Neptune, contain mostly hydrogen and helium that may 
be attractive for the extraction of deuterium and helium-3, but they have been found 
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to contain water that may be useful in future expansion of human settlement in the 
Solar System.140 
While Mars, Venus and Mercury may contain mineral resources in abundance, the 
physical extraction of such resources from those planets is very challenging and well 
beyond present technological capabilities.  The absence of an atmosphere and its 
proximity to the Sun means that Mercury is subject to great variances of surface 
temperature from 427°C to -180°C.141  Venus is definitely not an appealing place, as it 
has an average surface temperature of 462°C that would melt lead, tin and zinc, 
surface atmospheric pressure of 96 bars with the atmosphere composing primarily of 
carbon dioxide and clouds of sulphuric acid and the cloud coverage means that there 
is little or no solar energy on the surface.142  The outer planets are too cold, too far 
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away, their atmospheres too dense and gravitational fields too strong to make them 
viable candidates for mining in the near future.143 
Of all the planets in the Solar System, while Mars presents itself as the most pleasant 
of the inner planets, significant difficulties due to its volatile weather patterns and 
heavy gravitational field would nevertheless make Mars an unappealing candidate for 
mineral exploitation in the near future.  However, the satellites of the planets, 
particular Phobos and Deimos of Mars, present minimal problems and are potential 
resource targets as well as being a good advance base for the exploration and 
colonisation of Mars.144  High-resolution remote sensing photography of the surfaces 
of Phobos and Deimos show a well-developed regolith layer and are considered likely 
to be captured asteroids, a view strengthened by the fact that the two bodies are far 
from being spherical in shape.145  Scientific studies through absorption spectroscopy 
have revealed that there is likely to be deep primordial ice in these satellites at depths 
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of around twenty metres at the poles and around one hundred metres at the equator, 
making them prospective ore bodies that are in close proximity to the Earth.146 
The velocity change or energy required to land and take-off from these satellites is not 
great, assuming very little energy is needed for the spacecraft to match the heliocentric 
orbital velocity of Mars.147  Phobos, as the higher satellite, would have a lower 
circularisation velocity and as a result would present itself as the better candidate for 
the first exploration and mining expedition to the red planet and its satellites.148 
However, the proximity of the satellites to Mars would pose significant problems, as 
extremely delicate navigational controls are required to negotiate the aerocapture of 
the Mars atmosphere to arrive at the satellites.  Since the time for radio 
communications between the Earth and Mars can amount to several minutes and may 
be interrupted by occultations by other planets, the Sun and the asteroids, the 
navigational controls on the spacecrafts must necessarily be autonomous.  Such highly 
advanced space navigational systems on spacecrafts are as yet beyond the means of 
human technology.149  As a result, the mining and exploration activities on other 
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planets and their satellites must necessarily wait for further technological advances to 
take place. 
2.4.3  Geology and Mineralogy of Asteroids and their Suitability 
for Mining Activities 
2.4.3.1  Asteroid Taxonomy 
Table 2.4-1. Bell Superclasses of Asteroid Taxonomy and Likely Mineralogy150 
Superclass  Class  Inferred Minerals  Analogous Meteorites 




METAMORPHIC  T  ?  ? 
B, G and F  clays and opaques  altered carbonaceous chondrites 
Q  pyroxene, olivine, grey NiFe  H, L and LL chondrites 
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Information about the composition of asteroids has been growing significantly since 
the 1980s because of a rise in observational and modelling work.151  Increased use of 
spectroscopy as well as close flyby observations by Galileo of 243 Ida and by the Near 
Earth Asteroid Rendezvous (“NEAR”) probe of Mathilde and Europa have generated 
a substantial amount of data for asteroid geologists to determine the hypothetical and 
observable mineralogy of some asteroids. 
The most widely used system of taxonomy for asteroids is one developed by Tholen 
using seven colours derived from the Eight Colour Asteroid Survey (“ECAS”) at the 
end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s.152  In that system, fourteen asteroid 
classes were created with eleven of the classes distinguished by their ECAS spectra and 
three classes (E, M and P) distinguished only by visual albedo.  Barucci and Tedesco 
improved on this taxonomic system in the late 1980s, combining the data set from the 
ECAS with that derived from various infrared spectroscopy studies.153  In studying the 
data sets obtained in these different studies, astronomers began to distinguish 
asteroids based on the degree of metaphoric heating that they are believed to have 
                                                           
 
151 See, for example, discussion in Kowal, supra note 17, at 35-48. 
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received during their evolution.154  During the 1990s, the taxonomic classifications 
have been further refined to improve the distinctions between the compositional 
diversity of the classes as our knowledge of the geology of asteroids continues to 
increase.155 
2.4.3.2  Overview 
Due to their accessibility and relatively low escape velocities, asteroids present 
themselves to be potentially attractive targets for resources to supplement demand for 
resources on Earth and some mineral resources found on these asteroids could be 
particularly useful for further human development in outer space, as outlined in Table 
2.4-2 below.156 
Lewis suggested that around half of the reasonably sized Near Earth Asteroids are 
believed to be carbonaceous and therefore rich in carbon and water.157  Such asteroids 
contain important mineral resources for life support and are thus important mining 
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targets for future human development in outer space.  The other asteroids are 
believed to be metallic in nature, containing iron, nickel, troilite, olivine, pyroxene, 
plagioclase feldspar as well as non-metals such as arsenic, selenium, germanium, 
phosphorus, carbon and sulphur.158  These mineral resources are subject to significant 
demand on Earth and potentially in orbit and on celestial bodies in outer space. 
















Particularly of note is the quantity of platinum group metals on asteroids.  Platinum 
group metals include platinum, palladium, rhodium, ruthenium, iridium and osmium.  
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These metals are highly valuable but are rare in the crust of the Earth and in low 
concentrations.  Lewis and Meinel have pointed out that all common classes of 
meteorites found on Earth have higher concentrations of platinum group metals than 
even the best mines on Earth.  Further, they have suggested that asteroids would 
similarly have high concentrations of platinum group metals.160  It is projected that 
concentrations of 30 to 60 parts per billion or even 250 to over 1,000 parts per billion 
of platinum group metals may be found on asteroids, as compared to four to six parts 
per billion in the best mines on Earth.161  With the introduction of a hydrogen-based 
energy economy increasing the global demand for platinum group metals, the 
extraction and exploitation of mineral resources on asteroids will become increasing 
feasible over time. 
2.4.3.3  The S Class 
In studying S class asteroids, high resolution spectra from 0.8 µm to 2.5 µm allow for 
identification for the presence or absence of absorption features such as the 1.1 µm 
feature due to feldspar, a two micrometre feature to minerals such as pyroxene and 
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spinel (MgAl2O4) and a 2.2 micrometre feature attributed to organic compounds.162  
The original S class as designated by Tholen was separated into the K classes and two 
subclasses, being the So and Sp subclasses.  K class asteroids are similar to S class in 
spectra but have flat reflectance in the near infrared.163  The So subclass of asteroids is 
rich in olivine with a red continuum slope while Sp subclass asteroids are rich in 
pyroxene with a less red continuum slope.164  The remaining S class asteroids have a 
mixture of pyroxene and olivine in composition and a moderately red continuum 
slope compared to the So and Sp asteroids. 
The diversity of the S class of asteroids has been observed in the past, but 
spectroscopy has revealed that virtually all S class asteroids contain significant 
quantities of olivine and pyroxene.165  Olivine is a group of mineral silicates ranging 
from fayalite (Fe2SiO4) to forsterite (Mg2SiO4), providing for a good potential source 
of iron and magnesium.  Pyroxene ((Mg,Fe)Si2O6) and orthopyroxene ((Mg,Fe)2Si2O6) 
are bisilicates that similarly provide a good source of metals, along with silicon and 
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oxygen.  Considering the varying abundances of olivine, pyroxene and feldspar,166 the 
S class of asteroids can be subdivided into seven compositionally distinct subtypes.167 
Some S class asteroids are anomalous in composition, such as 387 Aquitania and 980 
Anacostia, as indicated in studies of reflective spectra.168  These two asteroids, for 
example, have a two-micrometre feature stronger than a weak or even non-existent 
one-micrometre feature.  The reverse is generally characteristic of assemblages of 
pyroxene and olivine.  It is believed that this is due to an abundance in spinel or 
chromite (FeCr2O4).169  The presence of spinel indicates a carbonaceous surface 
enriched in calcium and aluminium while the presence of chromite suggests an 
achondritic surface enriched in various minerals, including magnesium, aluminium, 
chromium and iron.170 
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2.4.3.4  The M and E Classes of Asteroids 
Astronomers have observed that an absorption feature at three micrometres generally 
indicates the presence of an abundance of hydrated silicates.  Generally, hydrated 
silicates allow for the recovery of water, silicon and free metals after appropriate 
means of processing.  Of the M class asteroids, 55 Pandora and 92 Undina were found 
to have three micrometre features that reflect the presence of recoverable hydrated 
silicates.171  On the other hand, observations of asteroid 16 Psyche, another M class 
asteroid, shows the absence of a three-micrometre feature.  Psyche is generally 
considered to have a higher metallic iron content than other asteroids because of its 
high radar albedo.172 
In addition to the hydrated M class asteroids, a large majority of C class asteroids have 
also been found to be composed of hydrated silicate surfaces and ice.173  Recent 
observations of 44 Nysa, an E class asteroid, showed deposits of pyroxene, low-iron 
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enstatite (MgSiO3) and hydrated silicates.174  This is in contrast to the previous belief 
that Nysa, as with other E class asteroids, would be composed of non-absorbing and 
spectrally neutral materials such as enstatite, forsterite and other low-iron silicates.175  
The only Earth-crossing E class asteroid, 3103 Eger, has been shown to contain mostly 
enstatite or forsterite.  However, these metal rich asteroids are found predominantly 
in the Hungaria asteroid region between 1.79 and 1.98 AU from the Sun.176 
2.4.3.5  The V Class 
The asteroid 4 Vesta, being a V Class asteroid, possesses similar spectra to basaltic 
achondritic meteorites, such as pyroxene and olivine.177  Other asteroids in similar 
orbits have been found to have similar spectra to Vesta, along with three Near Earth 
Asteroids.178  The asteroid 3628 Božnêmcová has similar spectra to ordinary 
chondritis, showing presence of pyroxene, olivine and compounds of nickel and 
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iron.179  Such asteroids are good sources for metals and silicon that, along with other 
asteroid classes discussed above, show an abundance of metallic compounds 
throughout the majority of the asteroid population that make them candidates for 
mineral exploitation. 
2.4.4  Suitability of Near Earth Asteroids 
Among the large population of asteroids in the Solar System, some groups of asteroids, 
namely the Apollo, Amor and Aten groups, are categorised as the Near Earth 
Asteroids.  These asteroids are generally very small members of the Solar System with 
diameters of around one kilometre or more.  They vary from being metallic or silicate 
to some form of carbonaceous chondrite that may be hydrated.180 
The Apollos are asteroids that actually cross the heliocentric orbit of the Earth and 
therefore represent a collision threat to the Earth and they are considered to be the 
origins of some recent meteor showers.181  The Amors do not cross the Earth’s orbit 
but approach it to within 0.3 astronomical units, posing a potential threat to the Earth 
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if gravitational perturbations cause their orbits to migrate across the orbit of the 
Earth.182  Atens are asteroids of which the large parts of their orbits are inside the orbit 
of the Earth, with the semi major axes of their orbits shorter than that of the Earth.  As 
they cross the orbit of the Earth, they also represent a collision threat to the Earth. 
 
Figure 2.4-1. The Three Groups of Near Earth Asteroids183 
The proximity of Near Earth Asteroids to the orbit of the Earth is also their greatest 
asset.  Most of the Near Earth Asteroids are very easy to reach and return from when 
compared with missions to the Moon or Mars because of the low thrust required for 
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departing from low Earth orbit and soft landings on the asteroids, as well as departing 
from the asteroids for the return trajectory back to Earth.184  The spectral studies 
discussed above have shown that at least some asteroids have regoliths and have 
higher concentrations of free metals than the lunar surface, mostly in the form of 
olivine and pyroxene.185  At least 20% of all Near Earth Asteroids are considered rich 
in volatiles and almost all asteroids are considered rich in metallic compounds.186 
The geological and mineralogical data of asteroids are collected by a number of 
methods, including visible and infrared spectral studies by astronomers, comparisons 
with meteorite samples and radar studies from radio telescopes.  Useful data have also 
been collected from the visual analysis by the flybys of 951 Gaspra and 243 Ida by the 
Galileo probe on its way to Jupiter and, more recently, from the flyby of 2867 Steins by 
the Rosetta probe on its journey to Comet Churyumov-Gerasimenko.187  The recent 
observations of 253 Mathilde and 433 Eros by the Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous 
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probe launched by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration have also 
enriched our knowledge about the physical composition of Near Earth Asteroids.188 
Gaspra, Ida and Mathilde all appear to have a well-developed regolith despite their 
extremely weak gravity.  Previous scientific speculation expected that the weak gravity 
would cause any original regolith to be lost over time, exposing the bare metal of the 
asteroid core.189  Ida was even found to have a satellite, Dactyl, which also retains a 
regolith despite being less than one kilometre in radius.190  Recent radar reflection 
studies have shown that two Apollo asteroids, 3554 Amun and 1986DA, are composed 
of solid metal cores.191 
In order to review the geological composition of asteroids beyond the study of 
reflective spectra, it is useful to study the classes and composition of meteorites.   
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Meteorites are generally classified as Stones, Stony-Irons and Irons.192  Stones 
comprise two classes: the chondrites and achondrites.  Chondrites appear to be 
samples of the primitive Solar System accretion bodies with very little metamorphism 
or some minor aqueous alteration or metasomatism and are believed to be sourced 
from Main Belt Asteroids.193  It is thought that they have not changed in composition 
since condensation from the pre-solar nebula that formed the present Solar System.  
Chondrites are further divided into enstatites, being ordinary chondrites that contain 
free metals, and carbonaceous chondrites that contain no free metals although 
extraction of volatiles by reduction of magnetite and other iron oxides is possible.194  
In contrast, the achondrites are igneous and basaltic rocks that were formed after 
being melted and as a result they tend to have dense surfaces with very little or no 
water.  The Stony-Irons and Irons, on the other hand, are believed to be fragments of 
metallic cores of planetesimals that shattered from a cataclysmic impact of some form 
during the early formation of the Solar System.195 
Of all classes of meteorites, ordinary chondrites are by far the most abundant and yet 
the only spectral matches, as discussed above, are apparently 1864 Apollo and 3628 
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Božnêmcová.196  It has been suggested that the meteorites found on Earth may not 
correspond with the existing population of asteroids due to changes over time.  If this 
is the case, there may be a higher abundance of volatiles in the asteroids than may be 
deduced from the proportion of chondrites in the meteorite population.197 
As for carbonaceous chondrites, some of the materials contained in them are 
considered to be insoluble macromolecular materials, composed of clusters of 
condensed aromatic, heteroaromatic and hydroaromatic ring systems in clusters that 
have been cross-linked by short methylene chains, ethers, sulphides and biphenyls.198  
This makes them similar to kerogens from oil shales or low-volatile bituminous coals, 
resulting in a possibly useful source of hydrocarbons when the existing supplies on 
Earth become exhausted.199  These kerogens (C100H71N3O12S2 or C100H48NO12S2,) have 
been pyrolysed in various scientific studies and have been found to produce carbon 
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monoxide, carbon dioxide, water, methane, ethane and propane.200  As a result, 
asteroids that have similar composition to carbonaceous chondrites are very desirable 
candidates for the extraction of water and various hydrocarbons. 
There are increasing indicia that many asteroids are either extinct or dormant comets, 
which is an observation often made because of the shape of their orbits or due to 
telescopic and spectroscopic evidence.  Steel, for example, suggested that a sizable 
proportion of asteroids may be linked with the Taurid Complex.201  The discovery of 
water in the form of solid ice makes the presence of hydrated volatiles on these 
asteroids a very likely possibility.202 
Cometary bodies tend to be of high porosity because of the lack of compacting forces 
and the skeletal structure of the interstellar dust particles.203  This porosity means that 
they have very low strength and can therefore be easily broken apart by impact or 
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gravitational tidal forces.  For example, the recent fragmentation of Shoemaker-Levy 
9 by the gravitational tides of Jupiter suggests that it was a zero-strength celestial body 
with very little compacting density.204  These asteroids are considered to have various 
volatiles trapped at depth, including water ice, dry ice, ammonia and hydrogen 
cyanide, along with various silicates and hydrocarbons hidden under a layer of 
remnant non-volatile hydrocarbons and silicate detritus.205  Although this may prove 
to be a rich source of hydrocarbons, this could make mining such an object using 
conventional and terrestrial means somewhat difficult. 
The total number of discovered Near Earth Asteroids is now well above 500 and is 
increasing at about 50 asteroids per year.206  The statistically projected number of 
Near Earth Asteroids with a diameter larger than 100 kilometres is estimated to be 
several thousands.207  Theoretically, this number of Near Earth Asteroids is being 
depleted by collisions with the inner planets and Jupiter, or by being pulled out of the 
Solar System or towards the Sun because of gravitational perturbations caused by 
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close encounters with Jupiter.208  However, there must be some natural means of 
replenishing the Near Earth Asteroid population or otherwise there would be very few 
of them remaining after the creation of the Solar System. 
This replenishment may result from the orbital decline or capture of comets and 
collisions between large asteroids in the Asteroid Belt, which catapult fragments into 
the near Earth orbits.  The comets, in turn, are replenished from objects in the Kuiper 
Belt.  Examples of the effects of gravity of a large planet on the mechanics of comets 
are shown in Figure 2.4-2 and Figure 2.4-3 below. 
In the first example, a comet that had a long period orbit around the Sun loses 
sufficient orbital energy by passing closely in front of a large planet such as Jupiter to 
become captured as a short period comet.209  In the second example, as shown in 
Figure 2.4-3 below, a short period orbit gains sufficient orbital energy by passing 
behind a large planet such as Jupiter to become a long period comet.  Similar effects 
would be experienced by asteroids that pass close by a large planet, such as Jupiter, 
Saturn or even Uranus and Neptune. 
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Figure 2.4-2. Gravitational Perturbations on Long Period Comets Caused by Jupiter 
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2.4.5  Other Groups of Potential Mining Candidates 
2.4.5.1  The Arjunas 
In addition to the common groups of Near Earth Asteroids, being the Apollos, Amors 
and Atens, there is also a class of asteroids called the Arjunas that have nearly circular 
orbits, similar to that travelled by the Earth.210 
Table 2.4-3. The Arjunas with Low Eccentricities211 
Name  E  i  q  Q 
4581 Asclepius  0.357  4.9  0.66  1.39 
1992BF  0.271  7.25  0.66  1.15 
1991JY  0.295  49.00  0.67  1.23 
1989UQ  0.265  1.3  0.67  1.16 
1989UR  0.356  10.34  0.70  1.47 
3554 Amun  0.281  23.4  0.70  1.25 
2062 Aten  0.182  18.9  0.79  1.14 
1982HR Orpheus  0.322  2.68  0.82  1.60 
1991JW  0.118  8.7  0.915  1.161 
1994UG  0.246  4.5  0.925  1.527 
1991VG  0.049  1.5  0.975  1.077 
1992JD  0.032  13.5  1.002  1.067 
1993DA  0.094  12.4  0.85  1.02 
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The Arjunas have orbits of around one astronomical unit in radius with very low 
orbital eccentricity.212  Their proximity to the Earth and their small size makes travel 
to and from the Arjunas a very energy-efficient exercise, provided that the orbital 
inclination of the asteroid is minimal, making them highly suitable candidates for 
asteroid capture and transfer to Earth orbit for exploitation. 
2.4.5.2  Coorbital Asteroids 
It has long been a theoretical possibility that there are Near Earth Asteroids that, upon 
passing near the Earth, are now trapped in strange orbits near the Earth as they orbit 
the Sun.213  In 1997, it was discovered that 3753 Cruithne, an Aten asteroid previously 
discovered in 1986, is indeed one such asteroid.214  Cruithne does not orbit the Earth 
but instead is dragged by the Earth along its highly inclined orbit around the Sun.  
Since then, there have been other asteroids suspected of being in coorbital motion 
with the Earth, such as Khufu.215  Although numbering only a handful, the fact that 
these asteroids tend to be very close to the orbit of the Earth means that they are very 
suitable candidates for early prospecting and exploitation. 
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2.4.5.3  Short Period Comets 
As discussed above, asteroids that have cometary origins are attractive candidates for 
the exploitation of hydrocarbons and other volatiles.  Similarly, short period comets 
may present themselves as appealing options for exploitation.  Short period comets 
tend to be composed of water ice, dry ice, ammonia (NH3), hydrogen cyanide (HCN), 
hydrocarbons and silicates.216  In addition, cometary nuclei have been found through 
absorption spectroscopy to contain formaldehyde (H2CO), methanol (CH3OH), 
methane (CH4) and various hydrocarbon aromatics.217  Although generally not 
detected directly by spectroscopy, various nitrogen and sulphur species, such as 
ammonia and hydrogen sulphide (H2S), have also been detected in cometary materials 
from time to time.218 
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Figure 2.4-4. Orbital Geometry of Short Period Comets219 
It is possible to conduct mining activities on these comets in situ, but one main factor 
inhibiting such exploitation is the extreme eccentricities of their orbits.  Cometary 
orbits tend to be very eccentric in character, as they have large orbital inclinations.220  
Since travelling to such comets can involve very long transit durations, fast perihelion 
missions for exploiting resources on these comets may be financially more 
advantageous, even though it would have a higher energy requirement than an 
                                                           
 
219 Drawn by the author.  In this diagram, point P is the perihelion of the orbit, point A is the aphelion 
and angle i is the inclination of the orbit. 
220 Brian G. Marsden and Gareth V. Williams (eds.), CATALOGUE OF COMETARY ORBITS (1999). 





124  |  Page     
aphelion mission.221  This is particularly so considering the orbits of such asteroids 
may lie well beyond the orbits of Jupiter or even Saturn.222 
2.5  TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY OF SPACE MINING 
2.5.1  Orbital Mechanics 
2.5.1.1  Orbital Geometry 
Even with the limited knowledge that the scientific community currently possesses on 
the geology and mineralogy of asteroids, it is clear that the asteroids would 
nevertheless be attractive targets for future exploration and exploitation vis-à-vis 
Mars, its moons Phobos and Deimos and other planets.  It is pertinent, therefore, to 
consider the technical challenges facing any serious attempt to achieve the goal of 
asteroid mining in the future. 
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Figure 2.5-1. Orbital Properties of an Asteroid223 
The position and orientation of an orbit with reference to the rest of the Solar System 
is given by its semi major axis (a), the inclination (i) of the orbital plane to the plane of 
the orbit of the Earth (which is referred to as the ecliptic), the eccentricity of the orbit 
(e), the longitude of the ascending node (Ω) and the argument of the perihelion (ω).224  
These orbital properties are illustrated in Figure 2.5-1 above. 
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The longitude of the ascending node of the orbit of an object is the angular distance, 
measured anticlockwise from the north, at the radius vector giving the Earth’s 
position at vernal equinox to the position at which the object passes south of the 
ecliptic to north of the ecliptic.  The argument of perihelion is the angular distance 
around the orbit of the object from its ascending node to its perihelion, measured in 
the direction of rotation.225 
In order to travel from the Earth to an asteroid, or vice versa, two velocity changes 
(∆v  ) are required.  The first is needed to depart from one orbit to intersect another 
orbit on a transfer trajectory and a second ∆v   is required in order to slow down and 
rendezvous with the target orbit.226  As a result, it is possible to measure and compare 
the accessibility of different asteroids by considering the total ∆v   required to travel 
from the Earth to an asteroid as well as the duration of time required in transit.227 
2.5.1.2  Calculating Energy Requirements 
There are several ways of estimating the general velocity requirement for any 
particular target asteroid, without considering particular launch windows that may 
give favourable or unfavourable gravitational orbital conditions for the transit 
                                                           
 
225 Ibid. 
226 Mark J. Sonter, Near Earth Objects as Resources for Space Industrialisation (2001) 1:1 SOLAR SYSTEM 
DEV. J. 1 at 2-3. 
227 Ibid. Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
  Page |  127 
trajectory.  Shoemaker and Helin presented a set of formulae for calculating the 
velocity change required to enter into a transfer orbit to a Near Earth Asteroid.228  The 
formula is summarily given below as:229 
( ) 5 0 30 . + = ∆ F v
r  
Where: 
(1)  F is called the “Figure of Merit”, an intermediary used by Shoemaker and 
Helin and defined as: 
R L U U F + =  
where: 
(a)  UL is the impulse required to inject the spacecraft into the transfer 
orbit from low Earth orbit; and 
(b)  UR is the impulse required to rendezvous with the asteroid from the 
transfer orbit.230 
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Generally, low ∆v   trajectories are achieved by a rendezvous at, or near, 
aphelion or perihelion of the target object’s orbit.  As a result, the most 
energy efficient ∆v   missions to the Near Earth Asteroids are commonly 
achieved by rendezvous near the aphelion. 
(2)  With some minor qualifications, UL is defined as: 
0
2
3 U s C UL − + =  
where: 
(a)  s is the Earth’s escape velocity, which is 11.2 kms-1; and 
(b)  Uo is low Earth orbital velocity, which is 8.0 kms-1.231 
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(a)  Q is the aphelion of the asteroid in AU; and 
(b)  i is the inclination of its orbital plane to the ecliptic.232 
(4)  The required impulse at rendezvous UR is given as: 
2 2
2
2 r c r C R U
i
U U U U + ⋅ ⋅ − = cos  
which, in short, is the impulse required to match the orbital speed of the 
asteroid and then slow down to enter into an orbit around it.233 
Shoemaker and Helin noted that the rendezvous impulse needed is generally very low 
for Apollo and Amor asteroids, usually around one kilometre per second.234  Generally, 
the outbound ∆v   and the inbound ∆v   are similar, assuming the launch windows 
resulting from the gravitational perturbations are ignored.  About 10% of all known 
Near Earth Asteroids have a total ∆v   of less than, or equal to, 6 kms-1 with a 
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reasonably low ∆v   launch opportunity occurring once every 2 to 3 years for every 
Near Earth Asteroid.235 
2.5.1.3  Hohmann Transfer Orbits 
The most energy efficient transfer trajectories are elliptical transfers between coplanar 
orbits with similar eccentricity and an alignment of the semi major axis.236  Of course, 
this is rarely the case as the two orbits would either not be coplanar or not be aligned 
along their axes.237  As a result, the minimum energy transfer between two objects 
would generally take place at the ascending node or descending node at perihelion or 
aphelion, when it is possible to take advantage of the tangential momentum carried by 
the spacecraft at those points.238  Generally speaking, the ∆v   required at aphelion 
would be less than that required at perihelion since less energy is needed to overcome 
the gravity of the Sun. 
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With a Hohmann transfer orbit, ∆v   is applied to a spacecraft when at perihelion to 
boost it to the higher orbit, where it will arrive near aphelion when a second ∆v   is 
applied in order for it to rendezvous with the asteroid.239  Once the mining operations 
are complete, the inbound journey begins by applying ∆v   to the spacecraft so that it 
can enter into a transfer orbit, and thus reach the lower orbit of the Earth near the 
perihelion.240  Such an orbit has been empirically determined to be the most energy 
efficient transfer trajectory between the Earth and other objects at a similar distance 
from the Sun.241 
2.5.1.4  Timing Considerations 
From the discussion above, there are several factors that influence the choice of 
trajectories to a Near Earth Asteroid.  They are: 
•  the eccentricity of the orbit; 
•  whether the perihelion of the orbit of the asteroid is inside or outside the 
orbit of the Earth; 
•  the length of time required in transit; 
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•  whether a Hohmann transfer trajectory is possible or a continuously 
thrusting trajectory would be required; 
•  the length of the possible mining season on the asteroid and whether 
repeated missions are possible; and  
•  whether the mining window is based on a rendezvous at aphelion or 
perihelion of the object.  
One of the important considerations in designing trajectories is the synodic period of 
the asteroid.  The synodic period of an object relative to the Earth is the time that 
elapses between similar configurations in the orbital positions of the objects, such as 
conjunctions or oppositions.242  The synodic period for an Arjuna asteroid with a 
period of twenty months, for example, would be sixty months or five years.  In other 
words, if both the Earth and an asteroid with a synodic period of five years were at 
aphelion in September 2001, then the next time this conjunction will occur again 
would be in September 2006.  In designing the mission trajectory to an asteroid, it is 
important to consider its synodic period because the Earth would have to be at a 
particular point on its orbit when the spacecraft returns from its rendezvous with the 
asteroid.  This extension of the project time required may possibly have a negative 
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impact on the desirability of the mining operation.  On the other hand, the longer 
mining season may allow for a greater return of mineral resources. 
2.5.2  Mission Trajectories 
2.5.2.1  Energy Cost of Mining Missions to Celestial Bodies 
















Generally, accessibility of celestial bodies for mining operations is defined based on 
energy requirements for the trajectories employed by the mission, expressed in terms 
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of the required velocity to move a mass from one orbit to another.  As detailed in 
Table 2.5-1 above, Near Earth Asteroids have relatively low energy requirements to 
reach them and return mineral resources from them to low Earth orbit, compared to 
even the surface of the Moon, for example. 
Gerlach suggested that the energy required to reach a typical Near Earth Asteroid may 
be less than placing a communications satellite in geostationary orbit.244  Further, the 
energy required to place materials from such asteroids on an intercept trajectory with 
the Earth orbit may be far less than what is required to lift the mass into orbit from the 
surface of the Earth.245  Lewis, Matthews and Guerrieri had estimated that 10% of all 
Near Earth Asteroids are more accessible in terms of the energy requirements than the 
Moon.246  Sonter placed that figure as being 6%, applying the approach taken by 
Shoemaker and Helin.247  Accordingly, the best targets for initial resource 
development, considering their relatively low energy requirements, are the Apollo, 
Amor and Aten asteroids with low eccentricity and low inclination orbits, along with 
any Trojan asteroids in the orbit of the Earth around the Sun.248 
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2.5.2.2  Apollo Asteroids 
For asteroids with highly eccentric but low inclination orbits, mining operations 
would demand Hohmann transfer trajectories for both outbound and inbound flights 
because of the high ∆v   required.  The mining season would therefore be restricted to a 
short season near aphelion.  This type of trajectory is appropriate for Apollo asteroids 
or Amor asteroids with comparatively high eccentricities.  In terms of energy 
efficiency, a relatively large hyperbolic ∆v   has to be destroyed during the return 
trajectory, which is negligibly alleviated by a lunar flyby that would remove no more 
than 1.5 kms-1.249 
This is complicated further by the need to ensure that the mission aligns with the 
synodic period of the asteroid, or the Earth will not be there when the spacecraft 
returns from its mining operation.  This means that the length of the mission must be 
calculated in integer years, so that the Earth would be in the same orbital position.  
Otherwise, the trajectory would have to be adjusted, resulting in some additional use 
of energy. 
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2.5.2.3  Short Period Comets 
For mining short period comets, it may be more appropriate to undertake the mining 
activities at perihelion rather than aphelion.  This is principally for two reasons: 
firstly, since solar energy may be too weak at aphelion, the use of solar power may be 
limited or rendered impossible, and secondly, the transition time between the Earth 
and aphelion may impose too heavy a financial burden for commercial launchers and 
operators.  The major disadvantage of having the mining season at perihelion is the 
requirement for a very high energy usage on the return transfer, which must be 
considered together with the very short mining season available at perihelion. 
On the other hand, mining dormant comets with short periods can enable almost total 
capture of all volatiles, and the equipment and energy costs required for the melting of 
the cometary core will be significantly less when compared with the mining and 
processing of regolith on other asteroid types.250  It may also be possible to move the 
comet gradually to the Earth orbit as the mass of the cometary nucleus reduces, 
facilitating the recovery of mineral resources from the comet. 
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2.5.2.4  Aten Asteroids 
Aten asteroids have orbits with low eccentricities.  Consequently, the mining mission 
best suited to them would involve a Hohmann transfer trajectory from low Earth orbit 
to rendezvous with the target asteroid at its aphelion and, after a long mining season, 
to depart the asteroid near perihelion.  It is not possible to undertake a mission similar 
to that used for short period comets or Apollo asteroids due to the mining season 
being too short and the Earth would be out of phase when the spacecraft returned to 
the Earth. 
The determination of whether the rendezvous should be at aphelion or perihelion 
would depend ultimately on the orbital mechanics of the asteroid and the proposed 
mining operations.  However, in most circumstances, a departure from the asteroid at 
perihelion would be more energy efficient since the spacecraft would have 
significantly more mass during the inbound journey vis-à-vis the outbound journey.  
This would make it desirable to take advantage of the energy savings generated from a 
departure at perihelion. 
On the other hand, the trajectory tends to require demanding propulsion systems and 
large amounts of fuel in this case.  The ideal scenario would be to offset these two 
characteristics in the selection of potential asteroids as mining targets.  If Hohmann 
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synodic period of these asteroids means that those with a semi major axis of around 
one astronomical unit, as is the case for the majority of these asteroids, would not be 
ideal candidates for mining.  This is because they would move very little along their 
orbits relative to the Earth and therefore would not provide any ballistic opportunities 
for reduced travel distance and time between the Earth and the asteroid.252  
Consequently, the exploitation of these asteroids should be undertaken only if the 
resources found to be available on the asteroid justifies the expense and time involved 
in the mining operation. 
2.5.3  Energy Requirements for the Mining and Processing of Ores 
There are two main energy requirements in any mining venture: the first being the 
energy needed to separate the ore from the surrounding regolith and the second being 
the energy to convert the ore chemically into the desired minerals.  The physical ore 
processing, or beneficiation, generally involves crushing and grinding the material into 
a fine powder that is then separated by magnetic or aqueous processes, thus improving 
the concentration of the ore by about 50%. 
                                                           
 
252 John C. Niehoff, Asteroid Mission Alternatives, in Morrison and Wells, supra note 228, at 225-244; 
and John C. Niehoff, Round-Trip Mission Requirements for Asteroids 1976AA and 1973EC (1977) 31 
ICARUS 430; Alfred C. Mascy and John C. Niehoff, Sample Return Missions to the Asteroid Eros, in 
Tom Gehrels (ed.), PHYSICAL STUDIES OF MINOR PLANETS: PROCEEDINGS OF INTERNATIONAL 
ASTRONOMICAL UNION COLLOQUIUM 12, March 1971 in Tucson, Arizona, United States of 
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The chemical processing, on the other hand, uses heat, reactants and catalysts to 
change the state of the metal from a compound state to a free state.  The energy 
required includes the enthalpy (the minimum energy required for the chemical 
reaction to take place) and additional heat to increase the rate of the reaction.  In most 
cases, this may involve melting the ore, thus significantly increasing the energy 
required.  By undertaking most of the chemical processing in space, the mass of the 
returned materials is reduced, resulting in lower launch costs from the asteroid.  
The total energy requirement for the mining and processing of mined ores from an 













(1)  E0 is the energy needed for ore beneficiation; 
(2)  g is the “grade” or concentration of the metal in the ore; 
(3)  η1 is the efficiency of the beneficiation process; 
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(5)  η2 is the efficiency of the smelting process. 253 
As Johnson pointed out, this in effect equates to requiring 500,000,000 joules of 
energy to produce one kilogram of free metal.  As a comparison, one kilogram of 
methane contains nearly 57,000,000 joules of energy.254  Since the beneficiation 
process consumes the bulk of the energy, most of the energy source would have to be 
launched from the Earth and transported to the asteroid along with the mining plant 
and infrastructure, thus significantly increasing the costs of such a venture.  On the 
other hand, the higher quality ore available on asteroids as compared to those found 
in the Earth’s crust today means that the transportation costs may well be offset by the 
cost benefits derived from processing higher grade ore from the asteroids.  Over time 
the energy costs of mining in space will decrease while the corresponding costs of 
mining terrestrial resources will increase, making the mining of asteroids a 
comparatively more energy efficient exercise in supplying the increasing demand of 
mineral resources. 
                                                           
 
253 Fred M. Johnson, A Comparison of Energy Requirements between Terrestrial Metal Extraction and 
Recovery of Asteroid Metal Resources, at <http://www.erie.net/~fjohnson/AsteroidPaper.html>, last 
accessed on 3 October 2001. 
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2.6  EXPLORATORY MISSIONS TO NEAR EARTH ASTEROIDS 
As with mining operations on the Earth, the mining of asteroids and other members of 
the Solar System requires prior exploration and prospecting.  In the case of asteroids, 
this can only be done with unmanned spacecrafts to determine the mineralogy of 
potential mining candidates in the Solar System.  
2.6.1  Flyby Missions 
In designing exploratory missions to asteroids, the types of missions are similar and 
analogous to missions concerning planetary exploration: flybys, orbiters, landers and 
sample return.  In scientific writings, the term “rendezvous” is used often to describe 
missions where the spacecraft meets and then travels in close vicinity to a comet or a 
small asteroid where the gravity is generally too weak for the spacecraft to enter into 
the orbit at a safe distance from the surface.  In practice, however, for most large 
asteroids the spacecraft would nevertheless function as an orbiter of the asteroid. 
Flyby missions to asteroids generally involve velocities of around five kilometres per 
second, similar to the velocity of the asteroids themselves.255  This type of mission is 
particularly useful for large asteroids, as the imaging and exploratory capabilities of 
                                                           
 
255 Morrison and Niehoff, supra note 6, at 235. Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
  Page |  143 
flyby missions are relatively limited and would be inappropriate for small objects.  For 
example, the Voyager exploration of the Galilean satellites suggested that a resolution 
of around ten kilometres is the minimum for useful surface geological data to be 
collected on a flyby mission.256  For a camera with a focal length of 1,500 minimetres, 
this resolution would be reached at a range of 500,000 kilometres.  In a typical flyby 
mission of a large asteroid, this range would last about two days.  However, as the 
relatively low-resolution images of 113 Amalthea taken by Voyager 1 shows in Figure 
2.6-1 below, even at a resolution of eight kilometres, the images taken of a moderately 
large asteroid would have very limited mineralogical applications.  As such, the 
practical benefits derived from such flyby missions in mineralogical studies can be 
somewhat limited. 
 
Figure 2.6-1. Image of Amalthea taken by Voyager 1257 
                                                           
 
256 The Galilean satellites are Io, Europa, Ganymede and Callisto, the four largest satellites of Jupiter 
that were discovered by Galileo. 
257 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Amalthea — Voyager 1 (2003) at 
<http://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/imgcat/html/object_page/vg1_1638131.html>, last accessed on 6 
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As for the physical exploration of asteroids, flyby missions are very limited in their 
capabilities due to the speed at which the spacecraft would be travelling as well as the 
distance it would have to maintain from the asteroid.  For a large asteroid, mass can be 
determined from the gravitational perturbation sustained by the spacecraft, which 
would be too negligible to detect on a small asteroid.  Flyby missions are generally 
unable to carry out detailed chemical analyses of asteroids.  For example, gamma ray 
spectroscopy can only be effectively carried out when the spacecraft is within one 
diameter of the asteroid.  Depending on the size of the asteroid, this time can range 
from around ten seconds for Eros to around three minutes for Vesta.258  This is 
undoubtedly the major deficiency in flyby missions to the asteroids for exploration or 
exploitation purposes. 
The drawback of the limited mineralogical analysis capability of flyby missions is 
offset greatly by the ability of such missions to visit multiple asteroids.259  Once the 
flyby spacecraft enters into a heliocentric orbit near the Asteroid Belt, it is possible to 
fly past a multiple number of asteroids with the potential of flying by about four 
asteroids per orbit.260  Further, the capabilities of a flyby mission would be increased 
                                                           
 
258 Ibid., at 236. 
259 See, for example, Masaaki Matsumoto and Junichiro Kawaguchi, Optimum Trajectory for Low-
Thrust Multiple Trojan Asteroid Flybys (2004), paper presented at the 18th International Symposium 
on Space Flight Dynamics, 11-15 October 2004 in Munich, Germany. 
260 David R. Brooks and William F. Hampshire II, Multiple Asteroid Flyby Missions, in Tom Gehrels 
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orbit of one thousand kilometres around Vesta, for example, it is possible to map the 
entire asteroid at a resolution is of a few metres, similar to the best pictures taken of 
Phobos and Deimos by the Viking spacecrafts.263  At close distances, chemical analyses 
through spectroscopy can also be undertaken on the asteroid itself. 
Another aspect of exploration missions to be considered is the use of landers.  There 
are two general types of landers: hard landers that do not slow when landing on the 
asteroid, and soft landers that can carry out experiments after having landed softly on 
the surface.  Hard landers are small objects that eventually crash into the asteroid and 
can provide valuable chemical and geological data in close proximity to the asteroid 
before impact.264  Soft landers, on the other hand, are sophisticated spacecrafts that 
increase significantly in larger mass and higher complexity, but the resulting increases 
in costs and difficulties due to these factors are offset greatly by the detailed and 
complex analysis and experiments that can take place on the surface.265  Such 
experiments include high-resolution imaging, microscopy and seismic soundings, and 
can prove invaluable for prospecting purposes. 
                                                           
 
263 Veverka and Thomas, supra note 145, at 628-651. 
264 See, for example, European Space Agency, Not-So-Soft Landings on Other Worlds (2001), at 
<http://www.esa.int/export/esaCP/ESAZXCZ84UC_FeatureWeek_0.html>, last accessed on 23 
December 2004.  
265 Paul F. Wercinski, Mars Sample Return – A Direct and Minimum-Risk Design (1996) 33 J. 
SPACECRAFT & ROCKETS 381; and Blake Adams, Mission Design Study for the 2003/2005 Mars Sample 
Return Mission (2002), Colorado Centre for Astrodynamics Research, University of Colorado at 
Boulder, at <http://ccar.colorado.edu/asen5050/projects/projects_2002/adams/>, 12 December 
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2.6.3  Sample Return Missions 
The capabilities of laboratories on the Earth for chemical and mineralogical analysis 
are far more powerful than anything a spacecraft robotic laboratory could muster, 
being limited by size, mass and available power.  On the other hand, the cost of 
deploying a sample return mission is much higher than a flyby, rendezvous or lander 
mission, thus limiting the potential scope of exploration of the asteroid.  The lack of 
detailed prospecting information for most Near Earth Asteroids renders the selection 
of potential asteroid targets for such an expensive mission somewhat unfeasible. 
One proposed mission involves an orbiter spacecraft weighing 600 kilograms to 
rendezvous with a suitable asteroid.266  After orbital capture, the lander weighing 
about three hundred to five hundred kilograms would soft-land on the asteroid 
surface and collect a sample of one hundred grams in a 30 kilogram canister that is 
then returned to the orbiter, which subsequently returns to the Earth orbit for possible 
recovery by the space shuttle or other like vehicle.267 
                                                           
 
266 Timothy D. Jones, Duane B. Eppler, Donald R. Davis, Alan L. Friedlander, James V. McAdams and 
Sergei K. Krikalev, Human Exploration of Near Earth Asteroids, in Tom Gehrels, Mildred Shapley 
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On 9 May 2003, the Hayabusa (MUSES-C) sample return mission from Japan was 
launched, with the target asteroid being Itokawa (1998SF36).268  After being launched 
from a Japanese M-V 5 launch vehicle in Kagoshima, a low-thrust solar electric 
propulsion system was used to enter into a transfer orbit to Itokawa, arriving in June 
2005.269  Figure 2.6-3 below details the mission that was undertaken by Hayabusa. 
When Hayabusa actually landed on Itokawa on 23 November 2005, it had failed to 
collect a sample as planned prior to the landing, but it was still able to determine the 
mass of the asteroid.270  The Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency was then able to 
improvise the possible means to collect a sample before Hayabusa left the surface of 
Itokawa and return the spacecraft to the Earth in 2010.271  In the meantime, much 
                                                           
 
268 Daniel J. Scheeres, Stephen B. Broschart, Steven J. Ostro and Lance A. M. Benner, The Dynamic 
Environment about Asteroid 25143 Itokawa: Target of the Hayabusa Mission, paper presented at the 
AIAA/AAS Astrodynamics Specialist Conference and Exhibit, 16-19 August 2004, in Providence, 
Rhode Island, the United States of America; Institute of Space and Astronautical Science, supra note 
273, at 231-232; and Akira Fujiwara, Tadashi Mukai, Junichiro Kawaguchi and Tono Uesugi, Sample 
Return Mission to NEA: MUSES-C (2000) 25 ADV. SPACE RES. 231 at 231-232. 
269 Akira Fujiwara, Junichiro Kawaguchi and Sho Sasaki, Hayabusa Mission to Asteroid Itokawa: In-Situ 
Observation and Sample Return, paper presented at the Workshop on Dust in Planetary Systems, 26-
30 September 2005, in Hawaii, United States of America, at 
<http://www.lpi.usra.edu/meetings/dust2005/pdf/4024.pdf>, last accessed on 28 January 2007. 
270 Makato Yoshikawa, Mass of Asteroid (25143) Itokawa Determined by Hayabusa Spacecraft (2006), 
paper presented at the 36th COSPAR Scientific Assembly, 16-23 July 2004 in Beijing, China; and 
Will Knight and Maggie McKee, Hayabusa Touched Asteroid Itokawa After All (23 November 2005), 
NEW SCIENTIST, at <http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn8362>, last accessed on 27 
January 2007. 
271 Damian Carrington, Spacecraft Snatches First Samples from Asteroid (26 November 2005), NEW 
SCIENTIST, at <http://space.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn8380>, last accessed on 28 January 
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data has been collected from the mission and much more has been analysed and learnt 
about the properties of Itokawa.272 
 
Figure 2.6-3. Mission Trajectory for Hayabusa to Itokawa273 
                                                           
 
272 Akira Fujiwara, Junichiro Kawaguchi, Donald K. Yeomans, Masanao Abe, Tadashi Mukai, Tomomi 
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Rubble-Pile Asteroid Itokawa as Observed by Hayabusa (2006) 312 SCIENCE 1330; Shinsuke Abe, 
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and Local Topography Measurements of Itokawa by Hayabusa (2006) 312 SCIENCE 1344; and Akira 
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Demura, Daniel J. Scheeres, Robert W. Gaskell, Olivier S. Barnouin-Jha, Andrew F. Cheng, Hideaki 
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2.7  COMMERCIAL FEASIBILITY OF SPACE MINING 
2.7.1  Advantages of Mining Near Earth Asteroids 
Gerlach and Sonter outlined the potential benefits from the mining of Near Earth 
Asteroids, as adumbrated in Table 2.7-1 below.  It is worth noting that Gerlach and 
Sonter also indicated that, in addition to these advantages, mining of asteroids would 
also benefit from the absence of existing landowners, the need to acquire mining 
rights, no constraints resulting from environmental conservation and no concerns 
over disposal of waste products.  These factors, along with the physical and 
mineralogical characteristics of Near Earth Asteroids in general, make them ideal 
candidates for mineral exploitation.  However, as discussed in greater detail later in 
this thesis, the existing international legal principles of international space law do not 
accord with these presumed benefits of asteroid mining and, accordingly, are not 
included in Table 2.7-1 below.275 
                                                           
 
275 See Carl Q. Christol, Protection of Space from Environmental Harms (1979) 4 ANN. AIR & SP. L. 433; 
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2.7.2  Costing a Space Mining Project 
It is a commonly known fact throughout the space industry and beyond that, 
commercial space ventures carry a very high level of risk with long lead times and a 
heavy capital investment cost.277  Space mining ventures are no different: the mineral 
ores extracted from space can generate a substantial profit provided that the costs 
relating to extraction and marketing are less than the revenue generated from sales.  
Even if the space mining venture is governmental instead of commercial, the 
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government would generally require the operation to maximise its cost-benefit ratio 
and, consequently, the returns. 
It is not difficult to anticipate the estimated costs involved in a space mining venture, 
regardless of whether the venture is by its nature, commercial or governmental.   
Kargel had suggested that a typical asteroid mining venture could require a 
capitalisation of at least U.S. $100 billion, presumably at 1996 values when his analysis 
was conducted.278 
Generally, the categories of costs in a space mining venture are: 
(1)  research and development costs, being the costs involved in inventing, 
designing, constructing and testing new equipments, devices or propulsion 
systems as well as methodologies that are to be adopted for extraction, 
processing and transportation; 
(2)  exploration and prospecting costs, being the steps necessary to 
undertake a feasibility study into a particular target object to ascertain 
with reasonable certainty the quality, type and location of ores that are 
available to be extracted; 
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(3)  construction and infrastructure development costs, being the costs 
involved in drilling, blasting and hauling as well as the transportation costs 
for plant and equipment to the mine; 
(4)  operational and engineering costs, include costs such as salaries, 
consumables, fuel, maintenance, taxes, safety systems, surveying, 
modelling and the acquisition of professional services such as legal and 
accounting; 
(5)  environmental costs, being those involved in alleviating or minimising 
the environmental impact on the asteroid; and 
(6)  time as the opportunity cost of the capital invested in the space mining 
venture would have earned in interest over the estimated duration of the 
venture if it was instead invested in an account bearing the market rate of 
commercial lending interest. 
In this example, there are seven major stages in the project throughout the estimated 
12 years of the commercial mining venture on a Near Earth Asteroid in outer space, as 
illustrated in Table 2.7-2 below. Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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As Gertsch and Gertsch have suggested, even when compared with the cost of the 
Henderson Mine in Empire, Colorado, or the Channel Tunnel, this sample space 
mining venture would have higher risks and a longer payback period than most large 
terrestrial projects.280  For example, even a small failure during flight can terminate the 
entire operation, resulting in no return for the large investment made. 
                                                           
 
279 Ibid. 
280 Ibid.  The Henderson Mine began operation in 1976 after U.S. $500 million was invested in its 
development: Colorado School of Mines (2004), at 
<http://cause.mines.edu/media/UNO_Henderson.pdf>, last accessed on 24 July 2007.  The 
Channel Tunnel cost over £10 billion and was completed in 1995: Ian Holliday, Gerard Marcou and 
Roger Vickerman, THE CHANNEL TUNNEL: PUBLIC POLICY, REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND 
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2.7.3  Determining Financial Feasibility 
It has been noted that the parameters for comparing different asteroid mining 
concepts and mission alternatives are not well developed.281  Sonter and Ross have 
suggested the use of net present value (“NPV”) is the most appropriate “figure of 
merit” as the means of determining the financial feasibility of asteroid mining 
missions.282  For an asteroid mining mission, the calculation of net present value would 
need to take into account: 
(1)  the cost to launch and conduct the mission; 
(2)  the mass returned and market value for the returned mass; and 
(3)  the time taken to complete the mission.283 
Sonter suggested that the formula for determining the net present value of a given 
asteroid mining mission might be given expression as: 
() ( ) [ ] n B M M M C i e r t f M C NPV inst power equip op
a v v
equip orbit




                                                           
 
281 Knut I. Oxnevad, An Investment Analysis Model for Space Mining Ventures (1991), paper presented at 
the 42nd International Astronautical Congress, 5-11 October 1991, in Montréal, Canada; and John S. 
Lewis, Kumar N. Ramohalli and Terry Triffet, Extraterrestrial Resource Utilisation for Economy in 
Space Missions, paper presented at the 41st International Astronautical Congress, 6-12 October 1990, 
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Where: 
(1)  NPV is the net present value of the returns on investment; 
(2)  Corbit is the launch cost from the surface of the Earth to the Earth orbit, 
expressed as dollar cost per kilogram; 
(3)  Mequip is the total mass of the mining and ore processing equipment, 
expressed in kilograms; 
(4)  f is the specific mass throughput ratio for the miner, expressed as 
kilograms of ores mined per kilogram of equipment per day; 
(5)  t is the mining period in days; 
(6)  r is the percentage recovery of valuable mineral from the ore; 
(7)  ∆v is the change in velocity needed for the return trajectory, expressed as 
kilometres per second (kms-1); 
(8)  ve is the propulsion exhaust velocity in kilometres per second (kms-1); 
(9)  i is the applicable interest rate on investment as available in the market, 
expressed as a percentage per annum; Economic and Technical Prospects of Space Mining 
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(10)  a is the semi-major axis of the transfer orbit, expressed in astronomical 
units; 
(11)  Mpower is the mass of the power supply, expressed in kilograms; 
(12)  Minst is the mass of instrumentation and control systems; 
(13)  Cop is the specific cost of the mining operation; 
(14)  B is the annual operational budget of the project; and 
(15)  n is the number of years from launch of the mission to the delivery of 
mineral resources in low Earth orbit.284 
It is apparent from the above equation that the per kilogram cost of launch from the 
surface of the Earth to low Earth orbit is not the most important determinant in a 
commercial asteroid mining operation, though usually this is the most crucial factor in 
assessing the financial feasibility of most space applications.  It is the cost of the 
mining operation itself, the energy cost of returning the mined ores to low Earth orbit, 
and the duration of years from the commencement of the project to the return of 
products that must be minimised.  In this context, Ross opined that missions that take 
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longer than around three years would need to have minimal costs and a good rate of 
return in order for the net present value of the returns to be positive.285 
The expected net present value (“ENPV”) provides a weighted measure of the NPV 
takes into account the probability of change in the variables factored into the 
calculation of NPV as well as the probability of failures.  The formula for the ENPV of 






j j NPV p ENPV
1
 
The determination of the probability of failure associated with each of the general and 
specific risks applicable to the mission is a complex and uncertain task.  This is 
because the use of new and unproven space technology makes it difficult to ascertain 
the probability of failure associated with each risk.  Further, the degree of risk varies at 
each phase of the mission, particularly where options that vary the relative risks are 
available at various phases of the mission to adapt to varying situations and to 
minimise any unfolding risk factors.286 
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2.7.4  Comparing Returns on Investment 
For an experimental and high-risk proposition such as asteroid mining, proposals 
would need to create a very high rate of return on investment (the “ROI”), perhaps in 
excess of 30% per year, to compete successfully for the financial investment needed.287  
In order to achieve set levels of ROI, or the income as a percentage of the investment 
after taking into account the projected costs and revenues as well as the project time, 
certain amounts of platinum metals must be recovered from the asteroid.  Given that 
currently platinum is valued at around U.S. $1,340 per ounce as on 5 September 2008, 
a 10% return on investment can be achieved by recovering 5,575,000 ounces of 
platinum from 1,155,000 tonnes of asteroid ore.288  In order to achieve a 50% return 
on investment, 54,750,000 ounces of platinum would have to be recovered from an 
estimated 11,350,000 tonnes of asteroid ore.289  Clearly, the higher the rate of ROI 
required, the more economically, technologically and practically unfeasible the 
venture becomes. 
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288 Richard Gertsch and Leslie Gertsch, Economic Analysis Tools for Mineral Projects in Space, Colorado 
School of Mines, Golden, Colorado, <http://www.mines.edu/research/srr/rgertsch.pdf>, last 
accessed on 31 October 2001.  The figures referred to above have been adjusted to reflect the price of 
platinum as on 5 September 2008.  The authors pointed out that the cost and the time duration are 
very low estimates and based very much on an optimistic scenario.  Current platinum prices can be 
found at <http://platinumprice.org>, last accessed on 8 September 2008. 
289 Ibid. Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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The payback period and the high risk involved make such ventures somewhat 
uncompetitive vis-à-vis terrestrial projects.  However, launching costs for the mining 
plant and equipment is a significant, if not the most significant, cost barrier that can 
only reduce over time with increased competition and improved technology.  Further, 
the research and development costs involved in mining the second and subsequent 
asteroids would decrease, as the firm would be able to utilise the existing technology 
available from previous ventures.  Consequently, even though initial ventures may 
have to rely on governmental participation or implementation through combining 
with a scientific or water extraction operation, over time the space mining ventures 
will become increasingly viable through the continual reduction of fixed costs.  When 
considered together with increasing demand and prices for platinum and other 
platinum-group metals on Earth, the mining of platinum group metals may soon 
become an attractive commercial investment for space entrepreneurs.  This is 
provided that the risks, being the most important factor in the calculation of the 
ENPV in the minds of financiers, can be substantially minimised. 
2.7.5  Minimisation of Mission Risks 
2.7.5.1  Overview 
The paramount issue for financiers and venture capital firms in considering such a 
venture is the level of risk associated with the venture.  The duration of time and the Economic and Technical Prospects of Space Mining 
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amount of initial investment are factors secondary to the issue of risk, otherwise most 
financiers would be willing to invest a substantial amount of funds provided that the 
returns exceed that generated from common “terrestrial” investments.  With 
significant risks involved, however, the degree of risk must be taken into account 
when considering the sufficiency of the returns generated from the venture. 
There are at least four broad categories of risk that may be generally and specifically 
associated with mining ventures in outer space as follows:  
(1)  technical risks, being those arising with the application of technology to 
the venture, especially unproven technology; 
(2)  physical risks, being those associated with scientific and physical 
uncertainty over the physical, geological and mineralogical nature and 
characteristics of the celestial body; 
(3)  economic risks, being those associated with the economic and market 
conditions of the mineral products to be recovered by the venture; and 
(4)  political and legal risks, being those associated with the legal and 
regulatory obstacles that would need to be overcome in order for the 
venture to successfully obtain financial investment and operate with 
minimal governmental interference. Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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2.7.5.2  Technical Risks 
Traditionally, the technical risks are the greatest and most fundamental to any space 
mission, as unproven technological applications in space pose significant threat of 
failure, regardless of whether such failure takes place at the time of launch, orbital 
operations, landing or return.  While risks associated with proven technologies, such 
as launches, can be minimised, the use of new technology on the surface of the Moon 
and asteroids will be untested and, unfortunately, computer simulations and scaled 
models would only partly minimise such technical risks. 
The various technical risks specifically associated with a mining venture on celestial 
bodies in outer space include: 
(1)  failure during launch from the surface of the Earth; 
(2)  failure during transfer of robotic mining equipment from low Earth orbit 
into a transfer orbit to the celestial body; 
(3)  crashing and other accidents during landing on the celestial body; 
(4)  system failure while the spacecrafts are in orbit around the Earth or in 
orbit around the celestial body; 
(5)  failure in launching containers from the surface of the celestial body to the 
orbiting spacecraft for return to low Earth orbit; Economic and Technical Prospects of Space Mining 
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(6)  system failure in the extraction and processing mechanisms on the surface 
of the celestial body; and 
(7)  electric power failures while in outer space and on the surface of the 
celestial body.290 
While these risks may be minimised through the application and use of proven 
technology and with rigorous testing and simulations, there remains significant threat 
of failure in the operation of these technical systems during a mining mission in outer 
space and on a celestial body. 
2.7.5.3  Physical Risks 
Despite significant exploration and prospecting activities conducted at most potential 
mining sites on Earth, there are nevertheless significant risks associated with the 
uncertain knowledge of mineralogical and geological features of terrestrial mining 
operations.291  The lack of precise knowledge in relation to ore concentrations, ore 
qualities and geological conditions at mining sites are risk factors that have to be 
considered when planning and financing mining activities on Earth.  These risks 
                                                           
 
290 Gerlach, supra note 124. 
291 See, for example, Ian Lerche, GEOLOGICAL RISK AND UNCERTAINTY IN OIL EXPLORATION: 
UNCERTAINTY, RISK AND STRATEGY (1997); and Paul D. Newendorp and John R. Schuyler, 
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increase substantially for mining activities that take place in remote areas, such as the 
Polar Regions and the deep seabed. 
For a mining venture in outer space, the degree of risks associated with such 
uncertainties in relation to the physical characteristics of the celestial body increases.  
These risks may be summarised as: 
(1)  uncertainty over mineral compositions and concentrations, because 
without the collection and analysis of actual samples from the celestial 
body itself, any such evidence remains theoretical, speculative or 
circumstantial; 
(2)  lack of suitable and/or available operating sites for mining equipment; 
(3)  mechanical characteristics of the celestial body, such as size, shape, spin 
rate, spin state, orientation and angular momentum, that may affect the 
design and operation of the mining equipment and the amount of solar 
power available;292 and 
                                                           
 
292 Derek W. G. Sears and Daniel J. Scheeres, Asteroid Constraints on Multiple Near-Earth Asteroid 
Sample Return (2001) 36 METEOR. & PLANET. SCI. 186; and Derek W. G. Sears, Daniel T. Britt and 
Andrew F. Cheng, Asteroid Sample Return: 433 Eros as an Example of Sample Site Selection (2001) 36 
METEOR. & PLANET. SCI. 30. Economic and Technical Prospects of Space Mining 
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(4)  errors and/or miscalculations in the consideration of physical 
characteristics and orbital mechanics of the celestial body and/or the 
trajectories to be used. 
These physical risks may be minimised through detailed planning as well as 
exploratory missions to the targeted celestial bodies to provide mapping imagery and 
data from flyby and orbital missions and to obtain geological and mineralogical 
samples from these celestial bodies by lander missions.  However, such missions are 
costly and while laboratory simulations may be conducted, it would not significantly 
reduce the relevant risks.293  Although some economic models presently exist for 
evaluating mining ventures with uncertainties over output yields, these risks are 
compounded by the difficulties of undertaking substantive exploration and 
prospecting activities on celestial bodies, such as Near Earth Asteroids.294 
2.7.5.4  Economic Risks 
The exploration, prospecting and development of a mine on the surface of the Earth 
usually takes a few years between a mining venture obtaining a mining lease or similar 
                                                           
 
293 Derek W. G. Sears, Paul H. Benoit, Steven W. S. McKeever, Dipankar P. K. Banerjee, Timothy A. 
Kral, Wesley E. Stites, L. A. Roe, Pamela E. Jansma and Glen S. Mattioli, Investigation of Biological, 
Chemical and Physical Processes on and in Planetary Surfaces by Laboratory Simulation (2002) 50 
PLANET. SP. SCI. 821. 
294 Bardia Kamrad and Ricardo Ernst, An Economic Model for Evaluating Mining and Manufacturing 
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entitlement to the site and the production of mineral resources.  For example, the Batu 
Hijau copper and gold deposit in the island of Sumbawa in Indonesia was discovered 
in 1990 but it was not until 2000 when commercial operation of the mine began.295  
This is the case even when precious minerals such as diamonds are involved, which 
were first discovered at the remote site of the EKATI Diamond Mine near Wekweti in 
the Northwest Territories of Canada in 1991.  It was not until September 1998 when 
the first diamond was actually recovered from the mine.296 
In a mining venture in outer space, the duration of time between exploration missions 
and the commitment of investment funds on the one hand, and the delivery of 
processed ores in the low Earth orbit or the surface of the Earth on the other, is even 
longer than that of terrestrial projects.  For instance, Gertsch and Gertsch undertook 
the analysis of a mission to mine an asteroid for platinum group metals at an 
estimated cost of around U.S. $5 billion and a duration of 12 years to completion, on a 
typical Near Earth Asteroid with approximately 150 parts per million in platinum 
group metals.297 
                                                           
 
295 Newmont Mining Corporation, Batu Hijau, Indonesia, at 
<http://www.newmont.com/en/operations/indonesia/batuhijau/index.asp>, last accessed on 28 
April 2007. 
296 B.H.P. Billiton Ltd., BHP Billiton Diamonds: History, at 
<http://ekati.bhpbilliton.com/repository/aboutMine/history.asp>, last accessed on 28 April 2007.  
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In such a context, it is important to factor into account the risk that commodity prices 
and demands fall significantly from the time of exploration to actual production and 
delivery of the minerals.  This may be the result of various factors including the 
discovery of substantial deposits on Earth, innovation and improvements in recycling 
and ore processing technologies, development of alternative substituting products or a 
decline in the demand for some of the secondary products.  However, it is noteworthy 
that such economic factors may significantly reduce the returns generated from the 
investment but they would not eliminate the returns generated from the investment, 
unlike most technical and physical factors. 
2.7.5.5  Political Risks 
Substantial mineral deposits found on the Earth are located in increasingly remote 
corners of the Earth and, accordingly, the legal and political risks associated with the 
location of the mining operation are becoming increasingly important.  In a recent 
study in the United States relating to natural gas exploration and production, Hartley 
and Medlock identified the following relevant social and political risk factors in the 
establishment of such production operations on the surface of the Earth: 
(1)  government stability, being a measure of the State’s ability to carry out its 
declared program and its ability to stay in office; Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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(2)  investment receptiveness, being a measure of the State’s attitude towards 
substantial external investments; 
(3)  internal conflict and tensions, being the existence and activities of armed 
opposition groups as well as the level of domestic ethnic, cultural and 
religious tensions; 
(4)  corruption; 
(5)  rule of law; and 
(6)  bureaucratic and governmental regulation.298 
In addition to the risk factors as adumbrated above, one would also consider the state 
and nature of the international and diplomatic relations of that State.  In any event, it 
is apparent from the risk factors listed above that they are generally inapplicable to a 
mining venture in outer space, though they may need to be taken into account, at least 
peripherally, in terms of the corporate and financial structure of the mining venture.  
However, there are legal risks that must be considered as possible obstacles to mining 
ventures in outer space. 
                                                           
 
298 Peter Hartley and Kenneth B. Medlock, Political and Economic Influences on the Future World 
Market for Natural Gas (2005), at James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Geopolitics of Gas 
Working Paper Series, at 
<http://www.rice.edu/energy/publications/docs/GAS_PoliticalEconomicInfluences.pdf>, last 
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2.7.5.6  Legal Risks 
In order to fully assess the feasibility of mining operations in outer space, it is prudent 
to undertake a detailed study of the legal issues that apply to the exploration, 
extraction and exploitation segments of such a mining operation.  These legal risk 
factors include: 
(1)  the provision of exclusive property rights for the mining operation; 
(2)  the right to extract and exploit mineral resources from celestial bodies; 
(3)  successful procurement of all necessary governmental approvals, licences 
and permits; 
(4)  potential contractual liabilities; and 
(5)  potential liability to third parties. 
It is through a comprehensive analysis of these risk factors and any legal reforms made 
to address these risk factors, an attempt at which is undertaken later in this thesis, that 
a complete picture of risk for mining operations in outer space can be painted. Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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2.7.6  Practical Implications of Risk Profiles 
It is clear from the above analysis that, given the gravity of the abovementioned risks, 
it is highly unlikely that any prudent investor in the present day would be willing to 
finance a commercial mining venture in outer space.  What must be considered in 
assessing these risks, however, is the effects that the passage of time has on most of 
these risks, as summarised in Table 2.7-3 below. 
In particular, technical improvements and advancements in launch technologies, 
propulsion systems, power generation and robotics over time will alleviate the 
technical risks, in addition to providing significant cost savings.  Continuing scientific 
exploration and studies of celestial bodies, along with improving observation 
techniques, will reduce the effects of the physical risks.  The worsening scarcity of 
mineral resources on Earth amid rising demand from developing economies, along 
with increasing concern of the environmental impact of mining activities, will reduce 
the economic risks that are inherent in terrestrial mining projects in any event.  Even 
political risks can be controlled with case-by-case studies of domestic and regional 
conditions collected empirically over time. Economic and Technical Prospects of Space Mining 
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On the other hand, the passage of time will have negligible effects on the legal risks 
associated with commercial space mining ventures.  Issues such as title and other 
property rights to mining operations and the extracted ores from celestial bodies are 
not discussion topics of high priority among intergovernmental institutions, despite 
being the subject of much debate in academic circles.  Similarly, potential liabilities 
between contractors and to third parties and the need for governmental approvals will 
remain, regardless of time. 
Only through revisions and changes to the body of international and domestic law 
dealing with outer space and celestial bodies will some of the legal risks be reduced, 
minimised or eliminated.  Therefore, it is important to consider in detail the legal 
issues associated with commercial space mining ventures and to address the possible 
need for a new legal framework for the commercial exploitation of mineral resources 
in outer space. 
2.8  CONCLUSIONS 
It is clear from the present study that the economic and technical conditions for space 
mining will eventuate in the near future as the next phase in the continual evolution of 
human civilisation.  Further, as the production costs of mineral resources continue to 
increase due to of depleting reserves, there will eventually be a point where economic 
or physical exhaustion of resources on Earth takes place or when the continual Economic and Technical Prospects of Space Mining 
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exploitation of such resources on Earth becomes environmentally undesirable.  When 
that occurs, there will be sufficient technological development to overcome the 
difficulties involved in extracting resources from the Near Earth Asteroids. 
While technological advancements in spacecraft design and exploration in the Solar 
System continue to increase exponentially, the development of the law has not kept 
pace.  As a result, legal issues in the advancement of commercial asteroid resources 
have replaced technical and economic issues as the most intractable hurdles to be 
overcome in the development of space mining.  In the following chapters, these issues 
will be explored to provide a more detailed legal picture of the exploitation of natural 
resources from celestial bodies in outer space.  
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CREATING A PRACTICAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE  
COMMERCIAL EXPLOITATION OF MINERAL RESOURCES IN OUTER SPACE 
CHAPTER 3 
State Responsibility and  
Liability for Compliance with 
Principles of International Law 
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3.1  INTRODUCTION 
Space law is a relatively new branch of public international law, with its origins traced 
back to no more than a theoretical concept in the 1930s.1  Since the beginning of the 
Cold War and the “Space Race” between the United States and the Soviet Union, 
however, the rapid commercialisation of the Earth orbit has led many scholars and 
commentators to realise that the existing legal framework for international space law 
is incapable of dealing with the commercial development of outer space.  The framers 
of the treaties in the 1960s had not envisaged that private and commercial satellites 
would orbit the world before the end of the century and deliver many of the services 
that human civilisation today now takes for granted.  These activities, such as remote 
sensing, weather forecasting, direct television broadcasting and telecommunications, 
have torn apart the thin fabric of the existing space law framework. 
In considering the legal framework applicable to future space activities, such as the 
launch and transit segments of a commercial space mining venture, it is important to 
resolve the existing legal issues arising from space commercialisation.  Even though 
                                                           
 
1 The first published monograph on space law was published in 1932.  See Vladimír Mandl, DAS 
WELTRAUMRECHT: EIN PROBLEM DER RAUMFAHRT (1932).  See also Vladímir Kopal, Vladimír Mandl 
— Founder of Space Law (1968) 11 PROC. COLL. L. OUTER SP. 357; and Gerhard Reintanz, Vladimír 
Mandl — The Father of Space Law (1968) 11 PROC. COLL. L. OUTER SP. 362. Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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the current pace of commercialisation has not been hindered by the ambiguities and 
uncertainties of space law, it must be kept in mind that the investments required for a 
space mining venture are far larger than even the largest deployment of 
telecommunications satellite constellations to date.2 
Indeed, a private commercial space mining venture may be comparable in size and 
cost to another human landing on the Moon, but without the financial resources and 
legal protection that was available to the United States Government at the time Neil 
Armstrong landed on the Moon in 1969.  It has been estimated in 1996 that a typical 
asteroid mining venture would require a capitalisation of at least U.S. $100 billion, or 
U.S. $120 billion in 2005 values.3  By comparison, the cost of deployment of the 
Iridium mobile communications satellite business was estimated at around U.S. $7 
billion in 1995 or U.S. $8.6 billion in 2005 values.4  The entire Apollo Program cost 
U.S. $25 billion between 1961 and 1972, or projected at U.S. $121.6 billion in 2005 
                                                           
 
2 For example, Iridium LLC expended over U.S. $6.5 billion in contracts for satellite design, launch, 
operations and maintenance: Sydney Finkelstein and Shade H. Sanford, Learning from Corporate 
Mistakes: The Rise and Fall of Iridium (2000) 29 ORGANISATIONAL DYNAMICS 138; and Martin 
Collins, One World … One Telephone: Iridium, One Look at the Making of a Global Age (2005) 21 HIST. 
& TECH. 301. 
3 Jeffrey S. Kargel, Market Value of Asteroidal Precious Metals in an Age of Diminishing Terrestrial 
Resources, in Stewart W. Johnson (ed.), ENGINEERING, CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATIONS IN SPACE V: 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SPACE (1996).  The value conversion 
was done based on the annual gross domestic product of the United States of America as determined 
by the USA Bureau of Economic Analysis, as this would be the more appropriate indicator than using 
the official annual consumer price index as calculated by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, as the 
latter would consider only consumer goods and, accordingly, is somewhat inappropriate for 
determining the cost of space missions.  For reference, the latter would calculate U.S. $100 billion in 
1996 to be U.S. $120 billion in 2005 values. 
4 See Collins, supra note 2. State Responsibility and Liability for Compliance with Principles of International Law 
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values.5  Private investment on such a scale can be feasible only with a substantial 
degree of certainty in the rights to explore, extract and exploit the mineral resources 
on celestial bodies.  In this context, it is important to analyse the predominant legal 
issues from the existing principles of space law that affect the commercialisation of the 
space sector, before considering the legal issues that are peculiar to mining activities in 
outer space. 
Firstly, important fundamental terms of the treaties were left vague and ambiguous 
during the Cold War because of the inability of the two antagonists, the Soviet Union 
and the United States, to agree on many issues at a detailed level.  Not surprisingly, 
however, private and commercial interests often require relative legal certainty over 
their rights and liabilities before being able to obtain large-scale investments that 
commercial activity requires.  As a result, these ambiguities created a climate of 
instability and uncertainty that has been detrimental to the solid development of a 
private and commercial space sector. 
Secondly, the framers of the treaties did not envisage the multinational and 
commercial nature of the space industry that would evolve when formulating the rules 
relating to international responsibility and jurisdiction in space.  It was believed at the 
time that the most likely proponent of space activities would be the governments of 
                                                           
 
5 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, at 
<http://www1.jsc.nasa.gov/er/seh/apollo_program.pdf>, last accessed on 25 July 2007. Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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States or their agencies, a belief that held true for no more than about 20 years after 
the first General Assembly resolution containing definitive principles of international 
space law.6  At the turn of the century, the commercial nature of the space sector has 
meant that the predominant players in the space industry today are large 
multinational firms or intergovernmental conglomerates.  For example, the Sea 
Launch project involved a joint venture of aerospace and maritime firms from several 
developed countries and the International Space Station is an intergovernmental 
effort involving 16 States, for which some contracted various commercial entities to 
undertake the construction of vital components.7  These contractors, in turn, are often 
themselves multinationals with complex ownership, financing and incorporation 
structures.  The ability of the international legal framework to prescribe liability and 
jurisdiction for the activities of such entities in space is becoming increasingly 
troublesome, compelling many commercial entities and their governments to 
                                                           
 
6 General Assembly Resolution 1962 (XVIII). 
7 The commercial partners of the Sea Launch project are Boeing Commercial Space (USA) (40%), RSC-
Energia (Russia) (25%), Akec Kvaerner (Norway) (20%) and SDO Yuzhnoye / PO Yuzhmash 
(Ukraine) (15%); the governmental partners of the International Space Station are Canada, Japan, 
Russia, the United States of America and the European Space Agency, of which the Member States are 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom: European 
Space Agency, All About E.S.A. (2008), at 
<http://www.esa.int/SPECIALS/About_ESA/SEMW16ARR1F_0.html>, 12 September 2008, last 
accessed on 1 November 2008. State Responsibility and Liability for Compliance with Principles of International Law 
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prescribe, clarify and limit their liabilities towards each other by private contract.8  On 
the other hand, the liability of the launch proponents towards third parties has not 
been definitively determined by the relevant treaties or the international judicial and 
arbitral institutions. 
Thirdly, there is a developing trend that the line dividing civilian and military 
activities in the aerospace industry is becoming blurred.  Recent commercial activities 
in space have brought into question the legality of many activities already being 
conducted in space, such as the military use of civilian communications systems and 
remote sensing data from satellites.  Although the United Nations has taken steps 
towards the codification of the principles relating to the specific applications of space, 
the legal rules relating to the military applications in space are no more refined than 
they were in the early 1960s, except for the continuing work of legal commentators to 
interpret such rules.  The lack of clarity on this issue makes it difficult for any military 
involvement in any commercial space mining venture, either in the form of 
                                                           
 
8 The 1998 International Space Station Intergovernmental Agreement is an example of a treaty 
governing an intergovernmental activity; and the 2001 bilateral agreement between Australia and the 
Russian Federation is an example of a bilateral agreement providing for cooperation between the two 
States for the regulation of private space launch activities: the Agreement Among the Government of 
Canada, Governments of the Member States of the European Space Agency, the Government of 
Japan, the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the United States of 
America Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space Station, opened for signature on 29 
January 1998, Temp. State Dep’t No. 01-52, CTIA No. 10073.000 (entered into force on 27 March 
2001); and the Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Russian 
Federation on Cooperation in the Field of Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes, 
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investment, personnel, intellectual property or even as a customer utilising the 
resources mined from outer space. 
In order for commercial space mining ventures to take place, it is necessary for these 
legal issues to be considered.  In particular, the creation of any new regulatory 
framework must take into account the entire body of legal principles in space law in 
order to create a regime that embodies the spirit, if not the content, of all of the 
relevant legal principles. 
3.2  SOURCES OF SPACE LAW 
3.2.1  United Nations Space Treaties 
As provided In parallel with the advancements made into the final frontier of outer 
space, the creation of the present corpus of international space law is due substantially 
to the efforts made in the adoption of multilateral treaties.  In particular, much of 
these efforts were made by States within the international multilateral framework of 
the United Nations. 
These treaties include: State Responsibility and Liability for Compliance with Principles of International Law 
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(1)  the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer 
Space and Under Water (the “Nuclear Test Ban Treaty”);9 
(2)  the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other 
Celestial Bodies (the “Outer Space Treaty”);10 
(3)  the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and 
the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (the “Rescue 
Agreement”);11 
(4)  the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space 
Objects (the “Liability Convention”);12 
                                                           
 
9 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (the 
“Nuclear Test Ban Treaty”), opened for signature on 5 August 1963, 480 U.N.T.S. 43; 14 U.S.T. 
1313 (entered into force on 10 October 1963).  Though technically not one of the United Nations 
space treaties, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is the first multilateral treaty that contains specific 
international legal obligations on the use of outer space by States. 
10 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (the “Outer Space Treaty”), opened for signature on 
27 January 1967, 610 U.N.T.S. 205; 18 U.S.T. 2410; T.I.A.S. 6347; 6 I.L.M. 386 (entered into force on 
10 October 1967). 
11 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects 
Launched into Outer Space (the “Rescue Agreement”), opened for signature on 22 April 1968, 672 
U.N.T.S. 119; T.I.A.S. 6599; 19 U.S.T. 7570; 1986 A.T.S. 8 (entered into force on 3 December 1968). 
12 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (the “Liability 
Convention”), opened for signature on 29 March 1972, 961 U.N.T.S. 187, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. 
7762; 1975 A.T.S. 5 (entered into force on 1 September 1972). Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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(5)  the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space 
(the Registration Convention”);13 and 
(6)  the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies (the “Moon Agreement”).14 
3.2.1.1  Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
Although generally not referred to as one of the United Nations space treaties, the 
1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty can be regarded as the first multilateral treaty to 
impose specific obligations on States in relation to outer space.  Specifically, the 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty requires States to prohibit and prevent the testing of nuclear 
weapons in space by their agencies and nationals.15  This requirement is not repeated 
in other United Nations space treaties and thus only the parties to the Nuclear Test 
Ban Treaty are prohibited from testing such weapons in space.16 
                                                           
 
13 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (the “Registration 
Convention”), opened for signature on 14 January 1975, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15; T.I.A.S. 8480; 28 U.S.T. 
695, (entered into force on 15 September 1976). 
14 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the “Moon 
Agreement”), opened for signature on 18 December 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3; 18 I.L.M. 1434, (entered 
into force on 11 July 1984). 
15 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Article I. 
16 Article IV(1) of the Outer Space Treaty prohibits only the deployment of weapons of mass 
destruction in space.  Article IV(2) of the Outer Space Treaty provides for a complete 
demilitarization of celestial bodies and thus effectively prevents the testing of nuclear weapons on 
celestial bodies.  State Responsibility and Liability for Compliance with Principles of International Law 
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Figure 3.2-1. Timeline of International Space Law Instruments 
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3.2.1.2  Outer Space Treaty 
It was agreed from the early days of the workings of the Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space (“COPUOS”) that the adoption of a treaty containing basic and 
general principles of space law was preferable at that time rather than a 
comprehensive legal code on space activities, similar to that eventually created under 
the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea.17  The main reason for this was the need 
to adapt to constantly evolving space technologies and new space applications.  As 
USA Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, stated at the time, the Outer Space Treaty is an 
“outstanding example of how law and political arrangements can keep pace with 
science and technology”.18  This is not a feature exclusive to the development of space 
law — a similar progressive approach was taken with international human rights 
                                                           
 
17 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature on 10 December 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 3; 21 I.L.M. 1261 (entered into force on 16 November 1994).  To some extent, this debate 
continues today with the issue being one of four discussion topics of the 2004 Colloquium on the Law 
of Outer Space in Vancouver, Canada.  See Natalia R. Malysheva, General Convention on Space Law: 
Some Arguments for Elaboration (2004) 47 PROC. COLL. L. OUTER SP. 254; Mimi Lytje, Obstacles on the 
Way to a General Convention (2004) 47 PROC. COLL. L. OUTER SP. 267; and Lotta Viikari, Problems 
Related to Time in the Development of International Space Law (2004) 47 PROC. COLL. L. OUTER SP. 
259. 
18 Dean Rusk, “Letter of Submittal from Secretary Rusk to President Johnson”, 27 January 1967, in 
Hearings on Treaty on Outer Space Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (1967), 90th 
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instruments.19  It is in this context that the United Nations adopted the Outer Space 
Treaty in 1967. 
There are some features of the United Nations space treaties that were considered 
groundbreaking at the time.20  The Outer Space Treaty, for example, was one of the 
first multilateral treaties that was open to signature by all States and not only those 
that were Member States of the United Nations.21  The space treaties also give explicit 
access to international organisations, such as the European Space Agency, to “accept” 
and fall within the scope of the provisions contained in the treaties.22  The inclusion of 
review clauses in the later treaties, namely the Registration Convention and the Moon 
Agreement, make it possible for the international legal community to revise the legal 
requirements in light of technological and political requirements.23  
The first document to be submitted by Member States to the General Assembly of the 
United Nations for consideration was a draft instrument containing the basic 
                                                           
 
19 Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1950, there has been a significant number of 
international legal instruments dealing with various issues of human rights, such as colonialism, racial 
discrimination, children, education, religious tolerance, women and slavery: see United Nations 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, International Human Rights Instruments (2007), 
at <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/intlinst.htm>, last accessed on 28 January 2007. 
20 Nandasiri Jasentuliyana and Roy S. Lee, MANUAL ON SPACE LAW (1979), vol. III, at xxiv-xxvi. 
21 Outer Space Treaty, Article XIV.  Similar provisions can be found in the Rescue Agreement, Article 7; 
Liability Convention, Article XXIV, Registration Convention, Article VIII and Moon Agreement, 
Article 19.  To some extent, this assertion is difficult to sustain, with Switzerland’s accession to the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice without being a full member of the United Nations. 
22 Outer Space Treaty, Article XIII.  See also Rescue Agreement, Article 6; Liability Convention, Article 
VII; Registration Convention, Article VII; and Moon Agreement, Article 16. 
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principles of space law that was originally proposed by the Soviet Union in 1962.24  
This was followed by draft declarations submitted to the General Assembly by the 
United Kingdom25 and the United States.26  When referred to the Legal Sub-
Committee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space for consideration, 
the United Arab Republic (now Syria and Egypt) also submitted a draft code of 
international cooperation in space.  However, no consensus was reached at the time 
on any of the instruments submitted, especially as the issues addressed by the 
proposed texts were different in both nature and content.27 
After lengthy discussions, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space was 
finally able to reach agreement on a text for the Declaration on Legal Principles 
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (the 
“Principles Declaration”), which was adopted by the General Assembly on 13 
December 1963.28  On 16 June 1965, the Soviet Union submitted to the Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space a draft treaty embodying the basic principles 
contained in the declaration.29  This was followed by a proposal from the United 
States containing a treaty for a similar purpose.30  After consultations over the 
                                                           
 
24 U.N.Doc. A/AC.105/L.2. 
25 U.N.Doc. A/C.1/879. 
26 U.N.Doc. A/C.1/881. 
27 U.N.Doc. A/AC.105/6. 
28 General Assembly Resolution 1962 (XVIII). 
29 U.N.Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.13. 
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following years, the Outer Space Treaty was adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly on 19 December 1966.31 
The fundamental legal principles contained in the Outer Space Treaty include: 
(1)  the freedom of exploration and use of outer space and celestial bodies by 
all States on a non-discriminatory basis;32 
(2)  the prohibition of national appropriation of outer space and celestial 
bodies by claim of sovereignty, use, occupation or by any other means;33 
(3)  the application of international law, especially the Charter of the United 
Nations, to space activities;34 
(4)  the complete demilitarisation of celestial bodies and the prohibition on 
the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in outer space;35 
(5)  the requirement of States to render assistance to astronauts in distress and 
repatriate foreign astronauts and space objects found in their territories;36 
                                                           
 
31 General Assembly Resolution 2222 (XXI). 
32 Outer Space Treaty, Article I. 
33 Ibid., Article II. 
34 Ibid., Article III. 
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(6)  international responsibility of States for “national” space activities and 
their liability for injury, loss and damage caused to other States;37 
(7)  the jurisdiction and control over the space object by a State through 
placement of a space object;38 
(8)  the requirement that space activities must be conducted with due regard 
to the interests of other States and potential harmful interference in the 
activities of other States is to be avoided;39 and 
(9)  States are to avoid harmful contamination of the Earth and any adverse 
changes to the environment of the Earth by the introduction of any 
extraterrestrial matter.40 
As at 1 January 2010, 100 States have ratified the Outer Space Treaty and a further 26 
States have signed it.41  It has been noted that all States involved in space activities are 
party to the Outer Space Treaty and that at least some of its provisions are likely to 
have crystallised into customary international law, although this is somewhat 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
36 Ibid., Article V. 
37 Ibid., Articles VI and VII. 
38 Ibid., Article VIII. 
39 Ibid., Article IX. 
40 Ibid., Article IX. 
41 United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs, Status of International Agreements Relating to Activities 
in Outer Space as at 1 January 2010, 1 January 2010, at < 
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/publications/ST_SPACE_11_Rev2_Add3E.pdf>, last accessed 
on 22 April 2010. State Responsibility and Liability for Compliance with Principles of International Law 
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controversial due to the comparatively little state practice and opinio juris on space 
activities vis-à-vis other subject matters of international law.42  The implications and 
effects of the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty as applied to the relevant aspects of 
commercial space mining ventures in outer space. 
3.2.1.3  Rescue Agreement 
By 1963, there was agreement among the members of the Legal Sub-Committee of the 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space that legal principles concerning the 
rescue and return of astronauts and space objects should be contained in an 
international treaty, separate to the treaty being drafted at the time that later became 
the Outer Space Treaty.  In 1964, the Legal Sub-Committee created a working group 
to consider the two draft instruments submitted by the Soviet Union43 and the United 
States.44  Several other States also submitted amendments to the two existing drafts 
and a new proposal was later jointly submitted by Australia and Canada, based on 
those discussions and amendments.45  After two further drafts with some differences 
were submitted by Italy46 and Argentina,47 the Secretariat of the United Nations 
                                                           
 
42 Bin Cheng, The 1967 Outer Space Treaty: Thirtieth Anniversary (1998) 23 AIR & SP. L. 156. 
43 U.N.Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.2. 
44 U.N.Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.9. 
45 U.N.Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.2. 
46 U.N.Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.21. 
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circulated a consolidated working draft.48  After debates and several revisions, the text 
was submitted to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and, following 
its approval, the General Assembly eventually adopted the Rescue Agreement on 19 
December 1967.49 
The Outer Space Treaty already requires all States to regard astronauts as “envoys of 
mankind in outer space” and render all possible assistance in the event of “accident, 
distress or emergency landing on the territory of another State Party or on the high 
seas”.50  This includes the obligation on astronauts in space to render “all possible 
assistance” to astronauts of other States, which is similar to the requirements of 
international maritime law to render assistance to other vessels in distress at sea.51  
The Rescue Agreement expands on these requirements and provides that: 
(1)  States are required to notify the launching authority and the United 
Nations or, if the launching authority cannot be identified, announce 
publicly any information or discovery of any accident, distress or 
emergency landing suffered by astronauts onboard a spacecraft;52 
                                                           
 
48 U.N.Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.28. 
49 General Assembly Resolution 2345 (XXII). 
50 Outer Space Treaty, Article V.  It is curious to note that such an obligation is not repeated in the 
provisions of the Rescue Agreement. 
51 Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 98. 
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(2)  if astronauts onboard a spacecraft have made an emergency landing 
within the territory of a State, that State is required to take all possible 
steps to rescue them, provide all necessary assistance and to return them 
safely and promptly to the launching authority;53 and 
(3)  if astronauts onboard a spacecraft have alighted in the high seas, all States 
in a position to do so must extend assistance in search and rescue 
operations and, if they are discovered within their territory, to return 
them to the launching authority.54 
The term “launching authority” refers to the State that was responsible for the launch.  
In the case of an international organisation, “launching authority” refers to that 
organisation provided that it has accepted the rights and obligations of the Rescue 
Agreement and a majority of its members are party to the Outer Space Treaty.55  In 
addition to astronauts, the Rescue Agreement also imposes specific obligations on 
States in relation to returned foreign space objects: 
                                                           
 
53 Ibid., Articles 2 and 4. 
54 Ibid., Articles 3 and 4. 
55 Ibid., Article 6.  In the event of the launch being conducted by an international organisation that has 
not accepted the provisions of the Rescue Agreement, its Member States would presumably be 
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(1)  States are required to notify the launching authority and the Secretary-
General of the United Nations of any information or discovery of any 
returned space object or its component parts;56 
(2)  if a space object or one of its component parts has returned to the territory 
of a State, that State is required to recover the object or component part, if 
requested, and to return it to the launching authority;57 
(3)  if a space object or one of its component parts has been found by a State 
beyond the territorial sovereignty of the launching authority, that State is 
required to recover it and to return it to the launching authority;58 and 
(4)  if the returned space object or one of its component parts is of a hazardous 
or deleterious nature, the State must notify the launching authority and to 
immediately take effective steps to eliminate possible dangers of harm.59 
The only reference to the reimbursement of costs by the launching authority is found 
in Article 5(5) of the Rescue Agreement, which relates only to expenses incurred in 
recovering and returning the space object or its component parts.  There is no specific 
                                                           
 
56 Ibid., Article 5(1). 
57 Ibid., Article 5(2) and (3). 
58 Ibid., Article 5(3). 
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provision in the Rescue Agreement that provides for the reimbursement of costs 
incurred in the rescue and repatriation of astronauts or the costs of any cleanup of 
hazardous materials or risks.  It appears from the language of the provision that the 
reimbursement of the necessary costs is to be dealt with separate to the liability for 
damage caused by the space object.60 
As at 1 January 2010, 91 States ratified the Rescue Agreement and a further 24 States 
have signed it.61  Similar to the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty, some 
commentators have asserted that some, if not all, of the provisions of the Rescue 
Agreement have crystallised into customary international law.62  However, this view 
may be difficult to sustain considering the absence of substantial state practice relating 
to these principles.  
3.2.1.4  Liability Convention 
It is not surprising that one of the more fundamental issues considered by the 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in its early days was the codification 
                                                           
 
60 The Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space (the “Nuclear Power 
Sources Principles”) establishes a contrary position; see the Nuclear Power Sources Principles, 
Principle 9(3). 
61 United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs, supra note 41. 
62 Vladlen S. Vereshchetin and Gennady M. Danilenko, Custom as a Source of International Law of Outer 
Space (1985) 13 J. SP. L. 22; and Gennady M. Danilenko, Outer Space and the Multilateral Treaty-
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of principles relating to liability for damage caused by space objects.  In 1962, the 
United States submitted a draft text on liability for space vehicle accidents,63 followed 
by separate proposals from Belgium64 and Hungary.65  In successive years, different 
amendments and alternative proposals were made by Argentina, Australia, Canada, 
India and Japan.  It was not until 1971, after years of discussions and negotiations 
within the Legal Sub-Committee, that a draft treaty was finally submitted to the 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and, subsequently, to the General 
Assembly for their consideration.  The Liability Convention was subsequently 
adopted by the General Assembly on 29 November 1971.66 
The Liability Convention was the first United Nations space law instrument to 
introduce the concept of a “launching State”.  Article I defines a “launching State” as a 
State that: 
(1)  launches the space object; 
(2)  procures the launching of a space object; 
(3)  provides the territory for the launch; or 
                                                           
 
63 U.N.Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.8. 
64 U.N.Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.7. 
65 U.N.Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.10. 
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(4)  provides the facility for the launch. 
The Liability Convention deals with the compensation payable by the launching State 
for any damage caused by the launch or attempted launch of a space object, including 
its component parts and launch vehicle.67  Where there is more than one launching 
State, a possibility clearly intended from the definition of “launching State”, they are 
jointly and severally liable for any damage caused and a launching State that has paid 
compensation may present claims for contribution from the other launching States, or 
they may develop agreements to apportion their liability.68  The Liability Convention 
excludes from its scope any damage caused to the nationals of the launching State and 
to foreign nationals invited to participate in the launch by the launching State.69 
In the case of damage caused by space objects on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft 
in flight, the launching State is absolutely liable.70  Provided the launch conforms with 
international law, then the absolute liability of the launching State would be 
exonerated to the extent that the damage was wholly or partly the result of gross 
negligence or an intentional act or omission by the victim State.71  Where damage is 
caused by space objects in outer space or on celestial bodies, compensation is payable 
                                                           
 
67 Liability Convention, Article I. 
68 Ibid., Article V. 
69 Ibid., Article VII. 
70 Ibid., Article II. 
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to the extent of the fault of the launching State.72  If two or more space objects were 
involved in an accident that subsequently caused damage to a third State, then the 
liability of their launching States to the third State for the damage caused is joint and 
several.73  In any event, no limit is placed on the liability of States under these 
provisions.74 
The Liability Convention provides for any claims for compensation to be made within 
one year of being aware of the damage through diplomatic channels or the United 
Nations, without the need to first exhaust any remedies available to the victim State 
through the domestic courts of the launching State.75  If no settlement is reached 
through negotiations, either party may request for the establishment of a Claims 
Commission to determine the merits and quantum of the compensation payable.76  
However, the determination of the Claims Commission is binding only where the 
                                                           
 
72 Ibid., Article III. 
73 Ibid., Article IV. 
74 This position should be contrasted with those found in maritime law in the 1976 Convention on 
Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, opened for signature on 19 November 1976, 1456 
U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force on 1 December 1986); and in international air law in the 1929 
Warsaw Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, 
opened for signature on 12 October 1929, 137 L.N.T.S. 11; 1933 U.K.T.S. 11 (entered into force on 
13 February 1933), Chapter III. 
75 Liability Convention, Articles IX, X and XI. 
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parties have so agreed, for otherwise the determination is a recommendatory award 
that the parties must consider in good faith.77 
As at 1 January 2010, 88 States ratified the Liability Convention and a further 23 
States have signed it.78  The practice of States in prescribing their liability in domestic 
legislation may constitute state practice in assessing the extent of its crystallisation 
into customary international law.  For instance, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, France, 
Hong Kong, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Republic of Korea, Russia, South Africa, 
Sweden, the Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States have all enacted 
domestic legislation on private space activities.79  In almost all of these States, they 
                                                           
 
77 Ibid., Article XIX(2). 
78 United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs, supra note 41. 
79 See Australia: Space Activities Act 1998 (Cth.) and Space Activities Regulations 2001 (Cth.); Belgium: 
Law on the Activities of Launching, Flight Operations and Guidance of Space Objects 2005; Brazil: 
Resolution on Commercial Launching Activities from Brazilian Territory (Res. No. 51 of 26 January 
2001) and Regulation on Procedures and on Definition of Necessary Requirements for the Request, 
Evaluation, Issuance, Follow-up and Supervision of Licences for Carrying out Launching Space Activities 
on Brazilian Territory (No. 27); France: Space Operations Act (No. 2008-518 of 3 June 2008) and 
Decree on the Authorisations Issued in Accordance with French Act No. 2008-518 of 3 June 2008 Relating 
to Space Operations (No. 2009-643); Hong Kong: Outer Space Ordinance 1997 (No. 65 of 1997); Japan: 
Basic Space Law (No. 43 of 28 May 2008); the Netherlands: Space Activities Act (13 June 2006); 
Norway: Act on Launching Objects from Norwegian Territory into Outer Space (No. 38 of 13 June 
1969); Republic of Korea: Space Liability Act (No. 8852 of 21 December 2007); Russia: Law on Space 
Activities 1993 (Decree 5663-1) and Statute on Licensing Space Operations (No. 104); South Africa: 
Space Affairs Act 1993; Sweden: Act on Space Activities (1982:963) and Decree on Space Activities 
(1982:1069); Ukraine: Ordinance of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine on Space Activity (15 November 
1996); United Kingdom: Outer Space Act 1986; and United States: Commercial Space Launch Act 1994 
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have legislated to transfer their liability under the Outer Space Treaty and the 
Liability Convention to private launch operators.80 
3.2.1.5  Registration Convention 
The Outer Space Treaty provides that the State of registry, defined as the State on 
whose registry a space object is registered, is to retain jurisdiction and control over the 
space object in outer space.81  However, the Outer Space Treaty does not contain any 
specific stipulations concerning the nature and content of the registers to be kept or 
any specific right or obligation concerning the act of registering space objects 
launched into outer space.  Accordingly, the determination of which State would 
rightfully be the “State of registry” for the purposes of the Outer Space Treaty can be a 
difficult task at times. 
In 1968, a draft convention dealing with the registration of space objects was 
submitted by France to the Legal Sub-Committee.82  In furtherance of this endeavour, 
the Legal Sub-Committee adopted a proposal from Canada in 1969 to request the 
Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee to study the technical aspects of registration 
                                                           
 
80 See, for example, Space Activities Act 1998 (Australia), Part 4. 
81 Registration Convention, Article VI. 
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appropriate for identifying and coordinating space objects.83  In 1972, after the 
Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee provided the Legal Sub-Committee with 
some conclusions, Canada submitted a draft treaty,84 which was later merged with the 
French proposal and jointly submitted.85  After several years of deliberations, 
including consideration of an alternative text submitted by the United States,86 the 
Legal Sub-Committee adopted a draft text for approval by the Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in 1974.87  Subsequently, the Registration Convention 
was adopted on 12 November 1974 by the General Assembly of the United Nations.88 
The Registration Convention continued with the use of the term “launching State” as 
defined in the Liability Convention.89  When a space object is launched into Earth 
orbit or beyond, the launching State is required to make an appropriate entry in its 
register of space objects and to provide all relevant information, including the 
launching State(s), its registration number, the date and location of launch of the 
space object, its function and basic orbital parameters.90  Where there is more than 
one launching State, the launching States must jointly determine which one of them is 
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to be the State of registry, without prejudice to any separate agreement between the 
States concerning jurisdiction and control over the space object.91  In other words, 
there can only be one State of registry even though there may be more than one 
launching State for a space object.92 
The Registration Convention was also innovative in being the first space law 
instrument to contain a review clause, providing for a scheduled review of its terms.  
Article X of the Registration Convention provides that the General Assembly is to 
consider a review of its provisions ten years after it enters into force and, in any event, 
after five years of its entry into force, a third of the State Parties to the Registration 
Convention may request a conference of all State Parties to be convened at any time 
to review its provisions. 
As at 1 January 2010, 53 States ratified the Registration Convention, with a further 
four States as signatories.93  The 10th anniversary of the entry into force of the 
Registration Convention passed in 1986 without any proposals for amendments to be 
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considered.  However, the issue of the registration of space objects has increasingly 
become a topic of discussion in private and academic circles in recent times, as there 
are often multiple launching States involved in the launch of a single space object and 
there are increasing instances of ownership transfers of satellites.94  It should be noted 
that most States that have not ratified the Registration Convention nevertheless have 
been able to make entries on the United Nations register of space objects on a 
voluntary basis, pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 1721B of 1961.95 
3.2.1.6  Moon Agreement 
With the two superpowers of the Cold War racing to reach the Moon, it was 
considered pertinent for the international community to adopt specific treaty 
provisions in relation to the Moon.  In 1966, the Soviet Union submitted a draft treaty 
to the Legal Sub-Committee containing the legal principles governing the exploration 
and exploitation of the Moon and other celestial bodies, which was considered in the 
formulation of the Outer Space Treaty.96  In 1969, Poland further submitted two 
proposals relating to the rules for human activities on the surface of the Moon and 
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other celestial bodies97 and Argentina also submitted a proposal to regulate the legal 
status of substances and resources that originate from the Moon and other celestial 
bodies in the Solar System.98 
In the following decade, in which there was consensus among its members that the 
legal issues concerning the Moon should be regulated by means of an international 
treaty, the Legal Sub-Committee failed, despite several attempts, to reach agreement 
on the provisions dealing with the use of lunar resources.  In the end, the Legal Sub-
Committee opted to defer the substantive issues relating to the regulation of the use of 
lunar resources to a later date and, consequently, the draft agreement as it stands 
today was submitted for adoption by the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space and the General Assembly.  On 5 December 1979, the General Assembly 
adopted the proposed text of the Moon Agreement.99 
The provisions of the Moon Agreement apply to the Moon and other celestial bodies 
in the Solar System, including orbits around, and trajectories to or from them.100  The 
main principles contained in the Moon Agreement include: 
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(1)  the requirement that the Moon and other celestial bodies are to be used 
exclusively for peaceful purposes and threats or uses of force and all 
hostile acts are prohibited;101 
(2)  the exploration and use of the Moon and other celestial bodies are to be 
conducted without discrimination of any kind, including discrimination 
based on economic or scientific development;102 
(3)  disruptions to the lunar environment and that of other celestial bodies by 
adverse changes or harmful contamination are to be prevented;103 
(4)  the Moon, other celestial bodies and their natural resources are the 
“common heritage of mankind” (res communis humanitatis); and 
(5)  an international regime is to be established in the future to govern the 
exploration and exploitation of natural mineral resources on the Moon 
and other celestial bodies.104 
It is this classification of the Moon, other celestial bodies and extraterrestrial natural 
resources as the “common heritage of mankind” that has proven to be one of the most 
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controversial features of international space law.  The same designation may be found 
in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in relation to the deep seabed 
and the mineral resources contained therein.105  In the Moon Agreement, material 
expression is given to the common heritage of mankind principle as the “equitable 
sharing by all State Parties in the benefits derived from those resources, whereby the 
interests and needs of the developing countries, as well as the efforts of those countries 
which have contributed either directly or indirectly to the exploration of that space 
object, shall be given special consideration”.106  As the international community was 
unable to reach agreement on the terms of this “equitable sharing” of benefits, the 
Moon Agreement provides that the terms of this governing regime are to be contained 
in a future treaty when resource exploitation in space becomes feasible.107 
The failure of the international community to reach agreement over the international 
legal regime to be created in order to implement Article 11 of the Moon Agreement, 
has resulted in the absence of any substantial acceptance of the Moon Agreement.  As 
at 1 January 2010, only 13 States were parties to the Moon Agreement and, among 
them, only Australia would likely be considered to have a space launch capability.108  
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Consequently, the legal status of the provisions contained in the Moon Agreement in 
the context of international space law remains a hotly debated issue. 
3.2.2  Extent of the Crystallisation of United Nations Space 
Treaties into Customary International Law 
3.2.2.1  Custom Generally 
In addition to the treaties, the content and effect of any customary norms in 
international law and the interdependent relationship between the treaties and 
custom must be considered.  Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice refers to “international custom, as evidenced by a general practice accepted as 
law” as a source of international law.  The elements in establishing a principle of 
custom, as detailed by Brownlie, are: 
•  uniformity and consistency of the practice of States; 
•  generality; 
•  duration; and Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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•  opinio juris et necessitatis.109 
What is meant by “uniformity” is that the consistent practice of States in observance 
of the customary norms.  While complete uniformity is not required to establish a 
principle of custom, there must be evidence of substantial uniformity in state practice 
and that this practice is the expression of a legal right of the State.110  T h e  
International Law Commission has produced a non-exhaustive list of the forms that 
state practice may take, including treaties, decisions of domestic and international 
courts, domestic statutes, diplomatic correspondence, opinions of national legal 
advisers and the practice of international organisations.111  While it is unnecessary that 
States adopt the same form of state practice in relation to the same customary norm, it 
is necessary for the content of the state practice to be consistent in reflecting the 
customary norm. 
Similarly, strict universality is not required but it is considered in determining the 
weight of abstentions or objections by a number of States in the face of established 
practice by other States.112  This is particularly the case because silence on the part of 
States may infer anything from tacit acquiescence to a mere lack of substantial 
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interest.  The approach taken by the International Court of Justice is to establish a 
customary principle by assessing the evidence demonstrating an “increasing and 
widespread acceptance” of the practice.113  Although Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of 
the Court refers to a “general” practice, the Court has suggested on several occasions 
that the law does allow for local or regional customs among a group of States or a 
group of States that are not geographically proximate but sharing a common and 
relevant characteristic.114  For example, archipelagic States may sufficiently adopt a 
“general” practice to be considered a customary norm for such States, even though 
coastal States may not exhibit any similar observance.  It is partly in reference to this 
that Tunkin suggested that socialist international law can be considered as a form of 
local customary law in the governance of legal relations between socialist States, 
though this would clearly have questionable effects in relation to third States.115  If this 
proposition is generally accepted, then the space-faring States may form a “group” in 
relation to the customary law for space activities, subject to the consideration to be 
given to non-spacefaring States in light of outer space and celestial bodies being 
designated the “province of all mankind” and, with the Moon Agreement, the 
“common heritage of mankind”.  However, this proposition is unlikely to be 
supported in the international community.  This is because of the extent to which 
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non-spacefaring States have sought to be involved in the formulation of principles of 
space law, the membership of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and 
its Legal Sub-Committee, and the fact that non-spacefaring States can lawfully 
become spacefaring States while landlocked States usually cannot become coastal 
States without conquest or catastrophic tectonic or similar activity. 
In the case of opinio juris, the Court has suggested that there must be a distinction 
between statements made by States as a result of a rule of international comity, which 
may not result from a belief in an international legal principle, in contrast to a practice 
or statement accompanied by a belief that it is in accordance with an international 
legal obligation.116  However, as Judge Tanaka and Judge ad hoc Sørensen suggested in 
their separate judgments in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, it is difficult to 
discover the necessary opinio juris when such a strict distinction is kept in mind as 
States rarely explain the motives behind a particular statement or practice.117  I n  
particular, Judge ad hoc Sørensen held that: 
This is a problem of legal doctrine which may cause great difficulties 
in international adjudication.  In view of the manner in which 
international relations are conducted, there may be numerous cases in 
which it is practically impossible for one government to produce 
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conclusive evidence of the motives which have prompted the action 
and policy of other governments.118 
Perhaps it is in recognition of such difficulties that Lauterpacht opined that: 
Unless judicial activity is to result in reducing the legal significance of 
the most potent source of rules of international law, namely, the 
conduct of States, it would appear that the accurate principle on the 
subject consists in regarding all uniform conduct of Governments (or, 
in appropriate cases, abstention therefrom) as evidencing the opinio 
necessitatis juris except when it is shown that the conduct in question 
was not accompanied by any such intention.119 
3.2.2.2  Treaties, Declarations and Custom 
The main issue with the determination of the existence of customary principles in the 
field of space law is that space activities, and the corresponding development of space 
law principles, have taken place only in recent decades.  Brownlie noted that, provided 
the consistency and generality of a principle are proved with sufficient practice and 
opinio juris, then no particular duration is required.120  Lachs was of the view that some 
customary norms were created by the international community in a very short period 
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of time in the 1950s and 1960s.  Judge Lachs observed this in his dissenting judgment 
in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases that: 
The first instruments that men sent into outer space traversed the air 
space of States and circled above them in outer space, yet the 
launching States sought no permission nor did the other States 
protest.  This is how the freedom of movement into outer space, and 
in it, came to be established and recognised as law within a 
remarkably short period of time.121 
This gives rise to the potential creation of “instant custom”, a development not 
universally accepted among commentators.122  If this was not acceptable or allowed, it 
would indeed be very difficult in the case of space law to prescribe the principles of 
custom due to the relative youth of such principles and the relative lack of state 
practice and opinio juris to evidence such custom.  In the North Sea Continental Shelf 
Cases, for example, the Court was of the view that a treaty as formulated may relate to 
custom in one of three ways: 
(1)  the treaty may be declaratory in nature or represent a codification of 
existing customary law; 
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(2)  the treaty may reflect custom as agreed by the States during its negotiation 
process through statements that may constitute opinio juris; or 
(3)  the treaty provisions have become accepted and followed by States as 
custom after its adoption and are said to have “crystallised” into 
customary norms of international law.123 
In the case of the United Nations space treaties, in particular the Outer Space Treaty 
and the Rescue Agreement, the second and third alternatives listed above likely apply.  
The widespread acceptance of the two treaties, as evidenced by the number of 
ratifications deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, suggests that 
the international community as a whole has accepted their provisions to be customary 
norms of international law.124  Further, the absence of state practice or opinio juris that 
are contrary to the terms of those treaties provides additional support for the 
hypothesis that these provisions may represent customary norms of international law. 
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3.2.3  General Assembly Declarations 
3.2.3.1  Overview 
When the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and, in particular, the 
Legal Sub-Committee, began deliberations on the principles applicable to space 
activities, it was clear that a comprehensive legal code governing space activities 
would not be appropriate.125  Instead, the Legal Sub-Committee opted to undertake a 
progressive approach to remain in step with the continuing development of space 
technology and applications.126 
As suggested by Jericho and McCracken in 1985: 
The [space] treaties constitute the entirety of public international 
space law upon which further treaties will eventually be based.   
However, it is postulated that further developments in the 
international space law area will show a decreasing growth rate with a 
possible levelling of the curve in the next decade.   
Contemporaneously, international law developments likely will 
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become more specific and tend toward the international commercial 
aspects of man’s space endeavours.127 
Accordingly, it was considered that, in relation to specific international commercial 
satellite applications, it was more appropriate to adopt an instrument containing legal 
principles in the form of a General Assembly declaration as contained in a resolution 
before completing the negotiations on the adoption of multilateral treaties.128 
The first General Assembly declaration containing principles of space law was the 
Principles Declaration, which was adopted unanimously by the General Assembly on 
13 December 1963.129  The origins of most of the fundamental principles of space law 
that are found in the later treaties, especially the Outer Space Treaty, can be found in 
the nine operative paragraphs of the Principles Declaration.  The first four paragraphs 
contain the positive principles later embodied in the Outer Space Treaty.  For 
example, space activities are to be carried on: 
(1)  for the benefit and in the interest of all mankind;130 
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(2)  in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United 
Nations;131 and 
(3)  in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and 
promoting international cooperation and understanding”.132 
Subsequent declarations, as discussed below, address specific issues arising from 
remote sensing of the Earth, direct television broadcasting, use of nuclear power 
sources and international cooperation in space activities.  The precise legal force and 
effect of these resolutions continues to be the subject of intense academic debate.  In 
addition to the relatively little state practice and opinio juris, a further complication is 
that the state practice or opinio juris made by a State that is already party to a relevant 
treaty may not be considered to be evidence of the existence of a customary principle.  
This is because the relevant state practice would have been done pursuant to its treaty 
obligations and not because the State considered itself bound by a relevant customary 
principle.  Consequently, the widespread acceptance of the Outer Space Treaty by the 
international community may have a counterproductive effect in the context of 
creating customary norms of space law. 
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In the case of the Outer Space Treaty, the issue of the customary status of its 
provisions has been considered by several commentators.133  It is generally accepted 
that the principles relating to freedom of use (Article I), non-appropriation (Article 
II), applicability of international law (Article III), State responsibility (Article VI), 
liability for damage caused by space objects (Article VII) and the retention of 
jurisdiction and control by States over space objects (Article VIII) may be considered 
part of customary law.134  The basis for such a proposition includes the large number 
of States that have ratified the Outer Space Treaty, the support given by States not 
party to the Outer Space Treaty to General Assembly resolutions reiterating the 
contents of these provisions and the opinio juris of States given in speeches made 
during debates in intergovernmental organisations, such as the Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.135  Although state practice may be considered to be in 
observance of a State’s treaty obligation, it is unlikely that the same can be said for 
statements of opinio juris. 
The Rescue Agreement, adopted for the elaboration and implementation of Article V 
of the Outer Space Treaty, is considered by some commentators to have crystallised 
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into customary norms of international law, at the very least partially.136  The main 
arguments made in support of this include the humanitarian nature of the astronaut 
assistance and rescue principles for which parallels may be found in the customary and 
treaty principles of international maritime law.  Further, the compliance of States not 
party to the Rescue Agreement with the provisions of Article 5 of the Rescue 
Agreement concerning the duty to notify, recover and return discovered space objects 
may be considered as custom, though this must be distinguished with any state 
practice in compliance with the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty.137  
It is very difficult to assert the provisions of the other space treaties, namely the 
Liability Convention, the Registration Convention and the Moon Agreement, as 
principles of customary international law.  The lack of consistent, uniform and 
universal state practice or opinio juris for compliance with the liability provisions of 
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the Liability Convention and the operative provisions of the Moon Agreement means 
that it is virtually impossible to consider the extent of their crystallisation into custom 
at this stage.  The absence of widespread acceptance of the Moon Agreement makes it 
highly unlikely that any of its provisions, with the possible exception of those that 
repeat or affirm principles already contained in the Outer Space treaty, may be 
considered custom.  In the case of the Registration Convention, States not party to it 
have nevertheless notified the Secretary-General of the United Nations of launched 
space objects explicitly pursuant to the Outer Space Treaty or General Assembly 
Resolution 1721B, which calls for the voluntary registration of space objects.138 
3.2.3.2  Effect of the General Assembly Space Law Declarations in 
Customary International Law 
Overview 
In addition to the general principles contained in the space treaties, the international 
community through the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space have chosen 
to adopt specific “legal” principles relating to particular space applications or activities 
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such as remote sensing of the Earth and direct television broadcasting by satellite, 
international cooperation in space activities and the use of nuclear or radioisotopic 
power sources.  The most important questions to be answered when considering these 
provisions is the binding effect they may have on States. 
The same arguments favouring the creation of “instant custom” arising from the space 
treaties can also be made in the case of General Assembly declarations, in the sense 
that they have codified customary norms as agreed by States during discussions in the 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space or became accepted and followed by 
the States as customary norms for them to be regarded as binding international law.  
In considering the customary effect of General Assembly resolutions, Brownlie 
suggested that the adoption of a resolution by the General Assembly may constitute 
evidence of the legal opinions of States, thus are opinio juris evidencing customary 
norms.139  Unless the extreme position that only physical acts can constitute state 
practice is taken, there is no doubt that the adoption of such resolutions must in some 
way constitute practice.  Akehurst, for example, defines state practice for these 
purposes as “any act or statement by a State from which views about customary law 
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can be inferred; it includes physical acts, claims, declarations in abstrato (such as 
General Assembly resolutions), national laws, national judgments and omissions”.140 
The effect of such declarations on the obligations of States can be considered in three 
ways.  On the one hand, Schwebel, when he was Deputy Legal Advisor to the 
Department of State, wrote that: 
As a statement of U.S. policy in this regard, I think it is fair to state 
that General Assembly resolutions are regarded as recommendations 
to Member States of the United Nations.  To the extent, which is 
exceptional, that such resolutions, [which] are meant to be declaratory 
of international law, are adopted with the support of all members and 
are observed by the practice of States, such resolutions are evidence of 
customary international law on a particular subject matter.141 
Consequently, it appears that a General Assembly declaration must have the explicit 
intention of creating customary law and at the time it was accepted as such by a true 
consensus, or sufficiently close to it, in order to be considered to reflect customary law.  
This calls into question the effect of abstentions as well as challenging the accepted 
view since generality, rather than universality, is the requirement for the 
establishment of a customary principle. 
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As a middle view, in the South West Africa Cases, Judge Tanaka in his dissenting 
judgment held that: 
What is required for customary international law is the repetition of 
the same practice; accordingly, in this case resolutions, declarations, 
etc. … must take place repeatedly … This collective, cumulative and 
organic process of custom-generation can be characterised as the 
middle way between legislation by convention and the traditional 
process of custom making, and can be seen to have an important role 
from the viewpoint of the development of international law.142   
It can be seen from this that, while Judge Tanaka did not appear to be as strict as 
Schwebel in prescribing a requirement of uniformity to be placed on custom-making 
resolutions, he did nevertheless require the resolutions or declarations to be repetitive 
in their statements in order to constitute evidence of customary norms of 
international law. 
At the other end of the continuum, Sohn wrote that: 
There is wide consensus that these declarations actually establish new 
rules of international law binding upon all States.  This is not treaty-
making but a new method of creating customary international law.  … 
Thus the United Nations has made possible the creation of “instant 
international law” … In a rapidly changing world the United Nations 
has found a method, albeit restricted by the rule of unanimity or 
quasi-unanimity, to adapt the principles of its Charter and the rules of 
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customary international law to the changing times with an efficiency 
which even its most optimistic founders did not anticipate.143 
In recent times, the debate over the value of General Assembly resolutions as 
customary norms has been somewhat overtaken by recent cases and commentaries.  
Sloan, for example, was of the view that General Assembly resolutions may be 
evidence of state practice when the following factors are taken into consideration: 
(1)  the legalistic nature of the language of its terms; 
(2)  the binding or mandatory nature of the language of its terms; 
(3)  the intention of the General Assembly as evidenced by statements of the 
States, especially those in the debate over the resolution; 
(4)  the voting record, in particular that of the States whose support may be 
essential for effective implementation, but nevertheless representing 
States from all economic, ideological and legal systems; and 
(5)  their repetition or recitation in subsequent resolutions, as Judge Tanaka 
suggested in his dissenting judgment in the South West Africa Cases.144 
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General Assembly resolutions are also increasingly gaining acceptance as evidence of 
state practice in cases of the International Court of Justice and various arbitral 
tribunals.  In Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua (Merits), the Court was confronted with the problem of having to 
formulate the customary norms in the unilateral use of force, in particular the opinio 
juris of States, and determined that: 
This opinio juris may, though with all due caution, be deduced from, 
inter alia, the attitude of the Parties and the attitude of States towards 
certain General Assembly resolutions ….  The effect of consent to the 
text of such resolutions … may be understood as an acceptance of the 
validity of the rule or set of rules declared by the resolution by 
themselves.145 
This was further expanded by the Court in the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons: 
The Court notes that General Assembly resolutions, even if they are 
not binding, may sometimes have normative value.  They can, in 
certain circumstances, provide evidence important for establishing 
the existence of a rule or the emergence of an opinio juris.  To 
establish whether this is true of a given General Assembly resolution, 
it is necessary to look at its content and the conditions for its 
adoption; it is also necessary to see whether an opinio juris exists as to 
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its normative character.  Or a series of resolutions may show the 
gradual evolution of the opinio juris required for the establishment of 
a new rule.146 
It is apparent that the Court has moved progressively towards adopting the approach 
suggested by Sloan in considering the nature and language of the terms of a resolution 
as well as the intention of the States concerned in determining whether a General 
Assembly resolution contains customary norms.  It is in this context that the General 
Assembly declarations concerning space activities are to be examined. 
The Space Law Declarations 
The five General Assembly declarations concerning space activities are: 
•  the Principles Declaration; 
•  the Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for 
International Direct Television Broadcasting of 10 December 1982 (the 
“Broadcasting Principles”); 
•  the Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space 
of 3 December 1986 (the “Remote Sensing Principles”); 
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•  the Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer 
Space of 14 December 1992 (the “Nuclear Power Sources Principles”); 
and 
•  the Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use 
of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking 
into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries of 13 
December 1996 (the “Cooperation Declaration”). 
In these General Assembly declarations it may be prudent, or at least convenient, to 
separate their provisions into four groups: 
•  operative provisions that merely repeat principles contained in existing 
treaties or declarations (the “Repeating Provisions”); 
•  operative provisions that state, without more, the application of existing 
provisions of the Outer Space Treaty or the Rescue Agreement to specific 
situations (the “Applying Provisions”); 
•  operative provisions that create new rights, duties or obligations of law 
that have not been previously stated in existing treaties or those that 
extend the applicability or content of the provisions of the Outer Space 
Treaty (the “New Provisions”); and State Responsibility and Liability for Compliance with Principles of International Law 
228  |  Page     
•  declaratory or introductory provisions that appear to have no legal effect 
(the “Non-Legal Provisions”). 
In the case of Repeating Provisions, the extent of the original treaty provision’s 
“migration” into a customary norm must first be considered.  For example, when a 
provision of the Outer Space Treaty is considered by most States and commentators 
to have crystallised into customary international law, it would mean that a Repeating 
Provision embodying the same provision of the Outer Space Treaty would be 
restating the law as it already exists in custom.  This is in addition to the weight, if any, 
that is to be given to the provisions in the declaration itself as evidence of customary 
international norms in the form of state practice or opinio juris. 
Applying Provisions are, strictly speaking, not statements of legal principles but are 
instead “working examples” of specific applications of an existing treaty principle.  
Consequently, they may be considered to be lacking in the requisite legalistic language 
to be considered evidence of customary norms.  In most cases the only relevant 
consideration when determining whether an Applying Provision is evidence of a 
customary norm is if the original treaty provision being applied is a customary norm 
of space law.  Nevertheless, it is possible, though unlikely considering the lack of 
precedents, for a specific application of a legal principle to be considered by States to 
have binding legal effect while the general principle does not. Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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In the case of New Provisions, it will be necessary to consider whether they crystallise 
custom as agreed during negotiations or if they have been subsequently accepted and 
followed as custom.  As an empirical exercise, the travaux préparatoires and, as a 
secondary source, the writings of legal scholars and commentators are examined to 
determine whether a New Provision has been accepted by States to be a principle of 
customary international law.  As in the case of the provisions of the space treaties, it 
would be necessary to consider the relevant state practice and opinio juris of States to 
ascertain the extent to which the provisions may have crystallised into customary 
international law. 
Principles Declaration 
The Principles Declaration, adopted by the General Assembly in 1963, is the only 
resolution considered to contain principles of space law that was declared before the 
adoption of the Outer Space Treaty and the Liability Convention.  Consequently, the 
Principles Declaration is unique in that, at the time it was adopted, its provisions were 
all New Provisions without an existing treaty precedent.  Since the adoption of the 
1967 Outer Space Treaty, however, it would be somewhat difficult to distinguish 
between the effects of the principles in the Principles Declaration vis-à-vis those of the 
Outer Space Treaty in the context of determining the customary norms of space law. State Responsibility and Liability for Compliance with Principles of International Law 
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Between 1963 and 1967, the customary status of the provisions of the Principles 
Declaration would have required an evaluation of the travaux préparatoires to assess 
the level of their acceptance by States.  Considering the positive statements made by 
almost all governmental representatives during the debates and negotiations, it is 
likely that the Principles Declaration is a codification of the customary principles 
accepted by States during the negotiations process.  For example, those provisions 
relating to the freedom of movement in outer space may well have already represented 
customary law by that time.147  Jenks wrote in those intervening years that: 
The authority of the Declaration of Legal Principles may be expected 
to grow with the passage of years.  While it is somewhat less than a 
treaty it must already be regarded as rather more than a statement of 
custom.148 
Indeed, Fawcett valued the evidentiary weight of the Principles Declaration so highly 
that he saw the adoption of the Outer Space Treaty as a “retrograde step”: 
In the Outer Space Treaty we have then a rigidly contractual 
instrument, in essence a bilateral arrangement between the principal 
space-users.  Apart from its provision for partial demilitarisation of 
outer space, tracking and inspection, it does nothing to elaborate or 
secure the principles already set out in General Assembly Resolutions.  
It may even be that this ill-constructed and precarious instrument is a 
retrograde step. … Though Resolution 1962 (XVIII) is for the most 
part a declaration, not of rules of international law, but of directive 
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principles, it may like other similar General Assembly Resolutions, be 
regarded as forming part of an international ordre public, to which 
States should strive to make their policies conform.149 
After 1967, the apparent acceptance of some of the Outer Space Treaty as customary 
law means that all that would be necessary is to compare the provisions of the 
Principles Declaration with those of the Outer Space Treaty.  A comparison of the 
Principles Declaration and the Outer Space Treaty is contained in Table 3.2-1 below. 
Table 3.2-1.  Principles Declaration150 
Para.  Content  Type  Treaty Provision 
1  Space activities in the interest of all mankind  Repeating  Outer Space Treaty I 
2  Freedom of exploration and use  Repeating  Outer Space Treaty I 
3  Non‐appropriation  Repeating  Outer Space Treaty II 
4  Application of international law  Repeating  Outer Space Treaty III 
5  International responsibility for space activities  Repeating  Outer Space Treaty VI 




8  Liability for damage caused by space objects  Repeating  Outer Space Treaty VII 
9  Assistance to astronauts in distress  Repeating  Outer Space Treaty V 
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In this way, the extent of the crystallisation of the provisions of the Principles 
Declaration is linked to that of the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty and thus their 
legal effect from 1967 cannot be considered independently. 
Broadcasting Principles 
The Broadcasting Principles may be considered to be the first of three General 
Assembly declarations that relate to specific space activities.  The first three 
paragraphs provide for the purposes and objectives to be observed by States when 
conducting direct television broadcasting activities.  Principle 6 requires States to 
make appropriate arrangements for international cooperation, taking into account the 
interests of developing States.  Principle 11 requires States to cooperate on the 
protection of copyright and associated rights in the conduct of television 
broadcasting.  A cursory glance over the travaux préparatoires of the Broadcasting 
Principles appears to show that there was substantial acceptance of the above 
provisions as being legal obligations, indicating their crystallisation into customary 
law.  However, the substantial lack of state practice and opinio juris means these 
provisions would not be regarded as having crystallised into customary principles of 
international law. Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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Table 3.2-2.  Broadcasting Principles151 




4  Applicability of international law  Applying  Outer Space Treaty III 
5  Rights and benefits of States  Applying  Outer Space Treaty I 
6  International cooperation in broadcasting  New Provision — Not Custom 
7  Peaceful settlement of disputes  Applying  Outer Space Treaty III 











15  Overspill of signals  Applying  I.T.U. instruments 
 
Principle 10 provides that a broadcasting or receiving State has the right to request 
consultations with the other States on the satellite broadcasting service.  Principles 13 
and 14 provide that a State establishing a new broadcasting service must notify the 
proposed receiving States and enter into consultations if requested.  Principle 15 states 
that the instruments of the International Telecommunication Union (the “ITU”) are 
exclusively applicable to the signal overspill from the service.  There does not appear 
to be widespread acceptance of these provisions by States during the debates and 
                                                           
 
151 Adapted, with some variation, from ibid., at 127. State Responsibility and Liability for Compliance with Principles of International Law 
234  |  Page     
negotiations.  For example, Argentina considered the spill-over issue not to be subject 
to the International Telecommunication Union, while Czechoslovakia and India both 
considered prior consent to be necessary instead of mere consultations.152  
Accordingly, it is likely that these particular provisions may not have the sufficient 
universality between States to be considered customary principles of law, even if there 
was sufficient evidence of a customary principle, which is not the case. 
Remote Sensing Principles 
Observations concerning the customary effects of the Broadcasting Principles can 
similarly be made about the Remote Sensing Principles.  While most of the provisions 
are applications of the Outer Space Treaty, there is a set of provisions relating to 
international cooperation and another set of provisions relating to the duty and the 
right to consult that are not the subject of widespread international acceptance. 
Principle II states that remote sensing activities are to be conducted for the benefit 
and in the interests of all States while “taking into particular consideration the needs 
of the developing countries”.  This is in effect a repetition of Article I of the Outer 
Space Treaty except that the original treaty provision did not require the particular 
needs of developing States to be taken into consideration.  This reflects the growing 
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influence of the developing States on the development of international law during this 
time.  The fact that this “change” is repeated through the subsequent treaties and 
declarations, such as the Moon Agreement, suggests that this is now an additional 
requirement that is supported by acceptance of most States.153  Consequently, a strong 
argument may be made supporting the crystallisation of this variation to the existing 
principle into customary international law. 
Table 3.2-3.  Remote Sensing Principles154 
Para.  Content  Type  Treaty Provision 
I  Definitions  Non‐Legal Provision 
II  Rights and benefits of States  Repeating  Outer Space Treaty I 










IX  Notification to the United Nations  Repeating  Outer Space Treaty XI 






XIV  International responsibility for activities  Applying  Outer Space Treaty VI 
XV  Peaceful settlement of disputes  Applying  Outer Space Treaty III 
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Principles V to VIII, setting out the steps required of States in relation to mutual 
assistance and international cooperation, were not the subject of much controversy 
during the debates.  Consequently, the uniformity requirement may be considered 
satisfied in terms of the creation of custom.  Principle XI requires States to transmit 
relevant data and information to States affected or likely to be affected by natural 
disasters.  Similarly, this may be considered to be a small extension of the obligations 
under Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty and the absence of controversy suggests 
that this was widely accepted by most States.  Again, the problem here is the relative 
absence of state practice and opinio juris. 
Principle XIII requires “sensing States” to enter into consultations upon request with 
“sensed States” in order to make available opportunities for participation.  This infers, 
as with the Broadcasting Principles, that the sensing States are required to notify 
sensed States of their sensing activities.  This is in contrast to the prior consent 
requirement that a significant number of States advocated during the negotiations as 
part of their permanent sovereignty over natural resources.  In the absence of 
uniformity, it would be appropriate to suggest that the provision is not a customary 
norm, even if there is sufficient state practice on this subject. 
Principle XII is a unique provision in that it requires sensed States to have access to 
primary and processed data relating to their territory on a non-discriminatory basis 
and on reasonable cost terms.  This provision does not appear to be based on any 
existing principle of space law but is in fact a compromise reached between those Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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States wanting free access and those that do not wish to provide any more rights to the 
sensed States beyond notification and consultation, arguing that the sensing of some 
States is an inevitable result of the orbit of the satellite.  In one of the later reports of 
the Legal Sub-Committee Working Group on Remote Sensing, it was evident that 
there were divergent views concerning the basis of those access rights, the type of data 
involved and the timing of the access, and that the final wording was a compromise 
that did not satisfy a significant number of States.155  Therefore, it would be difficult to 
support an argument that Principle XII is a legal obligation agreed to by all States. 
Nuclear Power Sources Principles 
The Nuclear Power Sources Principles contain eleven provisions of which Principles 1, 
6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 are Applying Provisions in the sense that they merely restate the 
application of provisions in existing space treaties to satellites containing nuclear or 
radioisotopic power sources.  In particular, Principle 6 merits some attention as it 
requires a right to consultations by States concerned with the re-entry of a nuclear 
power source.  This may be considered to be a direct application of the right to 
consultations in the case of potential harmful interference as provided for in Article 
IX of the Outer Space Treaty.  In contrast, it is distinguished from the consultation 
provisions of the Broadcasting Principles and the Remote Sensing Principles in that 
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these rights are not dependent on the potential for harmful interference to the space 
activities of the affected States and therefore cannot find support in Article IX of the 
Outer Space Treaty. 
Table 3.2-4.  Nuclear Power Sources Principles156 
Para.  Content  Type  Treaty Provision 







6  Duty and right to consult  Applying  Outer Space Treaty IX 
7  Assistance to States in case of re‐entry  Applying  Rescue Agreement 










In the case of the New Provisions, namely Principles 3 to 5, it is pertinent to assess the 
legal basis of these provisions to ascertain their appropriate status in customary 
international law.  Principles 3 and 4 are concerned with imposing a set of guidelines 
for the safe use of nuclear power sources, along with a requirement for a thorough 
safety assessment to be conducted prior to launch.  This can be seen to be an 
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elaboration of the obligations of States under Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty in 
that States are to have due regard to the interests of other States and to avoid harmful 
interference of the corresponding activities of other States. 
Principle 5 requires States to inform other States and the United Nations if an object 
containing a nuclear power source is malfunctioning.  The notification must include 
the orbital parameters of the spacecraft and its radiological risk.  It is probable that 
Principle 5 constitutes customary international law, as the provision appears to have 
its origins from the following treaty provisions: 
•  Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty, requiring States to avoid harmful 
contamination and adverse changes to the Earth’s environment by 
introduction of “extraterrestrial” matter; and 
•  Article IV(3) of the Registration Convention, which imposes a duty on 
States to notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations if a registered 
spacecraft is no longer in Earth orbit.157 
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Cooperation Declaration 
The Cooperation Declaration, adopted by the General Assembly without a vote in 
1996, is special in that not all of its provisions contain legal obligations that would 
support a view that they are intended to have binding effect.  For example, Paragraphs 
7 and 8 merely suggest that States are to strengthen the role of the Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and to contribute to the United Nations space programs 
and initiatives.  As such, they cannot reasonably be considered as legal obligations at 
all and certainly cannot be considered as part of customary law. 
Table 3.2-5.  Cooperation Declaration158 
Para.  Content  Type  Treaty Provision 
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Paragraph 5 poses difficulties in its classification in that it requires States to keep in 
mind certain goals and objectives in framing activities involving international 
cooperation.  It is unclear whether these goals are intended to be of a mandatory 
nature, as the words “promoting”, “fostering” and “facilitating” are used.  Even if the 
consideration of such issues is considered mandatory, the vagueness of the content of 
these goals makes it unlikely that States have intended for this to be a binding 
international legal obligation. 
Paragraphs 1 and 2 may be classified as Applying Provisions in that they are a specific 
application of existing treaty provisions in the context of international cooperation.  
Paragraph 2, for example, provides that States are free to determine all aspects of their 
participation in international space endeavours while ensuring compliance with 
legitimate interests of other States.  In this context, the relevant provisions of the 
Outer Space Treaty that support these provisions as having some legal effect in 
customary international law include the following obligations requiring States to: 
(1)  undertake space activities with due regard to the corresponding interests 
of other States and Article I of the Outer Space Treaty in relation to 
freedom of exploration and use;159 
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(2)  consider granting requests by other States to observe flights of space 
objects on the basis of equality;160 and 
(3)  inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the public and the 
scientific community of the nature, conduct, locations and results of their 
space activities.161 
3.2.4  Jus Cogens: Space Law Principles as Possible Peremptory 
Norms of International Law 
At least one other possibility exists for the principles contained in the United Nations 
space treaties and General Assembly declarations to have a binding effect on States 
that are not party to the treaties, which occurs if some or all of them have attained the 
status of jus cogens, or a “peremptory norm of general international law”.  This is 
especially so considering the difficulty involved in finding a sufficient body of state 
practice to support their crystallisation into customary international law.  Article 53 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that: 
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a 
peremptory norm of general international law.  For the purposes of 
the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international 
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law is a norm accepted and recognised by the international 
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation 
is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of 
general international law having the same character.162 
Commentators have suggested that Article 53 evidences “a new source, one that 
manifestly involves an intent of the community, as expressed in a community-wide 
forum, to create general norms directly”.163  It is argued that this new source of 
international law is created only when the international community assemble at a 
forum such as the General Assembly or at a universal international conference and 
without the need for state practice to have accumulated.164  Danilenko, in a detailed 
study on the process of creating principles of jus cogens, concluded: 
It is generally recognised that in order to acquire the quality of jus 
cogens a norm must first pass the normative tests for rules of “general 
international law”.  It is also established that, secondly, such a norm 
must be “accepted and recognised” as a peremptory norm by “the 
international community of States as a whole”.  … If the requirement 
of the acceptance and recognition by the international community of 
States “as a whole” is interpreted to mean the recognition by all the 
essential components of the international community, then the 
concept of jus cogens establishes a very strict threshold …. It follows 
that if there is an opposition to the proposed peremptory rule on the 
part of States comprising an important element of the international 
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community, such a dissent would prevent the emergence of a rule of 
jus cogens.165 
Generally, while it is unlikely that one single State can constitute an “important 
element of the international community”, two observations must be made when 
considering the creation of jus cogens within the framework of international space law.  
Firstly, the relatively small number of States involved in space activities lends support 
to the view that, in space law, each spacefaring State may well constitute an 
“important element of the international community”, along with the non-spacefaring 
States together as a bloc forming an important element in itself.  Secondly, some of the 
principles concerning space law are contained in treaties that have not achieved a high 
number of ratifications or in General Assembly declarations.  Subsequently, most 
States and commentators are of the view that they are not capable of creating custom, 
let alone jus cogens.166 
Subject to these qualifications, it is arguable that some of the fundamental principles 
of space law contained in the Outer Space Treaty may have attained the status of jus 
cogens.  Notable examples of this may include the principle of non-appropriation in 
Article II, the rescue and recovery obligations under Article V and the state 
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responsibility provision in Article VI.  Their overwhelming acceptance by States, 
including both parties to the Outer Space Treaty and otherwise, as well as the absence 
of clear objections during the negotiations lends support to that view.  However, it is 
also clear that most of the other principles contained in other United Nations space 
treaties are unlikely to have been intended by the States to attain the status of jus 
cogens.  Accordingly, an assessment of their status as principles of custom would 
nevertheless be necessary in order to determine their applicability to States that are 
not party to the treaties. 
3.2.5  Other Space-Related Treaties 
In addition to the treaties and General Assembly declarations as developed by the 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, there are also other treaties and 
declarations that are applicable to space activities.  This is the consequence of Article 
III of the Outer Space Treaty in extending the application of international law, 
particularly the Charter of the United Nations, to outer space.  For example, in State Responsibility and Liability for Compliance with Principles of International Law 
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considering the law on the use of force in outer space, particular attention must be 
paid to the General Assembly resolutions on the use of military force on the Earth.167 
There are other treaties and instruments on space law that are created by specialised 
agencies and international organisations for specific space applications.  For example, 
the International Telecommunication Union (“ITU”) regulates the use of radio 
frequencies in space and the allocation of orbital slots in the geostationary orbit 
through its Constitution and Convention and its subordinate Radio Regulations.  The 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (“UNESCO”) and 
the World Intellectual Property Organisation (“WIPO”) adopted the Brussels 
Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme-Carrying Signals Transmitted 
by Satellite to provide international protection for the intellectual property rights in 
such programs.168 
Significantly, a large number of bilateral and multilateral agreements have been used 
by States to provide a legal framework for specific institutions or activities.  The 
Convention for the Establishment of a European Space Agency (the “ESA 
Convention”) and the specific treaties creating international institutions such as 
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INTELSAT, INMARSAT and other regional satellite systems have played an 
important contribution to the development of space law.169  Recently, States have also 
adopted agreements to deal with specific activities, such as the bilateral agreement 
between Australia and Russia in the field of cooperation on the regulation of launch 
activities,170 and the Intergovernmental Agreement establishing the International 
Space Station.171 
3.2.6  Space Law and the Lex Specialis Principle 
The long-established principle lex specialis derogat legi generali provides that the 
special rules, the lex specialis, apply in preference to the general rules, the lex generali, 
even if the special rules derogate from the general rules.  The lex specialis principle is 
not a new one in the development of public international law, for as early as in Roman 
civil law, the Corpus Iuris Civilis noted that “in toto iure generi per speciem derogatur 
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et illud potissimum habetur, quod ad speciem derectum est”.172  Further, both Grotius 
and Vattel have expressed the view that rules that specifically regulate a subject matter 
are to apply in precedence to rules of a more general nature.173 
It is an observation made by quite a number of commentators that the existing body 
of space law constitutes lex specialis.174  Taken at its highest, a body of law that is lex 
specialis  may apply as a legal code to the exclusion of other general principles of 
international law.  The constituent instruments of the International 
Telecommunication Union, taken together, are an example of such a body of law.  If 
applied to space law, the specific principles contained in the Outer Space Treaty and 
other United Nations space law instruments would apply to the exclusion of any other 
general principle of public international law.  However, against this position are the 
express terms of Article III of the Outer Space Treaty, which state that: 
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State Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration 
and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, 
in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the 
United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace 
and security and promoting international cooperation and 
understanding. 
It is clear that, accordingly, general principles of international law would continue to 
have application to activities in outer space, although as a matter of application the 
principles of space law as contained in the relevant treaties would have priority over 
such general rules. 
3.3  STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND JURISDICTION 
3.3.1  State Responsibility 
3.3.1.1  Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty 
In the increasingly private and multinational space sector, Article VI has become a 
provision of much concern to States whose private nationals are engaged in space 
activities.  Article VI states that: 
State Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for 
national activities in outer space, including the Moon and other 
celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by 
governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for 
assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with the State Responsibility and Liability for Compliance with Principles of International Law 
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provisions set forth in the present Treaty.  The activities of non-
governmental entities in outer space, including the Moon and other 
celestial bodies, shall require authorisation and continuing 
supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty.  When 
activities are carried on in outer space, including the Moon and other 
celestial bodies, by an international organisation, responsibility for 
compliance with this Treaty shall be borne by the international 
organisation and by the State Parties to the Treaty participating in 
such organisation. 
It is clear from this that Article VI imposes the following obligations on States: 
(1)  to bear responsibility for national activities in outer space regardless of 
whether such activities are carried out by public or private entities; 
(2)  to assure that national activities are conducted in conformity with the 
Outer Space Treaty and, through Article III, with international law; 
(3)  to authorise and continually supervise, where appropriate, the activities of 
non-governmental entities in outer space; and 
(4)  to share international responsibility for the activities of international 
organisations of which the State is a participant. 
3.3.1.2  Content of Responsibility 
Presumably, the first issue to be determined is the content of this “international 
responsibility” to be borne by States.  In the past, some commentators have sought to Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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distinguish the “responsibility” prescribed under Article VI with “liability” as imposed 
under Article VII and the provisions of the Liability Convention.175  From this 
perspective, Article VI would do no more than to prescribe a regulatory responsibility 
on States without the imposition of any liability on the State.  In recent times, 
however, much emphasis has been placed by some commentators on the use of terms 
in other languages that are equally authentic for the purposes of interpreting the 
Outer Space Treaty.176  In the French text, the term “responsabilité internationale” is 
used in both Articles VI and VII in place of both international “responsibility” and 
“liability” in the English text.  Similarly, the Chinese term 「国际责任」, the Russian 
term “международную  ответственность” and the Spanish term “responsables 
internacionalmente” are used as the equivalent term for both “international 
responsibility” and “international liability” under Articles VI and VII.  Accordingly, if 
there is to be no differentiation in meaning between “responsibility” under Article VI 
and “liability” under Article VII, then Article VI must be interpreted to mean that 
States are to be internationally liable for national space activities conducted by both 
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public and private entities.177  This is particular so considering Article 33(3) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that the terms used in a treaty is 
presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text.178 
This is consistent with the principles of state responsibility in the body of customary 
international law in that liability for reparations must follow from a violation of 
international law.  For example, in Chorzów Factory (Indemnity) (Merits), the 
Permanent Court of International Justice held that: 
[It] is a principle of international law, and even a general conception 
of law, that any breach of an engagement involves an obligation to 
make reparation. … the Court has already said that reparation is the 
indispensable complement of a failure to apply a convention, and 
there is no necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself.179 
Consequently, Article VI should be considered to have the effect of imposing liability 
on a State for activities in outer space that may be attributable to the State. 
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3.3.1.3  Imputability to the State and the Duty to Authorise and 
Continually Supervise Private Space Activities 
Article VI requires for States to take international responsibility for “national” space 
activities conducted by both public and private entities.  Generally, the space activities 
carried out by public entities are acts attributable to the State and, accordingly, they 
are activities for which the State must take international responsibility.180  Further, if 
any damage or harm is caused to other States, the State is liable to pay reparations to 
the victim States to restore them as much as possible to their positions before the 
damage was inflicted (restitutio in integrum).181  The issue, therefore, is whether 
Article VI is merely a restatement of the existing principle of state responsibility or if it 
expands the duty imposed on States. 
Under general principles of international law, particularly with reference to the 
jurisprudence of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, the imputability of a “private” act to 
the State would appear to depend on an objective determination of any influence over, 
or benefit derived from, the activity that may be attributed to the State.  If the acts are 
conducted by private persons or entities without the direction or influence of the 
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State, then such acts are generally not imputable to the State.182  In Foremost Tehran 
Inc. v. Iran, a company decided not to pay dividends to its shareholders, one of which 
was the claimant USA company.  The Tribunal imputed that decision to the State 
because the company acted under the influence of some of its directors who were 
appointed by the Iranian Government and it was implementing government policy 
concerning the financial interests of foreigners.183  In Flexi-Van Leasing Inc. v. Iran, it 
was held that, even if the entity was under the control of the State, it must be 
demonstrated that the specific conduct itself was directed or influenced by the State 
for it to be imputable to the State.184 
The obligation under Article VI, with its qualification on “national” activities, may be 
seen as being no more than a restatement of the existing international law before the 
adoption of the Outer Space Treaty itself.185  In other words, States are to bear 
international responsibility for activities in outer space that are conducted under the 
State’s direction or influence, regardless of whether the activities are conducted by 
public or private entities.  To some extent, this can be seen as the logical interpretation 
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of Article VI as States should not have to bear responsibility for acts beyond its 
control, direction or influence.  For example, the acts and omissions of a Belgian 
national operating in Mexico ought not to be attributable to the Government of 
Belgium where: 
(1)  the Belgian national is not empowered by the law of Belgium to exercise 
elements of governmental authority;186 
(2)  the Belgian national is acting on the instructions of, or under the direction 
or control of, the Government of Belgium;187 
(3)  the acts have not been acknowledged or adopted by Belgium as its own;188 
However, the analysis must not end there, as Article VI imposes a further requirement 
that the “appropriate” State is to authorise and continually supervise the space 
activities of private entities.  This obligation is not qualified or confined by the use of 
the term “national” and, accordingly, is an obligation imposed on the State concerning 
all private activities, regardless of the existing degree of State control, direction or 
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influence over the activity.  Through the acts of authorisation and continuing 
supervision, the State would be asserting some degree of control, direction or 
influence over the private space activity, thus making it a “national” activity for which 
the State bears international responsibility.  This produces the overall effect of 
requiring a State to bear international responsibility for all public or private space 
activities under its control, direction or influence, including those that it authorises 
and continually supervises as the “appropriate” State. 
 
Figure 3.3-1. State Responsibility under Article VI: Summary of Analysis189 
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This conclusion has two ancillary effects.  The first is that this international 
responsibility would apply to the State even if the relevant private space activity was 
conducted outside the territorial jurisdiction of the State, provided that the activity 
can be attributed to the State.  This is consistent with the position taken under 
existing customary international law, as discussed by the International Court of 
Justice and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.190  
Further, this is also consistent with the approach adopted under the Liability 
Convention, which imposes liability on a State for the launch activities of its nationals, 
even if these activities take place outside the sovereign territory of that State.191 
3.3.1.4  The “Appropriate” State and the Duty to Authorise and 
Continually Supervise National Space Activities 
The second ancillary effect is that the State of nationality may find itself in a situation 
where it is unable to supervise the space activities of its private nationals.  For 
example, if the national, domiciled outside the territorial jurisdiction of his or her 
State of nationality, conducts his or her space activities within the territorial 
jurisdiction of another State, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the State of 
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nationality to authorise and continually supervise those space activities.  Kerrest 
suggested that this difficulty is in itself a breach of international law: 
This is of course in total breach of international law.  States have 
personal jurisdiction over their nationals.  They must keep the 
capacity to implement international law in general and space law in 
particular and to make it applicable to their citizens whether they are 
natural or legal persons.192 
When considered in the context of the duties imposed under Article VI being 
implemented through domestic legislation that carry criminal sanctions, this view 
does find some support in the existing body of international law.  This is most notably 
the case in S.S. Lotus, in which the Permanent Court of International Justice held that 
Turkey was capable of extending its criminal jurisdiction over French nationals 
arrested in Turkey for committing a crime under Turkish law in the high seas.193  As 
the Court stated: 
Though it is true that in all systems of law the principle of the 
territorial character of criminal law is fundamental, it is equally true 
that all or nearly all of these systems of law extend their action to 
offences committed outside the territory of the State which adopts 
them. … The territoriality of criminal law, therefore, is not an 
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absolute principle of international law and by no means coincide with 
territorial sovereignty.194 
Further in support of the ability of the “appropriate State” to implement its 
obligations imposed under Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, Dickinson stated in 
his introductory comment on the Harvard Research Draft Convention on Jurisdiction 
with Respect to Crime that: 
The competence of the State to prosecute and punish its nationals on 
the sole basis of their nationality is based upon the allegiance which 
the person charged with crime owes to the State of which he is a 
national. … If international law permits a State to regard the accused 
as its national, its competence is not impaired or limited by the fact 
that he is also a national of another State.195 
However, it must be noted that it is not in the legal competence of the State of 
nationality, but rather its physical inability to enforce its laws over nationals domiciled 
within the territorial sovereignty of another State that causes difficulties for the State 
of nationality to act as the “appropriate” State.  Even in Lotus, which Brierly suggested 
to be “based on the highly contentious metaphysical proposition of the extreme 
positivist school”,196 the Court stated that the “exclusively territorial character of law 
relating to this domain constitutes a principle which, except as otherwise expressly 
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provided, would ipso facto, prevent States from extending the criminal jurisdiction of 
their courts beyond their frontiers”.197  In other words, the personal jurisdiction that 
the State of nationality has over its nationals would allow for the later prosecution of 
any crimes committed by that national upon his or her return, but would not prevent 
that State from fulfilling its duty to authorise and continually supervise the space 
activities of that national. 
In any event, if the “appropriate” State is intended to be the State of nationality, then 
it is doubtful that the drafters of the Outer Space Treaty would have found it 
necessary to invent a new term to describe it.  Indeed, the term “appropriate” is best 
read with reference to the context in which it is placed, namely the act of authorising 
and continually supervising the space activities of private entities.  In the travaux 
préparatoires of the Principles Declaration, there was an U.S. proposal that contained 
the following provision: 
A state or international organisation from whose territory or with 
whose assistance or permission a space vehicle is launched bears 
international responsibility for the launching, and is internationally 
liable for personal injury, loss of life or property damage caused by 
such vehicle on the Earth or in air space.198 
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Therefore, it may be concluded that the “appropriate” State is better defined as the 
State in the best position to assert direct and immediate jurisdiction over the private 
entity to authorise and continually supervise its activities.  In the case of a space 
activity conducted by a private entity within the territory of its State of nationality, 
the “appropriate” State is clearly that State.  In the case of a private entity operating 
outside its State of nationality, however, the State in the best position to authorise and 
continually supervise is the State with territorial jurisdiction over the activities of that 
private entity.  Consequently, in most circumstances, the territorial State may be 
designated as the “appropriate” State, a proposition that is supported by some 
eminent commentators of space law.199 
In defining the term “appropriate State” as the territorial State, there are three 
implications that should be noted: 
(1)  this is a fairer outcome as the State of nationality should not be placed in a 
position where it must fulfil an impossible legal obligation; 
(2)  the problem of “double jeopardy” is avoided as the “appropriate” State 
and only that State is responsible under the Outer Space Treaty for 
                                                           
 
199 See, for example, Istvan Herczeg, Interpretation of the Space Treaty of 1967 (Introductory Report) 
(1967) 10 PROC. COLL. L. OUTER SP. 105 at 107; Stephen Gorove, Liability in Space Law: An 
Overview (1983) 8 ANN. AIR & SP. L. 373 at 377; and Michel Bourély, Rules of International Law 
Governing the Commercialisation of Space Activities (1986) 29 PROC. COLL. L. OUTER SP. 157 at 159. State Responsibility and Liability for Compliance with Principles of International Law 
262  |  Page     
authorising and continually supervising the space activities conducted by 
private entities within its territorial jurisdiction; and 
(3)  this definition does not affect or prejudice the effect of Article VII of the 
Outer Space Treaty or the provisions of the Liability Convention in 
imposing liability on the State of nationality, regardless of whether it had 
authorised and continually supervised the activity or otherwise. 
3.3.2  Jurisdiction 
On the issue of jurisdiction, Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty provides that: 
A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into 
outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such 
object, and over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a 
celestial body. … 
It is clear that the exercise of quasi-territorial jurisdiction over space objects depends 
on the carriage of that space object on the domestic registry of the State.  In the case of 
where only one State is involved in the launch of a particular space object, this does 
not pose any difficulties.  On the United Nations Register of Space Objects, almost all 
States have registered nearly all their space objects, either pursuant to the Registration 
Convention or on a voluntary basis under General Assembly Resolution 1721B (XVI). Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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However, where there is more than one launching State, these States must elect among 
themselves the State that shall register the space object and, accordingly, exercise 
quasi-territorial jurisdiction and control over the space object pursuant to Article VIII 
of the Outer Space Treaty. 
Article II(2) of the Registration Convention provides that: 
Where there are two or more launching States in respect of any such 
space object, they shall jointly determine which one of them shall 
register the object …, bearing in mind the provisions of Article VIII of 
the [Outer Space Treaty] and without prejudice to appropriate 
agreements concluded or to be concluded among the launching States 
on jurisdiction and control over the space object and over any 
personnel thereof. 
For example, the United States adopted the position that it will only register all space 
objects that are owned by U.S. governmental or private entities, regardless of where 
they were launched and that non-U.S. payloads launched from the United States 
should be registered by the State whose nationals own the payload.200  This is a 
positive development in terms of clarifying the practice of States in deciding on the 
appropriate State of registry between multiple launching States, as it reflects the 
commercial reality that it is the owner of the payload, rather than the other launching 
States, that would most desire the retention of jurisdiction and control. 
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What remains a subject of substantial academic debate is the problem of the transfer 
of registrations and, along with that transfer, the jurisdiction and control over the 
space object.  Neither the Outer Space Treaty nor the Registration Convention 
contain any provisions for the transfer of the registration of a space object.  This was 
seen as a particular issue during the privatisation of the International Maritime 
Satellite Organisation (“INMARSAT”) and the handover of the former British colony 
of Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China. 
Several commentators have suggested that an amendment to the Registration 
Convention would ultimately be necessary in order to address this issue.201  This 
position may be unnecessary when due consideration is given to existing state 
practice.  Recently, both the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, parties to the 
Registration Convention, have sought to register space objects to which they were not 
launching States.202  Particularly in the first case, the Netherlands asserted the view 
that it was not obliged to furnish any data pursuant to the Registration Convention as 
it was not a launching State but, having placed the satellites on its national register, 
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was entitled to assert jurisdiction and control over the space object pursuant to Article 
VIII of the Outer Space Treaty.203 
It is obvious that a duty to register the space object is imposed under the Registration 
Convention only on launching States and, accordingly, in order to register these space 
objects as non-launching States, both States must have found a right to register in the 
body of space law.  As the Registration Convention clearly does not provide this right, 
the other logical candidates are Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty with reference 
to domestic registries and General Assembly Resolution 1721B, with reference to the 
United Nations register.  In this way, it is not necessary for the Registration 
Convention to be amended, but merely for the new State of registry to seek the 
registration of the transferred space object under Article VIII of the Outer Space 
Treaty and General Assembly Resolution 1721B to assert jurisdiction and control over 
the space object. 
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3.4  LIABILITY 
3.4.1  Overview 
The fundamental concern of any enterprise in outer space would be liability.  From 
the very beginnings of international space law, it has been recognised that States 
would have to accept international liability for any damage or injury they cause to 
third parties through the conduct of space activities.  This is partly because space 
activities have been regarded by the international community as being inherently risky 
and dangerous and, consequently, third party States should be protected from any 
injury, loss or damage suffered resulting from the conduct of activities in outer space. 
When the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the “Outer 
Space Treaty”) was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1968, space 
activities were the exclusive domain of the Soviet Union and the United States.204  
This remained the case when the Convention on International Liability for Damage 
Caused by Space Objects (the “Liability Convention”) was adopted in 1972.205  At 
the time, there were no international joint efforts, even without the participation of 
the private sector, in space activities.  Three decades later, however, most space 
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activities today are conducted by commercial concerns operating on a multinational 
level.  The space treaties, in particular the Liability Convention, are proving to be 
inadequate in addressing the issues of third party liability, private space activities and 
the settlement of disputes.206 
The privatisation and commercialisation of space activities in recent decades have 
prompted several States to pass on their international liability for private space 
activities to the launch operators.  In order to assess comprehensively the liability 
regime applicable to private space activities, it is necessary not only to consider the 
international treaties but also the relevant domestic legislation concerning private 
space activities.207 
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3.4.2  International Liability 
3.4.2.1  Development of the Liability Convention 
One of the earliest issues debated among legal scholars with an interest in space law 
was the subject of responsibility and liability.  As early as 1958, it was suggested that: 
(1)  the State launching a spacecraft accept full international responsibility for 
any possible damage; 
(2)  the State be entitled to make certain reservations as under the Warsaw 
Convention excluding, for example, liability in the case of force majeure; 
and 
(3)  an International Guaranty Fund be created to pay for damage caused by 
satellites except for intentional acts.208 
In 1959, coinciding with this debate in academic circles, the Government of the 
United States circulated a proposal within the United Nations which suggested that, 
among other matters, the question of international liability for damage caused by the 
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launching, flight and re-entry of payloads and associated launch vehicles as a priority 
issue.209  During the first meeting of the Legal Sub-Committee to the United Nations 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (“COPUOS”) in 1962, a set of 
substantive principles on liability was proposed by the United States.210  Subsequently, 
it was agreed by all participating States to include a provision relating to liability in the 
Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1963.211 
The provision found in the 1963 Principles Declaration was substantially reproduced 
in Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty, stating: 
Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the 
launching of an object into outer space, including the Moon and other 
celestial bodies, and each State Party from whose territory or facility 
an object is launched, is internationally liable for damage to another 
State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by such 
object or its component parts on the Earth, in air space or in outer 
space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies. 
Considering the widespread acceptance of the Outer Space Treaty, it is likely that its 
terms or at least some of its essential provisions may be considered to have crystallised 
into customary law.  The indicia of their crystallisation include the widespread 
                                                           
 
209 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.4. 
210 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.4. 
211 General Assembly Resolution 1962 (XVIII). State Responsibility and Liability for Compliance with Principles of International Law 
270  |  Page     
acceptance of the Outer Space Treaty, the absence of objections by States and the 
repetition of its provisions in subsequent instruments.212  The difficulty in declaring 
with any certainty the extent of the crystallisation of the provisions of the Outer Space 
Treaty, especially those dealing with responsibility and liability, is the continuing 
absence of state practice that remains a prerequisite for the formation of custom.213 
The United States made a series of proposals for a set of principles on liability to the 
Legal Sub-Committee through the 1960s.214  In its view, there must be four essential 
elements for a working international treaty on liability for activities in outer space: 
(1)  an explicit rule that the demonstration of fault cannot be a requirement of 
or prerequisite to liability; 
(2)  the standards to be applied to evaluate the damage suffered and the 
appropriate compensation payable; 
(3)  a denial of the traditional requirement for the claimant to exhaust all 
appropriate local remedies; and 
                                                           
 
212 See, for example, the discussion in Vladlen S. Vereshchetin and Gennady M. Danilenko, Custom as a 
Source of International Law of Outer Space (1985) 13 J. SP. L. 22; D. Krstic, Customary Law Rules in 
Regulating Outer Space Activities (1977) 20 PROC. COLL. L. OUTER SP. 320; and Lee and Freeland, 
supra note 151. 
213 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits) (Nicaragua v. United States) 
[1986] I.C.J. Rep. 14 at 94; and North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Germany v. Denmark; Germany v. 
the Netherlands) [1969] I.C.J. Rep. 3.  See, for example, Brownlie, supra note 109, at 4-11. 
214 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.8. Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
  Page |  271 
(4)  the imposition of specific time limits on negotiations for settlements and 
the establishment of a theoretically impartial claims commission to 
“advise” the parties.215 
In addition to the proposals put forward by the United States, there were also several 
proposed texts from Belgium.216  Reis, legal adviser to the United States Mission to the 
United Nations at the time, suggested that the Soviet Union did not pay serious 
attention to such proposals and “preferred … not to put forward proposals under its 
own name but instead to rely upon Hungary”.217  Such a characterisation would appear 
to understate the contributions that the representatives of the Soviet Union made 
towards the formulation and discussion of the treaty. 
While the Hungarian proposals did not differ from the United States proposals on the 
subject of absolute liability, they did suggest that the nature and amount of 
compensation payable should be determined by the law of the launching State.218  The 
proposals also included a provision that rules of exception or exoneration from 
liability should have no application for “unlawful activities”.219 
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After more than a decade of negotiations, the Liability Convention was adopted by 
the General Assembly in 1972.  It was observed that the Liability Convention 
contained the fundamental elements sought by the United States through its 
proposals, while some less fundamental proposals were excluded in the interest of 
reaching a compromise.  Reis suggested that it gave “maximum assurance that a 
launching State which has ratified the convention will pay a just claim” and 
encourages space powers not to “deal arrogantly with justified damage claims” from 
claimant States.220  In order to scrutinise such claims, the provisions of the Liability 
Convention should be examined in detail. 
3.4.2.2  Liability Provisions 
The Liability Convention introduces the concept of a “launching State” which is 
subsequently used in the Convention on the Registration of Space Objects (the 
“Registration Convention”) and other instruments on the law of outer space.   
Article I defines the terms “launching State” and “space object” with the cumulative 
effect that a “launching State” for the purposes of the Liability Convention includes: 
(1)  a State that launches a space object, its component parts, its launch vehicle 
or parts thereof; 
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(2)  a State that procures the launch of a space object, its component parts, its 
launch vehicle or parts thereof; 
(3)  a State from whose territory a space object, its component parts, its launch 
vehicle or parts thereof is launched; and 
(4)  a State from whose facility a space object, its component parts, its launch 
vehicle or parts thereof is launched. 
From the above definition, it is clear that it is possible to have more than one 
launching State for each space object.  For example, a satellite owned and to be 
operated by a French private concern to be launched by a German launch operator 
from a Russian facility located in Australia may result in France, Germany, Russia and 
Australia all being regarded as launching States.  The Liability Convention imposes 
joint and several liability on the multiple launching States and each may present claims 
for indemnity or contribution from other launching States or to apportion their 
liability by agreement.221  In the earlier days, when launch activities were the field of 
governmental agencies, this joint and several liability was much less of a concern than 
it is today with each segment of a launch operation being conducted by private 
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multinational companies, making the imposition of international liability significantly 
more problematic. 
Article II of the Liability Convention provides for absolute liability for any damage 
caused by space objects that is suffered on the surface of the Earth or in airspace.  
Whether the deep seabed would be considered part of the “surface of the Earth” is 
unclear.  The provision states that: 
A launching State shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for 
damage caused by its space object on the surface of the Earth or to 
aircraft in flight. 
Provided that the space activity was conducted in accordance with international law, 
particularly the Charter of the United Nations and the Outer Space Treaty, the 
launching State would be exonerated from absolute liability to the extent that the 
damage resulted wholly or partly from the gross negligence or an intentional act or 
omission of the claimant State or its nationals and not from any unlawful act on the 
part of the launching State.222  There is no explicit definition in the Liability 
Convention as to what would constitute gross negligence and this has been a matter of 
substantial academic discussion, though for present purposes a precise definition is 
probably unnecessary for the Liability Convention to apply to contemporary 
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commercial applications.223  For instance, Awford applied a more general meaning to 
the term “gross negligence” in such a context: 
Exactly what is contemplated is not spelled out but if the claimant 
State caused or contributed to the damage it suffered by shooting 
down the Space Station of another State, using laser technology, 
presumably there will be complete exoneration.  If, due to a lack of 
liaison, the communication or control system of the claimant State’s 
satellite interferes with that of the satellite of another State, which 
then goes out of control and re-enters or collides with another 
satellite, then the facts may shown that the compensation for the 
damage needs to be apportioned in some way.224 
Article III of the Liability Convention, on the other hand, provides that liability for 
damage caused in outer space by a space object will be determined on the basis of 
fault.  Specifically, it states that: 
In the event of damage being caused elsewhere than on the surface of 
the Earth to a space object of one launching State or to persons or 
property on board such a space object by a space object of another 
launching State, the latter shall be liable only if the damage is due to 
its fault or the fault of persons for whom it is responsible. 
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It is uncertain at first glance what is meant by “another launching State” in Article III.  
However, considering the context of the provision as a whole, it is reasonable to 
assume that the appropriate meaning is “a launching State other than the launching 
State of the first object”.  In other words, Article III has application only where the 
damage caused is international and not domestic in nature. 
Article IV (1) states: 
In the event of damage being caused elsewhere than on the surface of 
the Earth to a space object of one launching State or to persons or 
property on board such a space object by a space object of another 
launching State, and of damage thereby being caused to a third State 
or to its natural or juridical persons, the first two States shall be jointly 
and severally liable to the third State, to the extent indicated by the 
following: 
(a)  if the damage has been caused to the third State on the surface 
of the Earth or to aircraft in flight, their liability to the third 
State shall be absolute; 
(b)  if the damage has been caused to a space object of the third 
State or to persons or property on board that space object 
elsewhere than on the surface of the Earth, their liability to the 
third State shall be based on the fault of either of the first two 
States or on the fault of persons for whom either is responsible. 
This provision deals with the situation where a collision occurs between two space 
objects in outer space and then causes damage to a third State, either on the surface of 
the Earth or in outer space.  It should be noted that the provision deals only with the 
primary damage being caused in outer space and not if it is caused on the surface of 
the Earth, for in the latter case the liability would be absolute.  In outer space, the Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
  Page |  277 
liability of the two States is to be apportioned on the basis of the extent to which each 
one of them was at fault or, if the extent of fault cannot be established, proportioned 
equally between them.225 
The Liability Convention does not apply to damage caused by a space object of a 
launching State to nationals of that launching State and to: 
Foreign nationals during such time as they are participating in the 
operation of that space object from the time of its launching or at any 
stage thereafter until its descent, or during such time as they are in the 
immediate vicinity of a planned launching or recovery area as the 
result of an invitation by that launching State.226 
If the provision is to be interpreted with its prima facie meaning, the reference to that 
launching State instead of a launching State appears to indicate that, in the case of 
damage caused by a space object that has multiple launching States, a claim may be 
made by the nationals of one launching State against the other launching States.  This 
ability of launching States to make claims against each other is questionable because if 
the claimant State presents a claim on behalf of its nationals against the other 
launching States, these States would have a right to indemnity or contribution from 
the claimant State, making the provision somewhat redundant.  The appropriate 
interpretation thus appears to be the exclusion of claims made by nationals of 
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launching States against any or all of the launching States from the scope of the 
Liability Convention. 
The standard for determining the amount of compensation payable under the 
Liability Convention is found in Article XII, which provides that the quantum of 
damage is to be determined: 
… in accordance with international law and the principles of justice 
and equity, in order to provide such reparation in respect of the 
damage as will restore the person, natural or juridical, State or 
international organisation on whose behalf the claim is presented to 
the condition which would have existed if the damage had not 
occurred. 
3.4.3  Modern Liability Controversies 
3.4.3.1  Launching State 
Since the provisions of the Liability Convention have never been specifically invoked 
in anger (except in heated academic discussions), there are significant uncertainties in 
the interpretation of its provisions.  The first and perhaps the most controversial 
today remains the definition of a “launching State” and its application to the 
multinational nature of the space industry today.  This was particularly difficult in the Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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context of the Sea Launch project, which involved a private joint venture of 
companies from Russia, the United States, Ukraine and Norway with the rockets 
launched from a converted oil drilling platform in the high seas.227  Some scholars have 
suggested that this creates a lacuna in the application of the Liability Convention.228  
This may not necessarily be true as the launch operator in a launch from the high seas 
or in airspace above the high seas and the satellite operator who procured the launch 
would nevertheless be easily identifiable, and all launching States are jointly and 
severally liable.  In the case of Sea Launch, for example, Norway, Russia, Ukraine and 
the United States would all be jointly and severally liable as launching States, though 
they may have agreed to apportion their potential liability by private contract. 
In practice, States would generally prefer “launching States” to be defined as narrowly 
as possible, especially in the context of “procuring” the launch, as a broad definition 
may have the effect of stifling participation by some States in international 
endeavours or to approve the tangential involvement of their private concerns in 
order to avoid potential international liability.229  Awford, for example, suggested that 
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an expansive and “somewhat imaginative” interpretation of the term “launching 
State” may have the “remote possibility” of including the following States: 
(1)  the State that owns the launch facility; 
(2)  the State that manufactured and installed the launch facility; 
(3)  the State that supplied some of the components for the launch facility; 
(4)  the State that transported some of those components to the launch 
facility; 
(5)  the State that owns the territory on which the launch facility is built; 
(6)  the State that owns the satellite to be launched; 
(7)  the State that manufactured the satellite; 
(8)  the State that supplied components to the satellite; 
(9)  the State that transported the satellite to the launch facility; 
(10)  the State that arranged for the launch; 
(11)  the State that supplied the launch vehicle; 
(12)  the State that manufactured the component parts of the launch vehicle; Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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(13)  the State that monitored the launch; and 
(14)  the State that provided the management of the overall project.230 
One other commercial reality in the launch industry is that the launch operator is 
generally not the entity that will operate and control the satellite once it has been 
inserted into orbit.  In such a case, it would be an injustice to continue to impose 
liability on the “launching States”, namely the States responsible for the launch, when 
they no longer have any control or influence over the operation and control of the 
satellite.  Some States today prepare bilateral agreements pursuant to Article V(2) of 
the Liability Convention to require the “operating States” to indemnify the “launching 
States” for any damage caused after orbital insertion.  This is particularly important as 
the fault liability that forms the basis of liability for damage caused in outer space is 
based on the fault of the launching States collectively.  Further, there is no treaty basis 
for the apportionment of liability between the launching States except by private 
intergovernmental agreement, as provided for under Article V of the Liability 
Convention.  However, the practical enforcement of these agreements may be 
problematic considering that such agreements “shall be without prejudice to the right 
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of a State sustaining damage to seek the entire compensation due under this 
Convention from any or all of the ‘launching States’”.231 
In addition to the conceptual difficulties associated with the definition of a “launching 
State”, there are further interpretation problems associated with the wording of the 
definition itself.  One such controversy is the issue of suborbital launches, which Gál 
suggested be excluded from the scope of the Liability Convention.232  Böckstiegel 
advocated that not all suborbital launches would be excluded as the definition of 
“launch” includes attempted launches, though what would constitute an attempted 
launch was not clarified.233  Gorove noted that, as with criminal law, an “attempt” 
must be intended and involved “perpetration” or “execution” of adequate means that 
have come close to success.234  This approach does not appear to have met with 
widespread acceptance and, in any event, this would limit the scope of the 
applicability of the Liability Convention in a way that the drafters may not have 
intended at the time.235 
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The issue of “procuring” a launch for the purposes of the Liability Convention has also 
raised some questions, particularly in the context of private launch activities.   
Böckstiegel suggested that the mere link of nationality of a private launch operator is 
not sufficient to make that State a launching State — the State must actively request, 
initiate or promote the launching of the space object to have “procured” the launch.236  
This view is shared by Nesgos in the context of the “procuring” role of the State when 
one of its private enterprises provides a space object to be launched by a foreign State 
or a launch operator of a foreign State.237  In light of the obligation imposed on the 
“appropriate State” to authorise and continually supervise space activities of non-
governmental entities and to take international responsibility for them under Article 
VI of the Outer Space Treaty, such an active role on the part of the State of nationality 
may be considered unnecessary for a State to be considered to have “procured” a 
launch.238  In such a context, the suggested view by Wirin that “procurement” requires 
actual control over the launch or the payload in orbit is clearly met.239 
                                                           
 
236 Böckstiegel, supra note 233, at 81. 
237 Peter D. Nesgos, International and Domestic Law Applicable to Commercial Launch Vehicle 
Transportation (1984) 27 PROC. COLL. L. OUTER SP. 98 at 102. 
238 This is partly suggested in Gorove, supra note 234, at 120. 
239 Wirin, supra note 229, at 113. State Responsibility and Liability for Compliance with Principles of International Law 
284  |  Page     
3.4.3.2  Space Object 
The Liability Convention defines a “space object” as including “component parts of a 
space object as well as its launch vehicle and parts thereof”.  It has often been noted 
that this is no more than a partial definition, or clarification, of a “space object”, which 
in any event refers to itself.240  Cheng outlined that “space object” covers “any object 
launched by humans into outer space, as well as any component part thereof, together 
with its launch vehicle and parts thereof” and so objects launched into the Earth’s 
orbit and beyond are ipso facto regarded as space objects.241  A similar legal definition 
for “space object” has been proposed by Kopal.242 
This has particular relevance in the case of a space object launched by a rocket 
deployed from an aircraft in airspace.  Böckstiegel suggested that, as the aircraft may 
be considered the first stage of the launch vehicle, the take-off of the aircraft would be 
considered the start of the launch procedure and therefore the State from whose 
territory the aircraft took off would be considered a launching State.243  Gorove stated 
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that it is more likely that the State in whose airspace the aircraft launched the rocket 
would be considered the launching State.244  In order to resolve this conceptual 
impasse, it may be more appropriate to consider the aircraft as the “facility” for the 
launch and the airspace the “territory” from which the space object is launched.  This 
is especially so considering one would be unlikely to consider the last port of call of the 
launch platform to be a launching State for a launch from the sea.  
The definition of “space object” has specific relevance in the context of attributing 
liability for damage caused by space debris.  Pieces, fragments and other substances of 
an object would generally be regarded as “parts” of that object.  The problem is that 
the partial definition in the Liability Convention refers to the inclusion of component 
parts of the space object and parts of its launch vehicle.  As the term “component 
parts” has a clear meaning, the argument may therefore be forcefully made that the 
drafters of the Liability Convention intended for such a distinction to be maintained 
in the case of the “component parts” of a space object vis-à-vis the “parts” of a launch 
vehicle.  However, as Gorove suggested, such a technical distinction does not appear 
to be maintained by state practice and, in practice, there does not appear to be a sound 
policy justification for such a distinction.245 
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One practical consequence of not maintaining a distinction between “component 
parts” and “parts” is that the launching States would be liable for damage caused by 
the orbital debris generated from their space objects to the space objects of other 
States.  It is for this reason that Wirin proposed that the use of the term “component 
parts” was to specifically exclude small pieces and fragments that are not capable of 
surviving a re-entry into the atmosphere of the Earth.246  On the other hand, Gorove 
was of the view that separating orbital debris from the definition of “space objects” 
would appear to run counter to the intention of the drafters of the Liability 
Convention.247  Cheng further pointed out that “fragments of a space object that fall 
on the Earth are … given the same status as the whole object … [and] nothing suggests 
otherwise, or that shattered fuel tanks or flakes of paint from space objects in outer 
space should be treated any differently”.248  However, it is respectfully submitted that 
the drafters of the Outer Space Treaty, in referring to the “parts” of a launch vehicle 
and “component parts” of a space object, clearly intended to suggest an interpretation 
to “component parts” other than that proposed by Cheng. 
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3.4.3.3  Fault 
The concept of “fault” as used in Article III of the Liability Convention, in which this 
term is not defined, has different meanings in different legal systems.  In civil law 
systems, fault is generally interpreted by the courts on a case-by-case basis.  In 
common law, fault is often associated with negligence in common law systems, thus 
necessitating considerations of the applicable duty and standard of care in its 
determination to be taken into account.249 
In practice, this discrepancy in the legal notion of “fault” in different legal systems 
may not be of substantial consequence, as the facts of the circumstances in which 
damage was suffered may be res ipsa loquitur.  For example, a satellite operator may be 
considered to be at fault if it placed the satellite in an orbit known to be already 
occupied by another satellite with which it is likely to collide or if the “victim” satellite 
operator failed to move its satellite out of the way of a known inert or “dead” satellite. 
Consequently, one of the most noteworthy difficulties in the imposition of 
international liability for damage caused by orbital debris is not the identification of 
the origin of the debris, but rather the attribution of fault on the part of the launching 
States.  In the context of common law notions of fault, it would be difficult to suggest 
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that the launching States would be at fault because, although the risk of collisions with 
the generated debris is reasonably foreseeable, the launching States are unlikely to be 
able to take steps to prevent such a collision short of not launching the original space 
object at all or to use a substantial amount of fuel to take the satellite into either a 
sufficiently high “parking” orbit or to deorbit it back into the atmosphere of the Earth, 
although such a costly outcome is unlikely to be endorsed by most States. 
3.4.3.4  Nuclear Power Sources 
The requirements of the Outer Space Treaty and the liability provisions of the 
Liability Convention are repeated in the Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear 
Power Sources in Outer Space (the “Nuclear Power Sources Principles”) as declared 
by the General Assembly in 1992 in the circumstance of space objects with nuclear and 
radioisotopic power sources onboard.250  Similarly, the provision relating to the 
determination of the amount of compensation payable under Article XII of the 
Liability Convention can also be found in the Nuclear Power Sources Principles.251 
In relation to the costs of the recovery and the clean-up, the Rescue Agreement and 
the Nuclear Power Sources Principles contain two substantially identical but 
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procedurally different provisions.  Under the Rescue Agreement, the expenses 
incurred for the recovery and return of the components of the space object are to be 
reimbursed by the States responsible for the launch.252  The costs of the clean-up and 
other steps taken to eliminate the hazardous nature of the returned components are 
excluded from this reimbursement provision.  Presumably this is because the costs of 
the recovery and return are technically not “damage”, while the clean-up costs of 
eliminating hazardous materials are necessarily “damage”.  Consequently, it is 
appropriate to establish a head of liability for recovery costs that is separate to that of 
the liability for damage. 
The Nuclear Power Sources Principles, on the other hand, provide that the 
compensation payable by the launching States in accordance with the Liability 
Convention and the Outer Space Treaty includes the reimbursement for “duly 
substantiated expenses for search, recovery and clean-up operations, including 
expenses for assistance received from third parties”.253  This means that, subject to the 
added requirement of “duly substantiating” the expenses, these costs are to be 
considered part of the “damage” to be compensated by the launching States.  This is 
clearly inconsistent with the similar provision in the Rescue Agreement as discussed 
above.  While this produces a procedural discrepancy, in practice it is doubtful that 
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the relevant States concerned would make two separate claims relating to recovery 
costs and the damage arising from the return of a space object from outer space. 
3.4.4  Calculation of Damages 
3.4.4.1  Approach 
Article I of the Liability Convention defines “damage” as being “loss of life, personal 
injury or other impairment of health; or loss of or damage to property of States or of 
persons, natural or juridical, or property of international intergovernmental 
organisations”.  Article XII further provides that the damages payable in 
compensation are to be determined “in accordance with international law and the 
principles of justice and equity” to the extent of restoring the injured parties to the 
condition prior to the damage occurring.  The Liability Convention does not appear 
to include environmental damage as part of the “damage” potentially caused by space 
objects.254  This approach has particular importance and relevance in considering 
clean-up costs of nuclear and radioisotopic power sources as discussed above. 
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3.4.4.2  Direct Damage 
Article I of the Liability Convention refers to four specific heads of recoverable direct 
damage, namely, loss of life, personal injury, other impairment of health and loss of or 
damage to property.  In the context of these damages, a claimant State would be 
required to demonstrate that the harm claimed flowed directly or immediately from 
and as the natural or probable result of the space object.255  Some commentators have 
noted that “impairment of health” can result from both contamination as well as 
physical injury and that it is not necessary to have direct contact with the space object 
to suffer harm.256  In this context, the radiation damage caused by the unexpected re-
entry of Cosmos-954 would be a recoverable damage, even without the need to rely on 
the Nuclear Power Sources Principles.257 
Christol suggested that, in accordance with the United States view of the position in 
international law, compensation for the following items would also be appropriate and 
would be considered “direct” damages: 
(1)  lost time and earnings and impaired earning capacity; 
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(2)  destruction or deprivation of the use of property, including where the 
property has been rendered unfit for its intended purposes; 
(3)  loss of profits resulting from business interruption; 
(4)  loss of rents; 
(5)  reasonable medical, hospital and nursing costs associated with injuries 
sustained by natural persons; 
(6)  physical and mental impairment; 
(7)  pain and suffering; 
(8)  humiliation; 
(9)  reasonable costs for the repair of property; and 
(10)  costs incurred in acts taken to mitigate the damage caused.258 
                                                           
 
258 Christol, supra note 223, at 359. Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
  Page |  293 
3.4.4.3  Indirect Damage and Economic Loss 
It is unclear from the Liability Convention whether it is intended to cover indirect or 
consequential damage.  Articles II and III both refer to the damage being “caused” by 
the space object.  Hungary and the Soviet Union opposed an interpretation that would 
allow recovery of indirect damage, while Italy and Japan both favoured it.259  In the 
end, the question was left open, as “the word ‘caused’ should be interpreted as merely 
direct attention to the need for some causal connection between the accident and the 
damage, while leaving a broad discretion so that each claim can be determined purely 
on its merits”.260 
There appears to be some academic support for the proposition that, since “caused 
by” requires no more than a causal connection between the space object and the 
damage, the Liability Convention covers both direct and indirect damage.261  In the 
situation of Cosmos-954, for example, Haanappel suggested that search and recovery 
costs incurred by Canada were incurred to mitigate probable damage and were 
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recoverable indirect damage for the purposes of Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty 
and the provisions of the Liability Convention.262 
3.4.4.4  Moral or Punitive Damages 
In international law, moral damage is identified as the injury to the dignity or 
sovereignty of a State, such as a breach of a treaty obligation that does not produce a 
material injury and yet the violating State would be expected to pay adequate 
monetary penalties.  Similarly, pain and suffering and the loss of capacity to enjoy life 
may also be considered to be moral damage to natural persons. 
The term “equity” has been noted as referring not to the common law concept of 
equity but rather to signify “moral justice”.263  In other words, the assessment of 
damages is a task to be undertaken with reference to the actual losses suffered rather 
than through the application of domestic or secondary international principles. 
The United States has long expressed the view that moral damages are covered by the 
Liability Convention and that, if a claim is made in the future by the United States, 
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such a claim would include a component for moral damages.264  While the moral 
damage done to a natural person may establish a sufficient causal link with the space 
object, it is difficult to see how the moral damage suffered by a State would be 
recoverable if a causal connection cannot be made to the space object, considering the 
mere causation of damage by a space object is not prima facie a breach of an existing 
principle of treaty law. 
Punitive damages have been considered by commentators to be both unnecessary and 
unrecoverable.265  The reason why punitive damages is considered unnecessary is 
because of the provision for unlimited liability under the Liability Convention that 
allows the victims to recover sufficient compensation for their damages sustained.  
There appears to be three reasons why punitive damages may be unrecoverable: 
(1)  the provisions of the Liability Convention are very specific in tying the 
causation of the damage sustained to the space object and punitive 
damages cannot be included as they are not by their very nature 
compensation for damage actually sustained by the claimant State; 
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(2)  punitive damages are generally assessed by tribunals only to punish the 
intentional acts of tortfeasors while the Liability Convention does not 
make any distinction on the liability of the launching States for 
intentional, reckless, negligent or accidental damage; and 
(3)  in the case of the launching State acting in breach of an existing legal 
principle, the appropriation “sanction” is the unavailability of any 
exoneration from absolute liability under Article VI of the Liability 
Convention and not the imposition of punitive damages. 
3.4.5  Procedural Issues 
3.4.5.1  Right to Claim 
The Liability Convention is an international legal instrument that deals only with 
liability between States, even where it is not the State itself that suffers damage caused 
by space activities.  Consequently, the right to claim for compensation under the 
Liability Convention is held by the States and not private nationals. Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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Article VIII of the Liability Convention provides that, in the case of damage suffered 
by private entities, the right to claim is first given to the State of nationality.266  If the 
State of nationality does not present a claim, then the State on whose territory the 
damage was sustained may present a claim.267  If neither State presents a claim, then 
any other State may elect to present a claim on behalf of the natural persons or private 
entities resident in that other State that has suffered loss or damage.268  However, 
there is no indication in the provisions as to how much time is to be given to each 
State to decide whether to present a claim to the launching State(s) for the damage 
sustained, nor does it specify whether a State must make a positive act to indicate its 
intention not to present a claim before the right to claim transmits to the next eligible 
State in accordance with Article VIII. 
Claims for compensation made under the Liability Convention must be presented 
within one year from the date the damage is sustained or, if the occurrence of the 
damage or the identity of the launching State was not known, the time limit shall run 
for one year from the date the claimant State knew or ought reasonably to know of the 
unknown information.269  These limits apply even if the claimant State did not know 
the full extent of the damage sustained, but the claimant State has the right to amend 
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any claim presented within one year of knowing or ought reasonably to know the 
actual full extent of the damage sustained.270 
The Liability Convention specifically exempts the claimant State from the customary 
requirement to exhaust all local remedies before making an international claim.271  
The claimant State or its nationals may elect to pursue remedies through the domestic 
courts and tribunals of the launching State prior to presenting a claim under the 
Liability Convention.  However, a claim cannot be made under the Liability 
Convention while a domestic remedy is being pursued.272  Presumably, this does not 
prevent a claim from being presented after the failure of the domestic action, nor does 
this prevent the claimant State from pursuing local remedies after a claim under the 
Liability Convention has been resolved and the claimant State remains unsatisfied. 
3.4.5.2  Procedure and a Claims Commission 
The Liability Convention provides that a claim for compensation for damage shall be 
presented to a launching State “through diplomatic channels”, which includes existing 
bilateral diplomatic representations, through another State that maintains diplomatic 
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relations with the launching State or the Secretary-General of the United Nations.273  
With the utilisation of such diplomatic mechanisms, the claimant State and the 
launching State are to negotiate a settlement on the appropriate amount of 
compensation payable, if there is any. 
If the claimant State and the launching State fail to arrive at a settlement within one 
year of presenting the claim, either party may request for the establishment of a 
Claims Commission.274  The Claims Commission comprises three members: one 
appointed by the claimant State and another appointed by the launching State, with 
the Chairman to be selected jointly by both parties.275  The size of the Commission 
does not increase if there are multiple claimant States or launching States, as the 
claimant States or the launching States are to collectively appoint one member of the 
Claims Commission.276 
The claimant State and the launching State are given two months from the 
establishment request to appoint the members of the Claims Commission and four 
months to agree to the appointment of the Chairman.277  If a party fails to appoint 
“its” member of the Claims Commission within that time, then the other party may 
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request the Chairman to constitute a single-member Claims Commission.278  In the 
absence of agreement between the parties on the choice of the Chairman, either party 
may then request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to appoint the 
Chairman instead.279 
The Claims Commission is charged with one task only: to decide the merits of the 
claim for compensation and determine the amount of compensation payable, if any, in 
accordance with Article XII of the Liability Convention.280  The Claims Commission 
is to determine its own procedure except that the award to be determined is to be 
decided by a majority vote.281 
One of the strongest criticisms made against the procedure for the Claims 
Commission as contained in the Liability Convention is that, unless the parties agree 
otherwise, the award made by the Claims Commission is of no more than a 
recommendatory nature, which the parties are to consider in good faith.282  A s  
suggested by some commentators, this means that nothing more than a conciliation 
procedure is assured under the Liability Convention.  This is because the Claims 
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Commission would resemble an arbitral tribunal only if the parties agree to be bound 
by its award.283 
3.5  CONCLUSIONS 
From the above analysis, it is clear that the following implications arising from 
Articles VI and VII of the Outer Space Treaty and the provisions of the Liability 
Convention for a commercial mining venture in outer space must be considered: 
(1)  the “appropriate” State is required to authorise and continually supervise 
the space activities of private entities and ensure that the activities comply 
with the Outer Space Treaty; 
(2)  the State of registry of a space object can assert jurisdiction and control 
over that space object; 
(3)  States bear international responsibility for the “national” space activities 
of private entities; and 
                                                           
 
283 See, for example, Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, Settlement of Disputes Regarding Space Activities (1993) 21 
J. SP. L. 1 at 3. State Responsibility and Liability for Compliance with Principles of International Law 
302  |  Page     
(4)  the “launching States” are absolutely liable for any damage caused by their 
space objects on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft in flight and for any 
damage caused in outer space to the extent that the damage was caused by 
the fault of the launching States. 
These implications have two important effects on the activities of a commercial space 
venture, particularly in the launch, transit and return segments of a commercial space 
mining venture.  Firstly, it would be necessary for the venture to comply with the 
provisions of the Outer Space Treaty, as the “appropriate” State would presumably 
take steps in its “continuing supervision” of the activity to ensure this compliance.  
Secondly, the States are likely to take positive steps, such as the enactment of domestic 
laws and regulations, to pass on its international responsibility and liability under the 
Outer Space Treaty and the Liability Convention to the private entities engaged in 
space activities.284 
With these in mind, it is evident that the legality of all aspects of a commercial space 
mining venture must be assessed, most notably, the effects of the freedom of 
exploration and use and the principle of non-appropriation on the exploration and 
extraction segments of the operation, as well as the “province of all mankind” and 
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“common heritage of mankind” doctrines on the exploitation segment.  These issues 
are explored in greater detail in the following chapters.   
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4.1  INTRODUCTION 
Along with all different types of space activities, the provisions of the Outer Space 
Treaty, the Liability Convention and the other United Nations space treaties all have 
important implications on the permissibility and confines of lawful activities in outer 
space and on celestial bodies.  Although the treaties and their provisions have direct 
effect only on the public or governmental space activities of States, Article VI of the 
Outer Space Treaty extends their application to private space activities by requiring 
States to authorise, continually supervise and adopt international responsibility for 
private space activities.  Accordingly, both governmental and private commercial 
space mining ventures, including their exploration and extraction segments, require 
compliance with the principles of international space law as contained in the United 
Nations space treaties and customary international law. 
In particular, in the exploration and extraction segments of such commercial space 
mining ventures, there are three important provisions of the Outer Space Treaty that 
have the potential of imposing obligations that may affect the legality of the venture.  
They are: 
(1)  Article I, which prescribes the requirement that space activities are to be 
conducted for the benefit and in the interest of all States, the freedoms of 
exploration and use of outer space, and the freedom of access to all areas 
of celestial bodies; Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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(2)  Article II, which embodies the principle of non-appropriation; and 
(3)  Article IX, which outlines the duty to have due regard to corresponding 
interests of other States when conducting space activities and to avoid 
harmful contamination of celestial bodies. 
For all three provisions, there are implications that affect all commercial activities in 
outer space and implications that have direct and specific effect on space mining 
operations.  For example, the principle of non-appropriation in Article II has 
implications for commercial activities in outer space sensu stricto and on celestial 
bodies generally as well as specific implications for the extraction segment of a mining 
operation. Therefore, it is pertinent to first consider the general content and effect of 
these provisions and, subsequently, to study their specific effect when applied to a 
commercial space mining venture.  This would then allow for an analysis of the 
applicable space law principles to such exploration and extraction activities. Rights and Duties in the Exploration and Extraction of Resources on Celestial Bodies 
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4.2  COMMERCIAL USE VS. PUBLIC USE 
4.2.1  Benefit and Interests of All Countries 
4.2.1.1  Overview 
Article I of the Outer Space Treaty provides for three of the most fundamental 
principles of international space law, namely the freedoms of exploration, access and 
use by all States on a non-discriminatory basis and that space activities are to be 
carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all States.  Specifically, Article I states: 
The exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and 
other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the 
interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or 
scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind. 
Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be 
free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of 
any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international 
law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies. 
There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space, 
including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and States shall 
facilitate and encourage international cooperation in such 
investigation. Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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Some commentators have suggested that these principles existed before the adoption 
of the Outer Space Treaty or that they had already become crystallised into customary 
law in any event.1  In this context, it is pertinent to note that these provisions can be 
found in the 1963 United Nations General Assembly Declaration on Legal Principles 
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (the 
“Principles Declaration”).  This has led to some commentators asserting that these 
principles were part of existing customary international law at the time the Outer 
Space Treaty was adopted in 1967.2  Of course, this would have meant an 
endorsement of the concept of “instant custom” as Cheng had advocated previously, 
whereby States adopt principles of customary international law by simultaneous and 
uniform state practice or opinio juris.3  In turn, this had been rejected by some scholars 
for the lack of constant and uniform practice.4  Regardless, it is prudent to consider 
the terms of the Outer Space Treaty to be binding principles of international space law 
on all States from the adoption of the Outer Space Treaty in 1967, either through 
                                                           
 
1 See Bin Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: “Instant” International Customary Law? 
(1965) 5 INDIAN J. INT’L. L. 23; and Daniel Goedhuis, Reflections on the Evolution of Space Law (1966) 
13 NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFT 109. 
2 See, for example, Vladlen S. Vereshchetin and Gennady M. Danilenko, Custom as a Source of 
International Law of Outer Space (1985) 13 J. SP. L. 22; and He Qizhi, The Outer Space Treaty in 
Perspective (1997) 25 J. SP. L. 93. 
3 Cheng, supra note 1, at 36. 
4 See, for example, C. Wilfred Jenks, A NEW WORLD OF LAW?  A STUDY OF THE CREATIVE 
IMAGINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1969) at 146; H. G. Darwin, The Outer Space Treaty (1967) 
42 BRIT. Y. INT’L. L. 278 at 280; Hugh W. A. Thirlway, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND 
CODIFICATION: AN EXAMINATION OF THE CONTINUING ROLE OF CUSTOM IN THE PRESENT PERIOD OF 
CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1972), at 62-68; and Vereshchetin and Danilenko, supra 
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States ratifying the Outer Space Treaty or through the crystallisation of such terms 
into customary international law. 
In the context of commercial space mining ventures, it is clear that the following two 
principles that are enshrined in Article I apply to such ventures: 
(1)  “exploration” and “use” of celestial bodies are to be carried out for the 
benefit and in the interest of all States; and 
(2)  all States have the freedom to access, explore and use all areas of celestial 
bodies on a basis of equality and without discrimination of any kind. 
This is further reinforced by Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty, which states: 
In the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and 
other celestial bodies, States Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by 
the principle of co-operation and mutual assistance and shall conduct 
all their activities in outer space, including the Moon and other 
celestial bodies, with due regard to the corresponding interests of all 
other States Parties to the Treaty.  States Parties to the Treaty shall 
pursue studies of outer space, including the moon and other celestial 
bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid their harmful 
contamination and also adverse changes in the environment of the 
Earth resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter and, 
where necessary, shall adopt appropriate measures for this purpose.  
If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or 
experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space, including the 
moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful 
interference with activities of other States Parties in the peaceful 
exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other 
celestial bodies, it shall undertake appropriate international 
consultations before proceeding with any such activity or experiment.  
A State Party to the Treaty which has reason to believe that an 
activity or experiment planned by another State Party in outer space, Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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including the moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially 
harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and 
use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, may 
request consultation concerning the activity or experiment.  
Within the context of the “benefit and interests of all countries” under Article I is the 
obligation imposed under Article IX that all activities must be conducted with “due 
regard to the corresponding interests of all other States” is of particular concern.  As 
discussed below, this obligation in Article IX may have some influence over the 
appropriate interpretation to be applied to the requirement contained within Article I.  
It is important, however, to first analyse the potential interpretations that may be 
made of this requirement in Article I before discussing in detail the effect of the 
interaction between the two provisions on commercial space mining activities. 
4.2.1.2  Article I of the Outer Space Treaty: “For the Benefit and in 
the Interest of All Countries” 
The crucial determination to be made is whether the phrase “for the benefit and in the 
interest of all countries” imposes a positive and specific obligation “regarding the 
sharing of the benefits of space exploration and use” or merely an “expression of desire Rights and Duties in the Exploration and Extraction of Resources on Celestial Bodies 
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that the activities should be beneficial in a general sense”.5  Gorove, who analysed this 
provision in detail, argued for the latter and regarded most commercial space 
activities, such as telecommunications, broadcasting, remote sensing and power 
generation, as being beneficial in a general sense and were sufficient to satisfy the 
requirement.6  In so doing, Gorove pointed to several factors that persuaded him to 
that view, which is shared, to some extent surprisingly, by some commentators from 
developing States.7 
Firstly, the criteria for determining what is of benefit to a State is almost entirely 
subjective.  What may be considered beneficial to one State may well be detrimental to 
another.  Further, what may be considered beneficial today may be considered 
detrimental tomorrow with the aid of new information and the benefit of hindsight.8  
As there are no means for settling disputes over the definition of such terms between 
States in the Outer Space Treaty or otherwise, it is likely and foreseeable that each 
State would insist on determining the beneficial aspects of an activity based on its own 
subjective criteria without reference to the legitimate rights, interests and expectations 
                                                           
 
5 Stephen Gorove, Implications of International Space Law for Private Enterprise (1982) 7 ANN. AIR & SP. 
L. 319 at 321. 
6 Stephen Gorove, Freedom of Exploration and Use in the Outer Space Treaty (1971) 1 DENVER J. INT’L. 
L. & POL’Y. 93.  
7 See, for example, Silvia Maureen Williams, Las Empresas Privadas en el Espacio Ultraterrestre (1983) 8 
REV. CEN. INV. DIF. AERO. ESP. at 39; and Luis F. Castillo Argañarás, Benefits Arising From Space 
Activities and the Needs of Developing Countries (2000) 43 PROC. COLL. L. OUTER SP. 50 at 57. 
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of other States.  This is unlikely to have been the intended outcome of the drafters of 
Article I of the Outer Space Treaty. 
Secondly, the benefits and interests of all countries must include, by definition, the 
State conducting that particular exploration and use of outer space and/or the celestial 
bodies.9  Accordingly, the interests of that State, presumably extending to commercial 
interests, would not be served if they were not taken into account in assessing the 
benefits derived from a particular activity in outer space, particularly with the need to 
provide some incentive or motivation for States to conduct space activities or at least 
to invest in them.  In other words, even if the requirement imposed a specific duty to 
“share” the “benefits” among all States, such a requirement must be considered to 
some extent to be subject to the commercial interests, among other categories of 
interests, of the State conducting the space activity in question. 
Thirdly, it is unclear from the provision whether it is the means of conducting the 
activity itself (obligation de moyens) or the results derived, or ends achieved, from such 
activity (obligation de résultat) that must be in the interest and for the benefit of all 
States.10  If it is the results or ends derived from such activities, then it must be noted 
that the existing body of space law provides no mechanism for any sharing or 
                                                           
 
9 Gorove, supra note 5, at 321. 
10 Such a distinction was made by Kerrest in the context of Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty.  See 
Armel Kerrest, Commercial Use of Space, including Launching (2004), in China Institute of Space Law, 
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distribution of such benefits in practice, even if the provisions of the Moon 
Agreement are taken into consideration in conjunction with those of the Outer Space 
Treaty.  If it is the means of the activity itself, then the legal requirement would be no 
more than a negative prohibition on States conducting activities that are detrimental 
to the interests of other States.  Monserrat Filho, in advocating the view that all space 
activities, public or private, must be subject to the “global public interest”, suggested 
that this “does not admit any form of exploitation and use of the outer space [sic] 
capable of causing bad and damage [sic] to a country and to people, to the whole 
humankind or to part of it, as well as hurting their legitimate interests”.11 
The idea of Article I in practice as being no more than a moral obligation, instead of a 
legal one, is a view that is shared with Gorove by other commentators.  Cheng, for 
example, observed that: 
Insofar as the preparatory work of the Treaty is concerned, the 
discussions which took place on several articles of the Treaty clearly 
showed that its draftsmen hardly intended this part of the Article I to 
be anything more than a declaration of principles from which no 
specific rights of a legal nature were to be derived, even though it may 
give rise to a moral obligation.12 
                                                           
 
11 José Monserrat Filho, Why and How to Define “Global Public Interest” (2000) 43 PROC. COLL. L. 
OUTER SP. 22 at 24.  Italics added. 
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Although this formulation may be considered the most favourable, especially in the 
context of promoting private and commercial space activities, it must be noted that 
there are two indicia to suggest that the requirement actually imposes a positive duty.  
The first is that the requirement in Article I utilises the plural form “interests” instead 
of the singular, which may indicate that this involves more than “just the vague, 
general ‘interest’ of all countries” and, instead, represents specific and identifiable 
interests.13  This may be taken to mean that a particular set of interests of all States is 
to be taken into account in the conduct of space activities.  The second is that while 
Article I may be considered to be “an aspiration couched in very general terms which 
could not be specifically implemented without further elaborations and guidelines”, 
the provisions of the Moon Agreement may arguably constitute the further 
elaborations and guidelines to give effect to the “interests and benefits of all countries” 
requirement.14  Accordingly, even though the Moon Agreement has not won 
widespread acceptance as the means of implementing the requirement, this may not of 
itself prejudice the view that the requirement may nevertheless require 
implementation at a practical level. 
                                                           
 
13 Ibid. 
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The foregoing analysis may be condensed to produce at least three possible outcomes 
and the corresponding applications on the exploration and extraction segments of a 
commercial space mining operation: 
(1)  Generalised mission statement rather than positive and specific duty.  If 
the requirement of “benefits and interests of all countries” is to be 
regarded as a generalised mission statement for all space activities instead 
of the imposition of a positive and specific duty, then clearly commercial 
mineral exploration and extraction activities on celestial bodies may be 
considered a positive development for all States, notwithstanding the 
absence of any sharing of financial or tangible benefits to other States. 
(2)  Obligation imposed on the activity rather than the results derived 
thereof.  If the requirement does impose a specific and positive duty but 
such a duty is imposed on the activity itself instead of on the results and 
outcomes derived thereof, then the duty may be interpreted as no more 
than a negative duty of ensuring that the activity does not cause a 
detriment to any State.  In such a case, commercial mineral exploration 
and extraction activities would not have much difficulty fulfilling such an 
obligation, as these activities or the means involved are unlikely to cause 
detriments for other States. Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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(3)  Positive duty to share the benefits derived from space activities.  If the 
requirement under Article I is to be interpreted as an actual obligation to 
share the resulting benefits derived from space activities, whether 
financial, tangible or both, then the Moon Agreement is an example, 
though an unacceptable one, of the practical means of fulfilling this 
obligation.  However, it follows then that the obligation does not arise 
until the State or its private entities have gained a benefit that is capable of 
being shared on an equitable basis.15  In the context of a commercial space 
mining venture, such a benefit would be produced only in the exploitation 
segment and thus the obligation would have no application on the 
exploration and extraction segments of the venture.  Further, there is no 
suggestion that all States would be entitled to an equal share of such 
benefits.  This is supported, for example, by the express stipulation in the 
Moon Agreement that there is to be an “equitable” sharing in the 
“benefits” derived from mineral resources extracted from celestial bodies, 
rather than an “equal” sharing in the “materials” or “profits” derived from 
such activities.16 
                                                           
 
15 Moon Agreement, Article 11. 
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It can be seen from above that some doubts remain concerning the legal content and 
effect of the requirement that space activities be carried out “for the benefit and in the 
interest of all countries” and, correspondingly, the legality conducting commercial 
mineralogical prospecting and exploitation activities on celestial bodies.  The existing 
body of state practice would tend to suggest that the provision is at least a generalised 
mission statement at the very least and at most an obligation on the nature of the 
activity rather than the benefits derived therefrom.  However, the exploitation of 
mineral resources from celestial bodies may well be an activity that may attract an 
interpretation that involves a positive duty to share the derived benefits with other 
countries.  This position is further supported by the existing formulation of the 
common heritage of mankind principle as contained in Article 11 of the Moon 
Agreement.  Therefore, it is in the context of Article I and other relevant provisions of 
the Outer Space Treaty that the effect of the common heritage of mankind principle 
must be considered. 
4.2.1.3  Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty: Due Regard to 
Corresponding Interests of Other States 
As observed above, Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty requires States to conduct 
their activities in outer space and on celestial bodies with “due regard to the Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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corresponding interests of all other States”.17  This requirement, as with all others in the 
Outer Space Treaty, extends to activities of private entities through the operation of 
Article VI.  At first glance, it is apparent that any attempt at a definitive interpretation 
of this “due regard” requirement would suffer from the same defect as the “benefit and 
interests of all countries” requirement in Article I in that the “corresponding interests 
of other States” are not articulated or defined. 
However, it is in the term “corresponding” that some legal salvation may be found for 
the commercial mining venture and its search for certainty in the applicable legal 
principles under international law.  The adjective “corresponding”, by definition, 
means something that is “equal” or “similar” to something else.18  In this case, it is clear 
that the “corresponding interests” of other States must be “equal” or “similar” to the 
interests of the State undertaking the space activity, otherwise the meaning of 
“corresponding” would be defeated. 
If Article I of the Outer Space Treaty imposes a positive and specific duty on States to 
share in the benefit of their space activities with other States in accordance with their 
interests, then there can be no “corresponding” interests.  This is because the interest 
of the States undertaking space activities would collide with those of non-participating 
States that are receiving a share of the benefits derived from such activities due to the 
                                                           
 
17 Italics added. 
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“equivalent” interests of the participating State conflict with those of the non-
participating States.  This lends support to the view that the term “interests” relates 
not to the financial interests of States but instead to a general interest of States and, 
accordingly, does not prescribe a positive and specific legal duty on States in their 
conduct of activities.19  In this case, the corresponding interests of States in the context 
of Article IX are the freedoms provided for in Article I, namely the freedom of 
exploration and use of outer space and access to all areas of the Moon and other 
celestial bodies. 
Consequently, it may be argued that Article I, taking into consideration Article IX, 
does no more than to impose a negative duty on States in their conduct of activities in 
outer space and on celestial bodies.  This duty is to ensure that such activities do not 
interfere with the rights provided under the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty or 
cause any detriment to other States.  It has been observed that the existing state 
practice already reflects this interpretation of the requirement under Article I.20  As 
considered below, this conclusion poses as one of the legal obstacles to the extraction 
segment of a commercial mining venture in space. 
                                                           
 
19 See, for example, Bin Cheng, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW (1997) at 234-235; James J. 
Trimble, The International Law of Outer Space and its Effect on Commercial Space Activity (1983) 11 
PEPP. L. REV. 521 at 546; and Ricky J. Lee, Definitions of “Exploration” and “Scientific Investigation” 
with Focus on Mineralogical Prospecting and Exploration Activities (2005), paper presented at the 56th 
International Astronautical Congress, 17-21 October 2005, in Fukuoka, Japan. 
20 Roger K. Hoover, Law and Security in Outer Space from the Viewpoint of Private Industry (1983) 11 J. 
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4.2.2  Lawfulness of Commercial Use Generally 
Kerrest noted that commercial uses of space, in general, pose legal problems mostly 
related to appropriation and that “sharing the common space resources, orbits and 
frequencies, establishing legal monopolies … through patent laws … may be in breach 
of space law”.21  However, Kerrest did not go on to explain what aspect of space law 
would be contravened by such commercial activities.  Presumably, this is the result of 
the “for the benefit and in the interests of all countries” requirement in Article I of the 
Outer Space Treaty.22  Arguably, the occupation of orbits and frequencies and the 
extension of intellectual property rights in outer space may certainly, to some extent, 
be in contravention of the requirements under the international law of outer space.23 
It may be seen that commercial space activities may have some difficulty falling within 
the requirements of Article I.  This is because commercial activities are, by definition, 
undertaken with a view to profit and such profits are to be shared only by the 
members of the private concern or the relevant governmental agency.  Consequently, 
the benefit to be obtained by all States from commercial space activities must be 
assessed qualitatively and quantitatively in some manner in order to satisfy the 
                                                           
 
21 Armel Kerrest, Commercial Use of Space, including Launching (2004), in China Institute of Space Law, 
2004 SPACE LAW CONFERENCE: PAPER ASSEMBLE 199 at 199. 
22 Ricky J. Lee, Commentary Paper on Discussion Paper Titled “Commercial Use of Space, Including 
Launching” by Prof. Dr. Armel Kerrest (2004), in China Institute of Space Law, 2004 SPACE LAW 
CONFERENCE: PAPER ASSEMBLE 220. 
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requirements imposed under Article I of the Outer Space Treaty.  There are at least 
four possible views on the legality of commercial space activities in such a context that 
may be placed on a continuum between two polarised positions: 
(1)  all commercial activities are, by definition, not for the benefit, nor in the 
interest of all States, though it may benefit one or a handful of States, and 
are thus unlawful under Article I of the Outer Space Treaty; 
(2)  commercial activities in space are lawful only to the extent that they 
provide, in conjunction to their commercial activities for profit, some 
element of “community service” to all States at no, or nominal cost, as is 
the case for some intergovernmental satellite organisations;24 
(3)  commercial activities in space are lawful only to the extent that the goods 
or services they provide may be purchased by any third party 
governmental or private consumer, regardless of national origin and on a 
                                                           
 
24 Amended Convention on the International Mobile Satellite Organisation, opened for signature on 24 
April 1998, [2001] A.T.S. 11 (entered into force on 31 July 2001), Article 3; and International 
Telecommunications Satellite Organisation, Agreement Relating to the International 
Telecommunications Satellite Organisation, at 
<http://216.119.123.56/dyn4000/dyn/docs/ITSO/tpl1_itso.cfm?location=&id=5&link_src=HPL
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non-discriminatory basis, as provided for in the case of remote sensing 
activities of the Earth;25 or 
(4)  commercial activities in space are lawful provided that the activity does 
not, by its nature, structure or form, prevent any other commercial or non-
commercial entity from undertaking the same activity in space. 
From existing state practice and opinio juris, it is doubtful that commercial space 
activities would per se be unlawful or that some element of “community service”, 
similar to those originally provided by INTELSAT and INMARSAT, would be 
required under international law.26  This is because to do so would be to suggest that 
the requirement under Article I prescribes a positive duty on the sharing of “benefits” 
derived from activities in outer space.  As discussed above, this is a view that was not 
widely accepted by either States and commentators when it was prescribed under 
Article 11 of the Moon Agreement for mineral resource exploitation activities.27 
It is arguable that, although there is no positive duty to share the derived benefits 
from non-exclusive commercial space activities, the fruits of such activities must be 
                                                           
 
25 Remote Sensing Principles, Principle XII. 
26 Convention on the International Mobile Satellite Organisation and Agreement Relating to the 
International Telecommunications Satellite Organisation. 
27 See, for example, Carl Q. Christol, The American Bar Association and the 1979 Moon Treaty: The 
Search for a Position (1981) 9 J. SP. L. 77; and Martin Menter, Commercial Space Activity under the 
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available for purchase by all potential customers on a non-discriminatory basis.  This 
is because, even though the principle of non-discrimination contained in Article I of 
the Outer Space Treaty relates to the freedom of exploration, use and access by States 
and not to the “benefit and interests of all countries” requirement, such an extension 
of the non-discrimination principle is not without precedent.  For example, in the 
Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space, Principle XII 
provides that the sensed State shall have access to the primary and processed data “on 
a non-discriminatory basis on reasonable cost terms”.  Admittedly, the sensed State in 
the case of remote sensing is in a unique position but arguably this is remedied by the 
requirement that the access is to be given on reasonable cost terms.  There is no such 
equivalent requirement for any other commercial space application, except for the 
non-discrimination requirement found in Article I of the Outer Space Treaty.   
Therefore, in the case of other commercial activities, or in considering the interests of 
other States, perhaps the commercial operator would be entitled to charge 
unreasonable costs provided that it is conducted in a non-discriminatory manner. 
In terms of monopolistic and other exclusive practices, however, it is arguable that 
they would be lawful under Article I, subject to the caveat that such practices restrict 
only the means to access or use outer space but not to the space or the use itself.  For 
example, a patent on a particular asteroid mining technology merely restricts one 
particular method of asteroid mining but does not inhibit the freedom of other States 
to mine asteroids by any other means.  In the case of orbital slots and frequencies, it is Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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arguable that the regulations of the International Telecommunication Union may 
constitute a lex specialis that takes precedence over the requirements of Article I of the 
Outer Space Treaty, if not an expression or application thereof. 
In the context of commercial mining operations on celestial bodies, therefore, it may 
be seen that the commercial nature may have the effect of enlivening causing two 
further obligations to be imposed under Article I: 
(1)  that the raw or processed ores are to be made available to other States on a 
non-discriminatory basis, though not necessarily on reasonable cost terms 
even though presumably they would be sold on the world market at listed 
prices as current at the time; and 
(2)  that any restrictive or monopolistic practices adopted by the venture 
relate only to the means of the activity and not to the general nature of the 
activity so that it does not prevent third parties from undertaking the 
same activity, albeit by different means. Rights and Duties in the Exploration and Extraction of Resources on Celestial Bodies 
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4.3  FREEDOMS OF EXPLORATION AND USE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF 
NON-APPROPRIATION 
4.3.1  Freedoms under Article I of the Outer Space Treaty 
One of the further requirements imposed under Article I of the Outer Space Treaty 
may be referred to as the three fundamental freedoms in space law: the freedom of 
exploration, the freedom of use and the freedom of access to all areas of all celestial 
bodies, including the Moon.  It is difficult to distinguish between “exploration” and 
“use” of outer space and celestial bodies, because although the two terms may, on first 
appearances, have very distinct meanings, it is very difficult in practice to determine 
their differences in applicability.  As Böckstiegel observed: 
At first sight, the distinction between “exploration” and “use” may 
seem sufficiently clear.  Indeed in connection with most space 
activities little doubt may come up which of these two terms is 
applicable.  First doubts appear however, because the Outer Space 
Treaty speaks of exploration “of outer space”.  This wording could be 
interpreted to mean that space must be the object of the exploration.  
The consequent would be that the great part of research which has to 
take place “in space” in view of the specific physical conditions there, 
but which has as its object specific materials, would not be covered 
and might only be considered as “use” of space.28 
                                                           
 
28 Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, Reconsideration of the Legal Framework for Commercial Space Activities 
(1990) 33 PROC. COLL. L. OUTER SP. 3.  Böckstiegel also observed at 4 that the Outer Space Treaty 
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It is conceivable that the distinction between “exploration” and “use” is the classical 
one as applied to the Polar Regions of the Earth, where “exploration” refers to 
scientific research while “use” relates to the practical implementation of this research, 
such as, in relation to the exploitation of natural resources.29  This definition would 
nevertheless produce difficulties for the commercial space mining venture, since 
arguably mineral prospecting activities could fall into either “exploration”, as merely 
research on the geology and mineralogy of a particular area of a celestial body, or 
“use”, being a commercial operation driven by the motivation of financial gain. 
In any event, such a delineation may not be sustainable considering the third 
paragraph of Article I refers to States having a “freedom of scientific investigation” 
and thus the term “exploration” must have a meaning other than scientific research.  
This is further supported by Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty, which provides, 
among other requirements, that States: 
… shall pursue studies of outer space, including the Moon and other 
celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid their 
harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the environment 
of the Earth resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter 
….30 
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This is clearly inconsistent with the proposition that “exploration” of outer space 
means scientific research in outer space, as the drafters of the Outer Space Treaty are 
unlikely to have repeated themselves in such blatant fashion.  Consequently, other 
possible definitions for the word “exploration”, vis-à-vis the meaning of the word 
“use”, must be contemplated.  If one chose to consider the results from activities 
involving “exploration” and “use” rather than the means themselves, then a distinction 
may be drawn on the benefits to be derived from such activities.  Specifically, 
“exploration” may be defined as activities in space that do not produce tangible 
benefits and “use” is in turn defined as activities that do produce tangible benefits.  
For example, the Apollo-Soyuz mission, where an U.S. Apollo craft docked with a 
Soviet Soyuz craft, was not intended to undertake scientific research nor did it 
produce any tangible benefits and thus may be classified as an “exploration” activity 
instead of a “use” of outer space. 
In the context of Article I of the Outer Space Treaty and a commercial space mining 
venture, however, the distinction that may be made between “exploration” and “use” 
is not of much practical consequence.  This is because in both cases the Outer Space 
Treaty provides for the prescription of a freedom for all States.  Consequently, the 
important consideration is the content of these freedoms provided under Article I of 
the Outer Space Treaty.  In accordance with the “benefit and interests of all countries” 
requirement in Article I, it may perhaps be presumed that the freedoms of exploration Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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and use also require no more than a negative duty imposed on States not to inhibit the 
exploration and use of outer space as conducted by other States or their nationals. 
With regard to the freedom of access, it is important to observe that this expressly 
relates to areas on celestial bodies only, in contrast to the freedoms of exploration and 
use which are applicable to both outer space sensu stricto and celestial bodies.  Utilising 
the formulation outlined above for the freedoms of exploration and use, it is arguable 
that the freedom prescribes a corresponding duty on States not to undertake any 
activity that would exclude access of other States to a particular area on a celestial 
body.  In other words, the obligations imposed under the freedoms of exploration and 
use are logistical ones prohibiting activities that exclude other States from undertaking 
the same activity.  On the other hand, the obligation imposed under the freedom of 
access to all areas of celestial bodies is a geographical one, which prohibits activities 
that exclude other States from accessing the same area on a celestial body. 
If these are the accepted effects of the freedoms provided under Article I, the practical 
question would be what level of activity would amount to an inhibition of another 
State’s freedom to explore or use outer space or access an area on a celestial body.  As 
discussed previously with respect to the exclusive and monopolistic commercial 
practices in space, it is arguable that any activity that purports to exclude other States Rights and Duties in the Exploration and Extraction of Resources on Celestial Bodies 
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from a particular type of activity or access to a specific area on a celestial body would 
contravene the freedoms contained in Article I.31  Conversely, in order not to 
contravene the freedoms, a lawful activity must not prevent another State from 
undertaking a particular type of activity or for accessing a specific area on a particular 
celestial body. 
The scope of such an obligation would be a question of degree.  If the obligation is 
applied strictly, for example, then the occupation of an orbital position around the 
Earth by any satellite, other than on the geostationary orbit, would infringe the 
freedoms of exploration and use as this would prevent another satellite from 
providing coverage to a particular area for a particular activity.32  On the other hand, if 
the prohibitions prescribed by the freedoms are applied too broadly, they may have 
very little legal effect, though their moral effects, if any, may be undiminished. 
The other provisions of the Outer Space Treaty and present state practice appear to 
favour the latter position, or at least an approach that is closer to that particular end of 
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32 The occupation of orbital slots on the geostationary orbit would not only occupy a particular orbital 
space to the exclusion of other satellites but also a particular radio frequency to be used for its 
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the “stringency continuum”.  For example, Article XII of the Outer Space Treaty 
specifically provides that: 
All stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the Moon 
and other celestial bodies shall be open to representatives of other 
State Parties to the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity.  Such 
representatives shall give reasonable advance notice of a projected 
visit, in order that the appropriate consultations may be held …33 
If Article I provides an unconditional right not to be excluded from accessing any area 
on a celestial body, then there is no reason why access to facilities on celestial bodies as 
per Article XII of the Outer Space Treaty would be needed.34  Further, on the issue of 
state practice, it must be noted that to date no protest or complaint has been lodged 
for the violation of any freedom prescribed under Article I, despite the large number 
of satellites that have been launched to date. 
Even in a restricted form, the freedom of access to all areas of celestial bodies 
nevertheless poses a significant legal obstacle for a commercial space mining venture.  
This is because mining activities, especially in the extraction segment of the activity, 
necessarily require some degree of exclusivity over the area in which the mining 
activities are to take place.  However, there is overlap between this issue and the non-
                                                           
 
33 Italics added. 
34 Gorove made the same observation and suggested that this is an indication that the drafters of the 
Outer Space Treaty had not intended to fully abolish the extension of sovereignty of States into its 
facilities and installations on celestial bodies.  See Stephen Gorove, Sovereignty and the Law of Outer 
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appropriation principle contained in Article II of the Outer Space Treaty.   
Consequently, it is important to consider the implications of Article II in conjunction 
with the freedom of access to celestial bodies.  
4.3.2  Article II of the Outer Space Treaty 
4.3.2.1  Overview 
It was clear from the beginning of space activities that the classical rules of 
international law on sovereignty, territory and delimitation cannot apply to outer 
space and celestial bodies.  For example, in the modern world of rockets, missiles and 
interplanetary probes, the traditional “cannon-shot” rule of potestas finitur ubi finitur 
armorum vis cannot apply, regardless of whatever arbitrary limit is prescribed to be 
the boundary of sovereignty.35  Article II of the Outer Space Treaty contains one of 
the most fundamental and universally acknowledged principles of space law, namely 
the principle of non-appropriation as stated in explicit terms: 
                                                           
 
35 Virgiliu Pop, A Celestial Body is a Celestial Body is a Celestial Body … (2001) 44 PROC. COLL. L. OUTER 
SP. 100 at 103; Ezra J. Reinstein, Owning Outer Space (1999) 20 NW. J. INT’L. L. & BUS. 59; and 
Rosanna Sattler, Transporting a Legal System for Property Rights: From the Earth to the Stars (2005) 6 
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Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not 
subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of 
use or occupation, or by any other means.36 
At first glance, two issues must be clarified in order to ascertain the precise content 
and effect of Article II.  Firstly, the adjective “national” qualifies the principle that 
only “national” appropriation is prohibited and so the definition of the term “national 
appropriation” must be explored.  Secondly, there are several possible interpretations 
concerning the scope of the phrase “by any other means” for the “national” 
appropriation of outer space and celestial bodies.  Only then can the precise content 
and effect of Article II be distilled and applied in the context of commercial activities 
in outer space. 
4.3.2.2  National Appropriation 
The first question that needs to be addressed in the context of the scope, content and 
effect of Article II is its applicability to non-governmental and/or private entities.  As 
Tennen noted, Article II does not refer explicitly to private entities even though the 
extension of the non-appropriation doctrine to private entities is “firmly established in 
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space law”.37  As with the discussion in the context of Article VI of the Outer Space 
Treaty, any act of national appropriation in outer space and on celestial bodies 
conducted under the State’s direction or influence, regardless of whether the act was 
undertaken by public or private entities, is prohibited.  As Article VI requires the 
appropriate State to authorise and continually supervise the space activities of private 
entities, any act of national appropriation by private entities would be subject to the 
direction or influence of the State, thus contravening Article II of the Outer Space 
Treaty.  Accordingly, it is clear that Article II must extend to private acts of national 
appropriation as well as those conducted directly by the State itself. 
The second question arises because Article II does not purportedly prohibit all forms 
of appropriation but merely “national” appropriation.  This must be considered as an 
issue of scope as distinct to the issue of whether Article II would have application to 
private and non-governmental entities, otherwise it may be possible for States to 
circumvent the prohibitions contained in the Outer Space Treaty simply by 
“privatising” the contravening activity.38  There is a significant body of opinion among 
                                                           
 
37 Leslie I. Tennen, Second Commentary on Emerging System of Property Rights in Outer Space (2003) 
United Nations, PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED NATIONS / REPUBLIC OF KOREA WORKSHOP ON SPACE 
LAW 342 at 343. 
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commentators that Article II also prohibits the creation of private property rights.39  
However, in considering the meaning of “national” appropriation, it is interesting to 
note that the French and Spanish texts both use similar wording to that of the English 
text.40  The Chinese text, on the other hand, stipulates a different meaning that 
provides that “outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, cannot, 
through the State by asserting sovereignty, use, occupation or any other means, be 
appropriated”.41  It is apparent that the Chinese text prohibits only appropriation of 
the Moon and other celestial bodies by the State and does not prohibit appropriation 
by private entities or, in the context of reconciling this with the other texts, that the 
meaning of “national” appropriation means appropriation by or for the State itself.  
Since Article XVII of the Outer Space Treaty makes the Chinese text equally 
authentic with the English, French, Russian and Spanish texts, the construction that is 
contained in the Chinese text must be given some degree of weight in determining the 
content and effect of Article II.  This is particularly so considering the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties determined that the terms used in each authentic 
                                                           
 
39 See, for example, Leslie I. Tennen, Outer Space: A Preserve for All Humankind (1979) 2 HOUS. J. INT’L. 
L. 145 at 149. 
40 The French text of Article II provides that “L’espace extra-atmosphérique, y compris la Lune et les 
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ni par voie d’utilisation ou d’occupation, ni par aucun autre moyen.”  Similarly, the Spanish text 
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text is presumed to have the same meaning and, where there is a difference, the 
meaning that best reconciles the texts is to be adopted.42 
Further, it may be useful to consider the relevant provisions of the Moon Agreement, 
because although it has not received widespread acceptance in the international 
community, its provisions may provide some guidance in the interpretation of Article 
II of the Outer Space Treaty, to which the Moon Agreement is intended to be an 
extension and thus complementary.43   Indeed, the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties mandates that subsequent treaties that interpret or apply the provisions of an 
earlier treaty are to be taken into account when interpreting the terms of the earlier 
treaty.44  To that end, Article 11 of the Moon Agreement provides that: 
1. … 
2.  The Moon is not subject to national appropriation by any claim 
of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other 
means. 
3.  Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the Moon, nor any 
part thereof or natural resources in place, shall become property 
of any State, international intergovernmental or non-
governmental organisation, national organisation or non-
governmental entity or of any natural person.  The placement 
of personnel, space vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations and 
                                                           
 
42 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature on 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
(entered into force on 27 January 1980), Article 33.  
43 Eilene M. Galloway, Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial 
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installations on or below the surface of the Moon, including 
structures connected with its surface or subsurface, shall not 
create a right of ownership over the surface or the subsurface of 
the Moon or any areas thereof.  
… 
If “national” appropriation as contained in Article II of the Outer Space Treaty and 
Article 11(2) of the Moon Agreement means appropriation by both the State and 
private entities, then the first provision of Article 11(3) is redundant, at least to the 
extent that it applies to the surface of the Moon.  One further noteworthy observation 
that may be made from this is that Article 11(3) of the Moon Agreement states that 
the Moon cannot become the “property” of any State, even though this would 
apparently be the existing effect of Article 11(2) by prohibiting the national 
appropriation of the Moon. 
It appears from the above discussion that, if Article 11(3) of the Moon Agreement is 
to have a meaning distinct to that of Article 11(2) and, therefore, Article II of the 
Outer Space Treaty, then “national appropriation”, as a term, must have a meaning 
different to that of attaining property rights by the State.  Some commentators 
support this narrow approach to the interpretation of Article II, rather than a broader Rights and Duties in the Exploration and Extraction of Resources on Celestial Bodies 
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one that includes exclusive property rights.45  To that end, it may be prudent to 
contrast these provisions with the terms of Article 137 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, which states that: 
1.  No State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights 
over any part of the Area or its resources, nor shall any State or 
natural or juridical person appropriate any part thereof.  No 
such claim or exercise of sovereignty or sovereign rights nor 
such appropriation shall be recognised.46 
It is clear from the above that Article 137(1) of the Convention on the Law of the Sea 
expressly prohibits the following acts: 
(1)  claim of sovereignty over any part of the Area by a State; 
(2)  exercise of sovereignty over any part of the Area by a State; 
(3)  appropriation of any part of the Area by a State; and 
(4)  appropriation of any part of the Area by a natural or juridical person. 
                                                           
 
45 See, for example, Carl Q. Christol, The Common Heritage of Mankind Provision in the 1979 Agreement 
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46 The “Area” is defined in the Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 1(1) as “the seabed and ocean 
floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction”. Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
  Page |  341 
It is apparent from Article 137(1) that the Convention on the Law of the Sea does not 
prohibit the exercise of sovereignty by natural or juridical persons.  From this it may 
be suggested that the Convention considered that only States can assert or exercise 
sovereignty over territory whereas both States and nationals can appropriate land.  
This is consistent with the distinction drawn in customary international law, which: 
(1)  considers sovereignty and the ability to assert jurisdiction, to be the 
exclusive province of States; and 
(2)  appropriation or title and the ability to obtain exclusive possession, to be 
capable of assertion by both States and private nationals.47 
When read in light of this distinction, “national appropriation” in Article II of the 
Outer Space Treaty may mean no more than the “exercise of sovereignty”.   
Accordingly, Articles II does not prescribe any rights or duties concerning the 
assertion of title by private nationals, as long as they do not amount to an exercise of 
sovereignty by the State as the British East India Company once did for Great Britain 
in earlier centuries.48  Similarly, Article 11(2) of the Moon Agreement would now be 
consistent and complementary with Article 11(3), the former dealing with the exercise 
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of sovereignty by States and the latter with the ability to assert title by both States and 
private nationals.  This is considered in detail below. 
4.3.2.3  Prohibition on Property Rights as a Customary Norm? 
As Article II may not apply to prohibit the actual creation of private property rights 
on celestial bodies expressly, but merely the assertion of state sovereignty, it is 
necessary to consider the possibility that such a prohibition is a norm of customary 
international law.  This is not a question of a treaty provision crystallising into 
customary international law, but rather the existence of a customary principle 
notwithstanding the express terms of Article II to prohibit private property rights on 
celestial bodies. 
As early as 1961, the formulation of Article II focused only on States and not on 
natural or juridical persons.  As the United States submitted, “man should be free to 
venture into space without any restraints except those imposed by the laws of his own 
nation and by international law”.49  This may be seen as an implicit recognition that 
nationals, not being subjects of international law, would be bound not to exercise 
property rights on celestial bodies in any event. 
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Alternatively, the provision prescribes that state sovereignty cannot be asserted by the 
acts of private nationals, though the language appears to suggest the former view.50  
This uncertainty was further emphasised by Australia as, after several drafts that did 
not include express language concerning property rights, its representative said that 
draft Article II “did not make it clear that outer space was not subject to national 
sovereignty and that no one could acquire property rights in outer space, including the 
Moon and other celestial bodies”.51 
There was a significant number of observations and statements made by several 
participating States that either affirmed or denied the application of Article II to 
property rights.  For example, Belgium took the view that no one has yet denied that 
the term “appropriation” included “both the establishment of sovereignty and the 
creation of titles to property in private law”.52  Further, in the First Committee 
proceedings on the draft of Article II, France noted that the provision prohibited 
claims to both “sovereignty and property rights in space”.53  On the other hand, the 
statements made by Brazil,54 Chile,55 Japan,56 the Netherlands,57 and the Philippines,58 
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55 Ibid. 
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in which they referred to the effect of the non-appropriation provision in preventing 
colonialism, international rivalries and internationalisation of outer space, would 
suggest that they were of the view that the provision related to the prohibition of state 
sovereignty only.  It is clear, however, on a detailed review of the travaux préparatoires 
that no State stated positively that Article II of the Outer Space Treaty does not and 
should not extend to prohibit property rights on celestial bodies.59 
In light of there being somewhat widespread acceptance by States that there is a 
prohibition on the claim and exercise of property rights on celestial bodies and, in the 
absence of any contrary opinio juris from States, the potential for the existence of such 
a customary norm must be recognised.   Consequently, it may be prudent to consider 
that, regardless of the appropriate interpretation to be given to Article II of the Outer 
Space Treaty, States and private nationals are bound by customary international law 
not to claim or exercise exclusive property rights on celestial bodies. 
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4.3.2.4  The Bogotá Declaration as an Example of Potential Breach of 
Article II of the Outer Space Treaty 
Overview 
On 3 December 1975, eight equatorial States, namely Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Indonesia, Congo, Kenya, Uganda and Zaïre,60 adopted the Declaration of the First 
Meeting of Equatorial Countries at Bogotá, Colombia (the “Bogotá Declaration”).61  
The Bogotá Declaration asserts that segments of the geostationary orbit (“GEO”) 
form an integral part of the territory of the subjacent States and thus the subjacent 
State was able to exercise sovereignty.  Goedhuis suggested that three of the reasons 
that supported this prima facie contravention of the non-appropriation principle are: 
(1)  the existence of the geostationary orbit relies exclusively on the gravity of 
the Earth and therefore cannot be considered part of outer space; 
(2)  the principles of the Outer Space Treaty were formulated without 
providing sufficient scientific advice to the developing States and were 
thus drafted for the benefit of the industrialised States only; and 
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(3)  the lack of delimitation between airspace and outer space meant that the 
non-appropriation principle does not apply to the geostationary orbit.62 
The first argument is answered easily by the observation that the existence of all 
orbits around the Earth relies exclusively on the gravity of the Earth and, accordingly, 
this is no justification for the singular treatment for the geostationary orbit.  If this is 
accepted, then no orbits around the Earth would be considered part of outer space and 
therefore subject to the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty.  This would be contrary 
to the express wording of Article IV, which prohibits the placement of any object 
carrying nuclear weapons or any other weapon of mass destruction “in orbit around 
the Earth”.  The second and third arguments, on the other hand, merit more 
discussion and analysis. 
Power Inequality of Industrialised States 
During debates in the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space (“COPUOS”), Colombia pointed out that she had not ratified the Outer Space 
Treaty and that the prescribed freedoms and the principle of non-appropriation did 
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not constitute customary international law or jus cogens.63  Since the launch of Sputnik-
1 in October 1957, there has been no claim of sovereignty over any part of outer space 
or celestial bodies until the Bogotá Declaration.  On the contrary, statements and 
international instruments in the intervening years have acknowledged and 
emphasised the binding character of the fundamental principles of space law, even 
outside the confines of the Outer Space Treaty.  Accordingly, it may be argued that 
the prescribed freedoms and the principle of non-appropriation have the requisite 
state practice and opinio juris to attain the status of being principles of customary 
international law.  Even where the eight equatorial States may arguably be able to 
contract out of customary principles through the Bogotá Declaration, they can only do 
so to affect themselves and not States that are not party to the Declaration.64 
In any event, as discussed earlier, a principle may be considered a peremptory norm of 
international law, or jus cogens, if it has received the acceptance of “all important 
elements of the international community”.65  Even if the eight equatorial States that 
were party to the Bogotá Declaration were to be considered collectively to be an 
important element of the international community, the fact that three of the eight had 
ratified the Outer Space Treaty at the time of the Bogotá Declaration and a further 
                                                           
 
63 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.173 at 56 (1977). 
64 Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that “A treaty does not create 
either rights or obligations for a third State without its consent”. 
65 See discussion at 242 et seq. Rights and Duties in the Exploration and Extraction of Resources on Celestial Bodies 
348  |  Page     
three had signed it seriously undercuts such an argument.66  Accordingly, the 
prescribed freedoms and the principle of non-appropriation may have gained the 
support of all important elements of the international community to attain the status 
of jus cogens. 
Absence of Delimitation between Airspace and Outer Space 
Resulting from the politically sensitive nature of the issue of delimitation, there has 
never been an agreed international boundary between airspace and outer space.67  
Recently, however, there has been a growing number of theoretical suggestions that 
have been advanced on this subject, particularly the methods by which the 
delimitation of airspace and outer space can be prescribed by international law.68  The 
two predominant theories are the “spatial” approach and the “functionalist” approach. 
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Spatial Approach 
The approach that has gained increasing support from States is the spatial approach, 
which simply seeks to draw a clear boundary between airspace and outer space at a 
particular altitude.69  At least eight possible altitudes have been suggested for such a 
demarcation by the 1970 and 1977 background papers prepared by the Legal Sub-
Committee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.70  Some spatial 
theorists have sought to establish this boundary between airspace and outer space on a 
geophysical basis, namely at the upper limit of the atmosphere of the Earth.71 
Accordingly, the boundary would be at the limits of the “meteorological atmosphere”, 
which is defined as the altitude beyond which physical phenomena would have 
negligible effect on the surface of the Earth, at about eighty to eighty-five kilometres 
from the surface of the Earth.72  This approach has received support from a number of 
international conventions, such as Article 1 of the Convention on the Regulation of 
Aerial Navigation, the Spanish-American Convention on Aerial Navigation and the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation, all of which have held that the expression 
“airspace” should be the region where air exists.73  Presumably, this means the body of 
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air surrounding the Earth, for otherwise air law would have application on all celestial 
bodies with an atmosphere, such as Mars or even the Europa, a satellite of Jupiter.  
One other suggestion that has been advanced concerning the appropriate altitude for 
a boundary between airspace and outer space is based on the aerodynamic 
characteristics of flight instruments.  This is referred to as the “von Karman line”, at 
which aerodynamic lift is exceeded by ascensional pressure.74  Accordingly, the 
aeronautical ceiling theorists propose that the air sovereignty extend up to one 
hundred kilometres above the Earth.75  This is in effect the average of the maximum 
altitude for an aircraft, namely about eighty kilometres, and the minimum altitude for 
space activities, or lowest perigee, which presently ranges between 70 and 160 
kilometres above the surface of the Earth.76 
There are theorists that have adopted a multilevel boundary whereby demarcation is 
based upon the division of airspace and outer space into zones.77  Representatives of 
the Committee on Space Research (“COSPAR”) have suggested that the division of 
the space above the Earth in three zones, the first up to the fifty or sixty kilometres 
over which the underlying State could exercise full sovereignty as its “airspace”.  The 
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second zones lies between the “airspace” and an altitude of around one hundred 
kilometres above the Earth to be designated as “mesospace”, subject to a new specific 
legal regime.78  The third zone is, of course, outer space, which lies beyond one 
hundred kilometres above the surface of the Earth.79  Similarly, some have proposed 
the “effective control” test, which decides the boundary on the basis of the altitude at 
which the States would be able to exercise effective control over its territory.80  The 
problems with these approaches are that, firstly, this depends greatly on a subjective 
determination of the capacity of the subjacent States to exercise sovereignty upwards 
from its territories and, secondly, the ability of States collectively to effectively control 
its airspace must increase over time with the continuing advances of economic and 
technological development. 
The most common suggestion advocated by States that favour a spatial delimitation is 
a demarcation based on the lowest perigee of a satellite orbiting the Earth, which is 
presently one hundred and ten kilometres above the surface of the Earth.81  Several 
studies, such as those conducted by COSPAR, have indicated that below the altitude 
of one hundred kilometres above sea level, satellites would not be able to continue in 
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orbit and would fall to the Earth.82  It has been contended that this approach satisfies 
the demands of the freedom for space flight and space exploration for it defines outer 
space as the region in which, as a minimum, a satellite can still prescribe a full orbit 
around the Earth.83 
This also satisfies the needs of international air law, as the boundary lies well above 
the maximum altitude that a civilian aircraft can operate, currently being no higher 
than 60 km above sea level.84  Even when State and military aircrafts are also taken 
into consideration, the von Karman line nevertheless lies below this proposed physical 
boundary between airspace and outer space.85 
This approach also appears to be the one supported by state practice, with the notable 
exception of the United States, discussed below.  It must be observed that no State has 
yet protested against satellites passing over its territories at altitudes above one 
hundred kilometres as being an infringement of its sovereign airspace.86  Further, 
some States have imposed a regulatory demarcation between airspace and outer space 
to confine the applicability of its domestic legislation regulating space launch 
activities.  For example, the Space Activities Act 1998 (Cth) of Australia expressly 
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defines “outer space” as being beyond one hundred kilometres above the surface of 
the Earth.87  Nevertheless, this falls short of being accepted as a customary boundary 
between airspace and outer space, as the requirements of universality would not be 
satisfied, even among space-faring States, for the acceptance of a physical delimitation 
between airspace and outer space in the absence of express treaty provisions.88 
Functionalist Approach 
The failure of the spatial approach to establish a scientific or technical criteria for the 
physical delimitation of air space and outer space has, to some extent, caused the 
functionalist approach, which provides for a non-physical delimitation of airspace and 
outer space, to gain increasing acceptance.  The functionalist approach concentrates 
on the character and nature of the activities of States and the objectives of such 
activities rather than the physical locale of the activities themselves at a given time.89  
Proponents of this approach argue that within the same space above the Earth, there 
simultaneously operate two international legal orders regulating aeronautical and 
astronautical activities of States respectively.90  Accordingly, the issue of delimitation 
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should be based primarily on the nature and the type of the particular activity, being 
either aeronautical and astronautical, wherein the latter should be subject to space law 
irrespective of the altitude at which they are carried out.91  Consequently, space 
activities would be governed by space law, regardless of the precise location where the 
activities are conducted at the time, such as the location of the launch facility for the 
launch vehicle of the space object.92  Effectively, this proposes different frontiers for 
the different types of space activities, which are conditional on the degree of tolerance 
accorded to them by subjacent States.93 
This is by no means an unworkable approach, as any access to outer space from the 
surface of the Earth must transverse airspace, in some cases that of other States or the 
high seas, in order to reach outer space.  For example, an equatorial launch from 
Christmas Island, an Australian external territory, would necessarily fly over the 
territories of Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and, in some cases, East Timor.  Similarly, 
a launch by Sea Launch near the territorial waters of Kiribati may fly over various 
States in the South Pacific, such as Tuvalu and Samoa, as well as French Polynesia of 
France and Tokelau and the Cook Islands of New Zealand.94  It would be surprising if 
such a launch vehicle would be subject to the provisions of international and domestic 
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air law.  The Commercial Space Launch Act 1984 of the United States, for example, 
defines its applicability by reference to the launch vehicle, being the involvement of a 
rocket of two hundred thousand pounds per second of impulse and a ballistic 
coefficient of twelve pounds per square inch, rather than by a physical delimitation 
between airspace and outer space at a specified altitude.95 
Effect on the Bogotá Declaration 
While it is true that there is no settled international delimitation between airspace and 
outer space, it is clear that all States intend for any activities involving the orbiting of a 
satellite around the Earth to be considered space activities.96  If activities involving 
satellites in low Earth orbit are considered to be space activities, then the deployment 
of satellites in the geostationary orbit must accordingly be considered space activities 
as well.  Consequently, the argument that the geostationary orbit may be considered 
to be part of airspace rather than outer space is an interesting one that has failed to 
gain the widespread acceptance of States. 
In conferences of the International Telecommunication Union, which has the primary 
responsibility of regulating the orbital slot allocations on the geostationary orbit, some 
delegations have expressly stated that the claims of sovereignty under the Bogotá 
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Declaration cannot be recognised.97  However, even though these claims have been 
widely rejected, it demonstrates a deep sentiment among some States that the space 
law framework under the Outer Space Treaty does not adequately protect the 
interests of the developing States, a problem made far more intractable later in the 
negotiations for the Moon Agreement.98 
4.3.2.5  “By Any Other Means” 
Lachs, who held the chair of the Legal Sub-Committee during the debates on the 
Outer Space Treaty, emphasised the prohibition of appropriation based on “use” and 
“occupation”, as he was of the view that Article II prevented the creation of “titles”.99  
As discussed previously, the use of the term “title” in the context of “national 
appropriation” is clearly meant to indicate claims of national sovereignty by States 
rather than proprietary or private ownership rights.100  In any event, having reached 
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such a conclusion, Lachs noted the phrase “by any other means” and asked: “What 
other means are there?”101 
Some commentators suggested that the phrase “by any other means” was not meant to 
refer to specific means but that it includes “whatever residue of international law 
applies to national appropriation, and has no limitation”.102  Lachs lent further support 
to this view by asserting that all other means were discussed “precisely to illustrate the 
unreality of their application to it.  It was ex abundante cautela that these titles were 
indicated and at once discarded”.103  Lachs went on to suggest three possible “other 
means”, namely discovery, contiguity and parts of outer space bordering airspace, and 
considered them all inadequate in asserting a claim of national appropriation.104 
The difficulty with the approach adopted by Lachs is that it assumed that the phrase 
“by any other means” was subject ejusdem generis to the means already enumerated.  
Christol, on the other hand, was of the view that the phrase “by any other means” has 
a life of its own.105  This is because the provision “by claims of sovereignty, by means 
of use or occupation” is all encompassing and thus the phrase “by any other means” 
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would not add anything to its legal effect.  Christol suggested that the negotiating 
history of Article II, as evidenced by the travaux préparatoires of the Outer Space 
Treaty, implied the phrase “by any other means” was designed to impose the same 
restrictions on individuals and private entities.106  If this interpretation is accepted, 
then “by any other means” would include the exercise of sovereign rights by States 
through private use, private occupation and assertions of private exclusive rights.   
This interpretation, though creative, is nevertheless consistent with the idea that 
Article II relates only to the exercise of state sovereignty or “national appropriation” 
and, in that context, refers only to a State exercising sovereign rights through private 
use or occupation of celestial bodies. 
4.3.2.6  Précis: Content and Effect of Article II of the Outer Space 
Treaty on Commercial Space Activities 
Setting aside the controversy concerning the legal validity of the claims made by States 
under the Bogotá Declaration, there remains a significant degree of disagreement 
among commentators even on the effect of Article II on exclusive claims of title 
asserted by non-governmental entities, such as private individuals or companies.   
Gorove, for example, adopted the “literalist” approach and was of the view that 
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individuals could lawfully appropriate any part of outer space, including the Moon 
and other celestial bodies.107  This position has found support among some 
commentators, especially in the context of the allocation and use of the geostationary 
orbit by private entities.108 
According to Christol, the more commonly accepted views on the effects of the non-
appropriation principle in Article II would include: 
(1)  prohibition on the appropriation of States of areas, or parts of areas of the 
space environment; 
(2)  prohibition on the appropriation of intergovernmental organisations of 
areas, or parts of areas of the space environment; 
(3)  prohibition on a State to grant to its nationals or private entities exclusive 
rights to the space environment; and 
(4)  prohibition on an intergovernmental organisation from exercising or 
granting exclusive rights to the space environment.109 
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In the context of private and commercial entities, this effectively means that Article II 
operates to prohibit the appropriation or assertion of exclusive rights by States, their 
nationals and private entities.  In other words, States and private entities would not 
have the legal authority to assert any exclusivity over any area of space.  For example, 
while a State or private entity can have a satellite occupying a particular orbital 
position around the Earth, it would not be able to assert exclusive use and occupation 
of that orbital position without a satellite.  Similarly, States and private entities are 
free to build facilities and installations on the Moon and other celestial bodies and sell 
those facilities, but they cannot exclusively occupy or sell the underlying “land” or 
other vacant “land”.  As discussed, however, this may not be correct in light of what 
“national appropriation” best meaning the exercise of sovereign rights.  Accordingly, it 
may be prudent to suggest that Article II of the Outer Space Treaty is in fact silent on 
the issue of exclusive property rights but does have the effect of prohibiting the 
exercise of sovereign rights, which is prohibited whether by claim, use or occupation 
by the State or its nationals. 
4.3.3  Relevant Provisions of the Moon Agreement 
4.3.3.1  Non-Appropriation: Article 11(2) 
Article 11 of the Moon Agreement, in seeking to repeat the provisions of Articles I 
and II of the Outer Space Treaty, has presented in itself some issues of interpretation Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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that it would be prudent to investigate.  To begin with, it should be noted that the 
Moon Agreement applies not only to the Moon, but also to other celestial bodies in 
the Solar System and orbits and trajectories around them.110  Accordingly, the 
provisions of the Moon Agreement would be applicable to the Moon, the other 
planets and their natural satellites as well as asteroids. 
In an identical manner to Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, Article 11(2) of the 
Moon Agreement prohibits “national appropriation” by any claim of sovereignty, by 
means of use or occupation or by any other means.  From the discussion in Part 4.3.2 
above, “national appropriation” would mean no more than exercise of state 
sovereignty so that Article 11(2), as is the case with Article II of the Outer Space 
Treaty, prohibits only the exercise of state sovereignty but has no effect on the 
creation of exclusive property rights by States or their private nationals. 
4.3.3.2  Freedom of Exploration and Use: Articles 11(4) and 6 
The three freedoms provided for under Article I of the Outer Space Treaty, namely 
the freedom of exploration, freedom of use and freedom of scientific investigation, 
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find expression in Articles 11(4) and 6 of the Moon Agreement.  Article 11(4) of the 
Moon Agreement provides that: 
4.  State Parties have the right to exploration and use of the Moon 
without discrimination of any kind, on the basis of equality and 
in accordance with international law and the terms of this 
Agreement. 
It is clear that Article 11(4) is simply a reproduction of the language contained in 
Article I of the Outer Space Treaty, except that the Moon Agreement does not 
provide for “free access to all areas of celestial bodies”.  This may be considered to be 
of no significance in light of the fact that the assertion and maintenance of 
exclusionary title on the surface and subsurface of the Moon is prohibited under 
Article 11(3) of the Moon Agreement.  In any event, the full force and effect of Article 
I of the Outer Space Treaty would continue to apply as it is not inconsistent with 
Article 11(4) of the Moon Agreement. 
Similarly, Article 6(1) of the Moon Agreement provides that: 
1.  There shall be freedom of scientific investigation on the Moon 
by all State Parties without discrimination of any kind, on the 
basis of equality and in accordance with international law. 
The requirements that scientific investigations on the Moon be conducted on the 
basis of equality and without discrimination of any kind are not found in Article I of Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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the Outer Space Treaty.  This also may not necessarily be of great significance in the 
context of mineral exploration and extraction activities for at least two reasons: 
(1)  the activities involved in scientific investigations may well encompass the 
exploration and/or use of outer space and celestial bodies and, 
consequently, would be subject to the equality and non-discrimination 
requirements under Article I of the Outer Space Treaty and Article 11(4) 
of the Moon Agreement; and 
(2)  Article 6(2) of the Moon Agreement, as discussed below, provides specific 
rights and duties concerning the collection of mineral samples from 
celestial bodies, thus giving specific content to the limitations on the 
freedom of scientific investigation in this context. 
4.3.3.3  Prohibition of Private Title: Article 11(3) 
Article 11(3) of the Moon Agreement contains the following specific prohibitions: 
(1)  the surface of a celestial body or any part thereof cannot become 
“property” of any State, intergovernmental or non-governmental 
organisation, domestic governmental or non-governmental organisation 
and natural persons; Rights and Duties in the Exploration and Extraction of Resources on Celestial Bodies 
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(2)  the subsurface of a celestial body or any part thereof cannot become 
“property” of any State, intergovernmental or non-governmental 
organisation, domestic governmental or non-governmental organisation 
and natural persons; 
(3)  natural resources in place on the surface or subsurface of a celestial body 
cannot become “property” of any State, intergovernmental or non-
governmental organisation, domestic governmental or non-governmental 
organisation and natural persons; and 
(4)  placement of personnel, vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations and 
installations on the surface or subsurface of a celestial body cannot create 
a right of “ownership” over that surface or subsurface. 
There is little doubt that “property” in this case means having title, especially when 
taking into account the wording of the other authentic texts.111  This is because, 
although the French word “propriété” and the Spanish word “propiedad” basically 
translates to “property”, the Chinese term「财产」can be translated as both “asset” 
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and “property”.112  This is further reinforced by the reference to “ownership” in the 
last provision of Article 11(3), indicating that “property” in this context must be the 
exercise of some form of title or property right over the surface or subsurface of the 
Moon or other celestial bodies, including its natural resources. 
This effectively means that, although there is a significant number of commentators 
who are of the view that Article II of the Outer Space Treaty prohibits the creation of 
property rights on celestial bodies, this prohibition did not in fact come into existence 
until the adoption of Article 11(3) of the Moon Agreement.  In any event, these 
prohibitions clearly impose a severe constraint on the ability of States and private 
entities to engage in the extraction of mineral resources from the surface or subsurface 
of celestial bodies.  This is because the extraction of mineral resources would require 
                                                           
 
112 Commercial Press, A New English-Chinese Dictionary (2nd ed., 1984), at 75.  The French text of 
Article 11(3) provides that “Ni la surface ni le sous-sol de la Lune, ni une partie quelconque de celle-
ci ou les ressources naturelles qui s'y trouvent, ne peuvent devenir la propriété d'États, 
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the ownership, or at least some form of title thereof, in the surface of the celestial 
body, in its subjacent subsurface and in the mineral resources, both before and after 
their extraction.  As the Outer Space Treaty does not contain equivalent prohibitions 
and the Moon Agreement has not received widespread acceptance in the international 
community, the ability of a mining venture to lawfully extract mineral resources 
remains somewhat uncertain. 
4.3.3.4  Extraction of Mineral Samples: Article 6(2) 
The Moon Agreement also contains a specific provision for the extraction of mineral 
samples from the surface or subsurface of the Moon and other celestial bodies in the 
Solar System.  Specifically, Article 6(2) of the Moon Agreement provides that: 
In carrying out scientific investigations and in furtherance of the 
provisions of this Agreement, the State Parties shall have the right to 
collect on and remove from the Moon samples of its mineral and 
other substances.  Such samples shall remain at the disposal of those 
State Parties which caused them to be collected and may be used by 
them for scientific purposes.  State Parties shall have regard to the 
desirability of making a portion of such samples available to other 
interested State Parties and the international scientific community for 
scientific investigation.  State Parties may in the course of the 
scientific investigations also use mineral and other substances of the 
Moon in quantities appropriate for the support of their missions. 
In this context, Article 6(2) of the Moon Agreement may be seen as an exception to 
the prohibition on the exercise of title and property rights over celestial bodies and Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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their natural resources, as provided under Article 11(3).  Specifically, it appears that 
Article 6(2) provides several rights to States: 
(1)  the right to collect on and remove from celestial bodies samples of its 
mineral and other substances in carrying out scientific investigations and in 
furtherance of the provisions of the Moon Agreement; 
(2)  the right to retain the samples collected and used for scientific purposes; 
(3)  the right to share a portion of a sample collected with the international 
scientific community for scientific investigations; and 
(4)  the right to use mineral and other substances on the Moon in quantities 
appropriate for the support of missions of scientific investigations. 
In each case, the right provided under Article 6(2) is confined to the purposes of 
scientific investigations.  In the context of the present study, the obvious next step 
would be to consider whether, as a matter of international law, exploration and 
prospecting of mineral resources can be considered “scientific investigation”.  To 
some degree, the geological and mineralogical study of celestial bodies is a necessary 
part of the “scientific investigation” of the Solar System.  For example, the scientific Rights and Duties in the Exploration and Extraction of Resources on Celestial Bodies 
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community has continually reaffirmed the value of such mineralogical study to 
discovering the origins of the Solar System.113  At the same time, the conduct of 
mineralogical studies of celestial bodies for the purposes of commercial prospecting 
and profit may not appropriately be considered to be part of humankind’s “scientific 
investigation” of the Solar System. 
The difficulty in maintaining this delineation lies in the practical reality that the 
scientific and commercial sectors of the space community are intertwined and greatly 
interdependent.  In practice, for any mineralogical study of a celestial body or part 
thereof, no matter how scientific in nature and how broad the coverage of the study, 
the data obtained may give rise to mining operations in a specific part of the surface or 
subsurface of the celestial body with a view to commercial gain.114  Similarly, a 
commercial mineral prospecting activity on a celestial body, no matter how capitalist 
oriented the mission or how confined the geographical scope of the prospecting, may 
give rise to the production of valuable data that may be shared to assist in the 
scientific investigation of that celestial body. 
                                                           
 
113 See, for example, A. G. W. Cameron, Origin of the Solar System (1988) 26 ANN. REV. ASTRON. & 
ASTROP. 441; and Hans E. Suess, Chemical Evidence Bearing on the Origin of the Solar System (1965) 3 
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Since it is difficult to reach a conclusion by practical differentiation between 
commercial prospecting and scientific investigation, it may be prudent to compare 
and contrast Article 6(2) of the Moon Agreement with similar provisions in other 
international resource development regimes.  For example: 
(1)  in the Convention on the Law of the Sea, “marine scientific research” in 
the deep seabed is regulated pursuant to Article 143 and Part XIII of the 
Convention, while the exploration of mineral resources is regulated by 
Article 153 and Part XI of the Convention;115  
(2)  in the Madrid Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic 
Treaty, Article 7 prohibits “any activity relating to mineral resources, 
other than scientific research”; and 
(3)  the scope of what constitutes scientific research in relation to mineral 
resources in Antarctica was further clarified in Article 1 of the failed 
Wellington Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource 
Activities to exclude prospecting and exploration, where: 
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(a)  “prospecting” means activities aimed at identifying areas of mineral 
resource potential for possible exploration and development, 
including geological, geochemical and geophysical investigations 
and field observations, the use of remote sensing techniques and 
collection of surface, seafloor and sub-ice samples, but not including 
dredging and excavations, except for the purpose of obtaining small-
scale samples, or drilling, except shallow drilling into rock and 
sediment to depths not exceeding 25 meters; and 
(b)  “exploration” means activities aimed at identifying and evaluating 
specific mineral resource occurrences or deposits, including 
exploratory drilling, dredging and other surface or subsurface 
excavations required to determine the nature and size of mineral 
resource deposits and the feasibility of their development, but 
excluding pilot projects or commercial production.116 
If the analogies between celestial bodies and the deep seabed and/or between celestial 
bodies and Antarctica may be maintained, then it would be reasonable to assume that 
the term “scientific investigation” in the Moon Agreement would also exclude mineral 
exploration and prospecting with a view of assessing the feasibility of mineral resource 
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development for commercial gain.  With this in mind, it is then important to consider 
the force and effect of the Moon Agreement in light of its limited acceptance in the 
international community. 
4.3.3.5  Force and Effect of the Moon Agreement Generally 
Overview of the Issues 
As of 1 January 2010, the Moon Agreement is in force but has been ratified by only 13 
States, of which only Australia is likely to be considered to have a space capability, and 
signed by a further four States, of which only France is likely to be considered to have 
an advanced space capability.117  Of course, this does not prevent a State without space 
capability from contracting with a third State or its nationals or private entities to 
launch space objects on its behalf or to provide it with space capability.118  In any 
                                                           
 
117 The States that have ratified the Moon Agreement are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Chile, 
Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines and 
Uruguay and the States that have signed but not ratified it are France, Guatemala, India and 
Romania: United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs, Status of International Agreements Relating 
to Activities in Outer Space as at 1 January 2010, 1 January 2010, at < 
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on 22 April 2010. 
118 This is, of course, subject to international regulation on the transfer of arms and advanced military 
technologies under the Wassenaar Agreement and the Missile Technology Control Regime: see, for 
example, discussion in Ricky J. Lee and Steven R. Freeland, The Impact of Arms Limitation 
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event, it is important to consider the legal force and effect of the Moon Agreement on 
third States that are not parties to the Moon Agreement. 
Generally, without focusing on specific provisions, there are at least three 
circumstances that are to be considered in this discussion: 
(1)  the force and effect of a right or obligation contained in the Moon 
Agreement for a State that has ratified it; 
(2)  the force and effect of a right  or  obligation  contained in the Moon 
Agreement for a State that has signed it but not ratified it; and 
(3)  the force and effect of a right  or  obligation  contained in the Moon 
Agreement for a third State. 
Rights under the Moon Agreement 
Prima facie, the force and effect of a right in each of the circumstances outlined above 
arising from the Moon Agreement should also be considered.  However, in the case of 
the present discussion, only the force and effect of obligations should actually be 
considered as there are no rights arising from the Moon Agreement.  The reasons 
being that: Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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(1)  the prohibitions on national appropriation and property rights under 
Articles 11(2) and 11(3) are clearly obligations and not rights; 
(2)  the freedoms of exploration, use and scientific investigation in Articles 6 
and 11(4) are rights that are already contained in the Moon Agreement 
and the only substantial difference between them lies in the additional 
obligation that scientific investigations must be conducted on the basis of 
equality and without discrimination of any kind; and 
(3)  the right to collect and use mineral samples in carrying out scientific 
investigations as contained in Article 6(2) is merely a specific example of 
the freedom of scientific investigation, with the requirement to consider 
the desirability of sharing the samples with other States being an 
additional obligation under the Moon Agreement, while noting that the 
obligation extends only to the need to consider, not to actually share any 
such mineral samples collected. 
In any event, a right contained in the Moon Agreement can only be exercised by a 
third State that is not party to it if the treaty intended for third States to have that 
right and be able to exercise it against parties and other non-parties of the Moon 
Agreement.  This is because Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties provides that: Rights and Duties in the Exploration and Extraction of Resources on Celestial Bodies 
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1.  A right arises for a third State from a provision of a treaty if the 
parties to the treaty intend the provision to accord that right 
either to the third State, or to a group of States to which it 
belongs, or to all States, and the third State assents thereto.  Its 
assent shall be presumed so long as the contrary is not 
indicated, unless the treaty otherwise provides. … 
In the case of the Moon Agreement, it should be noted that each provision containing 
a right refers to a right to be exercised by “States Parties”.  For example, Article 9(1) of 
the Moon Agreement provides that “States Parties may establish manned and 
unmanned stations on the Moon”.119  Accordingly, it is clear that the rights contained 
in the Moon Agreement were not intended to extend to third States without them 
being party to it and, therefore, cannot be exercised by them.120 
Obligations under the Moon Agreement 
It is generally accepted law that a State party to a treaty is bound by its terms and they 
must be performed by that State in good faith, a principle commonly referred to as 
pacta sunt servanda.121  Accordingly, the 13 States that have ratified the Moon 
Agreement are clearly bound by any obligations arising from it and must perform 
them in good faith.  Similarly, a State cannot be held to be bound by an obligation 
                                                           
 
119 Italics added. 
120 See generally Ian Robertson Sinclair, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES (2nd ed., 
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arising from a treaty to which the State is not a party, unless the party has expressly 
consented or if the obligation is one that exists also as a customary norm of 
international law.122  As for the five States that have signed but not ratified the Moon 
Agreement, Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that: 
A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object 
and purpose of a treaty when it has signed the treaty or has exchanged 
instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance 
or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become 
a party to the treaty … 
It should be noted that Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
refers to acts that defeat the “object” and “purpose” of a treaty rather than the breach 
or contravention of a treaty.  This is appropriate, because otherwise there would be no 
need for consent by ratification if a State is capable of being bound by terms of a 
treaty that it has signed but not ratified.  However, considering the number of years 
that have passed since the five States have signed the Moon Agreement and yet 
refrained from ratifying it, these States may well be considered to have “made their 
intention clear not to become a party to the treaty”.  In any event, it would be prudent 
to consider whether the action or conduct of a State defeats the objects and purposes 
of the treaty rather than the mere contravention of an obligation. 
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In the case of the Moon Agreement, its objects and purposes may be identified from 
its preamble as follows: 
(1)  promote the further development of cooperation among States in the 
exploration and use of the Moon and other celestial bodies in the Solar 
System on the basis of equality; 
(2)  prevent the Moon from becoming an area of international conflict; and 
(3)  define and develop the provisions of existing space law instruments in 
relation to the Moon and other celestial bodies. 
In the case of the prohibition on property rights under Article 11(3) of the Moon 
Agreement, it is arguable that the creation of such rights by States that have signed but 
not ratified the treaty would be contrary to the object of promoting the further 
development of cooperation among States in the exploration and use of the Moon.  
Similarly, the same can be said of the obligation to conduct scientific investigations on 
the basis of equality and without discrimination of any kind and the need to consider 
the desirability to share mineral samples collected with other States.  Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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4.3.4  Defining a Celestial Body 
4.3.4.1  The Problem 
One of the first problems identified during the early stages of the debate among 
commentators on the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Agreement related to the 
definition of “celestial body”.123  This is because objects in the solar system including 
the planets, their natural satellites, as well as asteroids and meteorites, differ markedly 
in size and physical conditions.  They range from small solid objects of varying shapes, 
such as asteroids, to large liquid or gaseous objects that are wholly unsuitable for 
landings, such as Jupiter and the comets.  In one of the earliest attempts to resolve this 
issue, Zhukov differentiated between bodies that may be objects of exploration and/or 
exploitation and others that are inappropriate for human activities due to their 
dimension, nature or substance.124  In his view, “celestial bodies” includes the “planets 
and their natural satellites, asteroids and large meteorites” but excludes 
“micrometeorites, smaller meteorites and comets”.125  In addition to the problem of 
introducing more terms that may require legal definition, this has the conceptual 
                                                           
 
123 See, for example, discussion in E. Brooks, National Control of Natural Planetary Bodies: Preliminary 
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result of excluding objects that may well be the subject of human interest.  In any 
event, because the treaties, especially the Moon Agreement, refer repeatedly to 
“celestial bodies”, a more precise legal definition should be advocated for the further 
development of space law.126 
4.3.4.2  Definition Based on Potential Human Interest 
It has been argued that two distinct legal regimes should be created to regulate space 
objects depending on their dimensions and the composition of their surfaces.  For 
some, including Zhukov, a distinction based on the existence of a human economic 
value was seen as important, while others would criticise this as being contrary to the 
common interest principle already established in space law.127  Gál suggests that the 
existence of a solid surface for the landing of space vehicles is an important factor to 
be considered.128  Specifically, he stated: 
Under the aspect of space law (sic) celestial bodies are the Moon, and 
the planets, moons, asteroids (or planetoids) of our solar system 
which are suitable for landing of manned or unmanned spacecraft, are 
of natural origin, and cannot be deviated from their celestial orbit.  In 
the astronomical sense the concept of celestial bodies is much wider; 
the lawyer, however, is not interested in those which cannot become 
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the scene of legally relevant actions, like the sun, our solar systems, 
comets, etc.129 
The adoption of this definition has the effect of excluding comets and the large 
gaseous planets, namely Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus and Neptune, from the definition of 
“celestial bodies”, even though they may well be objects of human exploration and 
possible exploitation.  Assuming that the definition of celestial bodies may be 
expanded to include any solid mass in space, thus including comets and tiny asteroids 
as well as some of the gas giants, Fasan posed an interesting scenario.130 
First, if a comet or asteroid is discovered to cross the Earth’s orbit, it poses a threat to 
the Earth environment as well as to the safety of astronauts.  Although this would 
undoubtedly be “a phenomenon which could endanger human life” and would “reach 
the surface of the Earth by natural means”, the Moon Agreement would apply to it as 
long as it has not reached the surface of the Earth.131  The use of any technology to 
deflect such an asteroid or comet from its natural orbit and guide it towards the sun 
would raise few questions with respect to the necessity of the action.  However, if one 
assumes that the destruction is the ultimate form of appropriation, any state that 
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destroys an asteroid or comet would, strictly speaking, contravene the provisions of 
the Moon Agreement. 
4.3.4.3  Definition Based on Potential Removal by Humans 
Fasan also presented another example in which the definition of celestial body may be 
controversial, more pertinent to the present study, where an asteroid, with a diameter 
of a few hundred meters, is removed from its orbit and moved to an orbit around the 
Earth, high above the geostationary orbit.  The question would be whether the 
asteroid remains a natural celestial body even if it is then hollowed out and its surface 
and interior covered with artificial installations and structures.132  Fasan suggested 
that this asteroid would then cease to be a “celestial body” as it is transformed into an 
artificial “space object” to which notions involving ownership, control, registration 
and liability are applied differently in international law.133  Accordingly, the legal 
definition of “celestial bodies” ought to be limited to objects that cannot be 
transported through space by human intervention, thus excluding smaller and less 
massive objects from any international legal regime that may be imposed under the 
Moon Agreement.134  In particular, Smirnoff suggested that “celestial bodies”: 
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… in the sense of the treaties and agreements on outer space are 
natural objects in outer space including their eventual gaseous 
coronas which cannot be artificially moved from their natural 
orbits.135 
However, there are a number of commentators who have opposed this view and 
suggested that the Moon Agreement and the other treaties would apply to any kind of 
object in outer space as “celestial bodies”.136  Indeed, if any object that can be moved 
from their natural orbits would not be considered a “celestial body” for the purposes 
of the international treaties, then it would have the undesirable consequences that the 
scope of applicability of any international regulatory regime would be at the mercy of 
technological developments, particularly in the field of propulsion, and it would not 
prevent the wholesale consumption of such bodies in outer space for mineral 
exploitation and other purposes. 
Indeed, if the suggestion made by Working Group Three of the International Institute 
of Space Law in 1964 was accepted, “celestial bodies” would be defined as those 
“natural objects in outer space … which cannot be artificially removed from their 
natural orbits”.137  As it is envisaged that asteroids will be moved in the near future in 
order to assist in the exploitation of their mineral resources, this definition would 
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assist in transforming such asteroids into “space objects” once moved and thus outside 
the regulatory ambit of some aspects of international law, particularly the provisions 
of the Moon Agreement, a result unpalatable for some commentators.  Hosenball had 
stated the contrary view that if an asteroid was moved into an orbit around the Earth 
for exploitation of its mineral resources, it would nevertheless remain a celestial body 
within the meaning of that term and thus would not change its character by its 
artificial movement.138 
4.3.4.4  Definition Based on Size 
The question then is whether such a distinction can be maintained on the basis of size.  
For example, what appropriate designation is applicable to “meteorites”, which are 
technically asteroids or comets, or fragments thereof, that either have no fixed or 
discernable orbit or have been captured by the gravity of the Earth or other celestial 
bodies?  Sztucki, for example, was of the belief that they are not included in the 
definition of “celestial bodies”: 
[Meteorites are] celestial bodies in the astronomical sense but 
certainly cannot be subjected to [the] legal regime envisaged for 
celestial bodies and, e.g. excluded from appropriation.  There is, 
however, an essential difference between meteorites and asteroids.   
Freedom of exploration and use of outer space, naturally, presupposes 
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taking samples of meteorites, etc., which because of the 
unaccountable number of meteorites and no fixed trajectory, does not 
impair possibilities of other States to do exactly the same.139 
Williams, in turn, refers to a definition that describes a meteorite as “a solid object 
moving in outer space, of considerably smaller proportions than an asteroid but 
considerably larger than an atom or molecule”.140  This is the definition accepted by 
Commission 22 of the International Astronomical Union in 1961.141  For a lawyer, 
however, this presents little value as there is a very large range of dimensions between 
atoms and asteroids, with no assistance in the definition of the terms “considerably 
larger” and “considerably smaller”.142  In any event, it would be difficult to sustain the 
proposition that the Sun, which of itself has little value for exploration or exploitation, 
would be a celestial body while a meteoroid, which may be of much human interest 
despite its size, would not be designated as such. 
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4.3.4.5  Search for a Commercially and Legally Viable Definition 
It is apparent from the above discussion that the following factors would have to be 
considered in seeking a commercially and legally viable definition of “celestial bodies”, 
especially in light of their potential value for human exploitation: 
(1)  it is clearly the intention of the framers of the Outer Space Treaty, the 
Moon Agreement and of the States that have ratified them for human 
exploitation of mineral resources on “celestial bodies” to be regulated by 
the terms and provisions of those treaties;143  
(2)  to exclude natural objects of potential human interest for exploration 
and/or exploitation from the definition of “celestial bodies” would appear 
to be contrary to the intent, if not the spirit, of declaring them the 
“province of all mankind” and may, in any event, render meaningless some 
provisions in the Moon Agreement relating specifically to the mineral 
resources on the Moon and other celestial bodies in the Solar System;144 
(3)  conversely, the definition of “celestial bodies” cannot refer only to natural 
objects of human interest as they cannot be ascertained as a class of 
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objects at any given point in time, giving rise to unnecessary uncertainty in 
the application of international space law; and 
(4)  similarly, the definition cannot be based on the ability of humans to 
remove such bodies from their natural orbits, as such bodies would only be 
moved if it was the subject of human interest and, along with 
advancements in propulsion technology, does not create a defined class of 
natural objects to be depicted as “celestial bodies”.145 
It is apparent that the main reason for requiring a definition of “celestial bodies” is to 
exclude, for most intents and purposes, objects that may be removed from their 
natural orbits from the scope of the definition.  The reason for this is so that the 
resources contained on such objects may be exploited without the need to refer to the 
terms and provisions of the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Agreement concerning 
the appropriation of celestial bodies and the exploitation of resources.146  However, 
there is no real reason other than commercial interests why this should be allowed in 
the context of outer space and celestial bodies being the “province of mankind”.  This 
is because eventually the desire and the ability to move even the largest of asteroids 
and comets would enable the exploitation of their resources without the need to have 
regard to the interests of other States. 
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Accordingly, it may be unnecessary to restrict the scope of the definition of “celestial 
bodies” as all natural objects within the Solar System and to define the scope of what 
would be defined as “appropriation” or “extraction”.  Specifically, the removal of a 
celestial body from its natural orbit or location should amount to both 
“appropriation” and “extraction”, if it is so removed for the purpose of resource 
exploitation.  On the other hand, if the removal of an object from its orbit is effected 
for reasons other than resource exploitation, such as necessity or science, then such 
removal should not be considered “appropriation” or “extraction” within the scope of 
the space treaties. 
Of course, the extraction of mineral resources in substantial amounts from a celestial 
body may result in variations to the natural orbit of the object as a result of changes in 
the mass of the object due to mass being removed from the object and the relatively 
small mass of the object itself.  However, as the extraction of mineral resources per se 
would invoke the relevant provisions of the treaties, it is unnecessary to prescribe a 
minimum amount of variation to the natural orbit of the object, even if it was to be 
relative to the mass of the object itself.  In this way, the real problem behind the 
definition of “celestial bodies” may be resolved without the need to frustrate future 
development of such objects and to give effect to the apparent intents of the treaties in 
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4.4  ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION OF CELESTIAL BODIES 
4.4.1  Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty 
The provision of the Outer Space Treaty that is generally cited with reference to the 
protection of the space environment is its Article IX, which requires States to take 
appropriate action in order to avoid the harmful contamination of outer space.   
Specifically, Article IX requires all States to conduct explorations of outer space in a 
manner that avoids the harmful contamination of outer space and celestial bodies, in 
addition to any adverse changes to the environment of the Earth through the 
introduction of extraterrestrial matter. 
There is no definition as to what would constitute “harmful contamination” of outer 
space and celestial bodies, though it would appear to be quite specific and narrow in 
scope.147  For instance, the avoidance of harmful contamination is an obligation 
restricted to the “study” and “exploration” of outer space and not to the “use” of outer 
space.148  It is somewhat surprising that the “use” of outer space and celestial bodies 
would not be subject to the requirement to avoid harmful contamination of the space 
environment and celestial bodies.  In any event, the lack of a precise definition of 
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“harmful contamination” nevertheless renders the analysis of the obligations imposed 
on States and their private entities somewhat difficult.  Although some commentators 
have suggested that “harmful contamination” means any activity or residue thereof 
that may be deemed harmful in any way, it is difficult to see how this can be sustained 
as all activities conducted in outer space would have an impact in some way on the 
environment, regardless of the nature of the activities involved.149 
Further, States are required to engage in appropriate international consultations if it 
has a reasonable belief that its planned space activity, or that of another State, could 
cause potential “harmful interference” with the peaceful exploration and use of outer 
space.150  This requirement has severe limitations, the first of which is that this 
provision is not retrospective in nature and relates only to activities proposed and not 
to activities already completed.151  The second is that there is no definition of “harmful 
interference” and, if the similar provision relating to the use of radio frequencies in 
space in the Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union is any guide, 
harmful interference would mean an impairment or total restriction to the ability of 
the other State to conduct its space activities.152  The third is that, even if such a 
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proposed activity results in harmful interference with the activities of other States, the 
obligation of the State proposing the activity is limited to conducting consultations 
with the affected States, without any obligation to modify its proposed activity, 
subject to its obligation to have due regard to the corresponding interests of those 
States under Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty. 
It is prudent also to note that Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty requires States to 
avoid “adverse changes in the environment of the Earth resulting from the 
introduction of extraterrestrial matter”, such as materials extracted from celestial 
bodies, and are to “adopt appropriate measures for this purpose”.153  Consequently, it 
will be necessary to adopt international regulations for the quarantine of 
extraterrestrial materials and for the States to undertake the continuing domestic 
supervision of private actors in the implementation of such regulations. 
4.4.2  Article 7 of the Moon Agreement 
Article 7(1) of the Moon Agreement does not provide much assistance in the 
interpretation of Article IX with respect to harmful contamination of celestial bodies.  
Specifically, Article 7(1) provides that: 
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1.  In exploring and using the Moon, States Parties shall take 
measures to prevent the disruption of the existing balance of its 
environment, whether by introducing adverse changes in that 
environment, by its harmful contamination through the 
introduction of extra-environmental matter or otherwise. 
It should be noted that Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty prohibited the harmful 
contamination of outer space and celestial bodies, while Article 7 of the Moon 
Agreement prohibited the disruption of the existing balance of celestial bodies.  This 
disruption of the existing balance is defined as: 
(1)  introducing adverse changes in that environment; 
(2)  harmful contamination of that environment through the introduction of 
extra-environmental matter; and 
(3)  other means. 
Further, Article 7 applies not only to “exploration”, as is the case for Article IX of the 
Outer Space Treaty, but also to “use” and “scientific investigation” as provided for 
under the Moon Agreement. 
It is clear that Article 7 does not extend or interpret Article IX of the Outer Space 
Treaty but rather creates new and additional obligations concerning the preservation 
of the “balance” of celestial bodies.  Accordingly, it is probable that Article 7 would 
only have force and effect on States that have ratified the Moon Agreement but not to Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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States that have merely signed it and third States, as provided for in the customary 
norms applicable to the law of treaties.154 
In this context it may be useful to consider the specificity of the provisions in Article 
145 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea concerning the protection of the 
environment in the deep seabed, although one must be mindful that, unlike the deep 
seabed, most celestial bodies are unlikely to contain life or an ecological balance.  In 
particular, Article 145 stipulates that: 
Necessary measures shall be taken in accordance with this 
Convention with respect to activities in the Area to ensure effective 
protection for the marine environment from harmful effects which 
may arise from such activities.  To this end, the Authority shall adopt 
appropriate rules, regulations and procedures for inter alia: 
… 
(e)  the prevention, reduction and control of pollution and other 
hazards to the marine environment, including the coastline, and 
of interference with the ecological balance of the marine 
environment, particular attention being paid to the need for 
protection from harmful effects of such activities as drilling, 
dredging, excavation, disposal of waste, construction and 
operation or maintenance of installations, pipelines and other 
devices related to such activities; 
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(f)  the protection and conservation of the natural resources of the 
Area and the prevention of damage to the flora and fauna of the 
marine environment. 
4.5  LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR A REGULATORY REGIME FOR 
EXPLORATION OF MINERAL RESOURCES ON CELESTIAL BODIES  
4.5.1  Two Types of Exploration 
In the interest of simplicity and convenience, the types of activities that the 
exploration segment may involve can be grouped into two categories: “prospecting” 
and “exploration”.  These two terms are defined in the Wellington Convention on the 
Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities as: 
(1)  “prospecting”, which means all activities directly or indirectly associated 
with the aim of identifying areas of mineral resource potential for possible 
exploration and extraction, including geological, geochemical and 
geophysical investigations and field observations, the use of remote 
sensing techniques and the collection of surface samples and small scale 
subsurface samples with drilling to depths not exceeding twenty-five 
metres; and 
(2)  “exploration” means all activities directly or indirectly connected with the 
aim of identifying and evaluating specific mineral resource deposits or 
occurrences, including exploratory drilling and other surface or subsurface Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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excavations required to determine the nature and size of mineral resource 
deposits and the feasibility of their development. 
For both prospecting and exploration activities, it will be necessary for any future 
international regulatory regime for such activities to address the legal issues that arise 
generally and specifically. 
4.5.2  The Exploration Segment Generally 
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty requires the State to authorise and continually 
supervise the activities of its private entities.  Consequently, it would be necessary for 
any private entity conducting space activities to comply with the obligations imposed 
on the State under the Outer Space Treaty, the Moon Agreement and other relevant 
international instruments. 
Further, it would be necessary for the State or a private “explorer” to consider the 
following general obligations under the Outer Space Treaty when undertaking 
prospecting or exploration on celestial bodies: Rights and Duties in the Exploration and Extraction of Resources on Celestial Bodies 
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(1)  the need not to interfere with the rights provided to other States under the 
Outer Space Treaty;155 
(2)  the need to have due regard to the corresponding interests of other States 
in the conduct of space activities;156 
(3)  the obligation to avoid harmful interference with the activities of other 
States in outer space;157 
(4)  the avoidance of harmful contamination of the space environment in the 
exploration of outer space and celestial bodies;158 and 
(5)  for States that are party to the Moon Agreement, there is an addition duty 
to avoid conducting activities that disrupt the existing balance on celestial 
bodies in their exploration and use.159 
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4.5.3  Prospecting Activities 
Prospecting activities may well be considered “exploration” or, at the very least, “use”, 
for the purposes of Article I of the Outer Space Treaty, and thus subject to the 
freedoms provided for under Article I.  It is likely that prospecting activities may also 
be considered “scientific investigations”.  In any event, States and their private entities 
are clearly free to undertake prospecting activities conditional upon the obligations 
imposed under the law.  Further, in addition to the general obligations detailed above, 
prospecting activities conducted by States Parties to the Moon Agreement are bound 
by the requirement under Article 6(2) of the Moon Agreement that States are to 
consider the desirability of sharing the samples collected with other States. 
It should be noted that, in the case of prospecting by means of remote sensing 
technology, the provisions in the Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth 
from Outer Space would not apply as those Principles relate only to the remote 
sensing of Earth from outer space and not of other celestial bodies. 
4.5.4  Exploration Activities 
As is the case with prospecting activities, exploration activities would fall within the 
scope of “exploration” or “use” of outer space and celestial bodies, though in this case 
it is doubtful whether exploration activities can be considered “scientific 
investigation” as such activities are clearly conducted with a view to commercial Rights and Duties in the Exploration and Extraction of Resources on Celestial Bodies 
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exploitation and profit.  As in the case of prospecting activities, States that are parties 
to the Moon Agreement, as well as their nationals, must comply with Article 6(2) of 
the Moon Agreement and consider the desirability of sharing the samples collected 
with other States. 
The predominant issue with exploration of specific areas on celestial bodies is 
exclusivity over that area for exploration purposes.  If Article II of the Outer Space 
Treaty is taken to mean the prohibition on the creation of exclusive property rights on 
celestial bodies, then it may be arguable that a State or one of its private entity would 
not be able to lawfully create exclusive exploration rights over a specific area of a 
celestial body. 
This is particularly so in light of the prohibition on private property rights in Article 
11(3) of the Moon Agreement.  However, this may be more of a practical than 
conceptual issue, as the answer may lie in the manner in which any exclusive right is 
asserted, especially in the absence of an intergovernmental institution for the 
provision of such rights as envisaged by Article 11(5) of the Moon Agreement.  If the 
State or private entity merely asserted an exclusive right to explore a particular area 
without any restrictions placed on access to third parties, the primary issue would be 
one of practical enforcement of such asserted right.  If this was possible, then this may 
nevertheless be a breach of Articles I and IX of the Outer Space Treaty in denying 
freedom of use to other States and failing to have due regard to the corresponding 
interests of other States.  If the State or private entity fenced off the area or impeded Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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access to the area for others by any means, then it may be seen to have asserted 
property rights over the area.  In addition to possible breaches of Articles I and IX of 
the Outer Space Treaty, this would contravene Article II of the Outer Space Treaty 
and, if applicable, Article 11(3) of the Moon Agreement. 
4.6  LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR A REGULATORY REGIME FOR 
EXTRACTION OF MINERAL RESOURCES ON CELESTIAL BODIES  
4.6.1  Sovereignty over Mineral Resources 
The first question that requires consideration is whether state sovereignty can exist 
over mineral resources as distinct to state sovereignty over territory.  The reason why 
this issue is significant is that, if sovereignty can exist over mineral resources, then the 
extraction of resources from celestial bodies may constitute a “national appropriation” 
for the purposes of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty.  This would effectively 
prohibit any extraction of mineral resources of celestial bodies.  Even though there is 
some uncertainty in the legality of extracting mineral resources from celestial bodies, 
it is clear that the express terms of the Outer Space Treaty and the other United 
Nations space treaties do not embody a specific legal prohibition. 
Article 11 of the Moon Agreement appears to attempt to put the issue beyond doubt.  
Article 11(2) reaffirms that national appropriation of celestial bodies, whether by any 
claim of sovereignty, means of use or occupation or by any other means, is prohibited.  Rights and Duties in the Exploration and Extraction of Resources on Celestial Bodies 
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Article 11(3) goes further by declaring that neither the surface or the subsurface of the 
celestial bodies “nor any part thereof or natural resources in place, shall become 
property of any State, … national organisations or non-governmental entity or of any 
natural person”.  Article 11(1) also declares natural resources on celestial bodies to be 
the “common heritage of mankind”. 
In such an analysis, it is prudent to keep in mind that the Moon Agreement is binding 
only on States that are party to it.  Consequently, it may be argued that States that are 
not party to the Moon Agreement may refuse to consider mineral resources on 
celestial bodies to be the “common heritage of mankind” or that the extraction of such 
resources is prohibited.  This is because neither provision exists specifically in the 
other United Nations space treaties and the provisions of the Moon Agreement have 
not been expressed to reflect customary international law or have crystallised into 
custom since their adoption. 
As for States that are party to the Moon Agreement, it may be noted that neither 
Article 11(1) nor Article 11(3) are expressed in absolute terms.  Both provisions refer 
to, and may be subject to, the express undertaking in Article 11(5) that States are to 
establish an international regime to govern exploitation of natural resources on 
celestial bodies when such exploitation is about to become feasible.  Accordingly, it 
may be said that not only does the Moon Agreement not prohibit the extraction of 
mineral resources, it actually permits such an activity and mandates that an Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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international regulatory regime is to be created to govern the “exploitation” of natural 
resources on celestial bodies. 
4.6.2  Extraction Methods 
Assuming that the extraction of mineral resources from celestial bodies is not unlawful 
per se, it is then appropriate to consider the lawfulness of the methods that may be 
used to extract such mineral resources.  There are at least four possible means of 
extracting ores from a celestial body such as a Near Earth Asteroid.  In each of these 
scenarios, different provisions of the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Agreement 
have varying effects on the ability of a State or its private entity to extract mineral 
resources from a celestial body.  Consequently, it is necessary to consider each 
scenario separately. 
4.6.2.1  Commercial Extraction of Natural Mineral Resources in situ 
on Celestial Bodies 
In analysing the legality of the commercial extraction of mineral resources in situ on 
celestial bodies, it is prudent to consider some of the international legal principles that 
have been previously discussed, as adumbrated below: Rights and Duties in the Exploration and Extraction of Resources on Celestial Bodies 
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(1)  the requirement that exploration and use of outer space be “carried out for 
the benefit and in the interest of all countries” in Article I of the Outer 
Space Treaty and Article 11 of the Moon Agreement; 
(2)  the principle of non-appropriation in Article II of the Outer Space Treaty 
and Article 11 of the Moon Agreement; 
(3)  the prohibition of private property rights on celestial bodies in Article 11 
of the Moon Agreement or as exists in customary international law; and 
(4)  the need for some authorisation from the creation of a regulatory regime 
as anticipated under Article 11 of the Moon Agreement. 
As discussed above, whether the commercial extraction of resources from celestial 
bodies can be categorised as being “carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all 
countries” within the meaning of Article I of the Outer Space Treaty would depend on 
the interpretation of the content and scope of the provision.  As mentioned above, 
Article I and Article IX may be interpreted in this context as imposing a negative duty 
on States not to interfere with the rights of, or to cause any detriment to, other States.  
This may pose a particular difficulty for the extraction of mineral resources from 
celestial bodies, though in the case of extraction in situ it may be suggested that the 
rights and interests of other States are not significantly affected.  This is because the in 
situ extraction activities of one State would not, in most cases, prevent another State Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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from undertaking the same activities on the same celestial body for the same mineral 
resources, though not from the same area. 
There is a risk that such an interpretation constitutes too liberal a view of the duties 
and obligations imposed under Article I of the Outer Space Treaty.  This is because it 
may be said that the commercial nature of the activity and the deprivation of the 
particular mineral ores of a celestial body by one State may be perceived to be carried 
out for the benefit of the State or States involved rather than “for the benefit and in 
the interest of all countries”.  As outlined in Section 4.2.2 above and in the context of 
existing state practice in other fields such as remote sensing of the Earth by satellite, 
the following additional legal obligations may be imposed on States by Article I of the 
Outer Space Treaty on the commercial extraction of mineral resources:  
(1)  to make available the raw or processed ores to other States on a non-
discriminatory basis, presumably at market value; and 
(2)  that nothing in the activity performed should prevent other States from 
undertaking the same activity. 
In any event, the principle of non-appropriation in Article II of the Outer Space 
Treaty and the corresponding provisions of the Moon Agreement presents further 
legal difficulties in the commercial extraction of mineral resources from celestial 
bodies.  This is due to the nature of the activity itself probably involving the assertion 
of exclusive private property rights over the surface and subsurface of the relevant Rights and Duties in the Exploration and Extraction of Resources on Celestial Bodies 
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celestial body.  Even if there is no technical need for exclusivity in the use of the 
mining area on the celestial body, the commercial need would necessitate the assertion 
of exclusivity as financiers and investors would never be willing to provide the funds 
necessary to finance the mining venture without assurances that their investment is 
protected by being able to preclude competitors from accessing the same area of the 
celestial body for mining and other incidental purposes. 
Although it may be prudent to suggest that Article II of the Outer Space Treaty is in 
fact silent on the issue of exclusive property rights, this is not an interpretation that 
has won widespread acceptance in the international community, for it is generally 
considered that the existence of private property rights requires the existence of state 
sovereignty, which is expressly prohibited by Article II of the Outer Space Treaty.160  
Further, it is clear that Article 11 of the Moon Agreement, by its express terms, 
prohibits the creation and assertion of private property rights.  The absence or 
illegality of exclusive private property rights necessitates changes to the existing body 
of space law or the creation of a new international regulatory regime that would allow 
for the creation of such rights for the purpose of exploring and extracting mineral 
resources on celestial bodies. 
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4.6.2.2  Extraction of Resources in situ on the Objects That Results in 
Substantial Depletion of the Mass of the Object 
One of the unique features of the mining of celestial bodies is that, unlike mining on 
Earth, the materials extracted from the surface or sub-surface of a celestial body is 
removed from that celestial body and sent to the Earth, causing some depletion of the 
mass of that body.  In addition to the legal issues that relate to the in situ extraction of 
mineral resources generally as discussed above, activities leading to the substantial 
depletion of the mass of a celestial body would be unlawful as a matter of international 
space law, in particular the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty.  This is because: 
(1)  destruction can be considered to be the ultimate form of appropriation, 
thus contravening Article II of the Outer Space Treaty;161 
(2)  other States are deprived of the ability to exercise similar rights over the 
same celestial body, thus possibly violating Articles I and IX of the Outer 
Space Treaty;162 and 
(3)  the disruption of the environment of the celestial body is in breach of 
Article 7 of the Moon Agreement. 
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From a policy and legal perspective, taking into account the legal uncertainty over the 
definition of “celestial body” in the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Agreement, 
several options exist in addressing the unique issues arising from such an activity: 
(1)  determine that, despite the substantial depletion of mass of a celestial 
body, such a mode of ore extraction would not contravene the provisions 
of the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Agreement; 
(2)  define a minimum mass for an object to be classified as a “celestial body” 
and then set a maximum limit on materials, defined as a percentage of the 
total mass of the celestial body, that may be extracted from it; 
(3)  define a maximum limit on materials, expressed as a percentage of the 
total mass of a celestial body, that may be extracted from a celestial body 
regardless of its mass or size; 
(4)  require some level of processing of the ores extracted to be conducted in 
situ so that the bulk of the extracted ores would remain on the celestial 
body; and/or 
(5)  the prohibition of mining activities on celestial bodies that have less than a 
prescribed minimum mass. Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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It will be necessary for the above options to be considered and, from a policy 
perspective, for the right balanced approach to be adopted in any future legal or 
regulatory regime.  This is particularly the case considering the depletion of mass of 
celestial bodies through mining activities may affect the orbital mechanics of that 
celestial body as well as those of nearby celestial bodies.163 
4.6.2.3  Changing the Orbit of Objects or Moving Them to Lunar 
Orbit or Earth Orbit for the Extraction of Resources 
For some smaller objects, such as small asteroids, it may be more cost effective to 
move the orbit of the object closer to the orbit of the Earth or even to remove the 
object to the Earth’s orbit or lunar orbit.  As discussed above, it is questionable as to 
whether an object in the Solar System that orbits around the Sun or a planet would be 
classified as a “celestial body” if one is capable of moving the object from its orbit.  It is 
difficult to exclude objects that are capable of being moved from the definition of 
“celestial bodies”, as this would become a diminishing classification as propulsion 
technology improves enabling larger objects to be moved from their orbits over time.  
Regardless, in addition to the legal issues noted above in relation to ore extraction 
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generally and the substantial depletion of mass from a celestial body, it is necessary to 
consider the specific issue of changing the orbital parameters of a celestial body or 
removing it from its natural orbit. 
There is no specific provision in the Outer Space Treaty or the Moon Agreement for 
changing the orbital parameters of, or removing celestial bodies, except for the legal 
principles that would apply to the activity as described above.  In practice, as discussed 
in Chapter 6 below, the international community would need to make a policy 
determination whether extraction of mineral resources from celestial bodies involving 
such acts would be lawful and, if so, what limits would apply to these acts.  This is 
particularly so given the possible effect such activities would have on the orbital 
mechanics of nearby celestial bodies that may even increase the possibility of such 
objects impacting the Earth in the future.164 
4.6.2.4  Moving the Object to Earth Orbit for a Controlled Descent to 
the Surface of the Earth for Extraction of Resources 
If it is technologically feasible to move a celestial body to the Earth’s orbit for the 
purpose of extracting mineral resources, then it may become desirable for the object to 
                                                           
 
164 See, for example, Carusi, Valsecchi, D’Abramo and Boattini, supra note 163; and Ahrens and Harris, 
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be placed in a controlled descent to the surface of the Earth, either as a whole or 
broken up in parts.  This would allow for the processing of the materials from the 
space object to be done entirely on the surface of the Earth.  In addition to the legal 
issues outlined above, one would need to consider the desirability of such activities in 
the implementation of any international regulatory framework, considering the risk of 
damage to the surface of the Earth and the risk of contamination by the introduction 
of extraterrestrial matter. 
4.7  CONCLUSIONS 
The mineralogical exploration of celestial bodies and the consequential physical 
extraction of mineral resources from their surface and/or subsurface raises specific 
legal and policy issues, in addition to the general issues of space law that are applicable 
to all space activities.  It is clear from the above discussion that an international 
regulatory framework for exploration and extraction activities on celestial bodies will 
need to consider the legal and policy issues as adumbrated below: 
(1)  the lawfulness of commercial prospecting, exploration and extraction 
activities in the context of the need to be conducted for the benefit and in 
the interest of all countries under Article I of the Outer Space Treaty; 
(2)  the granting of exclusive property rights on celestial bodies for exploration 
and extraction activities; Rights and Duties in the Exploration and Extraction of Resources on Celestial Bodies 
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(3)  the lawfulness of physically removing materials from celestial bodies for 
the purpose of commercial exploration and extraction of mineral 
resources; 
(4)  what obligations, if any, are placed on the dissemination of the 
prospecting and exploration data and the materials extracted from 
celestial bodies; 
(5)  the appropriate limits, if any, on the physical extraction of materials that 
may substantially deplete the mass of the celestial body; 
(6)  the appropriate limits, if any, on the size or mass of a celestial body that 
may be the subject of commercial mining activities; 
(7)  the legality of changes to the orbital parameters of a celestial body or the 
removal of a celestial body from its natural orbit; and 
(8)  the measures that may be prescribed or adopted to avoid adverse effects 
on the Earth through contamination by the introduction of extraterrestrial 
materials to the environment of the Earth. 
It is evident from the issues identified above on the exploration and extraction 
segments of a commercial space mining venture that such activities pose significant 
challenges for the existing body of space law.  Before considering the appropriate Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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international regulatory framework for such activities, it is prudent, if not necessary, 
to analyse the legal and policy issues arising from the exploitation segment of a 
commercial space mining venture.  In particular, this will entail a discussion of the 
declaration in the Moon Agreement that celestial bodies are the “common heritage of 
mankind”, generally considered to be the most controversial concept in the existing 
body of space law.  It is in resolving this controversy that the key to creating an 
appropriate international regulatory framework may be found.  
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5.1  INTRODUCTION 
The most controversial international legal impasse associated with the commercial 
exploitation of mineral resources in outer space is the concept that the Moon and 
other celestial bodies are the “common heritage of mankind”.  The common heritage 
of mankind is a relatively new concept of international law which provides to some 
extent for the non-appropriation, equitable benefit distribution, peaceful use, 
preservation and shared management of certain spatial areas that are currently not 
subject to territorial or sovereign control of any State.1  So far, the only multilateral 
treaties to formally incorporate the common heritage of mankind doctrine have been: 
(1)  the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies (the “Moon Agreement”) in relation to the Moon and 
other celestial bodies;2 and 
                                                           
 
1 These are the five tenets of the “common heritage of mankind” enunciated by most commentators.  
See, for example, Kemal Baslar, THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1998) at 80; and Kevin V. Cook, The Discovery of Lunar Water: An Opportunity 
to Develop a Workable Moon Treaty (1999) 11 GEORGETOWN INT’L. ENVT’L. L. REV. 647 at 656-659. 
2 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the “Moon 
Agreement”), opened for signature on 18 December 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3; 18 I.L.M. 1434 (entered 
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(2)  the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, in relation to 
mineral resource exploitation of the deep seabed.3 
In the Moon Agreement, there are some problems that have emerged regarding 
various interpretations of the common heritage of mankind doctrine.  From the 
experience of the debates over the Convention on the Law of the Sea, the prospect of 
mandatory transfers of benefits to non-participants, an indeterminate international 
governance regime and insecure private property rights have caused many States to 
shy away from the Moon Agreement.  The impasse over the Moon Agreement has led 
at least one scholar to suggest that there is now created a de facto moratorium on 
mining activities in outer space.4  This absence of certainty over the legal framework 
for celestial bodies has hindered moves towards commercial utilisation and 
exploitation of the Moon and has thereby inhibited possible lunar and celestial 
resource developments. 
In order for a solution to be found, the ideological, financial and practical implications 
the common heritage of mankind doctrine in the Moon Agreement must be analysed 
in the context of comparable international regimes, such as those governing 
Antarctica and the deep seabed under the Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
                                                           
 
3 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature on 10 December 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 3; 21 I.L.M. 1261, (entered into force on 28 July 1994). 
4 See, for example, Martin Menter, Commercial Space Activities under the Moon Treaty (1979) 7 
SYRACUSE J. INT’L. L. & COM. 213 at 221. Exploitation Rights: Concepts of “Province of Mankind” and “Common Heritage of Mankind” 
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especially the failures in those negotiations to reach a settlement that was agreeable to 
both the industrialised States and the developing States.  Further, it is prudent also to 
consider the origins of the doctrine in the New International Economic Order and its 
evolution in space law from the concepts and provisions contained in the Moon 
Agreement and other United Nations space treaties. 
5.2  ANTARCTICA AND THE 1988 WELLINGTON CONVENTION 
5.2.1  The Antarctic Treaty Framework 
In the Nineteenth Century, France, Great Britain, Russia the United States and other 
States undertook a series of exploratory expeditions to Antarctica, previously terra 
australis nondum cognita, which is now the earliest model of the international 
management of a geographical land area.5  By the early Twentieth Century, whaling 
from mainland shore stations commenced and led to the establishment of temporary 
settlements along the coast.6  After the Second World War, scientific research became 
the predominant activity in Antarctica, and newly developed transportation and 
                                                           
 
5 Douglas M. Zang, Frozen in Time: The Antarctic Mineral Resource Convention (1991) 76 CORNELL L. 
REV. 722 at 724-726.  See also John Hanessian, The Antarctic Treaty 1959 (1960) 9 INT’L. & COMP. L. 
Q. 436. 
6 J. Peter A. Bernhardt, Sovereignty in Antarctica (1975) 5 CAL. W. INT’L. L. J. 297; and Kurt M. 
Shusterich, The Antarctic Treaty System: History, Substance and Speculation (1984) 39 INT’L. J. 800. Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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communication technologies enabled the establishment of large-scale, permanent 
research stations on the continent.7  Despite this new scientific focus, seven States had 
made territorial claims at that time over the continent, specifically Argentina, 
Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom.8  In the 
1970s, the possibility of mineral resource exploitation began to be considered, with 
speculation that Antarctica contained large deposits of iron, copper, chromium, 
platinum, nickel, zinc, tin, silver and gold.9  There was also speculation of significant 
oil reserves in offshore Antarctica.10 
Comprehensive co-operative efforts to explore and regulate resource recovery 
activities in Antarctica started at the same time as regulatory developments in outer 
                                                           
 
7 Patrick T. Bergin, Antarctica, the Antarctic Treaty Regime, and Legal and Geopolitical Implications of 
Natural Resource Exploration and Exploitation (1988) 4 FL. INT’L. L. J. 1, at 20. 
8 Dagmar Butte, International Norms in the Antarctic Treaty (1992) 3 INT’L. LEG. PERSP. 1.  See also 
Alfred van der Essen, The Origin of the Antarctic System (trans. Susan Fisher), in Francesco Francioni 
and Tullio Scovazzi (eds.), INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR ANTARCTICA (2nd ed., 1996), 17-30, at 17-18.  
The United States did not make territorial claims to Antarctica: Todd Jay Parriott, Territorial Claims 
in Antarctica: Will the United States be Left Out in the Cold (1986) 22 STANFORD J. INT’L. L. 67; and D. 
Michael Hinkley, Protecting American Interests in Antarctica: The Territorial Claims Dilemma (1990) 
39 NAVAL L. REV. 43. 
9 Richard W. Bentham, Antarctica: A Minerals Regime (1990) 8 J. ENERGY NAT. RES. L. 120 at 123; 
Jonathan D. Weiss, The Balance of Nature and Human Needs in Antarctica: The Legality of Mining 
(1995) 9 TEMPLE INT’L. & COMP. L. J. 387 at 398-400; Ellen B. Heim, Exploring the Last Frontiers for 
Mineral Resources: A Comparison of International Law Regarding the Deep Seabed, Outer Space and 
Antarctica (1990) 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 819, at 836-837; Zang, supra note 5, at 724-726. 
10 See James E. Carroll, Of Icebergs, Oil Wells and Treaties: Hydrocarbon Exploitation Offshore Antarctica 
(1983) 19 STAN. J. INT’L. L. 207. Exploitation Rights: Concepts of “Province of Mankind” and “Common Heritage of Mankind” 
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space; i.e., during the International Geophysical Year of 1957-1958.11  During this 
period, over 30,000 scientists representing seventy countries undertook coordinated 
research studies of Antarctica and its environment,12 and established sixty staffed 
bases to gather scientific data.13  The international legal response spawned by this co-
operative venture culminated in 1959 in the signing of the Antarctic Treaty by twelve 
countries with established interests in Antarctica, primarily to defer further territorial 
claims over the continent.14  Currently, the Antarctic Treaty System (“ATS”) is 
comprised of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty in conjunction with numerous subsequent 
                                                           
 
11 Paul Lincoln Stoller, Protecting the White Continent: Is the Antarctic Protocol Mere Words or Real 
Action? (1995) 12 AZ. J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 335 at 344-346; Grier C. Raclin, From Ice to Ether: The 
Adoption of a Regime to Govern Resource Exploitation in Outer Space (1986) 7 J. INT’L. L. & BUS. 727 at 
730-732; Nicholas M. Matte, Legal Principles Relating to the Moon, in Jasentuliyana and Lee (eds.), 
MANUAL ON SPACE LAW (1979), at 317. 
12 Raclin, supra note 11, at 730-732. 
13 Zang, supra note 5, at 724-726; Stoller, supra note 11, at 344-346. 
14 The Antarctic Treaty, opened for signature on 1 December 1959, 402 U.N.T.S. 71; 1961 U.K.T.S. 97 
(entered into force on 23 June 1961).  For further discussion on the Antarctic Treaty see Raclin, supra 
note 11, at 730-732; Stacey L. Lowder, A State’s International Legal Role: From the Earth to the Moon 
(1999) 7 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L. L. 253 at 265-266; Zang, supra note 5, at 726-728; Stoller, supra 
note 11, at 346-348. Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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agreements adopted by parties to the original treaty.15  Since then, the Antarctic 
Treaty has proven to be remarkably resilient to external pressure and changing 
international focus on the use of Antarctica.16  As Stokke and Østreng noted: 
While the shift of emphasis from peaceful use to scientific freedom to 
environmental protection largely reflects changing priorities among 
the Consultative Parties themselves, it was also spurred by the fact 
that external criticism was increasingly targeting environmental 
matters: in some measure, the Consultative Parties seem to have 
sought to adapt the ATS to the substance of the external pressure.17 
5.2.2  Operation of the Antarctic Treaty System 
Given that the Antarctic Treaty does not displace the claims to title and sovereignty 
made by seven of the original Consultative Parties, the treatment of Antarctica under 
the Antarctica Treaty cannot in any manner be consistent with any form or concept of 
                                                           
 
15 Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Flora and Fauna, opened for signature on 13 June 
1964, 17 U.S.T. 991; 1998 A.T.S. 6 (entered into force on 1 November 1982) (the “Agreed 
Measures”); Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, opened for signature on 1 June 
1972, 29 U.S.T. 441 (entered into force on 11 March 1978) (the “CCAS”); Convention on the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, opened for signature on 20 May 1980, 33 U.S.T. 
3476 (entered into force on 7 April 1982) (the “CCAMLR”); Convention on the Regulation of 
Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, opened for signature on 2 June 1988, 27 I.L.M. 859 (not in 
force) (the “Wellington Convention”); Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic 
Treaty, opened for signature on 4 October 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1461 (entered into force on 14 January 
1998) (the “Madrid Protocol”).  See John Vogler, THE GLOBAL COMMONS: A REGIME ANALYSIS 
(1995) at 79; Heim, supra note 9, at 839-840; Zang, supra note 5, at 722-723; George N. Barrie, The 
Antarctic Treaty Forty Years On (1999) 116 S. AFR. L. J. 173; Karen Scott, Institutional Developments 
Within the Antarctic Treaty System (2003) 52 INT’L. & COMP. L. Q. 473. 
16 See, for example, Gilliam Triggs, The Antarctic Treaty Regime: A Workable Compromise or a 
“Purgatory of Ambiguity”? (1985) 17 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L. L. 195. 
17 Olav Shram Stokke and Willy Østreng, The Effectiveness of ATS Regimes: Introduction, in Olav Shram 
Stokke and Davor Vidas (eds.), GOVERNING THE ANTARCTIC: THE EFFECTIVENESS AND LEGITIMACY 
OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM (1996), 113-119, at 115. Exploitation Rights: Concepts of “Province of Mankind” and “Common Heritage of Mankind” 
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universal ownership, such as the common heritage of mankind.18  The common 
heritage of mankind doctrine is not articulated in any of the treaties of the ATS,19 
even though Balch suggested as early as 1910 that Antarctica should become “the 
possession of all members of the family of nations”.20  There are some provisions of 
the Antarctic Treaty that nevertheless resemble elements of the common heritage of 
mankind doctrine.  For example, the Antarctic Treaty: 
(1)  is made in “the interest of all mankind”;21 
(2)  specifies that “Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only”;22 
(3)  contains an elaborate system for the preservation of the Antarctic 
environment for future generations.23 
However, in sharp contrast to common heritage of mankind provisions contained in 
the Moon Agreement and the Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Antarctic Treaty 
                                                           
 
18 See Benedetto Conforti, Territorial Claims in Antarctica: A Modern Way to Deal with an Old Problem 
(1986) 19 CORNELL INT’L. L. J. 249; and Ellen S. Tenenbaum, A World Park in Antarctica: The 
Common Heritage of Mankind (1991) 10 VA. ENVT’L. L. J. 109. 
19 See Vogler, supra note 15, at 93-94; Zang, supra note 5, at 765-766. 
20 Thomas Willing Balch, The Arctic and Antarctic Regions and the Law of Nations (1910) 4 AM. J. INT’L. 
L. 265.  Balch is quoted and discussed in David C. Marko, A Kinder, Gentler Moon Treaty: A Critical 
Review of the Current Moon Treaty and a Proposed Alternative (1992) 8 J. NAT. RES. & ENVT’L. L. 293, 
at 310-313; Raclin, supra note 11, at 737-738; and Zang, supra note 5, at 726.  
21 Antarctic Treaty, Preamble. 
22 Ibid., Preamble and Article I. 
23 Ibid., Article IX(1)(f); and see Agreed Measures, CCAS, CCAMLR, Wellington Convention and 
Madrid Protocol.  See also discussion by Thomas M. Franck and Dennis M. Sughrue, Symposium: The 
International Role of Equity-as-Fairness (1993) 81 GEORGETOWN L. J. 563 at 590-594. Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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specifies that it does not nullify or affirm various pre-existing territorial claims over 
portions of Antarctica and it also does not assert the common ownership of Antarctica 
for all mankind. 24   Instead, the ATS has the effect of deferring the issue of claims to 
title and sovereignty over Antarctica to a later time and nothing contained in the 
Antarctic Treaty or during the life of the ATS was to disturb the status quo ante in 
relation to sovereignty.25  Scott noted that: 
The agreement to disagree regarding sovereignty has been 
reconfirmed in agreements concluded subsequent to the Antarctic 
Treaty.  Despite a Third World push in the 1980s and early 1990s to 
have the Common Heritage of Mankind principle accepted as the 
basis for a new international Antarctic regime, the unresolved 
question of national sovereignty continues to underpin debate on all 
Antarctic issues, including current concerns such as the management 
of tourism and establishment of a secretariat.26 
In any event, the fact that Antarctica is a terrestrial land mass means that it is, by its 
very nature, subject to the possibility of assertion of title and sovereignty by States.  
While this may mean that the Arctic may be a better case study than Antarctica for 
                                                           
 
24 Antarctic Treaty, Article IV. 
25 Ibid.  See Sir Arthur Watts, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM (1992), at 
136-140. 
26 Shirley V. Scott, Universalism and Title to Territory in Antarctica (1997) 66 NORDIC J. INT’L. L. 33 at 
39.  See also Peter J. Beck, Regulating One of the Last Tourism Frontiers: Antarctica (1990) 10 APP. 
GEOG. 343; Colin Michael Hall and Simon McArthur, Ecotourism in Antarctica and Adjacent Sub-
Antarctic Islands: Development, Impacts, Management and Prospects for the Future (1993) 14:2 
TOURISM MAN. 117; Debra J. Enzenbacher, Antarctic Tourism: An Overview of 1992/93 Season 
Activity, Recent Developments and Emerging Issues (1994) 30 POLAR REC. 105; and Debra J. 
Enzanbacher, The Regulation of Antarctic Tourism, in Colin Michael Hall and Margaret E. Johnson 
(eds.), POLAR TOURISM: TOURISM IN THE ARCTIC AND ANTARCTIC REGIONS (1995). Exploitation Rights: Concepts of “Province of Mankind” and “Common Heritage of Mankind” 
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present purposes, there is at present no regulatory regime applicable to the Arctic 
Ocean and its ice sheet besides the Convention on the Law of the Sea.27  As Chopra 
had observed: 
Since Antarctica had been conceived of as a land mass and only later 
was found to be a frozen continent, it was readily accepted as terra 
nullius.  A large part of Antarctica lies above the sea level and can 
easily be identified as terra (land).  However, a significant portion of 
the Antarctic continent does not fall clearly under the category of 
terra nullius — let alone the category of terra (land) — because it is 
below sea level.  These areas are more like frozen seas than frozen 
land and could be considered identical to the shallow, frozen Arctic 
Sea. … Taking these factors into account, it appears that one-third of 
the Antarctic continental area is nothing but frozen sea.  The only 
difference is that Antarctic ice is described as terra firma, i.e., firmly 
attached to the land mass, whereas Arctic ice is not firmly attached to 
the land beneath it in all places.28 
                                                           
 
27 See Brent Carpenter, Warm is the New Cold: Global Warming, Oil, UNCLOS Article 76 and How an 
Arctic Treaty Might Stop a New Cold War (2009) 39 ENVT’L. L. 215; Barnaby J. Feder, A Legal Regime 
for the Arctic (1978) 6 ECOLOGY L. Q. 785; Scott G. Borgerson, Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and 
Security Implications of Global Warming (2008) 87:2 FOREIGN AFF. 63; Bo Johnson Theutenberg, The 
Arctic Law of the Sea (1983) 52 NORDISK TIDS. INT’L. RET 3; David Vanderzwaag, John Donihee and 
Mads Faegteborg, Towards Regional Ocean Management in the Arctic: From Coexistence to Cooperation 
(1988) 37 U. N. B. L. J. 1; Lincoln P. Bloomfield, The Arctic: Last Unmanaged Frontier (1982) 60 
FOREIGN AFF. 87; Christopher C. Joyner, Ice-Covered Regions in International Law (1991) 31 NAT. 
RES. J. 213; Barry Hart Dubner, On the Basis for Creation of a New Method of Defining International 
Jurisdiction in the Arctic Ocean (2005) 13 MO. ENVT’L. L. & POL’Y. REV. 1; Melissa A. Verhaag, It is 
Not Too Late: The Need for a Comprehensive International Treaty to Protect the Arctic Environment 
(2003) 15 GEO. INT’L. ENVT’L. L. REV. 555; and Parker Clote, Implications of Global Warming on State 
Sovereignty and Arctic Resources under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: How the 
Arctic is No Longer Communis Omnium Naturali Jure (2008) 8 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 195. 
28 Sudhir K. Chopra, Antarctica as a Commons Regime: A Conceptual Framework for Cooperation and 
Coexistence, in Christopher C. Joyner and Sudhir K. Chopra (eds.), THE ANTARCTIC LEGAL REGIME 
(1988), 163-186 at 165-166. Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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With this background, the regulation of activities in Antarctica provides both a 
comparison and contrast to the laws governing the deep seabed and outer space, 
particularly in relation to the common heritage of mankind.  In contrast to both the 
deep seabed and outer space, the Consultative Parties to the Antarctic Treaty, on the 
other hand, have adopted an oligarchic formula to manage the area, in preference to 
the democratic formula that was chosen for the Moon Agreement.29  Ultimately, the 
oligarchic regime reserves management of Antarctica and its environment for States 
that have proven their technological capacities and financial investments in Antarctica 
under the “activity criterion” of the Antarctic Treaty.30  By this criterion, States must 
demonstrate sufficient “interest in Antarctica by conducting substantial research 
activity there, such as the establishment of a scientific station or the dispatch of a 
scientific expedition” in order to gain consultative status in the meetings of the 
Consultative Parties.31 
Currently, full participation in decision-making under the Antarctic Treaty is 
restricted to the 12 original members and 16 specially-selected additional members 
since 1961 that have satisfied the “activity criteria”, along with 19 non-consultative 
                                                           
 
29 See René-Jean Dupuy, The Notion of the Common Heritage of Mankind Applied to the Seabed (1983) 18 
ANN. AIR & SP. L. 347, at 349-350. 
30 See Cook, supra note 1, at 677-679; Raclin, supra note 11, at 745-747; Vogler, supra note 15, at 82-84; 
Stoller, supra note 11, at 346-348. 
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parties that have recently been granted “observer status” as a concession to the 
General Assembly of the United Nations.32  As Weiss commented: 
This split of voting privileges has resulted in a two-tiered system 
among the thirty-nine nations who have agreed to be bound by the 
[Antarctic] Treaty, with all the power in the hands of the 
[Consultative Parties]  So far no party has been denied [Consultative 
Party] status that has agreed to the Treaty and has built a scientific 
base and conducted research on the continent, but very few countries 
can afford to build a scientific base in Antarctica.33 
Furthermore, decisions of the Consultative Parties of the Antarctic Treaty are made 
by consensus, rather than by a majority vote.34  This custom ensures that States 
engaged in Antarctic activities are only bound by amendments and legal developments 
that they explicitly agree to.35  This also means that the number of Consultative 
Parties to the Antarctic Treaty cannot be increased dramatically, for such a step may 
cause the process of decision-making to be frustrated by dissensions.  
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Consensus decision-making was also adopted in the Agreement Relating to the 
Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
of 10 December 1982 (the “1994 Agreement”) governing deep seabed mining.36  In 
redressing the imbalance of power which resulted from its initial one nation-one vote 
system, the 1994 Agreement also amended the composition of the governing Council 
to more equitably balance the interests of developing countries, geographical regions, 
consumers, importers, investors and exporters of mineral products, and appropriately 
allocating proportional representation for these interest areas.37  The cumulative effect 
of these management provisions is to prevent legal or economic progress in Antarctica 
or the deep seabed being dominated by large numbers of developing and non-
participating states, and to consolidate a degree of stability in the governance of these 
areas. The Moon Agreement would benefit from incorporating comparable provisions 
in any revised amendments to its initial regime provisions, which are ultimately more 
conducive to the development of common heritage resources. 
On 29 September 1982, Malaysia proposed to the General Assembly of the United 
Nations that, as Antarctica belonged to the international community, the United 
Nations ought to administer the continent or to require the “present occupants” to act 
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as trustees for the international community.38  Supporting by a significant number of 
developing States, Malaysia proposed to place the issue on the agenda of the General 
Assembly, a move opposed by the Consultative Parties of the Antarctic Treaty.39  
During the debates, a number of challenges were made by various developing States in 
relation to the ATS, in particular: 
(1)  the exclusivity of decision-making by the Consultative Parties under the 
Antarctic Treaty, a charge justified by the Consultative Parties on the 
basis of the practical, financial and legal responsibilities assumed by the 
Consultative Parties as well as their unique knowledge and expertise in 
their involvement in activities in Antarctica; 
(2)  the meetings and negotiations between the Consultative Parties are 
confidential and held behind closed doors; and 
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(3)  the interest of the international community in the preservation of the 
Antarctic environment.40 
The greatest challenge to the legitimacy of the Antarctic Treaty in the context of the 
international community, however, is the prospect of the exploitation of mineral 
resources in Antarctica and its continental shelf.  It was apparent that there is a need 
to balance the regulation of activities relating to the exploitation of mineral resources 
and the concerns of the international community over the preservation of the 
Antarctic environment and the desire of the developing States to share in the mineral 
bounty of Antarctica.41  The compromise was the Convention on the Regulation of 
Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (the “Wellington Convention”), which was 
ultimately rejected by the international community and never entered into force.42 
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5.2.3  The Wellington Convention 
5.2.3.1  Origins of the Wellington Convention 
The Wellington Convention was negotiated during a time when a policy tightrope was 
attempted by the Consultative Parties to the Antarctic Treaty, namely the balancing 
act between the need to preserve the environment and to regulate activities of mineral 
exploitation in Antarctica.43  As suggested by the Consultative Parties themselves: 
The first is an internal accommodation between those Consultative 
Parties claiming sovereignty in Antarctica and those which neither 
make nor recognise such claims.  The second is an external 
accommodation between the Consultative Parties who have assumed 
that initiative for taking measures relating to Antarctica and the rest 
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of the international community, viewed either as individual states or 
collectively.44 
If the Wellington Convention had entered into force, an Antarctic Mineral Resources 
Commission would be created to oversee development in certain zones of the 
Antarctica.45  Private ventures would have been required to pay fees and taxes on the 
mineral resources they extract but there was no sharing of benefits or mandatory 
technology transfer.  It should be noted, however, that the Wellington Convention 
never came into force and has been shelved for fifty years.46 
5.2.3.2  Creating of a Legal Regime for Mineral Exploitation in 
Antarctica and its Continental Shelf 
The Wellington Convention was adopted to regulate the mineral resource exploration 
and exploitation activities of States in Antarctica and the surrounding ice shelves and 
continental shelves, the latter being a necessary intersection between the ATS and the 
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Convention on the Law of the Sea.47  Specifically, the Wellington Convention was 
adopted to regulate: 
… mineral resource activities which take place on the continent of 
Antarctica and all Antarctic islands, including all ice shelves, south of 
60 south latitude and in the seabed and subsoil of adjacent offshore 
areas up to the deep seabed.48 
The Wellington Convention provides for the establishment of the Antarctic Mineral 
Resources Commission, a Special Meeting of the Parties, an Advisory Committee, 
Regulatory Committees and a Secretariat.  The Antarctic Mineral Resources 
Commission was to comprise the Consultative Parties of the Antarctic Treaty as on 25 
November 1988 and decision-making was to be by three-quarters majority,49 except 
for a number reserved matters on which the “absence of a formal objection” or 
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consensus is required.50  The most important of these matters was the role to identify 
possible areas for mineral exploration and development, a decision that must also be 
agreed with by the Special Meeting of the Parties.51 
One notable feature of the Wellington Convention is that prospecting activities may 
be undertaken by any “Sponsoring State” without the need to obtain consent from 
either the Antarctic Mineral Resources Commission or any other institution created 
under the Wellington Convention.52  Before any exploration and extraction activities 
can take place, however, approval is required by the Antarctic Mineral Resources 
Commission is required after an assessment of the financial feasibility of the venture 
and the environmental impact of the project.53  Once the Antarctic Mineral Resource 
Commission issues an exploration permit, the applicant operator would have the 
exclusive right to explore for the mineral resources until a development permit is then 
obtained to extract and exploit the mineral resources in the designated area.54 
The problem arising from this process is that the freedom to undertake prospecting 
activities, which can have a significant impact on the local environment, was provided 
for expressly under the Wellington Convention.  Although it was possible for a State 
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who was a member of the Antarctic Mineral Resources Commission to continually 
and repeatedly frustrate any resource development in Antarctica and Antarctic waters 
by vetoing any application for an exploration permit, let alone a development permit, 
significant damage may already be done by the prospecting activities of States. 
5.2.3.3  Failure of the Wellington Convention 
The Wellington Convention was open for signature by the States that participated in 
the negotiations for a year.55  However, for Australia and France, the need to promote 
the adoption of a comprehensive agreement on the protection of the Antarctic 
environment was paramount and, accordingly, they decided not to sign the 
Wellington Convention.56  Coincidentally, this was followed by a number of oil spills 
in 1989 that highlighted the concern for environmental damage to polar regions and 
led to other countries, particularly Belgium, India and Italy, decide against signing the 
Wellington Convention.57  This oil spills include: 
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(1)  the Bahia Paraiso of Argentina, which ran aground two miles off Palmer 
Station of Antarctica on 28 January 2009;58 
(2)  the Humboldt of Peru, which ran aground near King George Island in 
Antarctic waters on 27 February 1989;59 and 
(3)  the Exxon Valdez of the United States, which was grounded on Bligh Reef 
in Prince William Sound off Alaska on 24 March 1989.60 
Considering the conservation of the Antarctic environment was already an important 
concern of the international community before the adoption of the Wellington 
Convention, it cannot be said that the reaction of the relevant States to the 
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international attention drawn to the oil spills was entirely unpredictable.61  These 
concerns were later addressed in 1991 in the Madrid Protocol on Environmental 
Protection to the Antarctic Treaty.62  As Rothwell noted about the Madrid Protocol: 
It was negotiated at a time when there was considerable debate over 
whether mining should be permitted in Antarctica and not long after 
the Treaty parties had concluded negotiations for a specific Antarctic 
minerals regime.  That the parties could so quickly about-turn and 
adopt a new instrument which not only sought to prohibit mining but 
also comprehensively protect the Antarctic environment is a 
testament to their goodwill to cooperatively manage Antarctica and 
the robustness of the Treaty system.63 
The failure of the Wellington Convention and the attitude of a significant number of 
the Consultative Parties of the Antarctic Treaty would make the mineral exploitation 
of Antarctica, Antarctic islands and Antarctic waters somewhat inconceivable in the 
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present socio-legal climate.64  Meanwhile, some of the attention of the advocates of 
mineral exploitation has shifted to the potential for the exploitation of icebergs that 
seasonally drift from Arctic and Antarctic waters to warmer waters.65 
Although there are a number of similarities between the conceptual treatment of 
Antarctica and other geographical areas of international regulation, such as the deep 
seabed and celestial bodies, there are several reasons why the Antarctic regime under 
the Wellington Convention would not be applicable to celestial bodies.  First, the 
sharing of benefits is required on an equitable basis under the Moon Agreement, 
whereas there is no such sharing requirement under the Wellington Convention.   
Second, the Antarctic system is dominated by its Consultative Parties, whereas any 
international regime created for celestial bodies must involve substantial participation 
by developing States.  Third, the States under the Wellington Convention and the 
Antarctic Treaty mostly operate by consensus, which would be impractical for any 
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decisions in space due to the number of States that would necessarily be involved in 
the relevant decision-making process.66 
5.3  OUTER SPACE AS THE PROVINCE OF ALL MANKIND 
5.3.1  Interpreting Article I of the Outer Space Treaty 
Article I of the Outer Space Treaty states that: 
The exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and 
other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the 
interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or 
scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind. 
… 
The concept of the “province of all mankind” is not defined in the Outer Space 
Treaty, though some commentators have made observations on whether the word 
“mankind” is meant to designate: 
(1)  all States; 
(2)  all States, particularly developing States; 
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(3)  all nations; 
(4)  all living human beings; or 
(5)  all living and future human beings.67 
In an effort to resolve the question over the meaning of “mankind” in Article I of the 
Outer Space Treaty, Gorove had suggested that: 
Mankind as a concept should be distinguished from that of man in 
general.  The former refers to a collective body of people, whereas the 
latter stands for individuals making up that body.  Therefore, the 
rights of mankind should be distinguished, for instance, from the so-
called human rights.  Human rights are rights to which individuals are 
entitled on the basis of their belonging to the human race, whereas 
the rights of mankind relate to the rights of the collective entity and 
would not be analogous with the rights of the individuals making up 
that entity.68 
In other words, the term “mankind” is intended to refer to a collective or commune of 
human beings and not to States.  Williams also noted further that: 
A growing trend of the international community is to take account of 
the positions and interests of medium and non-space powers in the 
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exploitation of these new areas of human activity.  Mankind, in the 
words of René-Jean Dupuy, is an interspatial and intertemporal 
concept and includes not only those who are present but also those 
who are to come.69 
It appears that, according to Gorove and Williams, the term “mankind” is intended to 
designate humanity as a whole, both present and future, rather than States or a 
collection of individuals.  If so, then the term “province of mankind” would denote 
some practical form of collective or communal sovereignty and ownership on the one 
hand or merely an idealistic and declaratory statement intended to negate any possible 
exercise of sovereignty or appropriation on the other.  Some commentators have 
adopted the former position and some of those suggest further that the application of 
the “common heritage of mankind” doctrine to outer space substantiates and clarifies, 
if not replaces, the abstract concept of “province of all mankind”.70  However, it is the 
latter position that appears to have wider acceptance.  After all, the Moon Agreement 
declares only celestial bodies and their natural resources, rather than outer space sensu 
lato, as the common heritage of mankind.71  Further, the limited acceptance of the 
Moon Agreement among the international community further lends support to the 
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position that the “province of mankind” merely negates any exercise of sovereignty or 
appropriation in outer space.72 
In any event, both the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Agreement refers to the 
“exploration and use of the Moon” and other celestial bodies, rather than the Moon 
and the other celestial bodies themselves, as the “province of all mankind”.73  
Accordingly, it may not be appropriate to consider the abstract “province of all 
mankind” concept in the Outer Space Treaty to have any practical implications on the 
status of celestial bodies in international law. 
5.3.2  Correlation with Article II of the Outer Space Treaty 
Suffice to note, however, that Article II of the Outer Space Treaty prohibits any 
national appropriation of outer space, the Moon and other celestial bodies, whether by 
claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.  It was 
noted by Adams that eliminating state sovereignty from outer space and celestial 
bodies have practical implications: 
The fundamental difficulty with eliminating sovereignty, though, is 
that another basis must be provided for performing the general 
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functions that may now be premised on sovereignty.  While states 
apparently recognise international interests in space exploration, they 
must still protect their legitimate interests in defence and safety.   
Without sovereignty, some basis must be established for creating and 
enforcing a regulatory regime.  …  How successful this provision will 
be depends on how effectively the remaining provisions in the treaty 
establish legal relationships, rights and duties to replace some of those 
ordinarily flowing from sovereignty.74 
To that end, a distinction is to be drawn between the characterisation of outer space 
and celestial bodies as res nullius or res extra commercium on the one hand, being the 
traditional characterisations of terrestrial areas not subject to national sovereignty, 
and the new concept of res communis on the other.75  Outer space, including the Moon 
and other celestial bodies, are not subject to assertions of national sovereignty or 
unconditional and unrestricted exploitation or use of outer space but instead are 
“commonly needed by humanity as a condition of survival and are to be used for the 
common benefit” and thus “cannot be subject to private ownership or state 
sovereignty”.76  Gál has taken the concept one step further and suggested that, as space 
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exploration and use are considered the venture of all humankind, outer space and 
celestial bodies must be deemed to be res communis omnium.77 
The concept of res communis or res communis omnium is based on the ideological 
assumption that States have a common interest in the exploration, use and 
exploitation of the global commons and this concept has found expression in the 
provisions of Articles I and II of the Outer Space Treaty.78  The one central problem 
with such an ideology is that each individual enjoys the benefit of exploitation and use 
of the resources to its maximum extent but spreads the cost of such exploitation across 
all users or even all humankind, thus providing a powerful incentive for individual 
over-exploitation.79  As Hardin illustrated: 
Picture a pasture open to all. … The positive component is the benefit 
to the individual peasant from grazing one additional animal.  The 
negative component is the reduction of grass available to feed his 
other animals.  But since the effects of overgrazing are shared by all 
the herdsmen, the negative component is measured by any given 
herdsman is overshadowed by the positive benefit to him of grazing 
an additional animal.  Therein lies the tragedy.  Each man is locked 
into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit — 
in a world that is limited.  Ruin is the destination towards which all 
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men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that 
believes in the freedom of the commons.80 
When this hypothetical common pasture is extrapolated to outer space and celestial 
bodies, States “are free to make maximum use of resources because no outside 
mechanism exists to force their acceptance of external costs, either the cost of resource 
degradation or the cost of resource depletion”.81  With the impact of the New 
International Economic Order (the “NIEO”) in the 1970s, States were soon 
confronted with a methodology devised by the international community, particularly 
the developing world, with the external mechanism needed to enforce the restrictions 
on the exploitation and use by States of the res communis of outer space, particularly in 
the form of the doctrine of the common heritage of mankind. 
5.4  THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 
5.4.1  Origins of the New International Economic Order 
The concept of the NIEO has much of its origins in the early decades of the Cold War, 
though some commentators suggest that the seeds for such a conceptual and 
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philosophical development were planted much earlier.82  In particular, the completion 
of the reconstruction of Europe after the Second World War shifted the focus from 
post-war rebuilding to the economic disparity between the industrialised States and 
the developing world.83  In any event, the focus on reconstruction of Europe has led 
partly to the progressive decolonisation in Africa and Asia and, rightly or wrongly, the 
newly decolonised and independent States had expectations of a more equitable 
international order.84  As Rozental suggested: 
The international order which emerged in the postwar era has been 
unable to satisfy the most basic aspirations of the majority of the 
world’s peoples.  The accession to independence of a multitude of 
nations in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean has created an entirely new 
set of problems and demands affecting the international community, 
especially in the field of economic relations. … This new state of 
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affairs has not benefitted those countries whose needs are the 
greatest.85 
It was observed at the time that the industrialised States continued to dominate the 
global economy, based on almost constant full employment and rapid technological 
evolution.86  In the meantime, the developing States continued to fulfil their old 
colonial roles of supplying the industrialised States with natural resources and raw 
materials, lacking the technology and capital necessary to process or refine such 
materials into more valuable finished products.87  It was also suggested that the 
conduct of transnational corporations amounted to the imposition of an inequitable 
and exploitative terms of trade on developing States.88  As Ellis observed: 
Frequently, these entities employed their economic power and 
monopolistic positions with respect to technology and manufactured 
products, to favourably control the terms of trade and investment in 
bargaining with developing nations.  Likewise, transnational 
corporations often controlled the commodity markets in which the 
developing nations sold their raw materials.  These entities used this 
control to impose inequitable terms of trade and exploit the 
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developing nations.  The developing nations increasingly viewed such 
business practices as coercive and restrictive.89 
Since the pace of decolonisation quickened during the 1950s and 1960s, the 
developing States found themselves increasingly able to control the agenda and voting 
patterns at the United Nations.  This was particularly the case with the General 
Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, as well as some of the international 
economic institutions such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (the “UNCTAD”), which was established on 1964.90 
In the 1970s, the world saw an end to an international economic framework 
dominated by the United States.  Two successive devaluations of the U.S. dollar and 
the ending of its convertibility to gold and the advent of floating currencies coincided 
with the oil crisis of the 1970s when energy prices increased rapidly in the face of 
limited oil supply from the Middle East.91  This unravelling of the international order 
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occurred at the same time as the number of developing States increased dramatically 
with the acquisition of independence by former colonies and the prevailing belief 
throughout the newly-independent developing world that political independence and 
non-alignment with superpowers would be the beginning to the solution of all of their 
other socio-economic problems.92  The reality, of course, was somewhat different, as 
Ferguson observed: 
As some not quite facetiously used to say, everyone thought that 
when the tri-colour flag or the Union Jack came down, and you got a 
new flag in the light of independence, a new seat in the United 
Nations, a new national anthem and a new national airline, then you 
had arrived.  The arrival never came, however.  The lines of trade and 
communications still ran to the old metropol.  Banking lines ran the 
same way.  Even cultural lines ran the same way.  Today in Africa, the 
easiest way to go from the east coast to the west coast is to go to 
Rome, Paris or London and then come back.  I once made a telephone 
call between two capitals 110 miles apart, Abidjan in the Ivory Coast 
and Accra in Ghana, and the call was routed from Abidjan to Paris, 
Paris to London, and London back to Accra.  The Ivory Coast had 
been French and the lines still ran to Paris.  Ghana had been the Gold 
Coast under the English and the lines still ran to London.93 
Ryan had suggested that there were two principal causes of dissatisfaction among 
developing States with the pre-existing international economic order: 
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(1)  the Bretton Woods institutions, namely the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (the “IBRD” or the “World Bank”), 
the International Monetary Fund (the “IMF”) and the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”), were created in the 1940s in a world that 
was vastly different to the world that existed with the global economic 
needs in the 1970s; and 
(2)  the Bretton Woods institutions and the international economic 
framework of the time were devised to serve the interests of the 
industrialised States and satisfaction of the urgent needs of the developing 
States will require a fundamental reshaping of these institutions.94 
With the realisation that the problems of the developing world were fundamentally 
economic and not political in nature, the developing States banded together into the 
so-called Group of 77 and established the Decade for Development to promote a 
greater flow of aid from the developed to the underdeveloped world.95  However, with 
the world gripped in the throes of an oil crisis, it was clear that the resources of the 
developed world were to be devoted to domestic needs.  As the developing world had 
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been persuaded by then that a complete overhaul of the international economic 
structure was required to accelerate their economic development, they began to call 
for the establishment of a new economic order.   The NIEO that they envisaged was a 
new world of which many industrialised States at the time considered to be 
“frightening and unimaginable”.96  As Scali, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the 
United Nations at that time, stated during the debates of the General Assembly 
concerning the adoption of the NIEO principles in resolutions: 
The document in question contains elements supported by all United 
Nations Members.  It also contain elements which many Members … 
— large and small, and on every continent — do not endorse.  The 
United states delegation, like many others, strongly disapproves of 
some provisions in the document and has in no sense endorsed them.  
The document we have produced is a significant political document, 
but it does not represent unanimity of opinion in this Assembly.  To 
label some of these highly controversial conclusions as agreed is not 
only idle; it is self-deceiving.  In this house, the steamroller is not the 
vehicle for solving vital, complex problems.97 
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5.4.2  Sixth Special Session of the General Assembly and the 
Principles of the New International Economic Order 
5.4.2.1  Adoption of the NIEO Resolutions 
By the 1960s, the developing States began realising that the United Nations presented 
itself as an accessible forum for them to challenge the existing international economic 
system that existed at the time.98  The increasing number of developing States in the 
international community meant that the Third World began to enjoy a numerical 
superiority in many of the United Nations organs in which they were able to control 
the agenda and voting on many economic and developmental issues, particularly in 
the General Assembly, the UNCTAD and the Economic and Social Council.99  
Crucially, the United Nations was perceived by the developing world as having a 
quasi-legislative or “limited legislative” role.100  For example, the following resolutions 
were adopted by the General Assembly and other intergovernmental organisations to 
create favourable quasi-legal principles of public international law: 
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•  Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
People of the General Assembly;101 
•  Resolution of the General Assembly on Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources;102 
•  Declaration of a United Nations Development Decade by the General 
Assembly;103 and 
•  the amendment to GATT to create non-reciprocal preferential trade 
benefits for the developing States.104 
In 1974, the Sixth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly was 
convened to address issues in the international economy.105  At this session, two 
resolutions were adopted at the urging of the developing States, namely the 
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (the 
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“NIEO Declaration”),106 and the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a 
New International Economic Order (the “NIEO Programme of Action”).107  The 
principles and concepts contained in the NIEO Declaration and the NIEO 
Programme of Action were later codified and elaborated in the Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States (the “Charter of Economic Rights”) that was also 
adopted by the General Assembly in 1974.108 
5.4.2.2  Objects and Goals of the NIEO Resolutions 
The aims and objects of the NIEO Declaration, the NIEO Programme of Action and 
the Charter of Economic Rights were controversial not because they were new but 
because some, if not all, of them were opposed by the industrialised States.109  The 
industrialised States also feared and opposed the perceived ultimate objective of the 
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NIEO, which was a “revolutionary restructuring of the existing international 
economic status quo” that would create a global “welfare state”.110 
The major objectives to be achieved in the implementation of the NIEO, to which the 
industrialised States oppose as being steps towards the creation of a global “welfare 
state”, include: 
(1)  the reduction of debt by the developing States; 
(2)  recognition of the economic sovereignty of the developing States; 
(3)  increasing the international purchasing power of exports of raw materials 
and commodities; 
(4)  increasing control by the developing States over the degree and nature of 
foreign investment and developmental aid; 
(5)  increasing foreign access to markets of industrialised States; 
(6)  promoting and reducing the costs of technology transfers; and 
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(7)  increasing the power and influence of the developing States in the Bretton 
Woods institutions, namely the World Bank, the IMF and the GATT.111 
The belief was that these goals, if implemented and achieved, would allow for the 
establishment of a new international economic order “based on equity, sovereign 
equality, interdependence, common interest and cooperation among all States”.112  
These goals were embodied in the terms and provisions of the NIEO Declaration, the 
NIEO Programme of Action and the Charter of Economic Rights. 
5.4.2.3  Principles Contained in the NIEO Resolutions 
The NIEO Declaration, the NIEO Programme of Action and the Charter of Economic 
Rights provide for the following principles that have been considered to be the 
principal manifestations of the NIEO: 
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(1)  the right of every State to sovereignty over its domestic economy and their 
natural resources;113 
(2)  the right of all States to “restitution and full compensation” for past 
exploitation of their territory and resources;114 
(3)  the right to increase domestic controls over foreign investment, including 
the activities of multinational corporations;115 
(4)  increased influence and decision-making power in the World Bank and 
the IMF;116 
(5)  reducing the cost and procedural difficulties in technology transfers from 
industrialised States to developing States;117 
(6)  non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory preferences in trade and tariffs;118 
(7)  increased flow of developmental aid;119 
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(8)  the maintenance of the international purchasing power of exports of raw 
materials and commodities;120 
(9)  the right to nationalise and expropriate foreign interests in accordance 
with the domestic law of the developing State;121 and 
(10)  the “seabed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction, as well as the resources of the area are the common 
heritage of mankind”.122 
Unlike the various General Assembly resolutions and declarations dealing with other 
areas of international law, such as those concerning space activities, the provisions of 
the NIEO Declaration, the NIEO Programme of Action or the Charter of Economic 
Rights are neither codifications of existing principles of customary international law 
nor the elaborations or specific applications of existing treaty provisions or customary 
provisions.  Similar to the 1963 Declaration on Legal Principles Governing the 
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,123 which preceded the 
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1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies,124 it is unlikely 
that the NIEO Declaration, the NIEO Programme of Action and the Charter of 
Economic Rights have any legally binding effect without their further implementation 
by way of an international treaty.125  As White had observed: 
While most States realise that the Charter [of Economic Rights] and 
the related U.N. documents and conventions have no legally binding 
weight, they nevertheless have had an important impact on the 
international economic community.  No developed country, of 
course, has rushed to transfer resources to an underdeveloped 
neighbour.  Rather, the virtue of these instruments lies in the fact that 
they have brought both the plight and the power of the developing 
countries to the attention of the Western industrial States.  The 
developed States now realise that the frustration which the Third 
World countries have faced is capable of creating a serious rift 
between developed and developing nations in the international 
economic community.126 
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However, some of the principles of the NIEO have found limited expression in 
various human rights instruments, particularly in relation to the provision of 
economic and social rights.127  Nevertheless, the absence of a binding treaty has been a 
continuing criticism of the ability of international law to address the revolutionary 
changes proposed within the NIEO context.128 
Other than the concept of the common heritage of mankind, the principles of the New 
International Economic Order have achieved remarkable success in their application 
and implementation in three particular areas of the regulation of the global economy.  
First, various instruments implementing preferential treatment for developing States 
in various trade and tariff arrangements had been adopted.  In the GATT, for 
example, decisions made on 25 June 1971 and 28 November 1979 introduced a 
generalised system of preferences to accord preferential tariff treatment to developing 
States without the usual application of the most favoured nation principle to such 
preferences.129  The most expansive trade agreement that has been perceived to 
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implement most of the elements of the NIEO has been the trade treaties between 
Europe and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, which contained 
provisions dealing with, inter alia, trade preferences, stabilisation of purchasing power 
for mineral and commodity exports and developmental aid.130 
Second, the voting quotas of the developing States in the World Bank and the IMF 
have increased steadily since the adoption of the NIEO instruments.131  This is due in 
part to the regular reviews of quotas and in another part to the pressure brought upon 
the industrialised States by the developing States, most notably in the IMF, which was 
seen correctly by those States to have a regulatory function as well as a financial one.132 
Third, the actions by some developing States in nationalising or expropriating public 
and private commercial interests and assets of industrialised States, have been met 
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with opposition and hostility from industrialised States.  The developing States have 
sought to justify their actions, particularly those assets relating to mining interests, as 
the Charter of Economic Rights provided for developing States with permanent 
sovereignty over their natural resources and the right to expropriate and nationalise 
foreign assets and interests in accordance with domestic law.133  The actions of these 
developing States, mostly notably of Iran and Libya, have led to a substantial number 
of international arbitrations to determine the liability and quantum of compensation 
that ought to be paid for the expropriated assets and business interests.134  Whether 
the actions of the developing States in expropriating foreign interests in mineral 
resources, and the subsequent political and legal consequences that followed, amount 
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to either a vindication or repudiation of the NIEO principles remain a matter of 
conjecture for the international community.135 
The most controversial of the principles of the NIEO and the issue that has the most 
long-term impact on international relations and the international political economy is 
the designation of the seabed and its mineral resources to be the common heritage of 
mankind.  The implementation of this concept in the negotiations over the 
Convention on the Law of the Sea has led to deadlocks during both the negotiations 
and the implementation of the treaty over a number of decades.136  Further, the 
extension of the same concept to celestial bodies and their mineral resources has led to 
a similar deadlock in the negotiations and the acceptance of the Moon Agreement. 
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5.5  ORIGINS OF THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND CONCEPT IN 
THE CONTEXT OF THE DEEP SEABED 
5.5.1  The Old Law of the High Seas 
The historical development of the law relating to the high seas can be described as a 
series of combats between those States that favoured closed seas and those that 
favoured the freedom of the seas.137  With the dominance of the maritime powers by 
the Seventeenth Century, the freedom of the seas had emerged victorious over the 
short-lived claims of Britain over the other waters surrounding the British Isles after 
the accession of James I,138 and even the partition of the oceans along with the non-
Christian lands of the world between Spain and Portugal by Pope Julius II under the 
Papal Bull Ea quae of 1506 that confirmed the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494.139  The 
high seas has long been recognised to be res extra commercium and, as such, are free 
from the sovereignty and appropriation of individual States, but has indeed been 
regarded since Roman times as omnium communia.140 
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Historically, the high seas were considered to be held on international “public trust”, 
in the sense that private property rights were excluded and vested trusteeship rights 
and duties in the international community to ensure public access and public 
benefit.141  The concept of the high seas being held on public trust can trace its origins 
to Roman law, as Marcianus had declared that the seas and its fishes to be “communis 
omnium naturali jure”.142  Similarly, Domitius Ulpianus had written as early as the 
Second Century and later adopted by Justinian I: 
Naturali iure communia sunt omnium haec: aer et aqua profluens et 
mare et per hoc litoria maris.  Nemo igitur ad litus maris accedere 
prohibetur, dum tamen villis et monumenti et aedificiis abstineat, 
quia non sunt iuris gentium, sicut est mare.143 
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In 1169, Pope Alexander III confirmed to the Consul of Genoa that freedom was to 
reign on the seas.144  When Spain claimed a monopoly of commerce in the West Indies 
and protested an expedition by Sir Francis Drake, on both occasions Elizabeth I of 
England asserted the freedom of the seas in response.145  Similarly, Russia had asserted 
the same principle in 1587 in its diplomatic correspondence with England.146  Grotius, 
in his famous work Mare Liberum published in 1609, opined that States cannot 
unilaterally or collectively attain sovereignty or title to the high seas by occupation or 
otherwise because they are res communis or res extra commercium.147  Butler observed 
that, since Grotius: 
Naval power and commercial shipping interests in the nineteenth 
century ensured European and American support for, indeed 
insistence upon, the principle of the freedom of the seas.  In the 
twentieth century the freedom of the seas has come to be accepted as 
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a “general”, “basic” or “fundamental” principle of international law: 
some are even prepared to treat it as jus cogens.148  
The concept of the freedom of the seas is negative or prohibitive in nature, in the 
sense that it is a restrictive doctrine that is asserted to counter attempts to interfere in 
the exercise of that freedom.  As such, the exercise of such a freedom is nevertheless 
subject to limits that apply to the extent that they prevent a State from using the high 
seas in a manner that interfere with or even deny the use of the high seas by another 
State.  As Gidel observed: 
La liberté de la haute mer, essentiellement négative, ne peut pas 
cependant ne pas comporter des conséquences positives.  Dirigée 
contre l’exclusivité d’usage elle se résout nécessairement en une idée 
d’égalité d’usage. … Tous les pavillons maritimes ont un droit égal à 
tirer de la haute mer les diverses utilités qu’elle peut comporter.  Mais 
l’idée d’égalité d’usage ne vient qu’en second lieu.  L’idée essentielle 
contenue dans le principe de liberté de la haute mer est l’idée 
d’interdiction d’interférence de tout pavillon dans la navigation en 
temps de paix de tout autre pavillon.149 
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The Convention on the Law of the Sea embodies this conflict between the guarantee 
of the freedom of the high seas and the prevention of interference with the exercise of 
that freedom by others.150  While all States have the freedoms to navigation, over 
flight, lay undersea cables and pipelines, construction of artificial islands, fishing and 
scientific research, these freedoms must be exercised “with due regard for the interests 
of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas.151 
5.5.2  The Old Law of the Deep Seabed 
The deep seabed, as with the high seas, is not subject to sovereignty or appropriation 
by States and it has been suggested that the same freedom of the high seas apply to the 
deep seabed beneath the high seas.152  The 1958 Convention on the High Seas 
provided for freedom of the high seas and that States may lay submarine cables and 
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pipelines on the deep seabed.153  However, as Oda stated the deep seabed and the high 
seas must be considered separately in terms of the legal principles applicable to them: 
It is quite defensible to maintain that the submarine areas have always 
been tacitly regarded as an international realm which can never be 
possessed by any State.  The author does not believe that the 
submarine areas, merely by reason of their being beneath the 
superjacent waters, thereby become a part of them.154 
Although the deep seabed is not subject to sovereignty or appropriation by any State, 
the use of resources from the deep seabed is a different matter.  The use of certain 
sedentary fisheries in the seabed, such as pearl, oyster and sponge fisheries, has been 
allowed to States on the basis of historical title or prescription.155  To some extent, this 
is no different to the regulation of the use of fisheries in the high seas.156 As early as 
1857, it was asserted in Great Britain that the right to own and operate mines on the 
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deep seabed beyond the low tide mark and title to the mineral resources vested in the 
Crown.157  For example, Oda stated a somewhat balanced view that: 
The principle of non-appropriation of the deep ocean floor does not 
lead us to conclude that the exploration or the exploitation of this 
area should be suspended.  On the contrary, the most effect 
exploitation of the resources should be encouraged and the incentives 
for this should not be removed.  Free access to the resources of the 
deep ocean floor should be the right of all nations, however, not 
merely the right of those possessing advanced technologies.158 
In the early debates on the regulation of the exploitation of resources of the deep 
seabed, there were those of one school who advocated the idea of international control 
of deep seabed resources, exercised by a specialised agency of the United Nations.159  
There were those of another school who were of the view that international regulation 
was not necessary until actual exploitation began and conflicts of interests between 
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States arose and, until then, the deep seabed was free to all for use and exploitation.160  
For example, Ely went so far as to suggest that: 
In this writer’s opinion, the most constructive accomplishment that 
the Law of the Sea conference could present to the mineral consumers 
of the world would be to forever refrain from meeting again, now or 
hereafter, either in this world or the next.161 
Although the exploitation of mineral resources from the deep seabed remained a 
distant possibility at the time, the international community began turning their minds 
to the idea of international regulation for such activities under the auspices of the 
United Nations or new specialised agencies.162  Unfortunately, progress on such a 
multilateral development was arrested by the coincidental timing of such an effort 
with the movement to establish and implement the NIEO and designate the deep 
seabed as the common heritage of mankind, although the proposal for such a 
designation actually originated from Malta. 
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5.5.3  Proposal from Malta that “Detonated the Time Bomb” 
On 17 August 1967, the Maltese Ambassador to the United Nations proposed to the 
General Assembly a “Declaration and Treaty concerning the reservation exclusively 
for peaceful purposes of the seabed and ocean floor underlying the seas beyond the 
limits of present national jurisdiction and the use of their resources in the interests of 
mankind”, described by one commentator as having “detonated the time bomb”.163  At 
the time, a significant number of States, some being industrialised States and some 
being developing States, were receptive of the proposal.164  Most of the industrialised 
States preferred a much more cautious approach to the proposal, with the Soviet 
Union unwilling to agree to anything beyond a study of present regulatory activities 
and the United States adopting an attitude of vehement opposition.165  Most of the 
opposition stemmed from his idea that of making the deep seabed and the ocean floor 
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a common heritage of mankind and to draft a multilateral treaty containing the 
following legal principles: 
(1)  the seabed and the ocean floor are not subject to national appropriation in 
any manner whatsoever and are reserved for peaceful purposes;166 
(2)  use of the seabed and the ocean floor and their economic exploitation are 
to be undertaken with the aim of “safeguarding the interests of mankind”; 
(3)  the “net financial benefits derived from the use and exploitation of the 
seabed and the ocean floor shall be used primarily to promote the 
development of poor countries”; and 
(4)  the creation of an international agency to assume jurisdiction over the 
seabed and the ocean floor “as trustee for all countries” and to regulate all 
activities involving their use and economic exploitation.167 
The United States reacted to the Maltese proposal rapidly, with a series of over twenty 
resolutions by the U.S. Congress aimed at deterring any progress on the proposal by 
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the United States or the international community and refusing to vest jurisdiction and 
control over the deep seabed and the ocean floor with the United Nations.168  The 
United States was of the view that it has a right of access to seabed minerals and this 
right was afforded it by customary international law as part of the freedom of the high 
seas, a position later legislated into U.S. domestic law.169  When reflecting on this 
opposition on the part of the industrialised States, particularly the United States, 
Pardo wrote that: 
I have a feeling that many may consider me a prophet of doom and 
gloom and somewhat of a utopian because I have predicted that the 
present uncertain status of the seabed may lead to a competitive 
scramble by a few countries to appropriate for national purposes the 
land under the world’s seas and oceans; that this would cause an 
escalation of the arms race, increased political tensions and 
progressive impairment of the marine environment as a whole; and 
that the establishment of an effective international regime for the 
seabed and ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction is the only way to 
avoid the incalculable dangers to all of us that appear to me inevitable 
if the present situation is allowed to continue much longer.170 
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It is the practical application of the concept of the common heritage of mankind to 
the deep seabed and the regulation of its use and economic exploitation by an 
international organisation with exclusive jurisdiction that became the focus of the 
debate in the negotiations over the seabed issues and, for that matter, the entire 
Convention on the Law of the Sea negotiations during the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS III”).  The developing States, by then 
organised together as the Group of 77, were determined that the mineral resources of 
the deep seabed were to be administered by a United Nations authority and exploited 
by an “Enterprise” controlled by the authority with the proceeds of exploitation going 
to an international fund for distribution primarily to the developing States.171  For the 
industrialised States, the argument was that commercial exploitation of resources 
would take place only if sufficient incentives are given to the States with the 
technological capability and the financial capacity to take on such a venture, 
particularly the European States, Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States.172  
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This formed the impasse that was to continue throughout the negotiations in 
UNCLOS over the terms of the Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
5.5.4  Negotiating History on the Deep Seabed 
5.5.4.1  Early Negotiations 
During the course of UNCLOS III, a combination of the improved scientific 
understanding and new economic prospects had initiated a set of novel issues to the 
governance of the ocean commons, particularly the deep seabed.173  In particular, this 
included the discovery of rich mineral deposits on the deep seabed in the form of 
polymetallic or manganese nodules, consisting primarily of nickel, copper, manganese 
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and cobalt, which are found on the floor of all oceans.174  This is in addition to gold, 
platinum, titanium, chromium, tin, diamonds and other rare minerals that can be 
found as placer deposits in the deep seabed.175  This coincided with the increasing 
demands of the developing States for the NIEO and the Maltese proposal to have the 
deep seabed and the ocean floor designated the common heritage of mankind and for 
their use and exploitation to be regulated by an international agency.176  The natural 
result of these diametrically opposed positions was deadlock. 
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Ironically, it was the United States that first presented a “Draft United Nations 
Convention on the International Seabed Area” in 1970.177  The negotiations over the 
new Convention on the Law of the Sea, being the first working session of UNCLOS 
III, took place in Caracas, Venezuela, in 1974.178  By the end of that session, the 
industrialised States had already won a significant victory by attaining support for a 
200-mile exclusive economic zone that would give the coastal States all of the 
resources found within 200 miles of their coasts, thus capturing most of the resource 
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wealth in the oceans for the wealthy coastal States.179  Danzig observed that, instead of 
compelling the industrialised States to limit their exclusive economic zones or to share 
the resources contained in them, as the United States had offered to do: 
The developing countries have joined a stampede to divide the best 
part of the ocean treasure colonial style. … This means that roughly 
ninety percent of the oil lying in the seabed would fall under national, 
as distinguished from international, jurisdiction and control. … It is 
one of the greatest give-aways in history. … I can attribute the stupid 
position adopted by so many of the developing countries only to: (a) 
the developing countries’ distrust of anything proposed by an 
imperial power; … (b) a conflict of interest among the developing 
states that hasn’t come out into the open.180 
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This outcome is also at variance with the position that the developing States had 
adopted or thought to have adopted prior to the convening of UNCLOS III in 1974.181  
Despite this concession, the industrialised States continued their opposition to the 
internationalisation of the deep seabed and its mineral resources. 
5.5.4.2  Unilateral Approaches 
By the time the Informal Composite Negotiating Text was produced in 1977, it was 
clear that no compromise over the issue of the treatment of the deep seabed was 
within sight.182  A significant number of commentators was already writing off the 
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prospect of reaching a compromise agreement over the terms of the Informal 
Composite Negotiating Text.183  In order to break the impasse, the United States 
began to move towards a unilateral approach as U.S. Ambassador Elliot Richardson 
sought passage of legislation through the U.S. Congress that would enable 
authorisation of private mining of the deep seabed.184  After a few years of 
deliberations, Congress in 1980 duly enacted the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources 
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Act.185  This was followed by similar legislation enacted by other industrialised States, 
including France, Germany and the United Kingdom.186  In justification for the 
unilateral approach, Ambassador Richardson had argued that: 
Far from jeopardising the Conference, sea-bed mining legislation 
should facilitate the early conclusion of a general acceptable treaty by 
dispelling any impression that the Governments of the countries 
preparing to engage in such mining could  be induced to acquiesce in 
                                                           
 
185 See Elliot L. Richardson, Law in the Making: A Universal Regime for Deep Seabed Mining? (1981) 8 J. 
LEGIS. 199; Dana B. Ott, An Analysis of Deep Seabed Mining Legislation (1978) 10 NAT. RES. LAWYER 
591; David W. Proudfoot, Guarding the Treasures of the Deep: The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral 
Resources Act (1973) 10 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 596; Dennis W. Arrow, The Proposed Regime for the 
Unilateral Exploitation of Deep Seabed Mineral Resources by the United States (1980) 21 HARV. INT’L. 
L. J. 337; J. P. Lawless, Implementation of the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, paper 
presented at the Offshore Technology Conference, 3-6 May 1982, in Houston, Texas, United States 
of America; Francis M. Auburn, The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Bill (1972) 9 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 491; Betsy Cox and Frank Brogan, Law of the Sea – Proposed Deep Seabed Hard Mineral 
Resources Act (1979) 9 GA. J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 641; Harry M. Collins, Deep Seabed Hard Mineral 
Resources Act — Matrix for United States Deep Seabed Mining (1981) 13 NAT. RES. LAWYER 571; 
Thomas M. Franck and Evan R. Chesler, An International Regime for the Seabed Beyond National 
Jurisdiction (1975) 13 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 579; and Porter Hoagland III, The Conservation and 
Disposal of Ocean Hard Minerals: A Comparison of Ocean Mining Codes in the United States (1988) 28 
NAT. RES. J. 451. 
186 Deep Sea Mining Act 1981 (U.K.); Law on the Exploration and Exploitation of Mineral Resources of the 
Deep Seabed (81-1135) (France); and Act of Interim Regulation of Deep Seabed Mining 1981 (Federal 
Republic of Germany).  See James C. F. Wang, HANDBOOK ON OCEAN POLITICS & LAW (1992) at 
284-286; David D. Caron, Municipal Legislation for Exploitation of the Deep Seabed (1980) 8 OCEAN 
DEV. & INT’L. L. J. 259; Francisco Orrego-Vicuña, National Laws on Seabed Exploitation: Problems of 
International Law (1981) 13 LAWYER AM. 139; Mark S. Bergman, The Regulation of Seabed Mining 
under the Reciprocating States Regime (1981) 30 AM. U. L. REV. 477; Paul N. McCloskey, Jr., Domestic 
Legislation and the Law of the Sea Conference (1979) 6 SYRACUSE J. INT’L. L. & COM. 225; Richard 
Todd Luoma, A Comparative Study of National Legislation Concerning the Deep Sea Mining of 
Manganese Nodules (1983) 14 J. MARIT. L. & COM. 243; and Barry Hart Dubner, The Caspian: Is it a 
Lake, a Sea or an Ocean and Does it Matter?  The Danger of Utilising Unilateral Approaches to 
Resolving Regional / International Issues (2000) 18 DICK. J. INT’L. L. 253. Exploitation Rights: Concepts of “Province of Mankind” and “Common Heritage of Mankind” 
480  |  Page     
an otherwise unacceptable treaty as the only means of obtaining the 
minerals of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction.187 
Ambassador Satya Nandan of Fiji, who at the time was chairman of the Group of 77, 
retorted that such action on the part of the United States amounted to an exercise of 
sovereignty in violation of international law: 
… unilateral legislation relating to sea-bed resources beyond national 
jurisdiction has no validity in international law, and activities 
conducted thereunder had no legal status. … There could be no 
substitute for a universally agreed treaty for a rational and equitable 
development of the resources of the deep sea-bed area in the interests 
of the world community as a whole.  Over-all agreement should not 
be jeopardised through hasty and short-sighted actions.188 
Rather than breaking the deadlock, it is apparent that the opposite result was 
achieved, as the unilateral act on the part of the United States and other industrialised 
                                                           
 
187 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/BUR/SR.41 (1978) at 8-9.  See also David Lawrence Treat, The United 
States’ Claims of Customary Legal Rights under the Law of the Sea Convention (1984) 41 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 253; Suzette D. Stenersen, Mining the Seabed: International v. National Control (1993) 4 
U.S.A.F.A. J. LEG. STUD. 103; Jack N. Barkenbus, Seabed Negotiations: The Failure of United States 
Policy (1977) 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 623; and Elliot L. Richardson, The United States Posture Toward 
the Law of the Sea Convention: Awkward but not Irreparable (1983) 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 505. 
188 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/BUR/SR.41 (1978) at 7-8. Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
  Page |  481 
States only increased intransigence of the developing States.189  The developing States 
considered such unilateral actions to be in breach of existing resolutions of the 
General Assembly.190  Accordingly, the unilateral approach did no more than to 
contribute towards entrenching the impasse between the industrialised States and 
developing States in UNCLOS III.   
5.5.4.3  Proposal for a Common Heritage Fund 
Meanwhile, the developing States attempted to break the impasse with an approach, 
opposite to the unilateral approach of the industrialised States in ideology and 
practice.  On 19 May 1978, Nepal introduced a proposal to establish a Common 
Heritage Fund during the Seventh Session of UNCLOS III in Geneva, Switzerland.191  
In an attempt to reverse the advantage obtained by the coastal States in the agreement 
over the exclusive economic zones, the proposal called for the substantial income from 
the use and resource exploitation of both the deep seabed and the exclusive economic 
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zones to be used  for developmental aid, combat marine pollution and to finance the 
United Nations and its peacekeeping operations.192  It was argued by Nepal that the 
proposal is an attempt to reconcile the competing common heritage of mankind and 
the exclusive economic zone concepts in UNCLOS III: 
The concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind has been damaged 
by those who contend that there is a necessary incompatibility 
between the idea of the Common Heritage and the idea of the 
economic zone.  We believe that both ideas are essential and we 
believe that they are necessarily intermixed, i.e. the economic zone 
can and should make a substantial contribution to the 
implementation of the concept of the Common Heritage.193 
However, the timing of the proposal and its requirement that contributions be made 
by coastal States from income generated from their exclusive economic zones ensured 
that the proposal was bound for failure.194  Norway, for example, made clear the day 
after the proposal was made that there could be no sharing of any mineral revenues 
from the exclusive economic zones and access for landlocked and other States with 
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special geographic characteristics must be restricted to living resources only.195  In any 
event, there could not have been any realistic prospects of acceptance and success 
when the proposal calls for an increase in international regulation and financial 
contributions towards developing States when the industrialised States, particularly 
the United States, were seeking to reduce or even eliminate them.  Such a proposal 
probably only added to the element of fear held by the industrialised States that these 
were steps towards the creation of a global welfare state.  
5.5.4.4  Conclusion of UNCLOS III 
The negotiations in UNCLOS III had operated on the basis of consensus for the 
majority of its time, as it was believed that a comprehensive legal framework for the 
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law of the sea required an absence of dissent during its negotiations for it to be 
acceptable and effective in practice.196  However, the rules of procedure allowed for 
formal voting in UNCLOS III after the failure of all attempts to achieve consensus.197  
At the final negotiating session on 23 April 1982, the United States called for a vote 
and the Convention on the Law of the Sea was adopted by 130 votes in favour with 4 
votes against and 17 abstentions.198  Of the four States that voted against its adoption, 
only the United States expressed firm objections to the terms of the provisions in Part 
XI of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, as Israel cast its negative vote due to the 
standing given to the Palestine Liberation Organisation under the Convention while 
Turkey and Venezuela voted against the Convention due to maritime delimitation 
disputes with neighbouring States.199  However, the most telling statement was in the 
States that abstained, namely Belgium, Bulgaria, Belarus, Czechoslovakia, East 
Germany, West Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Mongolia, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Spain, the Soviet Union, Thailand, Ukraine and the United Kingdom, as most 
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of them did so because they had the same objections as those of the United States.  
Rosenne noted that: 
This includes all the industrialised States of both Western and 
Eastern Europe (except Canada, France and Japan), three of the 
permanent members of the Security Council, and all (except the three 
mentioned) of the leading maritime powers, including those with the 
longest coastline, the USSR (as it then was) and the United States of 
America. … This boded ill for a major international convention 
intended to be universal in time and in space.200 
The Convention on the Law of the Sea was opened for signature on 10 December 
1982.201  From the time it was opened for signature in 1982 to its eventual entry into 
force in 1994, none of the States that abstained or voted against it had reversed their 
position.  Further, no industrialised States, even those that voted in favour of the 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, proceeded to sign and ratify it, with the exception 
of Cyprus, Malta and Iceland, by the time the 60th instrument of ratification was 
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deposited on 16 November 1993.202  It is noteworthy that China, as one of the largest 
consumers of mineral resources in the world and though it usually professes itself to be 
a developing State, had not ratified the Convention on the Law of the Sea at the time 
of its entry into force.203  This was the case even though it had been warmly embraced 
by a significant number of African and Latin American States.204  In any event, the 
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deposit of the 60th instrument of ratification precipitated the Convention on the Law 
of the Sea entering into force twelve months later, on 16 November 1994.205 
5.6  PART XI OF THE CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA AND THE 
EFFECTS OF THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND 
5.6.1  Overview and the Features of Part XI 
The concept of the common heritage of mankind concept was first enunciated in 
relation to outer space.  However, within months of the concept being discussed in the 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space as being applicable to the outer space, 
the Moon and celestial bodies in 1967, Malta advocated the acceptance on the part of 
the international community that the high seas and the deep seabed and its mineral 
resources were also the common heritage of mankind.206  The concept of the common 
heritage of mankind was ultimately incorporated into the Declaration of Principles by 
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the United Nations General Assembly in 1970,207 and was formalised into the 
Convention on the Law of the Sea.208  To date, the Convention on the Law of the Sea 
represents the most elaborated application of the concept of the common heritage of 
mankind in any instrument of international law.209 
Under Part XI of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, the deep seabed and its 
mineral resources are deemed to be the common heritage of mankind and can only be 
exploited in accordance with the terms of Part XI of the Convention on the Law of the 
Sea.210  The ideological conflict between the industrialised States and developing 
States, as well as the politics of the Cold War, meant that a balancing act was tried and 
failed between the call for the implementation of the NIEO and the need to maintain 
sufficient economic incentives for developed States who held the necessary capital and 
                                                           
 
207 General Assembly Resolution 2749 (XXV).  See discussion in René-Jean Dupuy, The Notion of the 
Common Heritage of Mankind Applied to the Seabed (1983) 18 ANN. AIR & SP. L. 347; Paul Lawrence 
Saffo, The Common Heritage of Mankind: Has the General Assembly Created a Law to Govern Seabed 
Mining? (1979) 53 TUL. L. REV. 492; L. Frederick E. Goldie, A Note on Some Diverse Meanings of “The 
Common Heritage of Mankind” (1983) 10 SYRACUSE J. INT’L. L. & COM. 69; Martin A. Harry, The 
Deep Seabed: The Common Heritage of Mankind or Arena for Unilateral Exploitation? (1992) 40 
NAVAL L. REV. 207; Steven Kotz, “The Common Heritage of Mankind”: Resource Management of the 
International Seabed (1978) 6 ECOLOGY L. Q. 65; Alexandre Kiss, Conserving the Common Heritage of 
Mankind (1990) 59 REV. JUR. U. P. R. 773; Douglas M. Johnston, The New Equity in the Law of the 
Sea (1976) 31 INT’L. J. 79. 
208 Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 136.  See discussion in Jasentuliyana (1999), supra note 
206, at 139-140; and Jasentuliyana (1995), supra note 206, at 105-106. 
209 See Stephen Vasciannie, Part XI of the Law of the Sea Convention and Third States: Some General 
Observations (1989) 48 CAM. L. J. 85; Shabtai Rosenne, The United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, 1982: The Application of Part XI: An Element of Background (1995) 29 ISR. L. REV. 491; and 
Bernard H. Oxman, The High Seas and the International Seabed Area (1989) 10 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 
526. 
210 Convention on the Law of the Sea, Articles 136 and 137. Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
  Page |  489 
technology to develop seabed resources.211  Further, parallel negotiations at the Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and in the Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space created a situation in which negotiations in one field 
often influenced the position of States on corresponding issues in the other, thus 
creating a high degree of inertia for any compromise to be offered by any State in 
either set of negotiations.212 
The main features of Part XI of the Convention on the Law of the Sea are: 
(1)  the deep seabed and its resources are declared the common heritage of 
mankind and no State or any entity can acquire rights to the mineral 
resources except pursuant to the Convention on the Law of the Sea;213 
(2)  the International Seabed Authority (the “ISA”) is empowered to licence 
mining operations and to undertake them for itself through the 
“Enterprise” and licence applicants are required to identify two areas of 
estimated equal value, one for the applicant and the other for the 
Enterprise or to developing States;214 
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(3)  determination of applications is to be done by a 36-member Council of 
the ISA, elected through a complex mechanism;215 
(4)  the Enterprise is to be initially funded by a complex financing system;216 
(5)  licensees are required to transfer mining technologies to the Enterprise on 
a compulsory basis;217 
(6)  production is controlled under an elaborate system to protect land-based 
miners so that seabed miners;218 and 
(7)  the equitable sharing of financial and other economic benefits derived 
from the exploitation of mineral resources in the deep seabed, as well as 
payments into the compensation fund.219 
The industrialised States, such as the United States, were particularly antagonistic to 
the final formulation to Part XI of the Convention on the Law of the Sea as it is now 
formulated.  Many industrialised States argued that Part XI excessively favoured the 
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special interests of developing States and land-based mineral exporters and, further, it 
imposed undue regulations and taxes, which were considered to be inconsistent with 
the laissez-faire philosophy of international trade.220  The unilateral approaches of the 
industrialised States in rejecting the Convention on the Law of the Sea and opting 
instead to enact domestic legislation for the authorisation of private mining activities 
in the deep seabed meant that the Convention on the Law of the Sea never achieved 
the universality that it had set out to attain. 
It was apparent that there were at least six areas of concern for the industrialised 
States in the manifestation of the common heritage of mankind concept for the deep 
seabed that prevented their acceptance of the Convention on the Law of the Sea.  
These areas of concern are: 
(1)  costs of the proposed ISA on its Member States as well as its decision-
making process; 
(2)  the nature and operations of the “Enterprise”; 
(3)  compulsory transfer of technology; 
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(4)  limitations on production; 
(5)  the financial terms of contracts; and 
(6)  the compensation fund. 
It is noteworthy, however, that it is not only the industrialised States that have 
expressed concern or objection to the provisions of the Convention on the Law of the 
Sea in relation to the deep seabed.  Significant concern has also been expressed by the 
developing States and those in favour of international regulation and other elements 
of the common heritage of mankind doctrine.  Pardo, for instance, wrote that: 
… the Seabed Authority to be established under the Convention, 
while possessing very detailed rulemaking authority, is substantially 
so weak as to be unlikely to be viable and structurally so complex as to 
be unworkable. … The composition and decision-making procedures 
in the key organ of the future Authority — the Council — are so 
complex as to make timely and effective decisions on important 
matters very difficult.  Unrealistic production limitations, heavy 
bureaucratic controls, substantial fees, production charges and other 
payments payable by those who have obtained production 
authorisations further weaken the Authority.221 
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5.6.2  Decision-Making in the International Seabed Authority 
While the Assembly of the ISA has competence in deciding the administrative issues, 
policies and operations of the ISA, it is the Council that has direct supervisory control 
over the development of deep seabed resources.222  It is the Council and not the 
Assembly that has the power to make final decisions for the ISA on applications for 
mineral resource development in the deep seabed, as well as decisions concerning 
rules, regulations and procedures of the ISA, the election of its Secretary-General, the 
production limits to be imposed as well as the annual budget of the ISA.223 
While all Member States of the Convention on the Law of the Sea are members of the 
Assembly of the ISA, only 36 Member States would be represented on the Council.224  
These States are supposed to represent the largest mineral consumer States, the deep 
seabed mining States, the major mineral exporting States, special interest States and 
the various geographical regional groupings used in the practice of the United 
Nations.225  The rules regarding the composition of the Council have been criticised as 
being too complex and, in any event, does not change the fact that developing States 
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would have a majority on the Council.226  Specifically, however, the Convention on the 
Law of the Sea requires the States of the socialist bloc, as they then were, be 
represented in both groups of the consumer and producer States and that the “largest 
consumer” is to be represented in the consumer group of States, thus guaranteeing a 
seat on the Council for the United States if it ratified the Convention on the Law of 
the Sea.227  In fact, the United States and other developed States would qualify as the 
largest consumers, producers and miners of deep seabed resources and, as such, 
significant representation of their interests in the Council of the ISA is almost 
guaranteed, particularly if the United States became a Member State.228  Further, as 
the adoption of rules, regulations and procedures relating to the equitable sharing of 
the benefits derived from mineral exploitation activities in the deep seabed are to be 
adopted by consensus, the United States and other industrialised States are further 
assured by the terms of the Convention on the Law of the Sea that such decisions 
cannot be made in a manner that does not have their agreement and acceptance. 
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5.6.3  The Enterprise 
The Convention on the Law of the Sea establishes the ISA’s own international 
business venture called the “Enterprise”.  Administered by a Governing Board and a 
Director-General, the Enterprise is vested with a wide range of powers to engage in 
mineral resource development of the deep seabed in direct competition with any 
commercial venture that has been granted a licence by the ISA.229  The start-up costs 
of the Enterprise were to be met by loans, grants and other subsidies, including limited 
direct contributions from the Member States and some access to the funds of the ISA.  
The profits derived from the operations of the Enterprise are to be used to contribute 
to the budget of the ISA as well as for sharing with the international community, with 
particular attention to the developing States.230 
The idea that the international regulator was to go into business in competition with 
the entities that it was to regulate has caused concern to the industrialised States, 
fearing that this conflict of interest would led to the Authority favouring the needs of 
the Enterprise over that of any commercial venture.231  Further, the ISA may be 
tempted to adopt rules and regulations that favour the operations of the Enterprise at 
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the expense of commercial ventures.232  Not surprisingly, these concerns have made 
the Enterprise one of the major stumbling blocks to the acceptance of the Convention 
on the Law of the Sea by the industrialised States. 
5.6.4  Compulsory Transfer of Technology 
One of the principal tenets of the NIEO is the transfer of relevant technology from the 
industrialised States to the developing States.  The Convention on the Law of the Sea 
provides for transfer of technology that would enable the Enterprise to exploit mineral 
resources on the deep seabed and to facilitate the redressing of the economic 
imbalance between North and South.  This takes place at two levels.  
First, the Convention on the Law of the Sea requires the transfer of technology to the 
ISA, not merely as a quid pro quo for applying for a licence for the exploitation of 
mineral resources in the deep seabed.233  In other words, an industrialised State “with 
no aspirations to mine the seabed might still incur an obligation to transfer technology 
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to the Enterprise and to other parties”.234  Second, every commercial venture for deep 
seabed mining is required to make available to the Enterprise the technology that it 
used to carry out its activities under its contract with the ISA.235  The Convention on 
the Law of the Sea makes some ineffective attempt at compensating the proprietor of 
the technology, as Gamble noted: 
Far more details are contained in Annex III; many of these attempt to 
provide fair payment for the technology transferred.  Yet it remains 
evident that such provisions would cause industry representatives to 
cringe.  They would respond that such technology is invaluable.  If in 
the process they exaggerate the cost, then the Enterprise could evoke 
compulsory settlement of the dispute in accordance with Part XI.236 
5.6.5  Limitations on Production 
Article 151 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea prescribes a mechanism for 
determining the limits on the production of mineral resources from the deep seabed 
during the “interim period”, which begins five years before the year in which the 
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earliest commercial production is planned to begin and lasts for 25 years.237  Further, 
during the interim period, the levels of production for other metals, including copper, 
cobalt and manganese cannot exceed what had been authorised as the maximum 
allowed production level for nickel.238  The Convention on the Law of the Sea 
expressly states that rights and obligations relating to anti-competitive and unfair 
economic practices would apply to exploration and exploitation activities in the deep 
seabed, but only to the extent that they are applicable under relevant multilateral trade 
agreements, such as the GATT.239 
It is apparent that such practices and measures are, in theory, incompatible with the 
concepts of an international free market and its economic practices.  The 
industrialised States, in particular, have suggested that such measures, designed to 
protect land-based mining activities in developing States, would impair the appeal of 
mining the deep seabed to a commercial venture.240  In practice, however, such 
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measures have existed for some time in domestic contexts, including in the regulation 
of the production of fossil fuels in the United States.241 
5.6.6  Financial Terms of the Contracts 
There was no historical precedent to the financial costs of deep seabed mining at the 
time the Convention on the Law of the Sea was adopted.  Consequently, the financial 
arrangements for the regulation of such commercial ventures was based on an 
economic and financial model for the future seabed mining industry formulated by 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.242  This model produced a serious of 
different rates of return based on various assumptions, with an average internal rate of 
return on investment (“ROI”) of around 15% based on this model.243 
Commercial mining ventures are subject to four separate charges payable to the ISA: 
an application processing fee, a fixed annual fee, an annual production charge and a 
                                                           
 
241 Burford v Sun Oil Co. (1943) 319 U.S. 315. 
242 See U.S. Congressional Research Services, OCEAN MANGANESE NODULES (1975), at 216-217.  See 
also Leigh S. Ratiner and Rebecca L. Wright, The Billion Dollar Decision: Is Deepsea Mining a Prudent 
Investment? (1978) 10 LAWYER AM. 713. 
243 Ibid.  See also Ronald S. Katz, A Method for Evaluating the Deep Seabed Mining Provisions of the Law 
of the Sea Treaty (1981) 7 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 114 at 122; and Bradley Larschan, The 
International Legal Status of the Contractual Rights of Contractors under the Deep Seabed Mining 
Provisions (Part XI) of the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1986) 14 DENVER 
J. INT’L. L. & POL’Y. 207. Exploitation Rights: Concepts of “Province of Mankind” and “Common Heritage of Mankind” 
500  |  Page     
share of the net proceeds from the mineral exploitation.244  The share of the net 
proceeds payable to the ISA was reducible at the option of the venture in exchange for 
an increase in the annual production charge, which was seen to be a concession to the 
socialist States, as they then were.245  The processing fee and some of these payments 
are comparable in magnitude and kind to the “premium payments” made to the 
developing States in return for the mining concessions.246  Further, the share of the 
proceeds that is payable by the commercial mining venture to the ISA ranges from 
35% of the net proceeds for an ROI that is less than 10% to 50% of the net proceeds 
for an ROI of greater than 20%.247  These rates of payments increase to 40% and 70% 
of the net proceeds, respectively, once the commercial venture has recovered the full 
costs of its investment.248  While the subject of much objection from the industrialised 
States, as Katz noted: 
These shares of net proceeds are not dissimilar to the income flow to 
developing countries from mining agreements, which usually include 
taxes additional to those mentioned above.  In Indonesia, for 
example, the tax rate on mining companies is 35% of taxable income 
for the first 10 years of operation and 45% thereafter.  In addition to 
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this corporation tax, the mining company must bear property tax, 
dead rent and stamp duties.249 
5.6.7  The Ultimate Compromise 
5.6.7.1  Adoption of the 1994 Agreement 
The political and economic environment changed after 1990, with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, enthusiasm for the NIEO philosophy 
waned and economic projections for deep seabed mining subsided.250  Further, as 
Baslar notes, “the decline of socialism and centrally-planned economies [was 
increasingly] replaced by free market economies and liberalism”, making a free-
market approach to deep seabed mining more acceptable on a worldwide basis.251  In 
response to these developments, Javier Pérez de Cúellar, then Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, began informal consultations in 1990 with a view of achieving a 
compromise over the Convention on the Law of the Sea.252  The imminent entry into 
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force of the Convention on the Law of the Sea only added urgency to the resolution of 
the common heritage issues relating to deep seabed mining.253 
In 1994, after extensive re-negotiations on controversial issues in Part XI of the 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, as mediated by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, then 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, the General Assembly adopted the 1994 
Agreement on 28 July 1994.  While reaffirming that the deep seabed and its mineral 
resources are the common heritage of mankind, the 1994 Agreement revises the rules 
and procedures governing the exploitation of seabed resources and rectifies some of 
the criticisms levelled at the initial version of Part XI of the Convention on the Law of 
the Sea.254  While there was the potential that a significant number of States that have 
ratified the Convention on the Law of the Sea would refuse to ratify the 1994 
Agreement, it is more likely that all of the Member States would agree to implement 
Part XI of the Convention on the Law of the Sea in accordance with the 1994 
Agreement instead of the original terms of Part XI, regardless of the status of 
ratifications to the 1994 Agreement. 
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5.6.7.2  Addressing the Objections of the United States and other 
Industrialised States 
The U.S. Government, under the administration of President Reagan, had raised six 
objectives that formed the policy basis upon which the Convention on the Law of the 
Sea must be reformed in order for it to be acceptable to the United States and other 
industrialised States: 
(1)  not deter development of deep seabed mineral resources to meet national 
and international demand; 
(2)  guarantee domestic access to these resources to enhance U.S. security of 
supply, avoid monopolisation of the resources by the Enterprise and to 
promote the economic development of the deep seabed; 
(3)  provide a decision-making role for the Council that reflects and protects 
the political and economic interests as well as financial contributions of 
the participating States; 
(4)  not allow amendments to the Convention on the Law of the Sea to come 
into force without consensus; 
(5)  not to set an undesirable precedent for other international regimes; and Exploitation Rights: Concepts of “Province of Mankind” and “Common Heritage of Mankind” 
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(6)  not contain provisions for the compulsory transfer of technology for 
funding for national liberation movements in order to secure ratification 
by the Senate of the United States.255  
In an effort to address these objectives raised by the United States, the 1994 
Agreement contained provisions that eventually received acceptance by the United 
States and other industrialised States: 
•  decision-making power in the ISA are concentrated in the Council so that 
the Assembly was to ratify or reject the Council’s recommendations;256 
•  the State that had the largest economy in terms of gross domestic product 
in the world on the date of entry into force of the Convention on the Law 
of the Sea was guaranteed a seat on the Council;257 
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•  Member States on the Council are divided into “chambers” of States with 
particular interests, with two of the four-member chambers likely to be 
controlled by major industrialised States, and decision-making by the 
Council was either by consensus or by two-thirds majority, provided that 
such majority decisions are not opposed by a majority in any one of the 
chambers, thus giving the industrialised States an effective veto;258 
•  financial and budgetary matters must be decided based on 
recommendations of the Finance Committee, which operated by 
consensus and on which the United States and other States that are major 
contributors of the budget are guaranteed membership;259 
•  the production ceiling, production limitations, commodity agreements 
and production authorisation and selection provisions in the Convention 
on the Law of the Sea would no longer apply;260 
•  the provisions dealing with compulsory technology transfer would no 
longer apply and, instead, the industrialised States are to cooperate with 
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the Enterprise and developing States that are unable to obtain the relevant 
technology on the open market or through joint ventures;261 
•  access to different areas of the deep seabed by applicants is to be on a first-
come, first-served basis;262 
•  the Enterprise is subject to the same rules and regulations as commercial 
ventures and is to begin operations in joint ventures until it is able to 
function independently and commercially;263 and 
•  the application fee is reduced and much of the financial obligations are 
eliminated, including the annual production charges.264 
Most importantly in relation to the financial effects of the common heritage of 
mankind concept, the Convention on the Law of the Sea provided that the equitable 
sharing of surplus revenues was to take into particular consideration “the interests and 
needs of the developing States and peoples who have not attained full independence 
or other self-governing status”.265  The United States had objected to this formulation 
as it would, inter alia, allow for funding for national liberation groups such as the 
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Palestine Liberation Organisation and the South West Africa People’s Organisation.266  
In practice, however, political developments in the Middle East and Namibia has 
made the issue moot and, in any event, any such distribution would happen only if the 
proceeds exceeded the administrative expenses of the ISA, its assistance to adversely 
affected land-based mineral producers and such distributions are agreed to by 
consensus of the Finance Committee and the Council.267 
5.6.7.3  Application and Implementation of the 1994 Agreement 
The compromise reached over the 1994 Agreement has achieved remarkable success 
in securing the acceptance of the industrialised States to the Convention on the Law of 
the Sea.  As at 21 July 2009, there were 159 Member States to the ISA and the 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, though the United States has not ratified it.268  
Since the 1994 Agreement, eight 15-year exploration contracts had been signed 
between the ISA and a number of Member States or contractors that provide them 
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with the exclusive right to explore an initial area of 150,000 square kilometres, with 
half of each of the areas to be relinquished after the first eight years of the contract.269  
Seven of these exploration areas are located in the Pacific Ocean south and southeast 
of Hawaii and the remaining one is in the Indian Ocean.270  The exploitation of 
mineral resources by these ventures will be subject to the regulations recently adopted 
by the ISA.271 
It must be said that the compromise represented by the 1994 Agreement was heavily 
skewed in favour of the industrialised States in an effort to obtain their acceptance of 
the Convention on the Law of the Sea.272  To date, however, despite these efforts, the 
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U.S. Senate has not ratified it and it is unlikely to do so before the end of the first 
decade of the present century.273  It is highly unlikely that the developing States would 
be willing to make concessions to a similar extent in relation to any other area that is 
subject to the common heritage of mankind concept, such as the celestial bodies of the 
Solar System and their mineral resources.274 
5.7  EVOLUTION OF ARTICLE 11 OF THE MOON AGREEMENT 
5.7.1  Early Controversies 
Since the launch of Sputnik-I in 1957, considerable success in the formulation and 
codification of the principles of outer space has been achieved within the framework 
of the United Nations.  In 1961 the General Assembly recognised that international 
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law, including the United Nations Charter, applied to outer space and that the Moon 
and other celestial bodies were not subject to national appropriation.275  In 1963 the 
General Assembly adopted the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing Activities of 
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, as proposed by the Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (“COPUOS”).276  Most of the principles embodied 
in the Declaration have become part of the 1967 Treaty on the Principles Governing 
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon 
and other Celestial Bodies (the “Outer Space Treaty”).277 
From the time of the adoption of the Outer Space Treaty, there has been recognition 
among the early commentators that celestial bodies ought to be subject to 
international jurisdiction and control instead of being subject to unilateral control.  As 
Smirnoff had summarised that:278 
The diversity of those arguments is very interesting and we should 
remind the reader that many of the lawyers quoted, like Faria and 
Goedhuis, use the example of the Antarctic Treaty 1959 to show the 
identity of reasons which do not admit the claims of the sovereignty 
of Earth countries to celestial bodies.279  Others like Meyer think that 
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“der Himmelaraum und die in ihm befindlichen Himmelskorper sich 
al seine Sache darstellen die der Gesamtheit aller Mitglieder der 
menschlichen Gesellschaft gehorten”.280  Faria goes a step further and 
adds “and also to all rational creatures of other civilised planets”.281  
Jessup and Taubenfeld and also Smirnoff advocate an international 
solution without any right of sovereignty of individual States but with 
the competence of the specialised agency of the United Nations.282  
Buckling talks about the “Interplanetarisches Kooperationsrecht”,283 
and Valladao is proclaiming the creation of the “Jus Inter Gentes 
Planetarum”.284  Menter is for the international regime of the celestial 
bodies with the jurisdictrion of the United Nations over those 
bodies.285  Quigg seeks international control for the Moon but does 
not think that it could be treated like Antarctica.286  Weinmann makes 
a very substantial argument against the possibility of the notion of 
discovery as applied to the Moon for the simple reason that 
everybody can see the Moon every night.287 
When Apollo 11 landed on the Moon in 1969, there was a realisation by the 
international community that the general principles in Outer Space Treaty were 
insufficient to regulate future exploitative activities on the Moon.288  Consequently it 
was generally accepted that a new treaty was needed.  Argentina and the Soviet Union 
proposed draft treaties for the Legal Sub-Committee of the Committee on the 
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Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in 1970 and 1971 respectively.289  Although agreement 
was reached on some provisions by 1972, there remained many issues that were not 
resolved until later in the decade. 
The Soviet Union, along with Bulgaria, Egypt, France, Japan and Poland, were of the 
view that the Moon Agreement should deal with the Moon only since it held a special 
place in the catalogue of objects in the solar system.290  The United States, along with 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Iran, Romania and United Kingdom supported the view 
that the agreement should apply to the Moon and all celestial bodies.291  In the end, 
agreement was reached that the Moon Agreement would apply to the Moon and other 
celestial bodies until other treaties established regulations that were more specific in 
nature.292  This agreement became embodied in Article 1 of the Moon Agreement.  
This article provides that the provisions of the Agreement: 
shall also apply to other celestial bodies within the solar system, other 
than the Earth, except insofar as specific legal norms enter into force 
with respect to any of these celestial bodies. 
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There was disagreement also within the COPUOS regarding the scope of the Moon 
Agreement or, specifically, if the Moon Agreement ought to apply only to the Moon 
and circumlunar space, to the celestial bodies in the Solar System but also to the 
remainder of the Milky Way galaxy or even to distant galaxies.  Despite the strong 
arguments of the United States otherwise, it was agreed that the Agreement would be 
limited in scope in relation to the Solar System.293   As to circumlunar space, the 
problem was not with the concept but with the precise definition of what circumlunar 
space encompassed.  In the end, a formula was adopted, with Article I referring to 
orbits around and other trajectories to or around the Moon.294 
After Malta suggested that the common heritage of mankind doctrine ought to apply 
to the use and exploitation of the deep seabed and its mineral resources in 1967, 
Ambassador Aldo Armando Cocca of Argentina proposed in the same year to 
COPUOS that the same doctrine ought also to apply to celestial bodies in outer space, 
which he considered to be res communis humanitatus in its draft Agreement on the 
Principles Governing Activities on the Use of Natural Resources of the Moon and 
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Other Celestial Bodies.295  Soon after, the General Assembly of the United Nations 
requested that the COPUOS prepare a draft treaty on lunar activities based on the 
existing principles of the Outer Space Treaty.296 
After a number of years of negotiations, a joint working paper was submitted to 
COPUOS jointly by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Romania, 
Sierra Leone and Venezuela, with the support of Egypt, India, Italy, the Soviet Union 
and the United States, that included a provision that celestial bodies ought to be 
subject to the common heritage of mankind doctrine.297  Further difficult negotiations 
between States followed, which were conducted in parallel with those in UNCLOS III, 
on the content and effect of the common heritage of mankind doctrine, whether a 
present moratorium was desirable and the interests of the developing States.298 
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In 1979, a difficult compromise was achieved in COPUOS when the developed States 
put forward the proposal from Brazil that was eventually contained in Article 11(1) of 
the Moon Agreement.  Minola commented on the compromise reached as: 
In effect the developed States have agreed that the common heritage 
principle means that an international regime should control resource 
exploitation.  In exchange for this concession, the developing 
countries agreed not to insist on a provision imposing a moratorium 
on exploitation pending the establishment of the international 
regime.  Thus the Moon Treaty expresses no moratorium, and none is 
implied by its legislative history.299 
The failure of the international community to reach a true agreement over the 
international legal regime to be created to regulate the use and mineral exploitation of 
celestial bodies under the Moon Agreement has resulted in the absence of any 
substantial acceptance of it among the international community.  In order to consider 
what is needed to create a new international framework for the use and mineral 
exploitation of celestial bodies, with or without the Moon Agreement, it is prudent to 
consider what the content and effect of the Moon Agreement are at present and how 
the common heritage of mankind doctrine ought to be applied in practice. 
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5.7.2  Provisions of the Moon Agreement 
Setting aside for a moment the provisions of Article 11 of the Moon Agreement that 
embodies the common heritage of mankind doctrine, there are a number of other 
provisions that are relevant to the use and exploitation of the mineral resources on the 
Moon and other celestial bodies.300  First, the Moon Agreement specifically extends 
the freedom to explore and use the Moon and other celestial bodies to private entities, 
though it is arguable that this was already anticipated under Article VI of the Outer 
Space Treaty.301  Second, the Moon Agreement grants title and ownership to any 
mineral resources on the surface of the Moon or that of a celestial body that are no 
longer in situ.302  Third, the Moon Agreement reaffirmed the principle contained in 
Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty that States and their private entities to retain 
ownership of equipment and installations that they bring to the Moon and other 
celestial bodies.303  Fourth, it has been suggested that the Moon Agreement does not 
prohibit a State or a private entity from making a profit from its activities on the 
Moon or other celestial bodies, though it ought to be noted that the Moon Agreement 
also does not explicitly permit this, which means that the controversy remains over the 
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potentially opposite effect of Article I of the Outer Space Treaty.304  However, a 
proposal from Italy during the negotiations over the Moon Agreement that no State 
be entitled to “exclusive economic profit” from their activities on the Moon and other 
celestial bodies was not accepted by the Legal Subcommittee of COPUOS.305 
The remaining provisions of the Moon Agreement can be seen to be either the 
reaffirmation or elaboration of the principles of the Outer Space Treaty.  In particular: 
•  activities on the Moon and other celestial bodies are to be conducted in 
compliance with public international law, including the Charter of the 
United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;306 
•  the Moon and other celestial bodies are to be used exclusively for peaceful 
purposes and the use of force, weaponisation of orbits and trajectories 
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around celestial bodies and the establishment of military installations on 
celestial bodies are prohibited;307 
•  States are to operate on the bases of cooperation and mutual assistance in 
their activities on celestial bodies, including disclosure to the international 
community of the details relating to the activities;308 and 
•  States are to bear international responsibility for their activities on 
celestial bodies, including those carried out by non-governmental entities, 
which they are required to authorise and continually supervise.309 
It is apparent that the provisions of the Moon Agreement, other than the common 
heritage of mankind provisions, would not be a matter of controversy either for the 
developing States or for the industrialised States.  This is because they either reaffirm 
or elaborate on the existing provisions of the Outer Space Treaty, which has formed 
the basis for the principles of international space law.  As Christol pointed out in 1980 
when commenting on the Moon Agreement: 
Its terms, properly understood, will provide a regime supportive of 
the [Outer Space Treaty].  The [Outer Space Treaty] focuses on the 
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exploration, use and exploitation of the space environment consisting 
of outer space, per se, the Moon and celestial bodies.  The Moon 
Treaty, unlike the [Outer Space Treaty], makes specific provision for 
the exploitation of the natural resources of the Moon and celestial 
bodies.  The Moon Treaty, while preserving the provision contained 
in Article 2 of the [Outer Space Treaty] that there may not be a 
sovereign appropriation of the Moon and celestial bodies, does enable 
defined juridical and natural persons to obtain proprietary rights in 
certain natural resources on and of the Moon and celestial bodies.310 
It is clear that the common heritage of mankind provisions of the Moon Agreement 
are the foci of the conflict between the industrialised States and the developing States.  
In the traditional view of most scholars, the “common heritage of mankind” principle 
in relation to outer space does not apply the res communis principle.  On the contrary, 
it transforms into something that creates specific obligations on states utilising this 
area.  Under the doctrine, areas designated as the common heritage of mankind, or 
terra communis humanitatis, would be owned by no one and yet theoretically managed 
by everyone.  Sovereignty does not exist here and legally the international community 
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as a whole would manage the area.311  States would have no role in the management of 
these areas except as representatives of all mankind. 
The common heritage of mankind doctrine also requires any use to be limited to 
peaceful purposes.312  For the purpose of scientific research, however, free access to 
any  res communis humanitatis would be permissible provided the benefits of such 
research are available to anyone expressing a genuine interest in them.313  In other 
words, even if the research were financed by a state or a group of states, the fruits of 
the research would be available freely to the international community, as has been the 
case in Antarctica.314  It is crucial to recognise that the doctrine requires any benefits 
derived from the exploitation of natural resources to be shared internationally.  As a 
result, exploitation by commercial entities would be deemed inappropriate unless their 
efforts contributed to the common benefit of all mankind.  The extent of this sharing 
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of benefits was never specifically defined and as such uncertainty remains on the 
extent of this obligation. 
The earlier proposals that were under consideration by the Legal Sub-Committee 
applied the common heritage of mankind concept to the mineral resources on the 
celestial bodies and not to the celestial bodies themselves.315  However, on 30 March 
1973, Argentina changed its own position and proposed that both the celestial bodies 
and their mineral resources are to be the common heritage of mankind.316  At the same 
time, an alternative proposal put forward by the Soviet Union on 21 May 1971 did not 
refer to the common heritage of mankind concept, yet it intrinsically embodied the 
concept by recognising that the surface and subsoil of celestial bodies, including any 
mineral resources contained therein, were res communis.317  Meanwhile, the United 
States submitted a working paper to COPUOS on 13 April 1972 accepting the 
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formulation in the original proposal of Argentina, even though this formulation was 
by then inconsistent with General Assembly Resolution 2749 (XXV) of 17 December 
1970 that applied the common heritage of mankind concept to the deep seabed and 
celestial bodies.318  After negotiations over a number of years concerning the 
application of the common heritage of mankind concept to celestial bodies, a joint 
working paper was submitted in 1976 by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, Mexico, 
Nigeria, Romania, Sierra Leone and Venezuela that urged the States Parties to create 
an international legal regime on the basis that the celestial bodies and their mineral 
resources are the common heritage of mankind.319 
It soon became apparent that three conflicting interests in the international 
community had emerged during the negotiations.  As Chen observed: 
Certain members considered “common heritage of mankind” as a 
philosophical concept lacking legal content which had no place in a 
legal instrument, while others maintained that it was a legal concept 
and a prerequisite for the elaboration of a treaty relating to the Moon.  
Some members held the view that activities should be permitted only 
for scientific purposes and that no commercial exploitation of the 
natural resources should take place before the establishment of the 
international regime; others thought that utilisation of the Moon and 
its natural resources should also be allowed for other experimental 
purposes; still others were of the opinion that utilisation should be 
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allowed for any peaceful purpose pending the establishment of the 
international regime.320 
These conflicting interests eventually became embodied in the provisions contained 
Articles 6, 11 and 18 of the Moon Agreement, as discussed below. 
5.7.3  Article 6 of the Moon Agreement 
The Moon Agreement expressly provides for the collection of “moon rocks”, or 
geological or mineralogical samples, when engaging in scientific investigations of the 
Moon and other celestial bodies, without granting them title or ownership to the 
samples so collected.  Specifically, the Moon Agreement provides that: 
In carrying out scientific investigations and in furtherance of the 
provisions of this Agreement, the States Parties shall have the right to 
collect on and remove from the Moon samples of its mineral and 
other substances.  Such samples shall remain at the disposal of those 
States Parties which caused them to be collected and may be used by 
them for scientific purposes.  States Parties shall have regard to the 
desirability of making a portion of such samples available to other 
interested States Parties and the international scientific community 
for scientific investigation.  States Parties may in the course of 
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scientific investigations also use mineral and other substances of the 
Moon in quantities appropriate for the support of their missions.321 
It is prudent to note that there are no restrictions on the exclusive collection and use 
of mineral samples and, more importantly, there are no restrictions on the exclusive 
use of resources, including in particular mineral resources, for the conduct of scientific 
investigations.  As Christol noted, the nature and extent of such scientific use can be 
somewhat wide-ranging and, as such, substantial exclusive use of mineral resources 
from celestial bodies are allowed for scientific investigations.322  The rights granted 
under Article 6 of the Moon Agreement extend to both the scientific investigations of 
States as well as those of international organisations and private entities, though the 
“appropriate” State would have the general duties to authorise and continually 
supervise the activities of the relevant private entities.323 
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5.7.4  Article 11 of the Moon Agreement 
5.7.4.1  The Premise 
As has been noted and commented upon by many since its adoption, there is no other 
aspect of the Moon Agreement that is more controversial than the provision declaring 
the Moon and other celestial bodies to be the “common heritage of mankind”.324  Such 
a requirement, alongside the express and implied obligations of the common heritage 
of mankind doctrine as imposed on states, continues to serve as a major inhibiting 
factor in relation to the general acceptance of the Moon Agreement.  Paragraph 1 of 
Article 11 of the Moon Agreement provides that: 
The Moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of 
mankind, which finds its expression in the provisions of this 
Agreement and in particular in paragraph 5 of this article. 
Paragraph 5 of Article 11 of the Moon Agreement provides that: 
States Parties to this Agreement hereby undertake to establish an 
international regime, including appropriate procedures, to govern the 
exploitation of the natural resources of the Moon as such exploitation 
is about to become feasible.  This provision shall be implemented in 
accordance with article 18 of this Agreement. 
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The idea that outer space and celestial bodies cannot be subject to the sovereign 
ownership of any state is not a new one.  Article II of the Outer Space Treaty prohibits 
“national appropriation”, even “by means of occupation”.  This in effect outlaws 
imperium, the form of public ownership that establishes sovereign rights in relation to 
certain areas by virtue of the fact that celestial bodies are res communis.325  However, 
dominium and ownership by a state of materials exploited would continue to be 
possible for private entities.  This is particularly relevant in the creation and 
acquisition of intellectual property rights, as they may be regarded either as the 
common heritage of mankind or as a benefit derived from the celestial bodies, and 
therefore subject to sharing among all States. 
5.7.4.2  Content and Effect of Article 11 of the Moon Agreement 
Article 11 of the Moon Agreement is, at its very highest, an interim arrangement with 
a declaration of principle in relation to the common heritage of mankind doctrine.  
Except for the specific provisions discussed above, the Moon Agreement does not 
provide for the practical implementation of the common heritage of mankind 
doctrine but merely foreshadows the establishment of a new regime when the 
commercial exploitation of mineral resources from celestial bodies are about to 
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become feasible.326  The Moon Agreement does not specify the terms of that regime 
and also does not indicate upon what basis any determination by the State Parties to 
the Moon Agreement as to the feasibility of the commercial exploitation of mineral 
resources from celestial bodies is to be made. 
In effect, Article 11 of the Moon Agreement does no more than designate celestial 
bodies and their mineral resources as the “common heritage of mankind” but does not 
impose any practical obligations on the part of States and private entities in 
conducting exploitation activities arising from such a doctrine.  Article 11(5) of the 
Moon Agreement defers the creation of a regulatory framework that would impose 
such practical obligations until a later time when such exploitation become feasible 
and imminent.  In effect, the designation of the celestial bodies and their mineral 
resources as the common heritage of mankind in the Moon Agreement in practice 
required no more than requiring such use be exclusively for peaceful purposes and 
prohibiting the assertion or maintenance of property rights or territorial sovereignty 
over celestial bodies, which are legal provisions that already found expression in the 
terms of the Outer Space Treaty.327  Until the foreshadowed international regulatory 
regime is implemented, the Moon Agreement and its common heritage of mankind 
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doctrine would not impose any additional practical obligations on the part of 
participating States or private entities under their supervision. 
5.7.5  Article 18 of the Moon Agreement 
The Moon Agreement provides that, ten years after the Moon Agreement enters into 
force, the General Assembly is to consider a review of the provisions of the Moon 
Agreement.328  In addition to this prescribed review, one-third of the Member States 
can request the convening of a general conference of the States Parties to the Moon 
Agreement, particularly in relation to the consideration of the appropriate regime for 
the implementation of Article 11 of the Moon Agreement.329  In theory, this would 
provide an opportunity for the States to consider the appropriate timing for the 
creation and implementation of a regime in accordance with the Moon Agreement.  
As Reynolds had commented in 1992: 
Because this review will allow all nations — not just those few that 
actually ratified the Moon Treaty — to discuss proposed remedies for 
the Treaty’s flaws, it will provide an opportunity to consider revisions.  
In particular, the United States should play a major part by proposing 
amendments to the Treaty that recognise the important role played 
by private property rights in promoting development of outer space.  
Land-grant type mechanisms, administered by the United Nations or 
by individual nations in accordance with agreed international 
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principles, might reward private development efforts with long-term 
leases or permanent property rights in space resources they develop.330 
The Moon Agreement entered into force on 11 July 1984, being 30 days after the fifth 
instrument of ratification was deposited.331   In 1994, the tenth anniversary of the 
entry into force of the Moon Agreement was reached and passed without much 
impulse or motivation on the part of the States Parties to the Moon Agreement to 
undertake a review of its provisions.  Given the entrenched views of the industrialised 
and developing States on the content and effect of the common heritage of mankind 
concept to celestial bodies and their mineral resources, it is unlikely that any legal 
regime can be created in the near future.  This can only be understood with reference 
to their contradictory positions. 
5.7.6  Attempts at Resolving the Political Impasse 
On 21 March 1994, with the tenth anniversary of the entry into force of the Moon 
Agreement approaching, the Legal Sub-Committee of COPUOS noted that a review 
of the status of the Moon Agreement was to occur in that year.332  Coincidentally, this 
                                                           
 
330 Glenn Harlan Reynolds, International Space Law: Into the Twenty-First Century (1993) 25 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L. L. 225 at 233; and Stephen Gorove, Exploitation of Space Resources and the Law (1984) 
3 PUB. L. FORUM 29. 
331 Moon Agreement, Article 19(3). 
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was the same period of time as when the negotiations over the revised terms for the 
implementation of the Convention on the Law of the Sea was taking place in the 
General Assembly, a fact that was noted by a number of States participating in the 
debates concerning the Moon Agreement, most notably the comments made by the 
representations of Portugal, Russia and Spain.333  The General Assembly in Resolution 
49/34 adopted the recommendation of COPUOS and the Legal Sub-Committee that, 
in considering whether to revise the terms of the Moon Agreement, the General 
Assembly “should take no action at the present time”.334  As Christol noted: 
While the confrontational behaviour that had been present in the 
negotiations of the 1960s and 1970s was not longer evident, this 
factor did not appreciably improve the working processes of the 
[Legal Sub-Committee] or the [COPUOS].  An outlook of “let well 
enough alone” pervaded the thinking of some countries.  On the 
whole these were the space-resource States.  But, as has been noted, 
the developing countries did not put forward a plan that might have 
provoked a meaningful analysis.335 
Although Resolution 49/34 represented the end of any formal process to review and 
perhaps revise the terms of the Moon Agreement, there remain persistent efforts on 
the part of some States for the issue to be further addressed by the international 
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community.336  The fact that there are inconsistencies between the Moon Agreement 
and the Outer Space Treaty means that there are now in effect two competing regimes 
under international law for the exploitation of mineral resources from celestial bodies, 
specifically one for those 13 States who are parties to both the Outer Space Treaty and 
the Moon Agreement and another for those who are party to the Outer Space Treaty 
but not the Moon Agreement.337  With the prospect of the exploitation of mineral 
resources from celestial bodies potentially becoming an imminent development, there 
is much incentive for the international community to compromise and reach 
agreement on the terms of an international regulatory framework to forestall possible 
unilateral regulation on the part of individual States.338 
The principal objections that have been raised by the industrialised States to the 
Moon Agreement, in particular those of the United States, are similar to those that 
                                                           
 
336After the adoption of Resolution 49/34, there were notable comments from Spain: U.N. Doc. 
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1995, at 5; Mexico: U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/639, 11 April 1996, at 40; U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.206 
Rev. 1, 4 April 1997; and U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/674, 14 April 1997, at 22; France and Germany: U.N. 
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1996, at 2.  See Frans G. von der Dunk, The Dark Side of the Status of the Moon: Public Concepts and 
Private Enterprises (1997) 40 PROC. COLL. L. OUTER SP. 119; René Oosterlink, Tangible and 
Intangible Property in Outer Space (1997) 39 PROC. COLL. L. OUTER SP. 277; and ibid. at 26-29; and 
Nandasiri Jasentuliyana, International Space Law and Cooperation and the Mining of Asteroids (1990) 
15 ANN. AIR & SP. L. 343. 
337The 13 States that have ratified the Moon Agreement are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Chile, 
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See Christol, supra note 335, at 32. 
338 See, for example, Anthony R. Filiato, The Commercial Space Launch Act: America’s Response to the 
Moon Treaty? (1987) 10 FORDHAM INT’L. L. J. 763; Francis H. Esposito, The Commercial Exploitation 
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were raised in opposition to the terms of the Convention on the Law of the Sea as it 
was originally adopted.339  After all, in the context of the Cold War, there was the 
perception that the Moon Agreement was implementing some form of international 
socialism with the common heritage of mankind.340  With the risk of generalisation, 
the practical objections of the industrialised States include: 
(1)  the absence of property rights that are essential for commercial 
development of mineral resources on celestial bodies;341 
(2)  the potential need to have “a hefty share of the proceeds going to less-
developed countries regardless of whether they have any investment in the 
activity or not”;342  
                                                           
 
339 See, for example, Carl Q. Christol, The American Bar Association and the 1979 Moon Treaty: The 
Search for a Position (1981) 9 J. SP. L. 77; and Michael J. Listner, The Ownership and Exploitation of 
Outer Space: A Look at Foundational Law and Future Legal Challenges to Current Claims (2003) 1 
REGENT J. INT’L. L. 75.  
340 Stephen D. Mau, Equity, the Third World and the Moon Treaty (1984) 8 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L. L. J. 
221 at 258.  This is in addition to the existing difficulties in attracting sufficient investment in 
commercial space endeavours: see Stacey A. Davis, Unifying the Final Frontier: Space Industry 
Financing Reform (2001) 106 COM. L. J. 455; and William Lee Andrews III, A Mighty Stone for David’s 
Sling: The International Space Company (2003) 1 REGENT J. INT’L. L. 5.  
341 See Michael E. Davis, Reaching for the Moon (1997) NEW SCIENTIST, 23 August 1997, at 46; and Ryan 
Hugh O’Donnell, Staking a Claim in the Twenty-First Century: Real Property Rights on Extra-
Terrestrial Bodies (2007) 32 U. DAYTON L. REV. 461. 
342 See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Key Objections to the Moon Treaty (2003), National Space Society 
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(3)  the establishment of an international organisation that would regulate 
mineral exploitation activities on celestial bodies with the potential for 
licensing processes to be “slow, cumbersome and prone to blackmail”;343 
(4)  the potential for the compulsory transfer of relevant technology from the 
industrialised States to developing States, as was the case under Part XI of 
the Convention on the Law of the Sea;344 
(5)  the potential for the creation of an entity similar to the Enterprise created 
under Part XI of the Convention on the Law of the Sea that would actively 
compete with commercial interests in the exploitation of mineral 
resources from celestial bodies; and 
(6)  the implied moratorium on the commercial exploitation of mineral 
resources from celestial bodies until the creation and implementation of 
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the international regulatory regime foreshadowed under Article 11 of the 
Moon Agreement.345 
For the developing States, private capitalisation of commercial exploitation of mineral 
resources on celestial bodies is incompatible with the values of the common heritage 
of mankind principle.346  For these developing States, as in the negotiations in 
UNCLOS III, the nature of the common heritage of mankind mandates some form of 
international regulation of management in their use to ensure that celestial bodies and 
their mineral resources are used for the benefit of all humankind.  Only in 
compromise between these two opposing philosophical positions can any agreement 
be reached over the creation of a new international regulatory regime. 
                                                           
 
345 See Stanley B. Rosenfield, The Moon Treaty: The United States Should Not Become a Party (1980) 74 
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5.8  CONCLUSIONS 
The evolution of some philosophical construct of common property over non-
sovereign areas that would otherwise be res extra commercium or res nullius has taken 
some twists and turns from its application to Antarctica, outer space, the deep seabed 
and celestial bodies.  It is apparent, however, that the common heritage of mankind 
concept is not more than such a philosophical doctrine, for the practical content and 
effects of the concept are no more than a malleable construct that had been adapted 
by the States negotiating over the legal regimes in practice.347  In other words, the 
concepts of “common property”, “province of mankind” and “common heritage of 
mankind” are in reality no more than doctrinal labels and it is in the practical 
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expression of these constructs into specific rights, duties and obligations that make 
them controversial among members of the international community.348 
In the earliest case of Antarctica, these doctrinal concepts found expression in the 
notions of common management, exclusivity of their use for peaceful purposes and 
the deferral of sovereign territorial claims over parts of the Antarctic continent.   
There is no universal participation in the regulatory regime under the ATS and, 
further, there is no declaration to the effect that Antarctica was not to be subject to 
territorial sovereignty or private ownership.  With outer space and celestial bodies 
under the Outer Space Treaty, the “province of all mankind” does not, without more, 
impose practical obligations or restrictions.  It is the other provisions of the Outer 
Space Treaty that rights and duties, such as the freedom of exploration, use and 
scientific investigation under Article I and the prohibitions of ownership and 
territorial sovereignty under Article II, are imposed.349 
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The deep seabed has seen two different sets of obligations under the common heritage 
of mankind concept.  The provisions in the Convention on the Law of the Sea 
prohibiting ownership and territorial sovereignty and requiring international 
regulation and management, the “equitable” sharing of benefits, mandatory transfer 
of technology and the creation of the Enterprise as a competing industry participant 
are all said to be practical expressions of the common heritage of mankind doctrine.  
However, the subsequent1994 Agreement had converted the regulatory regime form a 
comprehensive to a minimalist approach, providing only for the prohibition of 
territorial sovereignty and ownership and the international regulation and 
management of activities relating to commercial exploitation of the deep seabed.350  
This minimalist approach to the regulation of exploitation activities is nevertheless 
said to be an expression of the common heritage of mankind doctrine, clearly 
illustrating that the doctrine itself does not carry with it practical implications. 
The Moon Agreement defers the formulation of these practical provisions until a later 
time when the exploitation of mineral resources from celestial bodies becomes feasible 
and imminent.  On the one hand, this gave an opportunity for the international 
community to formulate such provisions while divorcing itself from the need to 
debate over the philosophical nature of the common heritage of mankind concept.  
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On the other hand, the deferral has illustrated the deep divisions that existed between 
different stakeholders as to the appropriate rights and duties that ought to be imposed 
in the commercial exploitation activities on celestial bodies.  It is clear that the 
creation of any international regulatory regime, whether as part of the Moon 
Agreement framework or otherwise, will require the balancing of the competing 
interests of these stakeholders with regard to the unwritten doctrinal principles of the 
common heritage of mankind.  
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6.1  INTRODUCTION 
Space law, especially the provisions of the Agreement Governing the Activities of 
States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the “Moon Agreement”), has been 
influenced by developments adopted in the law of the sea and the treaty framework 
relating to Antarctica and the deep seabed.1  While each has ultimately been 
developed separately from the others, outer space, the deep seabed, and Antarctica 
share several key features.  For example, each constitutes an international spatial area, 
which has potentially valuable and exploitable natural resources and an inhospitable 
environment, which necessitates technological sophistication and exorbitant financial 
investment to effectively exploit these resources.2  Further, the international 
community has regarded the preservation of both environments for future 
generations as an important priority.3  More importantly, all three areas are deemed to 
                                                           
 
1 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the “Moon 
Agreement”), opened for signature on 18 December 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3; 18 I.L.M. 1434, (entered 
into force on 11 July 1984).  See Eric Husby, Sovereignty and Property Rights in Outer Space (1994) 3 
DETROIT COLL. L. J. INT’L. L. & PRAC. 359 at 362; and Kevin V. Cook, The Discovery of Lunar Water: 
An Opportunity to Develop a Workable Moon Treaty (1999) 11 GEORGETOWN INT’L. ENVT’L. L. REV. 
647 at 677. 
2 Cook, supra note 1, at 677; and Grier C. Raclin, From Ice to Ether: The Adoption of a Régime to Govern 
Resource Exploitation in Outer Space (1986) 7 J. INT’L. L. & BUS. 727, at 728-730. 
3 Thomas M. Franck and Dennis M. Sughrue, Symposium: The International Role of Equity-as-Fairness 
(1993) 81 GEORGETOWN L. J. 563 at 590-594; and Kemal Baslar, THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON 
HERITAGE OF MANKIND IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1998) at 264-265. Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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be in the common interest of humankind and face dilemmas with respect to the 
application of common heritage of mankind and related principles. 
It has often been suggested that the principal factor restraining industrialised States 
from signing and ratifying the Moon Agreement is the result of their fear for the 
practical and financial implications of the common heritage of mankind doctrine.4  It 
is respectfully submitted that it is the moratorium imposed on commercial use and 
exploitation of mineral resources until the regulatory regime foreshadowed under 
Article 11 of the Moon Agreement has been implemented.  Such a moratorium and 
other restrictive provisions of the Moon Agreement do not exist under the Treaty on 
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (the “Outer Space Treaty”).5  
Accordingly, a State that ratifies the Moon Agreement would have the effect of 
voluntarily subjecting itself to a moratorium on commercial mineral exploitation 
activities on celestial bodies.  
                                                           
 
4 See, for example, Michael J. Listner, The Ownership and Exploitation of Outer Space: A Look at 
Foundational Law and Future Legal Challenges to Current Claims (2003) 1 REGENT J. INT’L. L. 75; 
Stephen D. Mau, Equity, the Third World and the Moon Treaty (1984) 8 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L. L. J. 
221; and Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Key Objections to the Moon Treaty (2003), National Space Society 
Chapters Network, <http://www.nsschapters.org/hub/pdf/MoonTreatyObjections.pdf>, 28 April 
2003, last accessed on 28 November 2009. 
5 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (the “Outer Space Treaty”), opened for signature on 
27 January 1967, 610 U.N.T.S. 205; 18 U.S.T. 2410; T.I.A.S. 6347; 6 I.L.M. 386 (entered into force on 
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Given the inconsistency between the terms of the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon 
Agreement, the low level of ratifications for the Moon Agreement has, in effect, 
created two parallel bodies of international law concerning activities of States on the 
Moon and other celestial bodies.  The States that have ratified the Moon Agreement 
are clearly bound by its terms, which would take precedence over the provisions of the 
Outer Space Treaty to the extent that they are inconsistent.6  The States that have not 
ratified the Moon Agreement would be bound only by the terms of the Outer Space 
Treaty and not by the provisions of the Moon Agreement and thus the low level of 
ratifications for the Moon Agreement would have the effect of imposing binding legal 
restrictions on its States Parties without international recognition of the rights granted 
under the Moon Agreement.7 
Clearly, as with the Convention on the Law of the Sea,8 any new international 
framework for the exploitation of the celestial bodies will have to achieve a requisite 
degree of universality in order for there to be sufficient legal and regulatory certainty 
for participating States and private entities to attract the requisite level of investment 
                                                           
 
6 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature on 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 
1980 U.K.T.S. 58 (entered into force on 27 January 1980), Article 30(2).  For the States that have 
signed but not ratified the Moon Agreement, they are nevertheless required to refrain from acts that 
would defeat its object and purpose: Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 18. 
7 This was part of the motivation for some States Parties to the Moon Agreement, most notably 
Australia and Chile, to seek an examination of it by the Legal Sub-Committee of the Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: U.N. Doc. COPUOS/LEGAL/T.632, 3 April 2000, at 3. 
8 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature on 10 December 1982, 1833 
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required for such a large-scale endeavour.  This can only be achieved if the divergent 
interests and concerns of the international community can be balanced in an effort to 
find an appropriate compromise that can be acceptable to most, if not all, States in the 
international community. 
 
Figure 6.1-1.  Competing Interests to be Balanced in the Creation of the New 
International Regulatory Framework 
Once the competing interests and concerns of various stakeholders have been 
balanced and compromised, it would then be possible for the international community 
to consider the terms upon which an international regulatory framework for the 
exploitation of mineral resources on celestial bodies is to be implemented. Meeting the Challenges and Balancing the Competing Interests in Creating a Legal Framework 
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6.2  NEED FOR BALANCING COMPETING INTERESTS 
6.2.1  Overview 
In relation to the issues arising from the possible exploitation of mineral resources on 
celestial bodies, a number of competing interests can be identified and they can be 
categorised into five dichotomies, as illustrated in Table 6.2-1 below. 
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6.2.2  Industrialised States vs. Developing States 
6.2.2.1  Property Rights and the Non-Appropriation Principle 
Commentators from some industrialised States, particularly those of the United 
States, have suggested that the Moon Agreement is unacceptable because it does not 
provide for any property rights for use or exploitation by States and private entities.9  
In fact, the Moon Agreement prohibits any form of private ownership or territorial 
sovereignty over celestial bodies.10  It has been suggested that, unless such private 
property rights are made available, either unilaterally or through an international 
organisation, there would be insufficient legal certainty to attract private investment 
in the commercial space sector.11  It is prudent to note that the prohibitions contained 
in the Moon Agreement in relation to property rights are already provided for, either 
expressly or impliedly, under the Outer Space Treaty.12  This was a position supported 
                                                           
 
9 See, for example, Reynolds, supra note 4. 
10 Moon Agreement, Article 11. 
11 See Stacey A. Davis, Unifying the Final Frontier: Space Industry Financing Reform (2001) 106 COM. L. 
J. 455; and William Lee Andrews III, A Mighty Stone for David’s Sling: The International Space 
Company (2003) 1 REGENT J. INT’L. L. 5. 
12 Outer Space Treaty, Article II.  See Stephen Gorove, Sovereignty and the Law of Outer Space Re-
Examined (1977) 2 ANN. AIR & SP. L. 311 at 316; Ezra J. Reinstein, Owning Outer Space (1999) 20 
NW. J. INT’L. L. & BUS. 59; and Rosanna Sattler, Transporting a Legal System for Property Rights: From 
the Earth to the Stars (2005) 6 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 23; Leslie I. Tennen, Second Commentary on Emerging 
System of Property Rights in Outer Space (2003) United Nations, PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS / REPUBLIC OF KOREA WORKSHOP ON SPACE LAW 342 at 343; and Patricia M. Sterns and 
Leslie I. Tennen, Privateering and Profiteering on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies: Debunking the 
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by the United States at the time, albeit that this was during the Cold War in the 1960s 
when it was perceived to be likely that the Soviet Union would beat the United States 
in their race to the Moon.13  
Despite the end of the Cold War, it is unlikely that the United States and the other 
industrialised States would seek a reverse course and abandon the position adopted in 
the Outer Space Treaty.  Indeed, it has been suggested that the prohibitions of private 
ownership and territorial sovereignty continue to attain widespread support among 
both industrialised and developing States in the international community.14  It is likely 
that, with the adoption of an international regulatory framework that provides for the 
grant of exclusive prospecting, exploration and mining licences by the new 
international regulator, which in the interest of convenience will be referred to as the 
International Space Development Authority (the “Authority”), substantial opposition 
on the part of the industrialised States on this issue will whittle away into irrelevance, 
as the legal certainty needed to attract sufficient commercial investment would have 
been attained without the need to disturb the existing prohibitions on sovereignty and 
title in the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Agreement. 
                                                           
 
13 See generally Nandasiri Jasentuliyana and Roy S. Lee (eds.), MANUAL ON SPACE LAW (1979), vol. 1. 
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6.2.2.2  Obligation to Share the Benefits Derived 
Determining the Rate of Contributions 
The most controversial of all obligations customarily associated with the common 
heritage of mankind doctrine is the requirement that there be an equitable sharing of 
the benefits derived from the exploitation and use of the common heritage of 
mankind.15  This principle found expression in the Convention on the Law of the Sea 
in relation to the exploitation of mineral resources in the deep seabed, which provides 
for a share for the International Seabed Authority of 35 to 50 percent before the 
mining concern has recovered all its development costs (including interest) and of 40 
to 70 percent after all development costs have been recovered.16  These shares of 
proceeds have proven to be unacceptable to the industrialised States. 
                                                           
 
15 See Frederick Arnold, Toward a Principled Approach to the Distribution of Global Wealth: An 
Impartial Solution to the Dispute over Seabed Manganese Nodules (1980) 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 557; 
Elisabeth Mann Borgese, A Constitution for the Oceans: Comments and Suggestions Regarding Part XI 
of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (1978) 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 371; James R. Silkenat, 
Solving the Problem of the Deep Seabed: The Informal Composite Negotiating Text for the First 
Committee of UNCLOS III (1977) 9 N. Y. U. J. INT’L. L. & POL’Y. 177; Robert B. Krueger, Policy 
Options in the Law of the Sea Negotiations (1978) 6 INT’L. BUS. LAWYER 89; and Robert F. Pietrowski, 
Jr., Hard Minerals on the Deep Ocean Floor: Implications for American Law and Policy (1978) 19 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 43. 
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Under the 1994 Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, the scale of 
contributions was replaced with the following formulation: 
The rates of payments under the system shall be within the range of 
those prevailing in respect of land-based mining of the same or 
similar minerals in order to avoid giving deep seabed miners an 
artificial competitive advantage or imposing on them a competitive 
disadvantage.  The system should not be complicated and should not 
impose major administrative costs on the [International Seabed] 
Authority or on a contractor.  Consideration should be given to the 
adoption of a royalty system or a combination of a royalty and profit-
sharing system.17 
Conceptually, it is relatively easy to see the appeal of this approach to free market 
economists of industrialised States and also to treasury officials of developing States 
that derive much of their revenue from the mining sector.  In practice, however, it is 
worth noting that the total effective tax rate that is payable by terrestrial mining 
concerns, which form the basis of the comparison in the formulation above, do not 
differ substantially from the fixed contribution shares in the prescribed original 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, as detailed in Table 6.2-2 below.  This is 
                                                           
 
17 Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (the “1994 Agreement”), opened for signature on 28 July 1994, 1836 
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particularly so keeping in mind that almost all States in the world have zero-rated or 
exempted all minerals from export duties.18 
Given the divergent range of royalty and taxation rates applicable to different mineral 
resources in different States throughout the world, the conceptual formulation found 
in the 1994 Agreement may have the potential to allow for too much discretion in the 
hands of a regulating authority, while fixed rates may have the potential to be too rigid 
in adapting to changes in global economic conditions.  It may be preferable to fix the 
contribution rate with reference to a basket of domestic royalty rates in relation to 
selected mineral resources, in much the same way as some currencies were floated 
with reference to a “basket” of other currencies in the 1970s and 1980s.19  The royalty 
rates included in the “basket” may be adjusted every few years by the Authority with 
reference to the competitive position of extraterrestrial mining vis-à-vis terrestrial 
mining on a similar basis as provided under the 1994 Agreement.  This would provide 
some fixed reference for the purpose of providing certainty to the commercial venture 
while being flexible enough to adapt to medium and long term trends in the market. 
                                                           
 
18 James Otto, Craig Andrews, Fred Cawood, Michael Doggett, Pietro Guj, Frank Stermole, John 
Stermole and John Tilton, MINING ROYALTIES: A GLOBAL STUDY OF THEIR IMPACT ON INVESTORS, 
GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY (2006), at 35-37. 
19 See Eiji Ogawa and Takatoshi Ito, On the Desirability of a Regional Basket Currency Arrangement 
(2002) 16 J. JAPAN. & INT’L. ECON. 317; Hali J. Edison and Erling Vårdal, Optimal Currency 
Baskets for Small, Developed Economies (1990) 92 SCAND. J. ECON. 559; and Lars Hörngren and 
Anders Vredin, Exchange Risk Premia in a Currency Basket System (1989) 125 REV. WORLD ECON. 
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Collection and Management of the Contributions 
The collection of the mandatory contributions is to be done by the Authority or by a 
Member State on behalf of the Authority in the case of a private entity being 
responsible for the mining operation.  The amount of the contributions to be paid to 
the Authority must be capable of being enforced in a practical and meaningful manner 
and, further, must be able to be verified by the conduct of an independent audit. 
The financial contributions collected by the Authority ought to be paid into two 
separate funds, the “Administrative Fund” and the “Common Heritage Fund”.  The 
Administrative Fund is to provide the funding necessary for all of the functions of the 
Authority, while the Common Heritage Fund is to be used to finance projects for the 
benefit of the whole of humankind or for large-scale development and infrastructure 
projects for developing States.  The issues relating to the management and control of 
both the Administrative Fund and the Common Heritage Fund are considered in 
greater detail below. 
6.2.2.3  Mandatory Transfer of Technology 
In the Convention of the Law of the Sea, there is a provision for the mandatory 
transfer of the technology used by a licensee to the Enterprise for its use in the Meeting the Challenges and Balancing the Competing Interests in Creating a Legal Framework 
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exploitation of mineral resources from the deep seabed.21  Under the 1994 Agreement, 
this mandatory obligation was transformed into a general duty on the part of the 
industrialised States to facilitate the acquisition of technology by the Enterprise.22  It is 
reasonable for the developing States to assume that the mandatory transfer of 
technology would form part of the obligations imposed on the industrialised States 
under any new international regime concerning celestial bodies arising from both the 
NIEO principles and the common heritage of mankind doctrine.23 
To some extent, such a transfer is not difficult to achieve, considering much of the 
technology required is likely to be the subject of patents and other forms of registered 
industrial property and, as such, would be published at the registration authority and 
available for inspection by the public at large.  Given the long timeframes involved in 
any mining venture on celestial bodies, all that would be required to achieve this result 
would be for the Implementation Agreement to provide for the publication and 
dissemination of patented or other registered technologies upon the expiry of any 
exclusivity or protection period as prescribed under international and domestic law.24 
                                                           
 
21 Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 144. 
22 1994 Agreement, Annex, Section 5. 
23 See, for example, Mark Orlove, Spaced Out: The Third World Looks For a Way in to Outer Space 
(1989) 4 CONN. J. INT’L. L. 597. 
24 Since 1995, most States have enacted patent protection laws that provide protection from the date of 
grant of the patent to twenty years from the filing date of the application: Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, opened for signature on 15 April 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
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Unlike mining activities in the deep seabed, however, the technological capabilities 
needed for mining activities on celestial bodies are both advanced and sensitive.   
Based on the phases of a commercial mining venture on a Near Earth Asteroid, one 
would expect the technological requirements to include:  
•  transportation technologies, both in the outbound journey for the 
equipment and the inbound journey for the processed ores; 
•  advanced automated rocketry capabilities; 
•  landing capabilities; 
•  automated or robotic space mining equipment; 
•  space material processing capabilities; 
•  advanced computerised targeting capabilities; and 
•  advanced space power generation and propulsion systems. 
It is apparent that the industrialised States would not conceivably allow these 
technological capabilities to be transferred to an international commercial entity or to 
developing States, as much of the technological capabilities referred to above clearly 
fall within the scope of existing military and dual-use technology control regimes, such 
as the Missile Technology Control Regime (the “MTCR”) and the Wassenaar Meeting the Challenges and Balancing the Competing Interests in Creating a Legal Framework 
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Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and 
Technologies (the “Wassenaar Arrangement”).25  It is noteworthy that many 
developing States have agreed to the principle that such technological capabilities 
ought not be proliferated internationally by their ratification and participation in the 
MTCR and the Wassenaar Arrangement.26 
Accordingly, it is both inconceivable and unrealistic for developing States to expect 
any form of technology transfer for mining of celestial bodies would be acceptable to 
the industrialised States, regardless of whether such transfer is to be on a mandatory 
or a voluntary basis.  However, it is improbable that such a requirement would be 
pressed by the developing States, knowing that there would not be any forthcoming 
compromise by the industrialised States on this issue.27  It is more likely that the 
developing States would be content with a significant share of the benefits derived 
                                                           
 
25 Wassenaar Arrangement, BASIC DOCUMENTS (2009), at 
<http://www.wassenaar.org/publicdocuments/2009/Basic%20Documents%20-
%20Jan%202009.pdf>, 20 January 2009, last accessed on 30 November 2009. 
26 The Member States of the Wassenaar Arrangement are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States: Wassenaar 
Arrangement, Participating States, at <http://www.wassenaar.org/participants/index.html>, last 
accessed on 28 November 2009; and the MTCR Partners are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Brazil, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Republic of Korea, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United 
Kingdom and the United States: Missile Technology Control Regime, MTCR Partners, at 
<http://www.mtcr.info/english/partners.html>, last accessed on 28 November 2009. 
27 See Colin B. Picker, A View from 40,000 Feet: International Law and the Invisible Hand of Technology 
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from such exploitation activities without experiencing the desire to undertake such 
exploitation activities for themselves. 
6.2.2.4  Competing and Participating International Enterprise 
The concept of creating an international commercial entity, controlled and operated 
by the relevant regulatory authority, to actively compete with commercial ventures 
regulated by that authority has proven to be completely unacceptable to the 
industrialised States.  Accordingly, the creation of the Enterprise to participate in deep 
seabed mining had proven to be a significant obstacle to the acceptance of the 
Convention on the Law of the Sea by the industrialised States.28  It would be 
reasonable to assume that the industrialised States have not had a change of heart on 
the issue when considering the regulatory framework for celestial bodies. 
In fact, the difficulties and risks posed by the international proliferation of advanced 
space technology would only be more problematic in relation to the Enterprise.  If the 
industrialised States would hesitate before transferring such technologies to other 
States, this hesitation would only multiply in relation to transferring such technologies 
to an intergovernmental organisation to be dominated by developing States.  It would 
                                                           
 
28 Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 170.  See Reynolds, supra note 4; and Stephen E. Doyle, 
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not be surprising that the industrialised States would prefer to surrender a larger share 
of the revenue derived from the exploitation of mineral resources than to be placed 
under an obligation to allow other States to acquire such advanced technology. 
6.2.3  Economic Development vs. Environmental Safeguards 
6.2.3.1  Preservation of the Environment of Celestial Bodies 
The Outer Space Treaty requires States to avoid harmful contamination of outer 
space, the Moon and other celestial bodies in their exploration and use.29  However, 
the term “harmful contamination” is not defined in the Outer Space Treaty.  This 
obligation is expanded in the Moon Agreement, which requires States to: 
… take measures to prevent the disruption of the existing balance of 
its environment, whether by introducing adverse changes in that 
environment, by its harmful contamination through the introduction 
of extra-environmental matter or otherwise.30 
If the obligations of the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Agreement required strict 
compliance, then much would turn on the definitions of “harmful contamination” and 
“adverse changes”.  There is as much potential to give narrow definitions to these 
                                                           
 
29 Outer Space Treaty, Article IX. 
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terms, so as to make it virtually impossible to have practical use of celestial bodies, as 
it would be to define them broadly so that only activities that have the potential to 
threaten the wholesale destruction of the celestial body would need to be prevented.  
This absence of meaningful definitions has been the subject of much criticism in terms 
of the need to protect the environment of celestial bodies.31  However, this lacuna 
does give the Authority with the opportunity to develop and adopt detailed rules and 
guidelines on the protection of the environment of celestial bodies that would be 
consistent with the requirements of the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Agreement. 
In particular, the Authority ought to adopt appropriate rules that require Member 
States and their private entities that undertake prospecting, exploration and 
extraction activities on celestial bodies to: 
•  remove all equipment, fixtures and installations at the end of their 
licensed period and either return them to the Earth, transport them to 
another site on the same celestial body, transport them to another celestial 
body or to dispose of them by burning them up through a planetary 
atmosphere or in the Sun; 
                                                           
 
31 See, for example, Paul G. Dembling and Swadesh S. Kalsi, Pollution of Man’s Last Frontier: Adequacy 
of Present Space Environmental Law in Preserving the Resource of Outer Space (1973) 20 NETH. INT’L. L. 
REV. 125; Marta Miklody, Some Remarks to the Legal Status of Celestial Bodies and Protection of 
Environment  (1982) 25 PROC. COLL. L. OUTER SP. 117; and Raymond T. Swenson, Pollution of the 
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•  remove all pollutants and waste materials at the end of their licensed 
period and either return them to the Earth or to dispose of them through 
the atmosphere of another planet or the Sun; 
•  minimise the generation of space debris in orbits around the Earth and the 
celestial body; and 
•  to the extent feasible, make good any environmental damage caused to the 
surface and subsoil of the celestial body during the licensed period. 
While these requirements may appear to be somewhat stringent in nature, there are a 
number of factors that would mean that the burden imposed by these rules would be 
minimal in practice.  First, prospecting, exploration and extraction activities on 
celestial bodies are likely to be robotic rather than manual in nature, as this would 
dispense with the need to send life support systems, living quarters, food and water 
supplies, a tavern and satellite-relayed screenings of Monday Night Football from the 
surface of the Earth, significantly reducing waste production.  Second, as the energy 
needed to send materials back to the Earth is negligible compared to the energy cost of 
sending materials from the surface of the Earth, it is likely that ore processing would 
take place on the Earth, thus minimising the generation of pollutants.  Third, the 
significant equipment manufacturing and transportation costs incurred make it highly 
likely that most of the equipment would be transferred or sold to another mining site, 
either on the same celestial body or otherwise.  These factors would combine to Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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reduce the actual cost of complying with these environmental preservation rules and, 
in any event, are comparable to the cost of complying with the environmental law 
applicable to mining activities in many terrestrial States. 
6.2.3.2  Prevention of Harmful Contamination of the Earth 
The Outer Space Treaty requires States to avoid harmful contamination and adverse 
changes to the environment of the Earth as a result of the introduction of extra-
terrestrial matter.32  This requirement is reaffirmed in the Moon Agreement.33  
Christol has noted the limited effectiveness of these requirements as it leaves “ample 
room for States to obstruct international cooperation in space and to take arbitrary 
decisions”.34  Further, Dembling and Kalsi have observed that Article IX of the Outer 
Space Treaty “does not prevent harmful space conduct especially that result in Earth 
pollution” as it is “self-judging, self-imposed and self-policed”.35 
However, the dawn of the age of space mining will bring with it the significant risk 
that much harm may be done to the Earth, its biological diversity or its environment 
through the introduction of extra-terrestrial matter.  This concern may be 
                                                           
 
32 Outer Space Treaty, Article IX. 
33 Moon Agreement, Article 7(1). 
34 Carl Q. Christol, THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE (1982), at 140. 
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compounded by recent scientific studies that suggested that there was life on Mars.36  
While the risk of a biological contamination of the Earth resulting from mining of 
celestial bodies may be somewhat remote, the risk of chemical contamination of the 
Earth cannot be underestimated.  Accordingly, if deemed appropriate, the Authority 
ought to adopt rules concerning the compulsory quarantine and sample testing and 
analysis of materials intended to be returned to the Earth.37 
6.2.3.3  Restrictions on Exhaustive Exploitation of Celestial Bodies 
As a definitional issue, the Moon Agreement and the other relevant treaties do not 
stipulate what type of celestial bodies it applies to or, more pertinently, what would 
constitute “celestial bodies” for the purposes of international space law.  After all, 
bodies that exist in the Solar System range in size from to microparticles to Jupiter, in 
composition from dense metallic solids such as a number of asteroids to frozen lumps 
of ice and rock such as most comets, and in distance to the Earth as close as the Moon 
                                                           
 
36 See Hannah Devlin, Evidence of Life on Mars Lurks Beneath Surface of Meteorite, NASA Experts Claim, 
THE TIMES (London), 27 November 2009, at 
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/science/space/article6934078.ece>, last accessed on 30 
November 2009. 
37 See George S. Robinson, Earth Exposure to Martian Matter: Back Contamination Procedures and 
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and as far as distant Kuiper Belt Objects.38  The absence of such definitional limits 
raises a particular problem in the circumstance where technology enables a mining 
operation to move or even completely consume a celestial body in the Solar System, 
such as a comet or a small Near Earth Asteroid. 
Considering the divergent views on what may constitute a “celestial body”, it may be 
more prudent for any new international legal regime to ensure that all bodies in the 
Solar System be considered “celestial bodies” for the purposes of the international 
treaties and simply prescribe restrictions on the “exhaustive” or “complete” 
exploitation of smaller bodies, which involves the total destruction of the small object.  
In other words, it may be more economically and physically convenient and feasible to 
move an entire small asteroid from its natural orbit to Earth orbit, where its resources 
can then be processed and dispatched to the surface of the Earth.  For example, these 
restrictions may include prescribing the maximum diameter and mass of objects that 
may be removed from their natural orbit for any purpose, including mineral resource 
exploitation.  Such limitations would also have the benefit of making it unlawful to 
move an object of significant size being moved to Earth orbit, which may pose 
                                                           
 
38 See, for example, R. Lynne Allen, Brett Gladman, J. J. Kavelaars, Jean-Marc Petit, Joel W. Parker and 
Philip D. Nicholson, Discovery of a Low-Eccentricity, High Inclination Kuiper Belt Object at 58 AU 
(2006) 640 ASTROPHYSICS J. 83; and Jane X. Luu and David C. Jewitt, Kuiper Belt Objects: Relics from 
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significant risk to life and property on Earth by its accidental or even deliberate 
impact with the Earth.39 
6.2.3.4  Nuclear Power Sources and Propulsion Systems 
Nuclear and Radioisotopic Power Sources 
Although solar power remains the most efficient and effective means of generating 
electrical power in the inner Solar System, such power sources may need to be 
supplemented by other means of electricity generation considering the likely distance 
from the Sun and also the tremendous needs for electrical power for mining 
operations.  Nuclear reactors are thus very strong candidates for deployment on such 
missions, as they can provide a large amount of electrical power without the need to 
require much mass to be launched from the surface of the Earth. 
In 1992, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Principles Relevant 
to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space (the “NPS Principles”).40  
Elaborating on the requirements of the Outer Space Treaty, the NPS Principles 
                                                           
 
39 See, for example, Leonard David, Space Weapons For Earth Wars, at 
<http://www.space.com/businesstechnology/technology/space_war_020515-1.html>, 15 May 2002, 
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impose conditions that have to be met when designing nuclear and radioisotopic 
power sources onboard a spacecraft.  In particular, the NPS Principles requires that: 
•  the probability of accidents onboard with serious radiological 
consequences must be kept extremely low; 
•  any foreseeable safety-related failures or malfunctions onboard the 
spacecraft must be capable of being corrected or counteracted by 
procedural or automatic means; 
•  the design of the spacecraft must be done in a manner that ensures, with a 
high degree of confidence, that the hazards in foreseeable operational or 
accidental circumstances are kept below acceptable levels, with reference 
to appropriate standards imposed by the International Commission on 
Radiological Protection and relevant international radiological protection 
guidelines to limit exposure in accidents; and 
•  spacecraft design must restrict radiation exposure geographically and to 
individuals to the limit of 1 millisievert per year.41 
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One of the issues of particular concern in the use of nuclear and radioisotopic fuel cells 
has a different condition, namely that of ultimate disposal.  Such spacecraft must be 
designed with a system of containment that will withstand the heat and other 
conditions of re-entry and impact on the surface of the Earth or water to ensure that 
no radioactive material may be scattered into the atmosphere, the ocean or the soil.  
These concerns stem from the long half-life and the potency of plutonium-238 and 
other likely radioisotopic materials to be used.  Further, new guidelines ought to be 
adopted by the international community to ensure that such materials and equipment 
are not left on the surface of celestial bodies but are instead sent into a trajectory 
towards the Sun for ultimate disposal, preferably without being in close proximity to 
the Earth when crossing Earth orbit. 
Nuclear and Radioisotopic Propulsion Systems 
Given the distances that need to be travelled in any commercial space mining venture, 
nuclear and radioisotopic propulsion systems would be strong candidates for many 
such ventures.  However, the preamble to the NPS Principles specifies that the sphere 
of their application includes only utilisation of nuclear power sources in space to 
generate “electric power on board space objects for non-propulsive purposes”.  At the 
same time, it leaves the option to revise the Principles, as new nuclear power 
applications emerge and international recommendations on radiological protection 
evolve.  In practice, this means that for the time being only the existing general Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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principles as contained in the relevant treaties would apply to a spacecraft using 
nuclear and radioisotopic propulsion systems and the safety requirements of the NPS 
Principles would have no application. 
As nuclear propulsion systems are not limited by the quantity of chemical fuels that 
may be carried into space, such systems can generate continuous thrust to achieve 
much faster speeds than those based on the existing chemical rocket technologies.  In 
1998, the United States deployed an ion propulsion engine using xenon gas onboard 
the probe Deep Space 1.42  This example clearly shows that there is the potential to 
develop nuclear electric propulsion systems that will make space travel and 
transportation faster, cheaper and more energy efficient. 
As nuclear propulsion systems are much more efficient and effective when deployed 
on deep space and interplanetary missions, the lack of specific legal regulation of such 
propulsion systems would, in practice, pose minimum risk to the Earth and its 
environment as well as to human health, both in terms of their operation, waste 
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Robert F. Roman, NEXT: NASA’s Evolutionary Xenon Thruster (2002), paper presented at the 38th 
Joint Propulsion Conference and Exhibition, 7-10 July 2002, in Indianapolis, Indiana, United States 
of America; and Ivana Hrbud, Melissa van Dyke, Mike Houts and Keith Goodfellow, End-to-End 
Demonstrator of the Safe Affordable Fission Engine (SAFE) 30: Power Conversion and Ion Engine 
Operation, paper presented at the Space Technologies Applications International Forum Conference, 
3-7 February 2002, Albuquerque, New Mexico, United States of America. Meeting the Challenges and Balancing the Competing Interests in Creating a Legal Framework 
568  |  Page     
residues and disposal.43  The new international framework for celestial bodies ought to 
prescribe appropriate safety rules and guidelines, particularly in relation to: 
•  the need for immediate, public and full disclosure of any relevant 
information by the responsible country about a spacecraft with a nuclear 
or radioisotopic propulsion system onboard in cases of its malfunction or 
possible re-entry into the Earth atmosphere; 
•  imposing the same design safeguards on nuclear propulsion systems as 
those relating to nuclear power sources under the NPS Principles; 
•  providing for the full and absolute entitlement to reimbursement of all 
reasonable costs incurred in the recovery, cleanup and return of the 
spacecraft and of any environmental damage caused or sustained; and 
•  require for their planned ultimate disposal by a trajectory that would 
ensure their eventual capture by the gravity of the Sun.44 
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6.2.4  Regulation vs. Free Market 
6.2.4.1  Creation of an International Regulatory Authority 
One of the fundamental aspects of the common heritage of mankind doctrine is the 
international regulation and control of their use and exploitation.  Consequently, the 
unilateral regulatory approaches taken by various industrialised States, particularly 
the United States, in opposition to the Convention on the Law of the Sea was a serious 
blow to the advocates of international regulation.45  This was particularly so as the 
unilateral regulatory frameworks, which operated between States on the basis of 
mutual and reciprocal recognition and comity, presented an alternative regulatory 
approach for mining activities in the deep seabed that was practical and feasible. 
It is inconceivable for the developing States to agree to abandon their demand for an 
international regulatory framework administered by an international authority and, 
instead, to accept unilateral regulation of mining activities on celestial bodies on the 
basis of reciprocal recognition.  This is particularly so in light of the experience in 
relation to the Convention on the Law of the Sea.  Accordingly, it is evident that a 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
44 See Ricky J. Lee and Catherine Doldirina, Legal and Policy Issues Arising from the Use of Nuclear and 
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regulatory regime can only be implemented through the creation of the Authority that 
will have the right to control and regulate activities in relation to exploitation of 
mineral resources from celestial bodies. 
6.2.4.2  Exclusivity in Licensing 
As part and parcel of the effort to persuade industrialised States to concede the role of 
regulating mining activities on celestial bodies to the Authority instead of doing so by 
means of unilateral approaches, the Authority must be able to grant exclusive licensing 
rights to States and their private entities.  Exclusivity would form the fundamental 
basis on which sufficient legal certainty can be found to attract investment. 
Although such a system may be subject to abuse and certain measures would need to 
be adopted in order to eliminate or minimise such abuses, such exclusivity would not 
be a negotiable element for the industrialised States.  In any event, the absence of 
exclusivity would only lead to potential disputes arising between Member States or 
their private entities as a result of overlapping rights.  This only greatly increases the 
risk of harmful interference in their respective space activities, about which the Outer 
Space Treaty has required States to prevent and consult with each other.46 
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6.2.4.3  Minimum Work Obligations 
One of the significant lessons learned from the regulation of the use of the 
geostationary orbit by the International Telecommunication Union is the need to 
avoid the “paper satellite” problem.  The problem became particularly acute when 
Tonga sought to abuse the first-come first-served process of allocating orbital slots on 
the geostationary orbit by filing for 16 orbital slots between Asia and the Americas.47  
Although Tonga was eventually compelled to limit its claim to six orbital slots, it is 
clear that conferring orbital slots to most developing States would only allow these 
States to “lease” their orbital slots to commercial operators for profit.48 
Such problems can be overcome by the Authority being proactive in assessing the 
feasibility of a proposed mining operation and granting exclusive licences for 
prospecting, exploration and/or extraction activities only on condition that the 
licensee would be required to satisfy minimum work requirements that prescribe the 
minimum amount of ore that must be extracted within a certain timeframe or the 
licensee may face monetary penalties and the forfeiture of the licence.  These 
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arrangements are quite common under the domestic laws and regulations of most 
States.  However, a balance must be struck between the need to ensure licences are not 
granted for frivolous licence applications and allowance for the enormous amount of 
financial investment and timeframe involved in extra-terrestrial mining operations. 
6.2.4.4  Protection of the Global Commodity Markets 
One of the unique features of extra-terrestrial mining ventures is that, unlike 
terrestrial mining or even deep seabed mining, there is unlikely to be a regular or 
gradual production of mineral resources from such mining activities.  Instead, it is 
more likely that the entire production of the mining operation would be transported 
in a single “shipment” from the celestial body to the Earth, or for the extracted ores to 
be transported to the Earth in large tranches.  Unless the mining venture sought to 
store the ores on the Earth and gradually release them onto the commodity markets, 
which it is unlikely to do given the anticipated need to recover the capital investment 
as quickly as possible, such a large influx of supply of a particular commodity would Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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have a significant impact on the price of that commodity in the global market.49  
However, any intervention on the part of the Authority in restricting the amount of 
mineral resources that may be released onto the commodity markets may be seen by 
the industrialised States to be an unwelcome intrusion in the workings of a 
functioning global free market. 
One solution may be for the Authority to buy the mineral resources produced from 
celestial bodies at the market price of those mineral resources, after deducting a small 
discount.  The Authority would then slowly release the resources onto the global 
commodity market in accordance with an established plan set out by the Authority.  
This would have the benefit of providing the extra-terrestrial mining venture with the 
best and quickest means of realising full value for their mineral resources.  The 
Authority, meanwhile, would have effectively shielded both the relevant venture and 
the States with significant terrestrial mining ventures from a sudden depreciation of 
the commodity prices resulting from a sudden large increase in supply.  However, to 
implement such a strategy, the Authority would need significant cash reserves that it 
may not have available to it without resort to the Common Heritage Fund. 
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6.2.5  Public Interest vs. Commercial Concerns 
6.2.5.1  Satisfaction of Baseline Demand of the Least Developed States 
for Essential and Scarce Mineral Resources 
The principal motivation for mining of mineral resources from celestial bodies will be 
economic needs driven by the physical and economic scarcity of such resources in the 
Earth’s crust.  Consequently, it is foreseeable that eventually the entire global demand 
for most mineral resources will be met by the supply from celestial bodies.  This is 
particularly so with the increasing consciousness among the international community 
as to the environmental and climatic impact of terrestrial mining activities that may 
lead to the socio-economic exhaustion of mineral resources on Earth before the 
physical exhaustion of such resources. 
If the mineral resources of the Earth will eventually be depleted by mining activities, 
then there may be philosophical as well as economic objections on the part of the 
developing States, particularly the poorest and least developed among them.   
Principally, it would be seen as an attempt by the industrialised States to deplete the 
mineral resources of celestial bodies to fuel their industrial needs, just as they have 
done with those in the Earth’s crust since the Industrial Revolution.  Since these 
resources are to be extracted from the common heritage of mankind, a strong 
argument may be made that such mining activities ought to ensure that the poorest Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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and least developed States of the world are ensured a baseline supply of essential 
mineral resources to ensure their survival and basic economic development.  Such 
baseline supply obligations can be compared with the universal service obligations 
that existed in INTELSAT and INMARSAT prior to their corporatisation near the 
end of the previous century.50 
The United Nations defines a Least Developed Country (“LDC”) based on: 
(1)  has gross national income per capita of less than US $ 745.00; 
(2)  human factors, such as high percentage of undernourished population, 
high infant mortality rate, low secondary school enrolment ratio and low 
literacy rate; and 
(3)  economic factors, such as population, geographical remoteness, 
merchandise export concentration, share of primary production in gross 
domestic product, homelessness and economic and export instability.51 
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There are currently 49 LDCs as defined by the United Nations.52  It is suggested that, 
in relation to certain mineral resources identified by the Authority as being essential 
for survival and basic economic development, that the Authority would ensure a 
baseline supply of such mineral resources to the LDCs.  If the Authority is to purchase 
the entire production output of mining activities from celestial bodies that has been 
returned to the Earth, then such a supply would not be difficult to be procured.   
Further, the financing for such supplies would be provided by the discounting applied 
by the Authority to the commodity price when purchasing the mineral resources from 
the extra-terrestrial mining operation. 
6.2.5.2  Economic Protection of Terrestrial Mining Activities 
In the Convention on the Law of the Sea, the economic interests of developing States 
with significant terrestrial mining activities are protected by certain economic 
measures.  These measures include limitations placed on production of mineral 
resources from the deep seabed and payments by deep seabed mining operations to a 
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compensation fund to assist such developing States in adjusting to any resulting 
adverse economic conditions. 
However, deep seabed mining and the framework for mining of celestial bodies as 
proposed differ in a number of significant aspects and, accordingly, it may not be 
necessary or prudent for the similar measures to be implemented in relation to mining 
of celestial bodies.  These major differences include: 
(1)  the mining of celestial bodies is likely to be prompted by a decline in the 
supply of mineral resources from the Earth’s crust, which is unlikely to be 
a strong economic factor in the pursuit of deep seabed mining; 
(2)  the Contribution to be paid to the Administrative Fund and the Common 
Heritage Fund would be comparable to royalties payable to any of the 
Member States, had the mining operation taken place within its territory; 
(3)  the Authority will purchase the entire production of mining operations on 
celestial bodies that are returned to the Earth and gradually release the 
mineral resources onto the commodity markets to avoid price shocks and 
other sudden changes to the global markets; and 
(4)  the costs incurred in undertaking a mining operation on celestial bodies is 
significantly and substantially higher than equivalent costs of deep seabed Meeting the Challenges and Balancing the Competing Interests in Creating a Legal Framework 
578  |  Page     
mining and terrestrial mining, particularly taking into account the costs to 
be incurred in transportation and robotic mining equipment. 
6.2.5.3  Management and Control of the Common Heritage Fund by 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank 
One of the potentially controversial aspects of the implementation of the new 
regulatory framework will be the control and management of the Common Heritage 
Fund.  Instead of having such management functions carried out by the Authority or a 
part of the Authority, it may be more appropriate to take advantage of existing 
international institutions and have the Common Heritage Fund managed and 
controlled jointly by the International Monetary Fund (the “IMF”) and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the “World Bank”). 
The World Bank is tasked with providing financial and technical assistance to 
developing States, usually by means of low-interest loans, interest-free credits and 
grants to developing States for infrastructure and social projects.53  Decision-making 
power is held by the Board of Directors, which comprises one Executive Director from 
each of France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States and 
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another 19 Executive Directors elected by the other Member States, with voting rights 
weighted by the shareholding of the Member States that appointed them.54 
The IMF was established for the purpose of, inter alia, facilitating the balanced 
growth of international trade, provide financial resources to assist States in balance of 
payments difficulties and to assist in the reduction of poverty through funding to 
States in financial difficulties and provide technical assistance to assist in improving 
economic management.55  Similar to the World Bank, the IMF is managed by its 
Executive Board, on which voting rights are determined based on the special drawing 
rights held by the Member State appointing that Executive Director.56 
The proposal to have the Contributions paid into a fund such as the Common 
Heritage Fund, which is to be administered by the World Bank, is not a new one.57  
However, though some of the funds in the Common Heritage Fund may be 
distributed to developing States for their own use or to assist them in the exploration 
and use of outer space, it may be prudent to limit such payments to a minor portion of 
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the use of the Common Heritage Fund.58  Instead, the majority of the Common 
Heritage Fund ought to be administered jointly by the World Bank and the IMF to 
assist developing States in specific funding for retiring short-term and high-interest 
sovereign debt, providing funding for infrastructure, health and education projects 
and to correct balance of payment problems. 
6.2.6  Hard Law vs. Soft Law 
Since the adoption of the Moon Agreement, the principal law-making activities of the 
United Nations in relation to outer space and celestial bodies have shifted focus from 
the drafting and adoption of multilateral treaties to General Assembly declarations.  
While treaties are binding on States that have ratified them, it remains a matter of 
academic and intergovernmental controversy if resolutions of the General Assembly 
can be considered binding instruments of international law without the intervention 
of customary principles.  Even with the five multilateral treaties, the international 
community appears to have deliberately avoided the creation of binding dispute 
settlement and enforcement mechanisms, most notably in the nature of the Claims 
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Commission provided for under the Convention on the International Liability for 
Damage Caused by Space Objects (the “Liability Convention”).59 
For the Authority and the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon 
Agreement to have any international legal credibility in regulating the prospecting, 
exploration, extraction and ancillary activities on celestial bodies, enforcement 
mechanisms and dispute settlement mechanisms must be created as an integral part of 
the Authority.  To that end, it would be necessary for its Member States to adopt 
binding and compulsory dispute settlement mechanisms and for enforcement 
mechanisms involving imposition of penalties, forfeiture of the Permits or even 
seizure and confiscation of mineral resources from celestial bodies.  Only through such 
mechanisms can the developing States have confidence in the ability of the Authority 
to ensure compliance with legal principles and specific rules and guidelines of the 
Authority by the industrialised States and their nationals and private entities. 
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In addition to the multilateral treaties, it will be necessary for the Authority to have 
quasi-legislative powers in drafting and enacting specific regulations, rules and 
guidelines dealing with various aspects of the regulation of mining activities on 
celestial bodies.  These issues include preservation of the environment of celestial 
bodies, protection of the environment of the Earth and the use of nuclear and 
radioisotopic power sources and propulsion systems.  It is preferable for the Authority 
to regulate these and similar issues by way of regulations, rules and guidelines rather 
than by treaty provisions as the former provides for much-needed flexibility and 
adaptability to technological advancement and innovation and shifting international 
socio-economic and environmental concerns.  Consequently, there must be some 
means by which the Authority can have such powers to make regulations and for their 
approval and implementation by the Member States of the Authority.  
6.3  PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
6.3.1  Overview 
With the legal and policy issues resolved, the creation of an international legal 
framework for commercial mining activities in outer space would not be complete 
without resolving also the practical and administrative issues in relation to the 
implementation and operation of such a new framework.  While the new international 
legal framework can be created through the adoption of the Implementation Meeting the Challenges and Balancing the Competing Interests in Creating a Legal Framework 
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Agreement, the framework would have no practical effect until it is implemented and 
the mechanisms for doing so are created.  It would become apparent that the practical 
implementation of this new framework cannot be achieved without the establishment 
of a new organisation that would administer the new regulatory framework. 
The essential elements of the structure, composition, functions and powers of the 
organs of this new organisation will need to be considered in turn to enable its 
establishment and the implementation of the revised legal principles to be adopted in 
the new framework.  This is in addition to considerations that must be made in 
relation to the financing and budgetary requirements of creating and operating such 
an organisation, potentially prior to any revenues are generated from the exploitation 
of resources from celestial bodies. 
It is envisaged that the resolution of the practical issues arising from the 
implementation of a new international legal framework would improve the 
acceptability of the new proposed framework for the international community.   
Further, this would also reduce the legal uncertainty relating to commercial space 
mining ventures and provide incidentally an administrative framework for the 
regulation of other future activities in outer space. Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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6.3.2  Implementation Agreement 
Just as the 1994 Agreement had provided for the necessary compromises concerning 
the position of various States on the Convention on the Law of the Sea, it is 
appropriate to implement the new international legal framework by means of a 
multilateral treaty (the “Implementation Agreement”) embodying the legal 
principles to be applied in creating the framework under the Outer Space Treaty and 
the Moon Agreement.  As such, it is clear that any State that desired to participate in 
the Authority must also be party to the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Agreement. 
There are four principal reasons why adoption by means of the Implementation 
Agreement is preferable to drafting and adopting a treaty de novo to replace the Moon 
Agreement.  First, most of the principles in the Moon Agreement would be acceptable 
to both industrialised and developing States if agreement can be reached as to the 
practical and financial content and effect of the common heritage of mankind 
obligations under Article 11.  Second, the majority of the principles contained in the 
Moon Agreement merely reaffirm or elaborate the existing legal principles as 
contained in the Outer Space Treaty and may have even crystallised into principles of 
customary international law.  Third, the existence of the Moon Agreement is one of 
the major driving forces behind any impetus to create a new regulatory framework 
and, in the absence of the Moon Agreement, it is possible that such efforts would lose 
some sense of motivation and urgency in adopting a new framework.  Fourth, it is 
perhaps a matter of fairness to the 13 States Parties to the Moon Agreement that they Meeting the Challenges and Balancing the Competing Interests in Creating a Legal Framework 
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ought to retain the rights and benefits of being party to the Moon Agreement as the 
new framework is no more than an implementation of the regime foreshadowed in 
Article 11 of the Moon Agreement.   
6.3.3  Organisational Structure 
The Authority will have to be established by multilateral treaty, presumably the same 
treaty that would adopt the new legal and policy principles to be implemented by the 
Authority.  The proposed objects of the Authority would include: 
(1)  the participation of all of its Member States in the formulation and 
revision of legal and regulatory provisions of the relevant treaties dealing 
with space activities, particularly concerning space mining ventures; 
(2)   the regulation of space mining ventures on celestial bodies through the 
licensing of various relevant activities and continuing surveillance and 
monitoring of activities conducted by licensees, as well as the collection 
and distribution of a share of the financial benefits as derived; and 
(3)  the peaceful and fair settlement of disputes between the Authority and the 
States and between States themselves in relation to mining activities in 
outer space and the provision of judicial oversight of the licensing 
activities of the Authority. Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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Figure 6.3-1.  Structure of the Proposed International Space Development Authority 
Accordingly, the Authority is proposed to have three major administrative organs.  
The General Assembly of the Authority is to act as the quasi-legislative body and 
would be the principal deliberative body of the Authority.  The operational and 
administrative work of the Authority is to be conducted by the Secretariat, which also 
facilitates the work of the General Assembly, the Branches of which are responsible 
for different aspects of the practical implementation of the new legal and regulatory 
framework.  The dispute settlement role of the Authority is to be facilitated by the 
Registry, which provides administrative support and coordination for a number of Meeting the Challenges and Balancing the Competing Interests in Creating a Legal Framework 
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arbitral panels and the appellate body, which for convenience may be called the Space 
Development Appeals Tribunal (the “Tribunal”). 
6.3.4  Membership of the Authority 
6.3.4.1  Different Approaches to Membership 
On the subject of qualification for membership of the Authority, there are clearly at 
least four possible approaches to determining membership of the Authority: 
(1)  membership is limited to space-faring States only with equal voting rights; 
(2)  membership is limited to States that have made a financial investment 
into the commercial activities of the Authority only; 
(3)  membership is open to all Member States of the United Nations; or 
(4)  membership is open to all States regardless of their status of membership 
of the United Nations. 
There are some precedents for intergovernmental organisations that limit access to 
States that meet a certain qualifying criteria.  The 1959 Antarctic Treaty, for example, 
limits participation to States that have demonstrated their interest in Antarctica by 
“conducting substantial research activity there, such as the establishment of a Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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scientific station or the despatch of a scientific expedition”.60  The 1994 Final Act and 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation provides that accession to the 
World Trade Organisation (“WTO”) would be on terms to be agreed between the 
prospective Member State and each interested Member State by consensus.61  
Although there is the possibility for limiting membership to the Authority only to 
space-faring States, the existing space treaties would undermine the legal effectiveness 
of any of the legal principles contained in the new legal framework.  This is 
particularly the case with the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Agreement.  The 
existing principles of non-appropriation and common heritage of mankind, among 
other legal principles, would cast doubt and uncertainty on the effect of legal 
provisions limited in their application to an exclusive club of Member States.  With a 
legal framework created with the intention of providing legal certainty to the 
international community at large, such limited membership to the new legal 
framework is clearly unsuitable. 
Similarly, it is probably not feasible or practicable for membership of the Authority to 
be limited to States that make a substantial financial investment in the Authority.  
Certain international intergovernmental institutions, such as the IMF, the 
                                                           
 
60 Antarctic Treaty, opened for signature on 1 December 1959, 402 U.N.T.S. 71; 12 U.S.T. 794; 19 
I.L.M. 860 (entered into force on 23 June 1961), Article IX. 
61 Final Act and Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, opened for signature on 15 
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International Telecommunications Satellite Organisation (“INTELSAT”) or the 
International Maritime Satellite Organisation (“INMARSAT”), all require some 
substantial contribution to the financial capital of the organisation.  In the case of the 
IMF, for example, membership and voting rights are tied to the financial contribution 
of its Member States.62  Similar provisions can be found in the respective constituent 
documents of INTELSAT and INMARSAT, before their subsequent corporatisation 
to become multinational business concerns.63 
Such a model for the membership of the Authority is not feasible because it is not 
carrying on an enterprise of some kind.  For example, INTELSAT and INMARSAT 
were intergovernmental organisations created to enable a common business enterprise 
with very high infrastructure costs and potential global benefits to be established and 
financed.64  The IMF was established to act as a lender to poorer States in monetary 
crises and endemic liquidity issues and, as such had to be capitalised by contributions 
from its Member States.65  The Authority can conceivably carry on a common global 
                                                           
 
62 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Articles III and XII(5). 
63 Agreement on the International Telecommunications Satellite Organisation, opened for signature on 
20 August 1971, 23 U.S.T. 3810 (entered into force on 12 February 1973), Articles V; and Convention 
on the International Maritime Satellite Organisation, opened for signature on 3 September 1976, 31 
U.S.T. 1; T.I.A.S. 905 (entered into force on 16 July 1979), Articles 5. 
64 Agreement on the International Telecommunications Satellite Organisation, Article III; and 
Convention on the International Maritime Satellite Organisation, Article 3.  See Alan Beesley, Edward 
McWhinney Q.C., Dallas W. Smythe, Barry Mawhinney and A. E. Gotlieb, The Legal Problems of 
International Telecommunications with Special Reference to INTELSAT (1970) 20 UNI. TORONTO  L. J. 
287; and Steven A. Levy, INTELSAT: Technology, Politics and the Transformation of a Regime (1975) 
29 INT’L. ORG. 655. 
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enterprise in the pursuit of mineral wealth in outer space, in a similar fashion to the 
earlier creation and development of INTELSAT and INMARSAT.  However, such a 
development for the deep seabed had proved to be widely unpopular among members 
of the international community.66  It is thus likely that taking a similar approach to the 
mining of celestial bodies may prove to be equally unpopular, if not more so. 
There is a significant number of multilateral treaties and conventions that are only 
open to members of the United Nations, such as the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide or the International Covenant of Civil and 
Political Rights.67  There are certainly some positive reasons why such a restriction 
may be prudent, especially within the context of an international treaty dealing with 
the peaceful exploitation of mineral resources in outer space.  First, the Charter of the 
United Nations requires its Member States to refrain from the use of force in resolving 
international disputes.68  Second, the Member States of the United Nations are 
                                                           
 
66 James B. Morell, THE LAW OF THE SEA: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 1982 TREATY AND ITS 
REJECTION BY THE UNITED STATES (1992); David Silverstein, Proprietary Protection for Deepsea 
Mining Technology in Return for Technology Transfer: New Approach to the Seabed Controversy (1978) 
60 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y. 135; and Yuwen Li, TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY FOR DEEP SEABED MINING: 
THE 1982 LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION AND BEYOND (1994). 
67 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened for signature on 9 
December 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force on 12 January 1951), Article 11; and 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature on 16 December 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force on 23 March 1976), Article 48. 
68 Charter of the United Nations, opened for signature on 26 June 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. xvi; 1946 U.K.T.S. 
67 (entered into force on 24 October 1945), Article 2(4).  Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United 
Nations states that “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
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expressly prohibited from intervening in the domestic affairs of other States.69  Third, 
States are bound to comply with decisions of the Security Council.70  These decisions 
include decisions imposing trade sanctions and embargoes and the use of military 
force against States that are considered by the Security Council to be a threat to 
international peace and security.71  Limiting the membership of the Authority to that 
of the United Nations would mean that the Member States of the Authority would 
have to comply with the international legal norms relating to peaceful settlement of 
disputes and other relevant principles in their activities in outer space.  However, this 
benefit may be redundant given that those norms have probably crystallised into 
customary international law and, in any event, any State that is party to the Outer 
Space Treaty would already be required to comply with the Charter of the United 
Nations.72  On the other hand, this requirement can potentially create much legal 
controversy, such as that over the status of the membership of Serbia and Montenegro 
                                                           
 
69 Ibid., Article 2(7).  Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations provides that “Nothing 
contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such 
matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application 
of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.” 
70 Ibid., Article 25. 
71 Ibid., Articles 41-42. 
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to the Genocide Convention when it was deemed not to have succeeded to 
Yugoslavia’s membership of the United Nations at the relevant time.73 
If membership of the Authority is open to all States, some of the problems arising 
from the limitations suggested above, whether based on substantial activity, financial 
investment or membership of the United Nations, would be overcome or avoided.  
Considering the biggest obstacle to the adoption of the Moon Agreement and the 
Convention on the Law of the Sea have been the lack of widespread acceptance by the 
international community, opening up the Authority to universal membership can only 
help to persuade States to become members of the Authority and participate in its 
mechanisms.74  Although some industrialised States may find discouragement in the 
potential voting power held by developing States in the Authority, the structure, 
composition and processes outlined below may alleviate some of the concerns of the 
industrialised States. 
                                                           
 
73 Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the Case concerning Application of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. 
Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections (Yugoslavia v. Bosnia and Herzegovina) [2003] I.C.J. Rep. 7.  See 
also Ricky J. Lee, Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the Case concerning 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Yugoslavia v. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina) [2003] AUS. INT’L. L. J. 205; and John R. Crook, The 2003 Judicial Activity of 
the International Court of Justice (2004) 98 AM. J. INT’L. L. 309. 
74 See Morell, supra note 66; Stanley B. Rosenfield, The Moon Treaty: The United States Should Not 
Become A Party (1980) 74 AM. SOC’Y. INT’L. L. PROC. 162; Carl Q. Christol, The 1979 Moon 
Agreement: Where is it Today? (1999) 27 J. SP. L. 1; Doug Bandow, UNCLOS III: A Flawed Treaty 
(1981) 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 475; and Steven J. Molitor, The Provisional Understanding Regarding 
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6.3.4.2  Proposed Process for Accession to Membership 
In the absence of a comprehensive multilateral convention dealing with the law of 
outer space, membership of the Authority would thus involve the prerequisites of 
being party to the Outer Space Treaty, the Moon Agreement and the Implementation 
Agreement.  Accordingly, the process for acceding to membership of the Authority 
would reasonably involve four essential criteria or steps: 
(1)  the prospective Member State being a party to the Outer Space Treaty, if 
it is not already an existing party; 
(2)  the prospective Member State being a party to the Moon Agreement, if it 
is not already an existing party; 
(3)  the prospective Member State being a party to the Implementation 
Agreement; and 
(4)  the prospective Member State being accepted by the General Assembly of 
the Authority as a Member State. 
Accession to the Outer Space Treaty is done simply by the prospective Member State 
signing and ratifying it and then depositing the instrument of ratification with the Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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designated depositories, namely the Governments of the Russian Federation, the 
United Kingdom and the United States.75  Similarly, the Moon Agreement can be 
acceded to in the same way, with a prospective Member State signing and ratifying it 
and then depositing its instrument of ratification with the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations.76  One would suggest that a prospective Member State may accede to 
the Implementation Agreement in the same manner, unless the Implementation 
Agreement prescribes a different specific procedure. 
The next issue that arises is whether the grant of new membership to a State would 
require approval by the General Assembly of the Authority and, if so, by how large a 
majority of Member States of the Authority before membership can be approved.  In 
the case of the United Nations, for example, acceptance of a new Member State 
requires a two-thirds majority of its General Assembly and a majority of nine out of 
the fifteen members of the Security Council, including the concurrence of its five 
permanent members.77  In the case of most intergovernmental organisations, such as 
the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (“OPCW”) or the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (“UNESCO”), admission 
to membership is automatic for Member States of the United Nations upon 
                                                           
 
75 Outer Space Treaty, Article XIV. 
76 Moon Agreement, Article 19. 
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ratification of the constituent treaty governing the organisation.78  In the case of some 
intergovernmental organisations, such as the Food and Agriculture Organisation and 
the World Tourism Organisation, a two-thirds majority of its existing Member States 
as present and voting would be necessary before a new Member State can be admitted 
to membership of the organisation.79  There are also international organisations with 
special membership rules, such as the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (“IFAD”) and the International Atomic Energy Agency, that are 
peculiar to the organisations themselves.80  The requirements for membership to some 
international organisations are summarised in Table 6.3-1 below. 
                                                           
 
78 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on their Destruction, opened for signature on 13 January 1993, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163; 32 
I.L.M. 800 (entered into force on 29 April 1997), Article XX.; and Constitution of the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, opened for signature on 16 November 1945, 4 
U.N.T.S. 275 (entered into force on 4 November 1946), Article II(1). 
79 Constitution of the Food and Agriculture Organisation, opened for signature on 16 October 1945, 12 
U.S.T. 980 (entered into force on 1 November 1945), Article II(2); and Statutes of the World 
Tourism Organisation, opened for signature on 27 September 1970, 27 U.S.T. 2211 (entered into 
force on 2 January 1975), Article 5. 
80 Membership to the International Fund for Agricultural Development requires approval by the 
Governing Council, in which voting rights are based on membership and financial contribution: 
Agreement Establishing the International Fund for Agricultural Development, opened for signature 
on 20 December 1976, 28 U.S.T. 8435; 15 I.L.M. 922 (entered into force on 30 November 1977), 
Articles 3 and 6.  Membership subject to approval by a simple majority of the General Conference 
upon recommendation by the Board of Governors: Statute of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, opened for signature on 26 October 1956, 276 U.N.T.S. 3; 8 U.S.T. 1093 (entered into force 
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81 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature on 7 December 1944, 15 
U.N.T.S. 295 (entered into force on 4 April 1947), Article 92. 
82 Constitution of the International Labour Organisation, opened for signature on 28 June 1919, 15 
U.N.T.S. 35; 1948 U.K.T.S. 47 (entered into force on 10 January 1920), Article 1. 
83 Terms of membership is to be determined by the Board of Governors: Articles of Agreement of the 
International Monetary Fund, Article II. 
84 Convention on the International Maritime Organisation, opened for signature on 6 March 1948, 289 
U.N.T.S. 48; 9 U.S.T. 621 (entered into force on 17 March 1958), Article 5. 
85 Statutes of the World Tourism Organisation, Article 5. 
86 Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunication Union, opened for signature 
on 22 December 1992, 1825 U.N.T.S. 3; 28 U.S.T. 7645 (entered into force on 1 July 1994), Article 2. 
87 Constitution of the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation, opened for signature on 8 
April 1979, 1401 U.N.T.S. 3; 1985 A.T.S. 18 (entered into force on 21 June 1985), Article 3. 
88 Constitution of the Universal Postal Union, opened for signature on 10 July 1964, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
(entered into force on 1 January 1966), Article 11. 
89 Constitution of the World Health Organisation, opened for signature on 22 July 1946, 14 U.N.T.S. 
185 (entered into force on 7 April 1948), Article 4. 
90 Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organisation, opened for signature on 14 
July 1967, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231; 28 U.S.T. 7645 (entered into force on 26 April 1970), Article 5. 
91 Membership is open to the Member States of the International Monetary Fund: Articles of 
Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Article II. 
92 Convention of the World Meteorological Organisation, opened for signature on 11 October 1947, 77 
U.N.T.S. 143; 1950 A.T.S. 5 (entered into force on 23 March 1950), Article 3. 
93 Membership is to be on specific terms approved by a two-thirds majority of the Ministerial 
Conference: Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, opened for signature on 15 April 
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It is suggested that the Authority would be better classified with the organisations that 
provide for automatic admission upon accession to the Moon Agreement and the 
Implementation Agreement, given the desire to attain universal membership among 
the international community.  This is similar to the requirement for membership to 
the International Seabed Authority, which is automatic upon accession to the 
Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Agreement relating to the Implementation 
of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.94 
6.4  ADMINISTRATIVE AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS 
6.4.1  Enforcement and Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
After the adoption and implementation of administrative processes for the operation 
of the Authority, it is prudent to then turn to the need for dispute settlement 
mechanisms within the Authority.  This is because disputes will inevitably arise 
between applicants and the Authority, the permit-holders and the Authority as well as 
between permit-holders themselves.  There is also the additional need for judicial 
                                                           
 
94 Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature on 10 December 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3; 21 
I.L.M. 1261 (entered into force on 16 November 1994); and Agreement Relating to the 
Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 
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accountability in the operation and administration of the Authority.  Accordingly, it is 
clear that judicial mechanisms must be created to enable the peaceful, effective and 
judicious settlement of such disputes. 
To that end, it is probably preferable to create separate arbitral panels (the “Panels”) 
for the resolution of different types of disputes, allowing for different specialist 
expertise to be employed in the determination of different types of disputes.  It is 
envisaged that the following bodies would be created within the Authority, each to be 
vested with judicial and quasi-executive functions relevant to their area of specialist 
expertise or competence: 
•  the Licensing Oversight Panel to hear and resolve disputes between the 
Authority and applicants or permit-holders in decisions relating to the 
grant or refusal of applications, the enforcement of conditions of permits 
and considerations of contraventions of legal or regulatory provisions of 
the relevant international law; 
•  the  Environmental Protection Panel to provide for surveillance, 
monitoring and enforcement of environmental protection safeguards in 
the protection of the environment of the Earth, the mitigation of space 
debris, contamination and pollution as well as the remediation works on 
celestial bodies;  Meeting the Challenges and Balancing the Competing Interests in Creating a Legal Framework 
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•  the Financial Duties Panel for the assessment and settlement of disputes 
over the quantum of contributions payable into the Administrative Fund 
and the Common Heritage Fund; 
•  the Dispute Settlement Panel for the settlement of commercial disputes 
between applicants or permit-holders in relation to activities subject to the 
premises of the Authority; and 
•  the Space Development Appeals Tribunal that hears appeals from the 
Panels, including but not limited to the Dispute Settlement Panel. 
The jurisdiction, powers, functions, composition and procedures of each of these 
Panels and the Space Development Appeals Tribunal are outlined below. 
6.4.2  Licensing Oversight Panel 
The Licensing Oversight Panel has the primary responsibility within the Authority for 
dealing with Exploration Permits, Mining Permits or Occupation Permits (together Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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the “Permits”).95  In fulfilling this responsibility, the functions of the Licensing 
Oversight Panel would include: 
(1)  considering and evaluating applications for the Permits or their renewals; 
(2)  exercising the discretion to grant or refuse applications for the Permits or 
their renewals; 
(3)  prescribing general or specific limitations or conditions on the Permits 
granted; and 
(4)  if merited, revoking any of the Permits granted for non-compliance with 
any limitation or condition imposed by the Permits. 
As the Licensing Oversight Panel would be tasked with the most essential and 
controversial aspect of the operations of the Authority, its composition and decision-
making process will undoubtedly be the subject of much debate in the negotiations.  
This is because both the industrialised and developing States will seek to have 
majority control.  Given the history of the negotiations over the composition and 
decision-making power of the Council of the International Seabed Authority, it is 
unlikely that the industrialised States would allow the developing States to attain 
                                                           
 
95 In this context, Occupation Permits are granted for areas that are not being explored or mined but are 
occupied for ancillary purposes, such as an electric power plant. M
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6.4.3  Financial Duties Panel 
The purpose of the Financial Duties Panel is to assess and levy the financial 
contributions payable by space mining ventures (the “Contribution”) to the 
Administrative Fund and the Common Heritage Fund, in implementation of the 
common heritage of mankind doctrine under Article 11 of the Moon Agreement.  
This is perhaps the most controversial of all issues arising from the Moon Agreement 
and, as a matter of practical reality, also the most controversial of all aspects of the 
Authority and its operations.  It is expected that the Financial Duties Panel would 
have to strive towards the following policy objectives and principles, even though such 
objectives and principles may be conflicting or even contradictory in nature: 
(1)  there should be no Contribution payable on a space mining venture to the 
extent that the mineral resources are to be used for global public interest 
or scientific purposes; 
(2)  the Contribution must not significantly discourage the financing and 
undertaking of commercial space mining ventures for mineral resources 
that are particularly rare in the Earth’s crust and have significant 
economic or physical demand on Earth; 
(3)  the physical and environmental impact of any space mining venture must 
be recognised and duly compensated for through the Contribution; Meeting the Challenges and Balancing the Competing Interests in Creating a Legal Framework 
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(4)  the economic impact of mineral resources from outer space on mining 
activities in developing States must be adjusted for and minimised; and 
(5)  the Contribution must be substantial and not token compensation for the 
extraction and exploitation of mineral resources from the celestial bodies 
in pursuance to the common heritage of mankind doctrine. 
In pursuit of these objectives, it is apparent that the Financial Duties Panel would 
have to take into account the following relevant considerations in determining the 
financial duty payable for any given space mining venture: 
(1)  the extent to which the mineral resources are to be used for global public 
interest or scientific purposes instead of commercial profit-making; 
(2)  the reasonable costs incurred in the venture, including the reasonable 
costs associated in obtaining finance for the venture; 
(3)  the stability and the extent of price fluctuations of the world commodity 
markets for the relevant mineral resources; 
(4)  the profits that may be reasonably derived from the venture, taking into 
account good, prudent and reasonable industry and business practices; 
(5)  the abundance, or lack thereof, of the relevant mineral resources in the 
Earth’s crust and the reasonable accessibility of known reserves; Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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(6)  the economic and physical necessity of such mineral resources; 
(7)  the physical impact of the mining activity on the celestial body in question 
and its availability and suitability for future exploration, scientific 
investigation and use by third parties; and 
(8)  the economic impact of the release of the mineral resources from the 
venture on the world commodity markets, especially the impact on the 
economies of developing States that engage in mining activities for the 
same or similar mineral resources on Earth. 
As with the Licensing Oversight Panel, it is probable that the industrialised States 
would not concede control of the Financial Duties Panel as they would not want the 
risk of the Financial Duties Panel acting arbitrarily in prescribing an unreasonably 
high rate of the Contributions to be made.  This would be the case despite the fact 
that the control of the Common Heritage Fund itself would be devolved to the World 
Bank and the IMF under the present proposal. 
6.4.4  Environmental Protection Panel 
The Environmental Protection Panel would be responsible for ensuring that holders 
of various Permits comply with the conditions and obligations imposed under the 
Outer Space Treaty, the Moon Agreement and the Implementation Agreement as well Meeting the Challenges and Balancing the Competing Interests in Creating a Legal Framework 
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as any specific rules or guidelines adopted by the Authority.  To that end, the 
Environmental Protection Panel would be responsible for enforcing such rules and 
issuing penalty assessments in the event that the holder of a Permit has failed to 
comply with any such obligation.  The Environmental Protection Panel would also 
have the responsibility of directing the Secretariat of the Authority to report to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations in the event of any risk of the harmful 
contamination of the environment of the Earth or a celestial body as required under 
the Moon Agreement.96 
6.4.5  Dispute Settlement Panel and the Space Development 
Appeals Tribunal 
The Dispute Settlement Panel is intended to be the arbitral authority of first instance 
in resolving disputes between States in relation with their activities that are connected 
with the Moon Agreement or the Implementation Agreement.  As such, it is modelled 
after the Dispute Settlement Body within the framework of the World Trade 
Organisation (the “WTO”) and the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International 
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Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (the “ITLOS”).97  The decisions of the Dispute 
Settlement Panel are to be binding on the parties but are subject to appeal to the 
Tribunal or the International Court of Justice. 
The Tribunal is to act as the highest arbitral authority in the enforcement of the 
international law relating to the exploitation and use of celestial bodies.  The Tribunal 
may be modelled after the Appellate Body within the World Trade Organisation, the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and, of course, the International Court 
of Justice.98  The jurisdiction of the Tribunal comprises all appeals from decisions of 
the Panels.  It is proposed that the Tribunal is not to have original jurisdiction, given 
the suggested jurisdictional competence of the Panels and the potential concurrent 
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.99 
                                                           
 
97 Final Act and Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, WTO Understanding on Rules 
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, opened for signature on 15 April 1994, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 154; 33 I.L.M. 1144 (entered into force on 1 January 1995); and the Convention on the Law 
of the Sea, Annex VI – Statute of the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea, opened for 
signature on 10 December 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3; 21 I.L.M. 1261, (entered into force on 28 July 
1994).  See Shabtai Rosenne, Establishing the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (1995) 89 
AM. J. INT’L. L. 806. 
98 The Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea; the WTO Understanding on Rules 
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes; and the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, opened for signature on 26 June 1945, 1945 U.K.T.S. 67 (entered into force on 24 October 
1945). 
99 The Appellate Body of the WTO similarly only has appellate jurisdiction and no original jurisdiction: 
WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Article 17(1).  
The International Court of Justice has original jurisdiction and no appellate jurisdiction, though it 
does have competence to hear applications for revisions to judgments where a decisive fact is newly 
discovered: Statute of the International Court of Justice, Articles 36 and 61. Meeting the Challenges and Balancing the Competing Interests in Creating a Legal Framework 
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The capacity of State Parties that are parties of a decision in any of the Panels to 
appeal to the Tribunal may be an automatic right per se or, alternatively, may require 
the prior leave of the Tribunal.  In the case of the Appellate Body of the World Trade 
Organisation, the right to appeal is a right that is automatic and exists per se.100  It is 
suggested that, given the nature of the functions of the Panels and the importance of 
their decisions, the right to appeal to the Tribunal should be automatic.  This is 
particularly the case given the substantial costs and time that are often required to 
conduct a case before international courts and tribunals. 
The Convention on the Law of the Sea offers a choice to its Member States in the 
compulsory settlement of their disputes between the ITLOS, the International Court 
of Justice or ad hoc arbitration.101  Each State is free to decide by written declaration 
for itself the means by which the interpretation or application of the Convention on 
the Law of the Sea is to be decided.102  This so-called Montreux Formula during the 
negotiations on the Convention on the Law of the Sea provides that a plaintiff would 
be required to go to the forum chosen by the defendant to be bound.103  In the case of 
disputes arising under Part XI of the Convention on the Law of the Sea in relation to 
                                                           
 
100 WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Article 17(4). 
101 Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 287. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Andronico O. Adede, THE SYSTEM FOR SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS 
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mining activities in the deep seabed, the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the ITLOS is 
vested with specific jurisdiction.104
 
Although the Montreux Formula may be appropriate in the case of the Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, it is suggested that it may be more appropriate for: 
•  the Dispute Settlement Panel to have exclusive and compulsory 
jurisdiction in determining any dispute between the Authority and a 
Member State or a particular applicant or holder of a Permit; 
•  the Dispute Settlement Panel to have non-exclusive but compulsory 
jurisdiction in determining any dispute between Member States and their 
nationals in relation to any activity to which the Implementation 
Agreement relates;  
•  the Tribunal to have exclusive and compulsory jurisdiction in determining 
any appeals from the Dispute Settlement Panel in relation to any dispute 
between the Authority and a Member State or a particular applicant or 
holder of a Permit; and 
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•  the Tribunal to have non-exclusive and non-compulsory jurisdiction in 
determining disputes between Member States and their nationals in 
relation to any activity to which the Implementation Agreement relates. 
Despite the availability of both the Dispute Settlement Panel and the Tribunal, it is 
anticipated that Member States may nevertheless elect to resolve relevant disputes 
between them through binding arbitration or determination by the International 
Court of Justice.  To this end, it would be appropriate to implement the Montreux 
Formula to the extent that it would require Member States to make a written 
declaration to submit to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Tribunal, the International 
Court of Justice or ad hoc arbitration to determine disputes with other Member States. 
Both the Dispute Settlement Panel and the Tribunal would be composed of a number 
of independent individual members, with the total numbers of both the Tribunal and 
the Dispute Settlement Panel being sufficient to take into account the needs of 
impartiality, workload and being representative of the principal legal systems and 
geopolitical distribution of the world.  The International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea, for example, is composed of 21 individual members, while the Appellate Body of 
the World Trade Organisation comprises seven individual members and the Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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International Court of Justice comprises 15 members.105  Specifically, it is suggested on 
the basis of those two model bodies that the members of the Tribunal: 
(1)  are nominated by State Parties to the Implementation Agreement as being 
recognised experts in the field of international law and space law and 
recognised for having a reputation of fairness and integrity;106 
(2)  are elected by a two-thirds majority of the present and voting members of 
the General Assembly of the Authority;107 
(3)  are elected to terms of nine years, except that one-third of the original 
members of the Tribunal would have terms of three years and another 
                                                           
 
105 WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Article 17(1); 
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Article 2; and Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, Article 3. 
106 See, for example, Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Articles 2(1) and 4(1); 
WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Article 17(3); 
and Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 2. 
107 Members are of the ITLOS are elected by a two-thirds majority of a meeting of the State Parties to 
the Convention on the Law of the Sea, provided that a quorum of two-thirds of the State Parties is 
constituted and the vote represents a simple majority of State Parties: Statute of the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Article 4(4).  Members of the Appellate Body of the WTO are 
appointed by the Dispute Settlement Body: WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Article 17(2).  Members of the International Court of Justice 
are elected by an absolute majority of the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United 
Nations, with the two votes conducted independently of each other: Statute of the International 
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one-third of their number would have terms of six years, as determined by 
lot or specific election;108 
(4)  may be re-elected to further terms;109 
(5)  have no political or administrative function or any active association or 
financial interest in any activity that are connected with the Moon 
Agreement or the Implementation Agreement;110 
(6)  enjoy diplomatic immunities and privileges when engaged on the business 
of the Tribunal;111 
                                                           
 
108 The same structure exists for the ITLOS: Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea, Article 5(1) and (2).  The members of the Appellate Body of the WTO are elected for terms of 
four years, of which three of the seven original members are to be limited to a two-year term as 
determined by lot: WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes, Article 17(2).  Similarly, the International Court of Justice adopts a similar structure, with 
judges elected to terms of nine years, with five of the original judges elected for three year terms and 
another five of that number elected for six year terms as determined by lot: Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, Article 13(1) and (2). 
109 This is also the case for the ITLOS, the Appellate Body of the WTO and the International Court of 
Justice: Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Article 5(1); WTO 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Article 17(2); and 
Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 13(1). 
110 Similar restrictions apply to members of the ITLOS, the Appellate Body of the WTO and the 
International Court of Justice: see Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 
Article 7; WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
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(7)  may not hear a case in which they were previously agent, counsel or 
advocate for one of the parties or in which they had previously heard as a 
member of any domestic or international court, tribunal or any other 
capacity;112 and 
(8)  may be removed from office if, in the unanimous opinion of the other 
members of the Tribunal, that particular member of the Tribunal does not 
comply with the conditions or the qualifications of the office.113 
6.5  FINANCING THE PROPOSED AUTHORITY 
The Authority, with its proposed structure and composition, is expected to incur 
substantial expenditure in its establishment and administration, which would have to 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
111 The same applies to members of the ITLOS and the International Court of Justice: Statute of the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Article 10; and Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, Article 19.  No equivalent provision exists in the WTO Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes.  Examples of the diplomatic immunities and 
privileges enjoyed can be found in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, opened for 
signature on 18 April 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (entered into force on 24 April 1964); and the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations, opened for signature on 24 April 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 
(entered into force on 19 March 1967). 
112 Similar restrictions apply to members of the ITLOS, the Appellate Body of the WTO and the 
International Court of Justice: see Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 
Article 8; WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
Article 17(3); and Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 17. 
113 This is the provision for the removal of the members of the ITLOS: Statute of the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Article 9.  Judges of the International Court of Justice may be 
removed from office by the unanimous decision of the other judges if a particular judge is considered 
not to comply with the conditions or qualifications of that office: Statute of the International Court 
of Justice, Article 18. Meeting the Challenges and Balancing the Competing Interests in Creating a Legal Framework 
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be met either from direct contributions from its Member States or from the regular 
budget of the United Nations.  For example, the budget for the International Seabed 
Authority until 1997 was derived from the regular budget of the United Nations, 
which provided U.S. $ 776,000.00 in 1994-1995 and U.S. $ 2,627,100.00 for 1995-
1996.114  By comparison, the World Trade Organisation, which has a much higher 
degree of complexity in structure and administrative burden than the Authority as 
proposed, cost its Member States U.S. $ 75,500,000.00 in 1995 when it was 
established.115  In the case of the International Seabed Authority and the International 
Tribunal on the Law of the Sea, the cost incurred was directly levied on their Member 
States on an assessed basis until they can be financed by contributions from seabed 
mining activities.116 
There are at least four potential approaches to the way in which the costs of 
establishing the Authority can be levied on its Member States.  First, the costs can be 
apportioned equally among the Member States of the Authority.  The benefit of this 
approach is that the cost burden incurred by each State is the same and reflects the 
voting power that each State has in the Authority.  This is the approach taken in some 
                                                           
 
114 Michael C. Wood, International Seabed Authority: The First Four Years (1999) 3 MAX PLANCK 
U.N.Y.B. 173 at 214. 
115 The Economist, Crunch!  Budget Problems at the World Trade Organisation, THE ECONOMIST, 4 April 
1998. 
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regional organisations, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(“ASEAN”),117 and the Southern Africa Development Community (the “SADC”).118 
Second, the costs can be apportioned on the basis of the likelihood that the Member 
States would participate in activities that may involve the mineral exploitation of the 
Moon and other celestial bodies.  Some may perceive this to be the implementation of 
a “user pays” system for the establishment of the Authority, in that those who benefit 
from the establishment and the use of the Authority are to bear their costs.  The 
adoption of this justification, however, fails to recognise that the purpose of the 
common heritage of mankind doctrine is, among others, the sharing of the benefits 
derived from the exploitation of mineral resources from the Moon and other celestial 
bodies.  Accordingly, the practical effect of the doctrine is that all Member States of 
the Authority, in particular the developing States, are the main beneficiaries from the 
establishment and use of the Authority.  It stands to reason that, if the intention is to 
adopt a “user pays” approach to financing the cost of establishing the Authority, then 
all Member States of the Authority and not just the industrialised States are to bear 
some of the burden of this cost. 
                                                           
 
117 Rodolfo C. Severino, SOUTHEAST ASIA IN SEARCH OF AN ASEAN COMMUNITY: INSIGHTS FROM THE 
FORMER ASEAN SECRETARY-GENERAL (2006), at 33. 
118 Katharina Pichler Coleman, INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND PEACE ENFORCEMENT: THE 
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Third, the costs can be apportioned on the basis of the size of the economies of the 
Member States, in a similar manner to which the expenditure budget of the United 
Nations is apportioned on the basis of the capacity of the Member States to pay.119  
The principal benefit of this approach is that a poorer State is not precluded from 
participating in the United Nations or other intergovernmental organisations simply 
because it cannot afford to pay an equal contribution to the budget of the 
organisation.120  The principal deficiency with this approach lies in the fact that, 
although the developing States are likely to be significant financial beneficiaries of the 
operations of the Authority, they would be bearing a disproportionately light financial 
burden in relation to the establishment of the Authority. 
                                                           
 
119 Article 17 of the Charter of the United Nations provides that “The expenses of the Organisation 
shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly”.  Rule 160 of the General 
Assembly Rules of Procedure provides that the Committee on Contributions is to advise the General 
Assembly on the scale of assessment upon which the apportionment of the financial contributions 
are based, which is to be reviewed regularly: General Assembly Resolution 58/1(B).  On 21 December 
2007, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a biennial budget of US$4.17 billion for 
2008-2009: United Nations, “Concluding Main Part of Session, General Assembly Adopts $4.17 
Billion Budget” (press release, 21 December 2007), at 
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/ga10684.doc.htm>, last accessed on 19 May 2008.  See 
also Warren Hoge, Despite U.S. Opposition, United Nations Budget is Approved, THE NEW YORK 
TIMES, 23 December 2007, at <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/23/world/23nations.html>, last 
accessed on 4 May 2008. 
120 See Irving B. Kravisand and Michael W. S. Davenport, The Political Arithmetic of International 
Burden Sharing (1963) 71 J. POL. ECON. 309; Gi-Heon Kwon, The Declining Role of Western Powers in 
International Organisations: Exploring a New Model of U.N. Burden Sharing (1995) 15 J. PUB. POL’Y. 
65; Michele Fratianni and John Pattison, The Economics of International Organisations (1982) 35 
KYKLOS 244; and J. Diamond and J. R. Dodsworth, Normative and Positive Theories of International 
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Fourth, the costs can be apportioned on the basis of the size of the economies of the 
Member States but a prescribed minimum contribution is required of all Member 
States regardless of their economic power.121  Similarly, a prescribed maximum 
contribution is also determined to avoid the handful of the largest economies in the 
world shouldering an overly large financial burden vis-à-vis all other States.122  In this 
manner, a balance is struck between the desire to provide some equitable sharing of 
the burden of establishing the Authority while taking into account the economic and 
financial weaknesses of developing States in contrast to the industrialised States. 
6.6  CONCLUSIONS 
The present uncertainty in the legal environment in which commercial mining 
activities on celestial bodies may take place cannot attain any more degree of 
entrenchment or permanence than it already has.  With the Moon Agreement adopted 
by the General Assembly more than 30 years ago, the time has come for the 
international community to negotiate in good faith, along with an appreciation of 
                                                           
 
121 The United Nations has adopted a similar approach, prescribing the minimum contribution of a 
Member State to be one-thousandth percent (0.001%) of its operating budget, though in order to 
avoid imposing an overly high financial burden on some countries, a prescribed ceiling of one 
hundredth precent (0.01%) is imposed for least developed States: United Nations, Briefing on 
Methodology of the Scale of Assessment (2006), at <http://www.un.org/ga/61/fifth/scale-
method.pps>, last accessed on 19 May 2008. 
122 The United Nations has adopted a similar approach, to cap the contribution of the United States, the 
largest economy in the world as measured by gross domestic product, at twenty-two percent (22%) of 
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political realities and commercial practicalities, with a view to reaching agreement on 
the terms of the Implementation Agreement that would create the Authority. 
For such an effort to succeed, there must be a strong sense of universality achieved in 
spirit and in practice with the creation of this new regulatory framework for the 
Implementation Agreement to be able to provide international legal certainty in 
theory as well as practice and ideology.  Though balancing the diverse interests and 
concerns of the various stakeholders in the international community, this proposal 
may then be successful in reaching an appropriate compromise that can be acceptable 
to most, if not all, States in the international community.  
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7.1  QUOD ERAT DEMONSTRANDUM 
7.1.1  Elements of Proving the Hypothesis 
The central hypothesis to be demonstrated in this work is that one of the major 
inhibiting factors to the commercial exploitation of mineral resources from celestial 
bodies is the absence of an appropriate legal framework to govern such activities.  In 
order to demonstrate that the hypothesis is satisfied, it is contended that the following 
assumptions must be proven: Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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•  there is an economic scarcity of mineral resources in the Earth’s crust; 
•  an analysis of the physical and technical requirements to conduct activities 
in the exploration, prospecting and exploitation of mineral resources from 
celestial bodies, particularly the Near Earth Asteroids, shows that such 
activities are feasible within the capabilities of existing technology; 
•  an analysis of the socio-economic factors relating to the supply of various 
mineral resources on Earth and the financial requirements for the 
commercial exploitation of mineral resources from celestial bodies, 
particularly the Near Earth Asteroids, shows that such exploitation is 
economically and financially feasible; 
•  generally and specifically, the absence of a legal framework giving certain 
rights and duties to private actors in the space sector inhibits the financing 
and development of such private or commercial ventures; and 
•  at present, an appropriate legal framework governing relevant activities 
on celestial bodies does not exist. 
Each of these elements are discussed in greater detail below. Concluding Observations 
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7.1.2  Economic Scarcity of Resources in the Earth’s Crust 
This is undisputed that the mineral resources that exist in the Earth’s crust are finite 
and, consequently, it is only a matter of time that such mineral resources would be 
physically exhausted by continued human consumption and use.  While the physical 
scarcity of mineral resources would certainly, without more, create an economic 
scarcity of such resources, it is more likely that economic exhaustion of such mineral 
resources would precede their physical exhaustion.  This is because there would 
eventually be a point on the supply and demand curve where consumers would refuse 
to pay the high prices resulting from diminishing reserves, increasing costs of 
extraction and need for mitigation of environmental costs, or when producers refuse 
to sell at government-imposed low prices. 
Accordingly, given the physical scarcity of mineral resources in the Earth’s crust, it is a 
necessary consequence that there is an economic scarcity of mineral resources on 
Earth if such resources are not supplemented by further physical reserves to be found.  
It is clear that such mineral resources may be found and, indeed, can only be found on 
the celestial bodies of the Solar System, particularly asteroids and other smaller 
celestial bodies such as comets that pass near the orbit of the Earth.  Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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7.1.3  Physical and Technical Feasibility of Asteroid Mining 
Within the orbit of Jupiter, there is a large number of asteroids orbiting around the 
Sun in orbits of various shapes, eccentricities and distances.  Most asteroids are 
concentrated in the main Asteroid Belt between Mars and Jupiter, which are referred 
to as the Main Belt asteroids.  In addition to the Main Belt asteroids, there are a few 
classes of asteroids that have orbits that are near, or even crossing, the heliocentric 
orbit of the Earth. These asteroids are collectively referred to as the Near Earth 
Asteroids and they present themselves as strong candidates for future mining 
activities when the mineral resources on Earth are being depleted.  This is because the 
gravity, travel time and launch costs to these asteroids would be comparatively low for 
economically viable exploitation to take place. 
The two most important considerations in determining the viability of mining a 
particular asteroid is the time factors as well as the energy costs required for the 
mission, assuming that the existing human technology for propulsion, spacecraft 
design and construction as well as mining infrastructure can be adapted for asteroid 
mining purposes.  The ideal asteroid for mining purposes would be one that is close to 
the Earth and allows for a long mining season without requiring large amounts of 
energy to reach it or to return to Earth from it.  In this context, the mining of some 
Near Earth Asteroids would be preferable over others as some energy efficient 
trajectories, such as Hohmann transfer trajectories, allow for only very short mining 
seasons on the asteroid.  These factors mean that, from physical and technical Concluding Observations 
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perspectives, the exploitation of mineral resources from Near Earth Asteroids is 
certainly feasible within the confines of present technology. 
7.1.4  Economic and Financial Feasibility of Commercial Mining 
on Near Earth Asteroids 
The important factors in determining the economic and financial feasibility of the 
mining of mineral resources from Near Earth Asteroids include: 
(1)  the cost of the operation; 
(2)  the time between the launch of the operation and the eventual sale or use 
of the mineral resources; 
(3)  various risks of failure; and 
(4)  the expected return on the investment. 
After a brief analysis, it is apparent that the predominant factor that is the most 
variable in the evaluation of the financial viability of a commercial venture to extract 
and exploit mineral resources from celestial bodies is the evaluation of the risks.  This 
is especially the case in relation to risks that cannot be resolved by technical or 
financial means.  For such a venture to be profitable or at least financially feasible, 
there must be legal and regulatory certainty for the conduct of such activities. Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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7.1.5  Absence of an Appropriate Legal Framework 
It is already commonly acknowledged that the existing body of space law is very ill 
adapted to the commercial realities in the space industry today.  When the Outer 
Space Treaty was drafted and adopted in the early 1960s, the present 
commercialisation and development in space was inconceivable to all except the most 
devoted science fiction writers and filmmakers.  It was not until the Moon Agreement 
that the possible mineral exploitation of other celestial bodies was considered.   
However, even in the Moon Agreement it is quite apparent that its drafters did not 
anticipate the development of space mining ventures until the distant future, as 
Article 11 of the Moon Agreement deferred the creation of a specific 
intergovernmental organisation until such time as deemed necessary by the parties to 
the Moon Agreement when space mining activities become imminent. 
It is in the exploration and extraction segments of the mining operation that would 
encounter most of the legal obstacles.  In the exploration segment, ores samples are 
either robotically analysed in situ or are returned to Earth for further and more 
detailed analysis.  While this exercise of gathering samples may arguably be no 
different to the collection of lunar rocks during the U.S. Apollo missions, the crucial 
distinction is that in the case of mineral prospecting, the samples are collected for 
ultimate private commercial rather than public scientific gain.  Accordingly, this raises 
issues as to the lawfulness of such activities. Concluding Observations 
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In the extraction segment, the legal obstacles involved are more complex and difficult 
to resolve.  The freedom of access and the principle of non-appropriation found in the 
Outer Space Treaty, in particular, makes mineral extraction activities on celestial 
bodies difficult, if not impossible, to justify in law.  This is because the conduct of 
mineral extraction activities must have, as a necessary requirement, some degree of 
exclusionary right in the area of asteroid being mined, a right that would be contrary 
to those legal principles.  Further, the act of extraction itself may contravene, by its 
very nature, the principle of non-appropriation. 
It is thus apparent that, even if the Moon Agreement is to be considered an integral 
and applicable part of space law, the existing international legal framework cannot 
provide an adequate regime for the regulation of mineral exploration and extraction 
activities on celestial bodies.  The fact that only 13 States have signed and ratified the 
Moon Agreement have led commentators to suggest that the impasse in the 
international community over the effect and application of its terms is unlikely to be 
broken in the near future.1  However, unless such regulation is provided by means of 
new legal instruments, the conclusion can be easily reached that there is indeed a 
lacuna of law dealing with such activities on celestial bodies. 
                                                           
 
1 United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs, Status of International Agreements Relating to Activities 
in Outer Space as at 1 January 2010, 1 January 2010, at 
<http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/publications/ST_SPACE_11_Rev2_Add3E.pdf>, last accessed 
on 22 April 2010. Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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7.2  QUOD ERAT MELIORANDUM 
7.2.1  Conceptual Evolution of the Common Heritage of Mankind 
In the 1970s, the increasing international clout of the developing world have led to an 
attempt of a revolution in international law and international economic relations.   
The New International Economic Order that was introduced at that time also 
included the invention of the concept of the common heritage of mankind and the 
increasing conflict between the industrialised States and the developing States over 
the content and effect of the application of this concept, particularly to the deep 
seabed and celestial bodies. 
The doctrine of the common heritage of mankind not only prohibits sovereignty and 
ownership over the celestial bodies, it also creates positive rights on the part of the 
States in the international community to insist that they have a role in the 
management of the areas that are the common heritage of mankind as representatives 
of all humankind.  As such, the doctrine requires any benefits so derived from the 
exploitation of mineral resources from the common heritage of mankind to be shared 
internationally or is for the common benefit of all humankind.  Given that the terms 
and the extent of the sharing of such benefits are not specified, much uncertainty and 
debate remains on the practical effects of the doctrine. Concluding Observations 
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7.2.2  Past Failures over the Deep Seabed and Antarctica 
Because of this differing opinion, both the Moon Agreement and the original 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea received very little support among 
States and, consequently, the world reached an impasse over the law relating to deep 
seabed and celestial bodies.  The industrialised States refused to be part of any 
intergovernmental system that set a precedent for international taxation, while the 
developing States did not want any agreement that did not clarify the extent of their 
rights and benefits derived from the common heritage of mankind.  However, when 
the Convention on the Law of the Sea was about to enter into force in the early 1990s, 
strenuous diplomatic efforts were made to reach a compromise.  In 1994, this resulted 
in the adoption of the Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which was acceptable to both 
industrialised and developing States by significantly reducing the obligations of the 
deep seabed mining States.   
The idea that States may not own a particular spatial area to the exclusion of other 
States is not a new one, for as far back as the Seventeenth Century it was already 
recognised that the sovereignty of States does not extend to the high seas.  However, 
the idea that a spatial area may be subject to the universal ownership of humankind is 
certainly a new concept.  For example, it was proposed in the early Twentieth Century 
that the Antarctic continent should be a sanctuary for all humankind.  Although the 
Antarctic Treaty does not stipulate as such, it is certainly the intention of the Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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Antarctic Treaty System for some form of common management to take place over 
the exploration and scientific work conducted in Antarctica by deferring the 
territorial claims of the interested States. 
7.2.3  Attempt to Create a Legal Framework for the Exploitation of 
Mineral Resources on Celestial Bodies 
The industrialised States saw the concept of celestial bodies being declared the 
“common heritage of mankind” as providing that all States shall have access to the 
benefits derived from the resources contained in those spatial areas and nothing more.  
The developing States, on the other hand, believed that the industrialised States would 
be required to share their profits derived from the exploitation of these spatial areas 
with the developing States on an equitable basis.  This is because, by exploiting 
resources in the common property of humankind, the industrialised States are 
depriving the developing States of the resources of which they are proud part owners. 
Because of this differing opinion, the Moon Agreement received very little support 
among States and, consequently, the world reached an impasse over the law relating to 
deep seabed and celestial bodies.  The industrialised States refused to be part of any 
intergovernmental system that set a precedent for international taxation, while the 
developing States did not want any agreement that did not clarify the extent of their 
rights and benefits derived from the common heritage of mankind.  Resulting from Concluding Observations 
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the uncertainty over the implications of the Moon Agreement, it is clear that the 
Moon Agreement or some form of it must be fully implemented and made acceptable 
to most States for commercial space mining ventures to take place once the economic 
and technical conditions are present.  Without legal certainty, the entrepreneurs or 
their investors would not be satisfied that title could be safely asserted over the mining 
site and for the ore to be extracted and sold on Earth. 
No similar efforts have been made with the implementation of Article 11 of the Moon 
Agreement as with the treatment of the deep seabed under the 1994 Implementation 
Agreement.  Meanwhile, views differ over the legal ramifications of the present Article 
11 in the interim period before the Article is implemented.  Without agreement on the 
application of Article 11 of the Moon Agreement, there is no legal framework that is 
applicable to the exploitation of mineral resources from celestial bodies, posing as a 
major obstacle to the future resource exploitation in outer space. 
7.2.4  Balancing the Interests of Competing Stakeholders 
If the international impasse over the practical effects of the common heritage of 
mankind concept as applied to celestial bodies is to be broken, there must be some 
attempt at reaching a compromise by balancing the competing interests of the various 
stakeholders on the issue.  In fact, the need the balance competing interests have 
become the most important step in removing the legal shackles to the future 
commercial mining of asteroids. Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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Considering the enormous financial commitments needed to invest in the 
technological advances necessary to enable such mining developments, the absence of 
any legal certainty will only inhibit such commitments, with the incidental detriment 
of continuing the degradation of the global environment through the exploration and 
extraction of mineral resources from environmentally sensitive areas of the Earth’s 
crust.  Accordingly, with the mining of asteroids the next necessary step in the 
economic evolution of the human civilisation, the adoption of a practical legal 
framework for the commercial exploitation of mineral resources in outer space will 
transform this present science fiction into a future reality. 
7.3  QUOD ERAT FACIENDUM 
7.3.1  Creating a New Legal Framework 
Resulting from the uncertainty over the implications of the Moon Agreement, it is a 
fundamental cornerstone of this work that the Moon Agreement or some form of it 
must be fully implemented and made acceptable to most States for commercial space 
mining ventures to take place once the economic and technical conditions are present.  
This is because without some form of international property rights available, it is 
unlikely that the entrepreneurs or their investors would be satisfied that title could be 
safely asserted over the mining site and for the ore to be extracted and sold on Earth. Concluding Observations 
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There have been different suggestions for possible frameworks in implementing 
Article 11 of the Moon Agreement, ranging from the minimalist approach of a 
subsidiary treaty clarifying the contents of Article 11 to the replacement of the entire 
treaty with the creation of an intergovernmental agency or organisation to govern all 
activities of States involving the use of outer space.  However, controversy and 
disagreements remain over the implementation of the common heritage of mankind 
provision of the Moon Agreement, for which there are several options available to the 
international community. 
However, the international community may opt to create a unique regime for the 
development of resources in outer space.  There are some significant differences 
between the terms of Article 11 of the Moon Agreement and Part XI of the 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, for example, which may imply that a different form 
of sharing of benefits may be required. 
7.3.2  Practical Aspects of the New Legal Framework 
Perhaps more importantly, it is important for any new intergovernmental 
organisation dealing with space activities to clarify the powers and functions of the 
organisation in relation to four broad areas that are relevant to commercial space 
mining activities.  These areas are the implementation of the “common heritage of 
mankind” principle, the provision of property “licences”, and the resolution of some 
jurisdictional and liability issues applicable to a space mining venture.  It is therefore Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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fitting that this work concludes by providing for ideas and proposals for the creation 
of such an organisation to allow space mining to take place, in order to give a practical 
demonstration of what needs to be done. 
7.3.3  How the World May Change 
There is no need to list the many challenges facing humanity as it 
enters the next century.  Be they environmental, political, economic 
or social, the problems are both obvious and immediate. ... For the 
environmentalists, the space option is the ultimate environmental 
solution.  For the Cornucopians, it is the technological fix that they 
are relying on.  For the hard core space community, the obvious by-
product would be the eventual exploration and settlement of the Solar 
System.  For most of humanity, however, the ultimate benefit is 
having a realistic hope in a future with possibilities.  Indeed, the space 
option is humanity’s most optimistic approach to its future. 
Our civilisation is at its peak — we have the means today to 
implement the space option but not yet the commitment.  However, 
if our species does not soon embrace this unique opportunity with 
sufficient commitment, it may miss its one and only chance to do so.  
Humanity could soon be overwhelmed by one or more of the many 
challenges it now faces.  The window of opportunity is closing as fast 
as the population is increasing.  As the 21st Century draws near, the 
main challenge to the space community will be informing and then 
convincing the public of the viability of the space option as the only 
optimistic alternative to the other current approaches to human 
destiny because our future will be either a Space Age or a Stone Age. 
— Arthur R. Woods and Marco C. Bernasconi† 
   
                                                           
 
† Arthur R. Woods and Marco C. Bernasconi, Choosing a Space Age or a Stone Age (1995), SPACE NEWS, 
2-8 October 1995.  
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Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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APOLLOS1 
 
Name  Designation  q  Q  E‐MOID  H  e  a 
Apollo  1932  HA  0.647  2.293  0.02562  16.25  0.56  1.47 
Adonis  1936  CA  0.442  3.306  0.01183  18.7  0.764  1.874 
Hermes  1937  UB  0.623  2.689  0.00411  17.5  0.624  1.656 
Oljato  1947  XC  0.624  3.726  0.00169  15.25  0.713  2.175 
Antinous  1948  EA  0.889  3.63  0.18307  15.54  0.607  2.259 
Toro  1948  OA  0.771  1.963  0.05047  14.23  0.436  1.367 
Icarus  1949  MA  0.187  1.969  0.03488  16.9  0.827  1.078 
  1950  DA  0.837  2.561  0.03984  17  0.507  1.699 
Geographos  1951  RA  0.828  1.663  0.03121  15.6  0.335  1.246 
Cuno  1959  LM  0.721  3.242  0.03138  14.4  0.636  1.982 
Cerberus  1971  UA  0.576  1.584  0.15625  16.84  0.467  1.08 
Daedalus  1971  FA  0.563  2.359  0.2686  14.85  0.615  1.461 
Sisyphus  1972  XA  0.874  2.914  0.1037  13  0.539  1.894 
  1973  NA  0.884  3.984  0.088  15.3  0.637  2.434 
Midas  1973  EA  0.622  2.93  0.00382  15.5  0.65  1.776 
  1974  MA  0.425  3.147  0.16082  15.7  0.762  1.786 
Tantalus  1975  YA  0.904  1.676  0.04344  16.2  0.299  1.29 
Orthos  1976  WA  0.823  3.984  0.10204  14.9  0.658  2.404 
Aristaeus  1977  HA  0.794  2.404  0.01002  17.94  0.503  1.599 
Bacchus  1977  HB  0.701  1.455  0.06755  17.1  0.35  1.078 
Cacus  1978  CA  0.883  1.363  0.01641  17.1  0.214  1.123 
Hephaistos  1978  SB  0.36  3.974  0.12331  13.87  0.834  2.167 
  1979  XB  0.647  3.789  0.02044  18.6  0.708  2.218 
Wilson‐Harrington  1979  VA  0.991  4.286  0.04707  15.99  0.624  2.638 
Syrinx  1981  VA  0.632  4.302  0.11202  15.8  0.744  2.467 
Nereus  1982  DB  0.952  2.025  0.00329  18.2  0.36  1.488 
  1982  TA  0.525  4.075  0.09809  14.6  0.772  2.3 
Orpheus  1982  HR  0.819  1.601  0.01374  19.03  0.323  1.21 
Eger  1982  BB  0.907  1.903  0.08009  15.38  0.354  1.405 
  1983  LC  0.761  4.468  0.02369  19.3  0.709  2.614 
  1983  VA  0.782  4.413  0.1737  16.4  0.699  2.597 
Phaethon  1983  TB  0.14  2.402  0.02062  14.6  0.89  1.271 
  1984  QY1  0.246  5.698  0.13409  14  0.917  2.972 
Jason  1984  KB  0.518  3.911  0.0744  15.7  0.766  2.215 
Camillo  1985  PA  0.987  1.84  0.07797  15.5  0.302  1.413 
Hypnos  1986  JK  0.953  4.736  0.01534  18.3  0.665  2.844 
  1986  PA  0.589  1.53  0.01954  18.4  0.444  1.06 
Epona  1986  WA  0.448  2.561  0.16121  15.5  0.702  1.505 
                                                           
 
1 IAU Minor Planet Centre, List of Apollo Minor Planets (2009), at 
<http://www.cfa.harvard.edu/iau/lists/Apollos.html>, 19 November 2009, last accessed on 19 
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Name  Designation  q  Q  E‐MOID  H  e  a 
Kwiila  1987  OA  0.606  2.387  0.08141  18  0.595  1.496 
Mithra  1987  SB  0.749  3.66  0.04555  15.6  0.66  2.204 
Pan  1987  SY  0.597  2.289  0.02825  17.2  0.586  1.443 
Poseidon  1987  KF  0.587  3.082  0.19424  15.5  0.68  1.835 
Ubasti  1987  QA  0.875  2.418  0.16978  16.2  0.468  1.647 
  1988  TA  0.803  2.279  0.00636  20.8  0.479  1.541 
  1988  XB  0.76  2.175  0.00666  18.6  0.482  1.468 
  1988  EG  0.636  1.906  0.02438  18.7  0.499  1.271 
Zeus  1988  VP4  0.783  3.742  0.07222  15.8  0.654  2.262 
  1989  UP  0.984  2.746  0.00652  20.5  0.473  1.865 
  1989  AZ  0.876  2.419  0.05573  19.6  0.468  1.648 
  1989  DA  0.987  3.34  0.04321  18.9  0.544  2.163 
Tomaiyowit  1989  UR  0.695  1.464  0.03408  18.4  0.356  1.08 
  1989  JA  0.913  2.628  0.02219  17  0.484  1.771 
Minos  1989  QF  0.676  1.627  0.0266  17.9  0.413  1.152 
Castalia  1989  PB  0.549  1.577  0.02059  16.9  0.483  1.063 
Asclepius  1989  FC  0.658  1.387  0.00324  20.4  0.357  1.022 
Xanthus  1989  FB  0.781  1.302  0.17273  17.1  0.25  1.042 
Toutatis  1989  AC  0.939  4.122  0.00608  15.3  0.629  2.531 
  1990  UO  0.285  2.229  0.20353  19.7  0.773  1.257 
  1990  UN  0.806  2.615  0.02103  23.5  0.529  1.711 
  1990  UA  0.778  2.503  0.01211  19.6  0.526  1.64 
  1990  SM  0.492  3.71  0.02679  16.2  0.766  2.101 
  1990  HA  0.759  4.349  0.01858  16.3  0.703  2.554 
  1990  OS  0.902  2.455  0.00896  19.3  0.463  1.678 
  1990  TG1  0.781  4.097  0.06821  14.8  0.68  2.439 
  1990  SS  0.894  2.511  0.06742  18.6  0.475  1.703 
  1990  MF  0.95  2.542  0.01727  18.7  0.456  1.746 
  1990  SP  0.83  1.88  0.05361  17  0.387  1.355 
  1990  UQ  0.81  2.292  0.0443  17.3  0.478  1.551 
  1990  BG  0.64  2.332  0.27306  14.7  0.569  1.486 
  1990  MU  0.555  2.687  0.02732  14.1  0.657  1.621 
  1991  XA  0.974  3.603  0.04475  23.7  0.574  2.289 
  1991  VG  0.976  1.077  0.00399  28.5  0.049  1.027 
  1991  VA  0.926  1.932  0.00705  26.5  0.352  1.429 
  1991  TF3  0.961  3.504  0.08488  19  0.569  2.232 
  1991  TB2  0.425  3.665  0.11111  17.1  0.792  2.045 
  1991  TU  0.945  1.887  0.0045  28.5  0.333  1.416 
  1991  GO  0.666  3.186  0.02533  19.9  0.654  1.926 
  1991  BA  0.713  3.772  0.00036  28.5  0.682  2.243 
  1991  LH  0.363  2.351  0.43059  17.7  0.733  1.357 
  1991  JW  0.915  1.161  0.02009  19.5  0.118  1.038 
  1991  RB  0.748  2.161  0.03793  19  0.486  1.454 
  1991  BN  0.869  2.018  0.02083  19.2  0.398  1.444 
  1991  AQ  0.487  3.94  0.01765  17.1  0.78  2.214 
  1991  DG  0.909  1.945  0.039  19.1  0.363  1.427 
  1991  VH  0.973  1.301  0.02471  16.9  0.144  1.137 
Tukmit  1991  BB  0.863  1.509  0.10983  15.8  0.272  1.186 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  1991  EE  0.848  3.646  0.02897  17.4  0.623  2.247 
  1991  CB1  0.683  2.69  0.21942  17.8  0.595  1.687 
  1991  WA  0.562  2.587  0.19395  16.8  0.643  1.575 
  1991  CS  0.938  1.308  0.02361  17.4  0.165  1.123 
  1991  VK  0.909  2.775  0.0481  16.7  0.507  1.842 
Golevka  1991  JX  0.987  4.01  0.02814  19.2  0.605  2.498 
  1991  TB1  0.942  1.966  0.14035  17  0.352  1.454 
  1991  AM  0.517  2.878  0.39587  16.3  0.696  1.698 
Talos  1991  RC  0.187  1.976  0.18932  17  0.827  1.081 
Heracles  1991  VL  0.417  3.25  0.06115  14  0.773  1.833 
  1992  DU  0.957  1.362  0.03778  25.3  0.174  1.159 
  1992  BC  0.92  1.926  0.10356  19.6  0.353  1.423 
  1992  HF  0.609  2.173  0.11989  20.4  0.562  1.391 
  1992  UY4  0.987  4.288  0.01451  17.8  0.626  2.638 
  1992  SY  0.994  3.425  0.09753  17.9  0.55  2.21 
  1992  QN  0.763  1.618  0.13254  17.1  0.359  1.19 
Sigurd  1992  CC1  0.869  1.914  0.11702  15.2  0.375  1.392 
  1992  SK  0.843  1.654  0.04579  17  0.325  1.249 
  1992  JB  0.996  2.117  0.08553  17.6  0.36  1.556 
  1992  TB  0.721  1.962  0.27265  17.1  0.462  1.342 
Cadmus  1992  LC  0.756  4.306  0.09539  15.4  0.701  2.531 
  1992  HE  0.957  3.522  0.28802  13.9  0.573  2.24 
  1993  UA  0.959  3.086  0.00361  25.4  0.526  2.022 
  1993  TZ  0.879  3.163  0.00504  26  0.565  2.021 
  1993  KA2  0.509  3.957  0.00224  29  0.772  2.233 
  1993  HP1  0.973  2.993  0.00481  27  0.509  1.983 
  1993  HD  0.485  2.405  0.00011  23  0.664  1.445 
  1993  HC  0.975  3.001  0.06685  20.6  0.51  1.988 
  1993  GD  0.84  1.365  0.14054  20.8  0.238  1.103 
  1993  KH  0.85  1.618  0.00129  18.6  0.311  1.234 
  1993  PC  0.607  1.702  0.06584  18.1  0.474  1.154 
  1993  VB  0.918  2.901  0.00063  19.5  0.519  1.91 
Ahau  1993  BW2  0.927  1.743  0.10096  17.4  0.306  1.335 
Peleus  1993  XN2  0.983  3.252  0.09763  16.5  0.536  2.118 
Izhdubar  1993  WD  0.739  1.275  0.14539  16.9  0.266  1.007 
  1993  PB  0.559  2.288  0.3734  16  0.607  1.424 
  1993  UC  0.817  4.051  0.08943  15.2  0.664  2.434 
  1993  VA  0.826  1.886  0.08035  17.3  0.391  1.356 
  1993  VW  0.873  2.518  0.06096  16.5  0.485  1.696 
  1993  EA  0.527  2.015  0.00545  17  0.585  1.271 
  1994  XM1  0.896  3.124  0.00059  28  0.554  2.01 
  1994  XG  0.793  2.367  0.06681  18.7  0.498  1.58 
  1994  XD  0.626  4.073  0.01987  19.1  0.733  2.35 
  1994  VH8  0.911  2.335  0.00277  27.5  0.439  1.623 
  1994  UG  0.876  1.601  0.02376  21  0.293  1.238 
  1994  RC  0.907  3.631  0.04282  19  0.6  2.269 
  1994  RB  0.892  4.047  0.03471  23.4  0.639  2.469 
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  1994  GV  0.962  3.046  0.00027  27.4  0.52  2.004 
  1994  GK  0.776  3.219  0.0038  24.2  0.611  1.998 
  1994  ES1  0.574  2.226  0.00077  28.5  0.59  1.4 
  1994  EU  0.994  1.76  0.03002  25.9  0.278  1.377 
  1994  EK  0.778  3.536  0.03181  20.1  0.639  2.157 
  1994  CB  0.982  1.316  0.05704  21  0.145  1.149 
  1994  CN2  0.952  2.195  0.01261  16.7  0.395  1.573 
  1994  CC  0.955  2.32  0.01576  17.7  0.417  1.638 
Illapa  1994  PM  0.366  2.59  0.02401  17.9  0.752  1.478 
  1994  CK1  0.699  3.104  0.06271  17.3  0.632  1.902 
  1994  AH2  0.739  4.329  0.10363  16.3  0.708  2.534 
  1994  LX  0.825  1.698  0.15463  15.3  0.346  1.262 
  1994  PC1  0.904  1.788  0.00059  16.8  0.328  1.346 
  1995  YR1  0.293  3.103  0.01502  20.2  0.827  1.698 
  1995  UB  0.822  1.98  0.00362  27.5  0.413  1.401 
  1995  SA  0.873  4.027  0.02113  17.4  0.644  2.45 
  1995  OO  0.477  3.832  0.29164  17.3  0.778  2.155 
  1995  LG  0.223  1.906  0.22307  18.7  0.791  1.065 
  1995  FO  0.946  2.031  0.13331  20.9  0.365  1.488 
  1995  FJ  0.792  1.379  0.14827  20.5  0.271  1.085 
  1995  FF  0.674  3.96  0.00244  26.5  0.709  2.317 
  1995  EK1  0.508  4.023  0.05125  17.6  0.776  2.265 
  1995  DW1  0.586  1.495  0.14223  21.1  0.437  1.04 
  1995  DV1  0.975  4.58  0.05195  23  0.649  2.778 
  1995  CS  0.437  3.437  0.00128  25.5  0.774  1.937 
  1995  UO5  0.556  2.564  0.4022  17.2  0.644  1.56 
  1995  BL2  0.613  1.857  0.37479  17.1  0.504  1.235 
  1996  XX14  0.892  4.207  0.0976  19.2  0.65  2.55 
  1996  XW1  0.942  2.51  0.24308  19  0.454  1.726 
  1996  VB3  0.74  2.518  0.02187  22.4  0.546  1.629 
  1996  TY11  0.571  1.886  0.19761  19.4  0.535  1.228 
  1996  TD9  0.795  1.87  0.02215  23.8  0.404  1.332 
  1996  TP6  0.947  4.365  0.09206  20.1  0.644  2.656 
  1996  TC1  0.523  3.212  0.01235  24  0.72  1.868 
  1996  SK  0.498  4.365  0.00398  16.9  0.795  2.432 
  1996  RG3  0.79  3.209  0.00264  18.5  0.605  2 
  1996  JA1  0.761  4.352  0.00443  21  0.702  2.557 
  1996  GD1  0.768  1.604  0.05944  20.6  0.353  1.186 
  1996  FT1  0.875  2.038  0.02471  24.4  0.399  1.457 
  1996  FS1  0.346  2.553  0.14614  20.3  0.762  1.449 
  1996  BT  0.201  2.212  0.03339  23  0.834  1.207 
  1996  AW1  0.737  2.316  0.04181  19.5  0.517  1.527 
  1996  AP1  0.967  2.864  0.02315  24.5  0.495  1.915 
  1996  AJ1  0.286  2.334  0.00472  20.2  0.782  1.31 
  1996  EO  0.804  1.879  0.03291  19.2  0.4  1.341 
  1996  FR3  0.445  3.888  0.0888  16.4  0.795  2.166 
  1996  FG3  0.686  1.423  0.02837  18.2  0.35  1.054 
  1996  MO  0.874  2.714  0.06812  18.4  0.513  1.794 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  1996  JG  0.612  2.993  0.01165  19.5  0.66  1.802 
  1996  EN  0.858  2.155  0.02095  16.5  0.431  1.506 
  1997  YM9  0.982  1.209  0.03051  24  0.104  1.095 
  1997  XE10  0.978  2.755  0.01576  25  0.476  1.867 
  1997  XR2  0.86  1.294  0.00064  20.8  0.201  1.077 
  1997  WQ23  0.878  2.595  0.01046  20.5  0.495  1.736 
  1997  WB21  0.997  1.925  0.05138  20.3  0.318  1.461 
  1997  VG6  0.702  2.515  0.04884  19.5  0.564  1.608 
  1997  VM4  0.491  4.752  0.11086  18  0.813  2.622 
  1997  UA11  0.894  3.902  0.00059  25.2  0.627  2.398 
  1997  US2  0.568  2.781  0.00599  19.9  0.661  1.675 
  1997  TC25  0.97  4.215  0.00154  24.6  0.626  2.593 
  1997  TZ16  0.815  3.228  0.00946  24.5  0.597  2.021 
  1997  MS  0.527  3.348  0.17572  19.1  0.728  1.937 
  1997  GD32  0.838  3.343  0.01666  21.5  0.599  2.09 
  1997  GC32  0.701  3.364  0.07099  18.5  0.655  2.033 
  1997  GL3  0.498  4.075  0.00195  19.5  0.782  2.286 
  1997  CD17  0.964  1.282  0.00732  27.5  0.142  1.123 
  1997  CZ3  0.645  2.166  0.09578  19.6  0.541  1.406 
  1997  US9  0.756  1.349  0.24843  17.3  0.282  1.053 
  1997  EH29  0.405  2.024  0.15139  19  0.667  1.214 
  1997  BQ  0.909  2.581  0.03603  18.1  0.479  1.745 
  1997  AQ18  0.613  1.681  0.18676  18.3  0.465  1.147 
  1997  AP10  0.515  2.371  0.11037  16.9  0.643  1.443 
  1997  XF11  0.744  2.14  0.00079  16.9  0.484  1.442 
  1997  WU22  0.819  2.117  0.14429  15.5  0.442  1.468 
  1997  UF9  0.571  2.314  0.37858  16.2  0.604  1.442 
  1997  BR  0.927  1.744  0.01283  17.6  0.306  1.336 
  1998  YW5  0.462  2.044  0.13115  19.8  0.631  1.253 
  1998  YM4  0.414  2.539  0.04654  19.7  0.72  1.476 
  1998  XR16  0.954  3.593  0.1608  18.5  0.58  2.273 
  1998  XD12  0.526  2.269  0.03156  20.7  0.623  1.397 
  1998  XN2  0.916  3.083  0.00862  19.6  0.542  1.999 
  1998  WD31  0.947  3.198  0.01585  23.5  0.543  2.073 
  1998  WP7  0.695  1.731  0.1262  20.2  0.427  1.213 
  1998  WL4  0.474  3.027  0.21877  19.4  0.729  1.75 
  1998  WB2  0.816  3.145  0.01469  21.8  0.588  1.981 
  1998  WZ1  0.959  3.366  0.02254  19.9  0.556  2.163 
  1998  VD32  0.756  1.446  0.03004  22.2  0.313  1.101 
  1998  VE31  0.851  1.25  0.12165  20.9  0.19  1.05 
  1998  VD31  0.523  4.779  0.05916  19.4  0.803  2.651 
  1998  VN  0.909  1.866  0.05136  20.5  0.345  1.388 
  1998  UY24  0.926  1.801  0.12764  21.6  0.321  1.364 
  1998  US18  0.838  4.41  0.03199  20.4  0.681  2.624 
  1998  SJ70  0.656  3.814  0.03382  18.4  0.706  2.235 
  1998  SL36  0.809  1.98  0.02058  20.5  0.42  1.395 
  1998  SC15  0.745  1.801  0.00033  19.4  0.415  1.273 
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  1998  SU4  0.48  1.83  0.02162  21  0.584  1.155 
  1998  SH2  0.76  4.627  0.01104  21  0.718  2.694 
  1998  QA62  0.525  3.622  0.02094  19  0.747  2.073 
  1998  QR52  0.743  1.345  0.21104  18.7  0.288  1.044 
  1998  QK28  0.979  3.684  0.00641  19.4  0.58  2.332 
  1998  QC1  0.812  3.155  0.01788  19.6  0.591  1.983 
  1998  QA1  0.985  3.224  0.00627  19  0.532  2.105 
  1998  QQ  0.394  2.077  0.17487  18.7  0.681  1.235 
  1998  QP  0.745  2.826  0.01319  21.2  0.583  1.785 
  1998  OK1  0.776  1.913  0.03903  19.5  0.423  1.345 
  1998  MW5  0.652  1.394  0.07617  19.1  0.363  1.023 
  1998  MV5  0.982  1.426  0.01623  24  0.184  1.204 
  1998  LE  0.456  2.58  0.06255  20.5  0.7  1.518 
  1998  KY26  0.984  1.48  0.00238  25.5  0.201  1.232 
  1998  KO3  0.595  4.596  0.08623  19.3  0.771  2.596 
  1998  KN3  0.179  3.031  0.01836  18.5  0.888  1.605 
  1998  KM3  0.65  2.694  0.00293  19.7  0.611  1.672 
  1998  KH  0.474  2.832  0.07099  18.4  0.713  1.653 
  1998  HK49  0.921  1.888  0.07856  22.4  0.344  1.405 
  1998  HH49  0.772  2.33  0.00305  21.3  0.502  1.551 
  1998  HT31  0.771  4.297  0.03171  20.8  0.696  2.534 
  1998  HJ3  0.505  3.463  0.01164  18.9  0.745  1.984 
  1998  HM1  0.9  1.934  0.01612  24.5  0.365  1.417 
  1998  FF14  0.862  1.645  0.02689  20.4  0.312  1.253 
  1998  FG12  0.943  3.541  0.10993  21  0.58  2.242 
  1998  FL5  0.981  2.108  0.10469  21.5  0.365  1.545 
  1998  FL3  0.948  1.572  0.04124  22  0.248  1.26 
  1998  EP4  0.872  2.247  0.06237  21.5  0.441  1.56 
  1998  EE3  0.911  3.512  0.00988  27  0.588  2.211 
  1998  DV20  0.778  3.189  0.07288  20.3  0.608  1.983 
  1998  DX11  0.986  4.025  0.01103  27.1  0.607  2.505 
  1998  BR26  0.837  2.442  0.01468  26  0.489  1.64 
  1998  BT13  0.987  3.984  0.00381  26.5  0.603  2.486 
  1998  BY7  0.801  3.248  0.02537  21.5  0.604  2.024 
  1998  WZ6  0.86  2.045  0.03617  17.3  0.408  1.452 
  1998  VO  0.831  1.318  0.0262  20.4  0.227  1.075 
  1998  BB10  0.732  1.813  0.02265  20.3  0.425  1.272 
  1998  SH36  0.467  1.709  0.01207  20.6  0.571  1.088 
  1998  SA15  0.848  2.985  0.04576  19.4  0.557  1.916 
  1998  MZ  0.575  2.119  0.00154  19.3  0.573  1.347 
  1998  KJ9  0.522  2.375  0.00517  19.4  0.64  1.448 
  1998  HL3  0.715  1.542  0.04539  20.1  0.366  1.129 
  1998  FR11  0.801  4.782  0.06842  16.4  0.713  2.791 
  1998  FW4  0.701  4.331  0.00773  19.7  0.722  2.516 
  1998  YW3  0.591  1.609  0.38842  18.2  0.463  1.1 
  1998  XS16  0.61  1.814  0.40454  16.3  0.497  1.212 
  1998  XZ4  0.7  3.176  0.30064  16.4  0.639  1.938 
  1998  WM  0.838  1.611  0.16757  16.6  0.315  1.225 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  1998  VO33  0.238  2.258  0.06912  16.9  0.809  1.248 
  1998  UO1  0.378  2.812  0.05648  16.7  0.763  1.595 
  1998  ST49  0.942  3.679  0.06171  17.6  0.592  2.31 
  1998  HL49  0.635  2.85  0.08462  17.4  0.636  1.743 
  1998  FH74  0.254  4.148  0.23643  15.8  0.885  2.201 
  1998  CS1  0.629  2.354  0.01882  17.6  0.578  1.491 
  1998  SO10  0.511  4.085  0.45365  15.9  0.778  2.298 
  1998  XM4  0.966  2.348  0.10889  15.4  0.417  1.657 
  1998  UT18  0.942  1.866  0.03606  19.2  0.329  1.404 
  1998  SS49  0.692  3.154  0.003  15.7  0.64  1.923 
  1998  OX4  0.813  2.349  0.00115  21.2  0.486  1.581 
Mjolnir  1998  FG2  0.835  1.76  0.02148  21.6  0.356  1.297 
  1998  QH2  0.909  1.943  0.07621  16  0.362  1.426 
  1998  FH12  0.502  1.68  0.01278  19.2  0.54  1.091 
  1998  MT24  0.848  3.994  0.14334  14.7  0.65  2.421 
  1998  ML14  0.915  3.907  0.01553  17.5  0.621  2.411 
  1998  KK17  0.678  2.176  0.16172  16.5  0.525  1.427 
  1998  SU27  0.861  3.386  0.0703  19.5  0.595  2.123 
  1998  DV9  0.987  2.5  0.00193  18.2  0.434  1.744 
Itokawa  1998  SF36  0.953  1.695  0.01274  19.2  0.28  1.324 
  1998  WT  0.524  1.913  0.03352  17.7  0.57  1.219 
  1998  YN1  0.833  2.278  0.05593  17.5  0.464  1.556 
  1998  VD35  0.819  2.311  0.00269  20.4  0.477  1.565 
  1998  BZ7  0.904  3.173  0.05548  17.6  0.557  2.038 
  1998  QS52  0.311  4.092  0.01311  14.2  0.859  2.201 
  1998  OH  0.915  2.168  0.02784  16.1  0.406  1.542 
  1998  QK56  0.917  2.85  0.11061  17.5  0.513  1.883 
  1999  YR14  0.991  2.316  0.00612  18.9  0.401  1.653 
  1999  YG3  0.861  1.708  0.0416  19.1  0.33  1.285 
  1999  YC  0.241  2.603  0.24607  17.1  0.831  1.422 
  1999  XN141  0.949  4.047  0.0458  22.6  0.62  2.498 
  1999  XM141  0.78  1.696  0.0339  19.6  0.37  1.238 
  1999  XL136  0.639  2.982  0.00245  19.8  0.647  1.81 
  1999  XK136  0.719  4.047  0.00976  20.1  0.698  2.383 
  1999  XS35  0.934  34.63  0.00226  17.2  0.947  17.782 
  1999  VV25  0.985  3.493  0.01989  25  0.56  2.239 
  1999  VF22  0.343  2.283  0.03466  20.6  0.739  1.313 
  1999  VK12  0.503  3.954  0.0153  23.7  0.774  2.229 
  1999  VO11  0.819  3.685  0.06401  18.6  0.636  2.252 
  1999  VS6  0.931  1.465  0.1226  19.1  0.223  1.198 
  1999  VR6  0.528  3.963  0.04902  21.2  0.765  2.246 
  1999  VP6  0.959  1.799  0.09472  19.9  0.305  1.379 
  1999  UZ5  0.531  4.75  0.06765  21.8  0.799  2.641 
  1999  UR  0.941  2.855  0.01429  21.4  0.504  1.898 
  1999  TW16  0.377  2.472  0.14974  19.5  0.736  1.424 
  1999  TV16  0.932  2.218  0.01413  23.4  0.408  1.575 
  1999  TT16  0.723  3.604  0.02279  19.6  0.666  2.163 
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  1999  TN13  0.963  3.1  0.02506  23.6  0.526  2.032 
  1999  TM12  0.852  2.343  0.0677  21.6  0.467  1.598 
  1999  TC5  0.911  3.119  0.1853  18.5  0.548  2.015 
  1999  TY2  0.894  3.648  0.02774  23.3  0.606  2.271 
  1999  TX2  0.688  1.874  0.19694  18.2  0.463  1.281 
  1999  SK10  0.985  2.541  0.11288  19.6  0.441  1.763 
  1999  SJ10  0.613  3.648  0.06637  19.5  0.712  2.131 
  1999  SH10  0.955  1.242  0.00956  22.7  0.131  1.098 
  1999  SG10  0.562  2.348  0.02867  20.6  0.614  1.455 
  1999  SF10  0.955  1.602  0.0037  24.2  0.253  1.278 
  1999  RM45  0.598  2.764  0.0018  19.4  0.644  1.681 
  1999  RA32  0.934  1.119  0.05702  21.2  0.09  1.026 
  1999  RJ27  0.958  2  0.10855  19.5  0.352  1.479 
  1999  NW2  0.995  1.239  0.0178  23.2  0.109  1.117 
  1999  LS7  0.706  1.313  0.05015  20.7  0.301  1.01 
  1999  LD6  0.927  2.726  0.0834  22.4  0.492  1.827 
  1999  LX1  0.319  2.01  0.02514  20.6  0.726  1.164 
  1999  LW1  0.457  2.419  0.09938  20.4  0.682  1.438 
  1999  KL1  0.983  2.453  0.0838  21.5  0.428  1.718 
  1999  JZ10  0.688  1.925  0.03753  21.8  0.473  1.306 
  1999  JR6  0.444  2.289  0.22215  18  0.675  1.367 
  1999  JE1  0.394  2.252  0.02381  20  0.702  1.323 
  1999  HA2  0.84  4.742  0.11689  17.7  0.699  2.791 
  1999  HD1  0.659  1.604  0.21662  20.4  0.418  1.131 
  1999  GR6  0.32  2.365  0.17105  19.8  0.761  1.342 
  1999  GY5  0.442  1.851  0.06472  20  0.614  1.146 
  1999  GL4  0.842  3.397  0.02643  19.7  0.603  2.119 
  1999  FN53  0.946  2.525  0.05577  18.3  0.455  1.735 
  1999  FJ21  0.925  1.624  0.06048  20.3  0.275  1.274 
  1999  FR19  0.808  2.29  0.03605  22.3  0.478  1.549 
  1999  FP19  0.933  2.952  0.16245  20.1  0.52  1.943 
  1999  FQ10  0.993  2.913  0.00988  23.6  0.491  1.953 
  1999  FR5  0.964  2.739  0.00709  23.4  0.479  1.852 
  1999  FA  0.935  1.221  0.00636  20.7  0.133  1.078 
  1999  ED5  0.932  2.559  0.17673  19.6  0.466  1.746 
  1999  CG9  0.994  1.127  0.02355  25.2  0.062  1.061 
  1999  CW8  0.9  3.576  0.23475  18.6  0.598  2.238 
  1999  CT8  0.757  1.742  0.19133  18.8  0.394  1.25 
  1999  CQ2  0.931  2.075  0.00499  27.3  0.381  1.503 
  1999  AJ39  0.837  1.478  0.16274  22  0.277  1.158 
  1999  AM10  0.876  2.773  0.06306  21  0.52  1.825 
  1999  RD32  0.604  4.672  0.05018  16.4  0.771  2.638 
  1999  VP11  0.452  1.717  0.00148  18.5  0.583  1.084 
  1999  VO6  0.297  1.974  0.07752  17  0.738  1.135 
  1999  TL12  0.609  1.554  0.25623  18.9  0.437  1.081 
  1999  TC10  0.969  3.684  0.12196  18.6  0.583  2.327 
  1999  SM5  0.697  3.893  0.05051  19.1  0.696  2.295 
  1999  RK45  0.362  2.834  0.08789  19.5  0.773  1.598 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  1999  NB5  0.966  3.184  0.01362  21  0.535  2.075 
  1999  JU3  0.963  1.416  0.0007  19.2  0.19  1.19 
  1999  DB7  0.971  1.441  0.00199  19.9  0.195  1.206 
  1999  CV8  0.841  1.753  0.05718  19.7  0.352  1.297 
  1999  VT25  0.554  1.769  0.04797  21.2  0.523  1.162 
  1999  RR28  0.651  3.107  0.01524  18.4  0.653  1.879 
  1999  JV3  0.849  2.053  0.06745  18.8  0.415  1.451 
  1999  GS6  0.599  1.783  0.0189  19.2  0.497  1.191 
  1999  TF211  0.949  3.953  0.02392  15  0.613  2.451 
  1999  JA11  0.831  1.692  0.1061  18.4  0.341  1.261 
  1999  FB  0.464  1.896  0.1977  18  0.607  1.18 
  1999  CF9  0.71  2.835  0.02006  17.9  0.599  1.772 
  1999  BJ8  0.858  2.943  0.02342  18.1  0.549  1.9 
  1999  AN10  0.639  2.279  0.00177  17.9  0.562  1.459 
  1999  XA143  0.772  2.916  0.04365  16.6  0.581  1.844 
  1999  RQ36  0.897  1.356  0.00232  20.9  0.204  1.126 
  1999  MM  0.632  2.616  0.00171  19.3  0.611  1.624 
  1999  OW3  0.46  3.718  0.36918  14.7  0.78  2.089 
  1999  NC43  0.741  2.778  0.02424  16  0.579  1.76 
  1999  JV6  0.694  1.321  0.03112  19.9  0.311  1.008 
  1999  DJ4  0.957  2.749  0.02244  18.6  0.483  1.853 
  1999  GT3  0.217  2.451  0.19231  18.1  0.838  1.334 
  1999  TF5  0.732  3.316  0.04521  19  0.638  2.024 
  1999  SL5  0.887  2.958  0.02572  17.4  0.539  1.922 
  1999  LU7  0.78  3.422  0.08546  18.7  0.629  2.101 
  1999  JM8  0.949  4.465  0.04785  15.3  0.65  2.707 
  1999  GJ4  0.257  2.421  0.15768  15.4  0.808  1.339 
  1999  OR3  0.86  3.207  0.05838  18.1  0.577  2.033 
Beowulf  1999  JB  0.616  2.225  0.3845  17.1  0.566  1.42 
  1999  VV  0.768  1.897  0.22763  16.3  0.423  1.332 
  1999  JT6  0.901  3.372  0.00179  16  0.578  2.136 
  1999  HP11  0.722  2.472  0.12379  19.5  0.548  1.597 
  1999  HZ1  0.68  2.531  0.1309  18.4  0.576  1.606 
  1999  KV4  0.97  2.112  0.17298  16.8  0.371  1.541 
  1999  CU3  0.75  2.402  0.06228  16.8  0.524  1.576 
  1999  WC2  0.802  3.63  0.06436  16.8  0.638  2.216 
  1999  VU  0.619  2.155  0.14406  17.2  0.554  1.387 
  1999  UM3  0.779  3.974  0.06939  16.3  0.672  2.376 
Zephyr  1999  GK4  0.997  2.926  0.02259  16.1  0.492  1.962 
  1999  CV3  0.885  2.034  0.11997  15  0.394  1.459 
  2000  YO29  0.554  3.075  0.33517  17.5  0.694  1.815 
  2000  YJ29  0.327  3.589  0.32367  17.9  0.833  1.958 
  2000  YG29  0.977  5.375  0.0066  18.8  0.692  3.176 
  2000  YF29  0.937  2.045  0.01006  20.3  0.371  1.491 
  2000  YH4  0.806  2.173  0.08544  18.7  0.459  1.489 
  2000  YA  0.835  3.929  0.0053  23.6  0.649  2.382 
  2000  XJ44  0.627  3.639  0.09892  20.1  0.706  2.133 
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  2000  WP148  0.97  1.667  0.07973  19.3  0.264  1.318 
  2000  WM107  0.998  4.087  0.23554  18.8  0.607  2.543 
  2000  WJ107  0.862  3.034  0.00488  23.8  0.557  1.948 
  2000  WS67  0.38  2.217  0.23463  18.4  0.707  1.299 
  2000  WM63  0.869  1.191  0.11986  20.6  0.157  1.03 
  2000  WT28  0.994  4.11  0.01914  24.5  0.611  2.552 
  2000  WS28  0.897  3.238  0.01716  23.6  0.566  2.067 
  2000  WQ19  0.918  1.894  0.19451  18.3  0.347  1.406 
  2000  WL10  0.892  5.401  0.0669  18.1  0.716  3.147 
  2000  WK10  0.441  2.516  0.02354  18.5  0.702  1.478 
  2000  WH10  0.854  4.218  0.04913  22.5  0.663  2.536 
  2000  WG10  0.924  1.404  0.03552  24.4  0.206  1.164 
  2000  VZ44  0.539  3.624  0.05175  21  0.741  2.081 
  2000  UQ30  0.952  2.541  0.01225  22.1  0.455  1.746 
  2000  UP30  0.53  3.963  0.06324  17.4  0.764  2.247 
  2000  UO30  0.994  2.621  0.03885  24.3  0.45  1.807 
  2000  UG11  0.824  3.032  0.00763  20.4  0.573  1.928 
  2000  TU28  0.877  1.27  0.00155  21  0.183  1.074 
  2000  TL1  0.936  1.739  0.03565  23.4  0.3  1.338 
  2000  SJ344  0.941  1.339  0.04513  22.6  0.175  1.14 
  2000  SB45  0.94  2.178  0.00089  24.5  0.397  1.559 
  2000  SO10  0.598  2.001  0.36558  17.5  0.54  1.3 
  2000  SM10  0.76  2.662  0.00881  24.1  0.556  1.711 
  2000  SL10  0.907  1.838  0.01092  22.2  0.339  1.373 
  2000  SH8  0.862  2.514  0.20829  18.8  0.489  1.688 
  2000  SG8  0.244  4.686  0.17432  17.5  0.901  2.465 
  2000  SD8  0.775  1.484  0.08673  20.8  0.314  1.129 
  2000  SL  0.933  2.148  0.12513  18.3  0.394  1.54 
  2000  RE52  0.869  1.433  0.02958  22.5  0.245  1.151 
  2000  RV37  0.525  1.557  0.14276  19.4  0.496  1.041 
  2000  RN12  0.876  3.7  0.13154  20  0.617  2.288 
  2000  RM12  0.807  4.055  0.15312  16.8  0.668  2.431 
  2000  RK12  0.785  4.349  0.05292  21.3  0.694  2.567 
  2000  RS11  0.87  1.693  0.00836  19.1  0.321  1.281 
  2000  QX69  0.735  1.284  0.00066  24.5  0.272  1.01 
  2000  QV7  0.672  2.145  0.01749  21.4  0.523  1.409 
  2000  QU7  0.8  3.758  0.14037  18.2  0.649  2.279 
  2000  QS7  0.906  4.459  0.0032  19.6  0.662  2.683 
  2000  PN8  0.98  1.524  0.08137  22.2  0.217  1.252 
  2000  PY5  0.919  3.705  0.04783  21.1  0.602  2.312 
  2000  PG3  0.408  5.245  0.20979  16.1  0.856  2.827 
  2000  PE3  0.79  3.8  0.09784  20.5  0.656  2.295 
  2000  PD3  0.814  3.183  0.02749  18.4  0.593  1.998 
  2000  PN  0.243  1.797  0.01907  22.5  0.762  1.02 
  2000  OM  0.611  2.791  0.05361  18.6  0.641  1.701 
  2000  OH  0.994  3.854  0.01977  17.6  0.59  2.424 
  2000  LF3  0.877  4.282  0.02145  21.6  0.66  2.58 
  2000  LD3  0.373  2.506  0.13004  19.6  0.741  1.439 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2000  LK  0.118  4.241  0.1077  18.4  0.946  2.179 
  2000  KP44  0.472  3.386  0.23768  18.8  0.755  1.929 
  2000  KW43  0.758  2.146  0.04625  20  0.478  1.452 
  2000  KE41  0.401  5.595  0.18437  17.4  0.866  2.998 
  2000  KA  0.716  1.947  0.0014  21.6  0.462  1.332 
  2000  JJ5  0.572  3.252  0.09861  18.9  0.701  1.912 
  2000  JF5  0.911  3.205  0.02103  21.9  0.557  2.058 
  2000  JE5  0.742  1.735  0.04623  18.9  0.401  1.238 
  2000  GV147  0.949  2.543  0.00185  19.2  0.456  1.746 
  2000  GD147  0.851  2.933  0.08864  20.2  0.55  1.892 
  2000  GW127  0.614  3.857  0.09629  19.6  0.725  2.236 
  2000  GU127  0.579  3.635  0.10547  18.5  0.725  2.107 
  2000  GF2  0.835  1.847  0.01174  20.5  0.378  1.341 
  2000  EY106  0.922  2.462  0.18644  18.8  0.455  1.692 
  2000  EF104  0.668  1.627  0.17613  18.9  0.418  1.148 
  2000  EU70  0.521  3.889  0.04351  18.6  0.764  2.205 
  2000  EK26  0.819  3.991  0.0004  18  0.659  2.405 
  2000  EJ26  0.533  2.233  0.00719  19.3  0.615  1.383 
  2000  EA14  0.891  1.343  0.04309  21  0.203  1.117 
  2000  DO8  0.954  3.996  0.0039  24.8  0.614  2.475 
  2000  DL8  0.861  3.532  0.09043  19.2  0.608  2.197 
  2000  DK8  0.787  4.267  0.12494  19.2  0.689  2.527 
  2000  DO1  0.456  2.398  0.01336  20.4  0.681  1.427 
  2000  DN1  0.954  4.815  0.00878  19.7  0.669  2.885 
  2000  CP101  0.676  2.873  0.04378  19.2  0.619  1.774 
  2000  CO101  0.979  1.173  0.02311  19  0.09  1.076 
  2000  CE59  0.948  1.327  0.00662  20.4  0.167  1.138 
  2000  CM33  0.963  1.683  0.04284  21.3  0.272  1.323 
  2000  BO28  0.68  2.717  0.04644  19.9  0.599  1.698 
  2000  BO19  0.741  1.646  0.00464  24.8  0.379  1.193 
  2000  BL19  0.983  4.476  0.13409  19.9  0.64  2.73 
  2000  BE19  0.825  2.914  0.06015  17.9  0.559  1.869 
  2000  AH205  0.68  1.612  0.01502  22.4  0.407  1.146 
  2000  AF205  0.748  1.32  0.01811  21.5  0.277  1.034 
  2000  AD205  0.701  2.685  0.12893  18.6  0.586  1.693 
  2000  AG6  0.824  1.211  0.00397  25.3  0.19  1.018 
  2000  AB6  0.936  2.642  0.01603  22.1  0.477  1.789 
  2000  AA6  0.618  1.961  0.00747  21.9  0.521  1.289 
  2000  QK130  0.872  1.49  0.00023  20.6  0.262  1.181 
  2000  NM  0.906  4.464  0.12827  15.5  0.663  2.685 
  2000  CT101  0.839  1.761  0.01236  20.7  0.355  1.3 
  2000  PK5  0.58  3.291  0.2207  17.7  0.7  1.936 
  2000  MU1  0.848  1.899  0.00981  19.9  0.383  1.373 
  2000  DP107  0.851  1.88  0.0156  18.2  0.377  1.365 
  2000  DM1  0.706  2.031  0.14077  18.1  0.484  1.369 
  2000  YV137  0.998  1.898  0.02057  18.6  0.311  1.448 
  2000  VM2  0.566  2.983  0.10947  17.1  0.681  1.774 
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  2000  UH1  0.857  2.896  0.03431  19.2  0.543  1.876 
  2000  TK1  0.514  1.885  0.41038  17.6  0.572  1.2 
  2000  RW37  0.935  1.56  0.00799  20  0.25  1.248 
  2000  QW69  0.961  1.791  0.02494  17.2  0.302  1.376 
  2000  LB16  0.797  1.685  0.00426  18.5  0.358  1.241 
  2000  KX43  0.498  1.728  0.27027  19.2  0.553  1.113 
  2000  JH5  0.873  1.418  0.11008  17.6  0.238  1.145 
  2000  FK10  0.705  2.013  0.06645  19  0.481  1.359 
  2000  EV70  0.566  1.849  0.01203  20.2  0.531  1.208 
  2000  EH26  0.969  2.739  0.00096  21.7  0.477  1.854 
  2000  WO67  0.929  3.938  0.04816  16.4  0.618  2.433 
  2000  KB  0.476  4.205  0.52398  16.2  0.797  2.34 
  2000  YN29  0.83  4.237  0.01497  17.5  0.672  2.533 
  2000  WB1  0.496  2.107  0.09031  17.5  0.619  1.301 
  2000  JG5  0.274  2.407  0.02725  18.1  0.796  1.341 
  2000  GJ147  0.887  1.437  0.02457  19.5  0.237  1.162 
  2000  GP82  0.847  1.946  0.09078  17.5  0.393  1.397 
  2000  FM10  0.473  2.489  0.12675  17.9  0.681  1.481 
  2000  CF59  0.604  2.755  0.31408  16.7  0.64  1.679 
  2000  YH66  0.301  2.045  0.16409  17.9  0.744  1.173 
  2000  XG47  0.98  3.302  0.10432  16.6  0.542  2.141 
  2000  WN63  0.737  2.411  0.13969  19.1  0.532  1.574 
  2000  WN10  0.702  1.301  0.12637  20.1  0.299  1.001 
  2000  VJ61  0.952  3.414  0.18157  15.8  0.564  2.183 
  2000  SU180  0.827  3.38  0.03549  19.2  0.607  2.103 
  2000  HA24  0.776  1.503  0.02723  19.2  0.319  1.14 
  2000  GX127  0.729  1.554  0.2609  18  0.361  1.141 
  2000  GO82  0.424  3.904  0.36994  16.7  0.804  2.164 
  2000  EZ148  0.98  4.164  0.08456  15.1  0.619  2.572 
  2000  EE104  0.71  1.3  0.00843  20.3  0.293  1.005 
  2000  CN101  0.584  2.614  0.10745  14.8  0.635  1.599 
  2000  BJ19  0.305  2.278  0.38929  15.8  0.764  1.292 
  2000  WN107  0.828  3.471  0.13417  16  0.615  2.149 
  2000  WK63  0.587  4.286  0.12288  16.1  0.759  2.437 
  2000  QJ1  0.775  2.405  0.10808  16.3  0.513  1.59 
  2000  JT66  0.633  1.82  0.35077  18  0.484  1.227 
  2000  JS66  0.969  1.423  0.09725  18.7  0.19  1.196 
  2000  HD24  0.512  2.171  0.1032  17.7  0.618  1.341 
  2000  GR146  0.622  2.304  0.2031  15.9  0.575  1.463 
  2000  GK137  0.985  3.006  0.01716  17.4  0.506  1.996 
  2000  FL10  0.839  2.087  0.08211  16.9  0.427  1.463 
  2000  PJ6  0.851  1.752  0.05195  18.4  0.346  1.301 
  2000  OL8  0.604  2.037  0.01664  19.9  0.543  1.32 
YORP  2000  PH5  0.774  1.237  0.00039  22.7  0.23  1.006 
  2000  BF19  0.868  2.123  0.04529  19.1  0.42  1.495 
  2000  GE2  0.709  2.476  0.01123  20.7  0.555  1.592 
  2000  DM8  0.661  2.306  0.26704  14.9  0.554  1.484 
  2000  XK47  0.816  2.275  0.03582  18.2  0.472  1.546 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2000  OG  0.411  4.209  0.15311  16.2  0.822  2.31 
  2000  PN9  0.757  2.935  0.01495  16.1  0.59  1.846 
  2000  EX106  0.799  1.409  0.1675  18  0.276  1.104 
  2000  UV13  0.908  3.961  0.06495  13.5  0.627  2.434 
  2001  YB5  0.323  4.387  0.00396  20.9  0.863  2.355 
  2001  YK4  0.58  4.707  0.07131  18.4  0.78  2.644 
  2001  YV3  0.545  3.346  0.0338  20.2  0.72  1.945 
  2001  YP3  0.947  4.046  0.02104  22  0.621  2.497 
  2001  YO2  0.404  2.184  0.15427  21  0.688  1.294 
  2001  YN2  0.706  4.313  0.0005  25.4  0.719  2.51 
  2001  YF1  0.982  1.991  0.12609  19.5  0.339  1.486 
  2001  YE1  0.952  2.872  0.05884  20.8  0.502  1.912 
  2001  YD1  0.797  2.173  0.01646  24.8  0.463  1.485 
  2001  YC1  0.868  1.524  0.0317  24.1  0.274  1.196 
  2001  XG105  1  2.005  0.07887  21.8  0.335  1.503 
  2001  XX103  0.683  3.401  0.01551  23.6  0.665  2.042 
  2001  XO88  0.983  4.015  0.04963  22.3  0.607  2.499 
  2001  XP31  0.704  1.593  0.01158  21.9  0.387  1.148 
  2001  XU30  0.737  3.659  0.0073  19.8  0.665  2.198 
  2001  XH16  0.784  3.424  0.00543  24.8  0.627  2.104 
  2001  XW10  0.489  3.719  0.0784  19.4  0.768  2.104 
  2001  XV10  0.918  3.495  0.05498  16.1  0.584  2.206 
  2001  XX4  0.446  1.567  0.01131  22.1  0.557  1.007 
  2001  XU4  0.852  1.186  0.05234  23.7  0.164  1.019 
  2001  XP1  0.717  5.067  0.01546  17.9  0.752  2.892 
  2001  XG1  0.803  3.209  0.01962  23.3  0.6  2.006 
  2001  XF1  0.793  2.165  0.08975  19.2  0.464  1.479 
  2001  XU  0.416  4.723  0.00091  19.2  0.838  2.57 
  2001  XP  0.607  1.654  0.15689  21.1  0.463  1.13 
  2001  XD  0.413  3.671  0.0658  18.4  0.798  2.042 
  2001  WH49  0.997  1.937  0.03239  26  0.32  1.467 
  2001  WO15  0.913  2.702  0.0102  22.6  0.495  1.807 
  2001  WN15  0.379  4.169  0.21828  19.4  0.834  2.274 
  2001  WM15  0.756  2.941  0.00468  25  0.591  1.848 
  2001  WK15  0.985  1.297  0.07803  21.1  0.137  1.141 
  2001  WJ15  0.643  2.324  0.00643  23.6  0.566  1.484 
  2001  WJ4  0.984  1.528  0.00521  27.4  0.216  1.256 
  2001  WV1  0.768  2.037  0.00189  22.5  0.452  1.402 
  2001  WT1  0.657  1.522  0.12151  20.1  0.397  1.089 
  2001  WH1  0.493  4.436  0.04494  20.4  0.8  2.464 
  2001  VE76  0.845  2.674  0.03308  23.6  0.52  1.759 
  2001  VC76  0.979  2.53  0.16802  19.7  0.442  1.755 
  2001  VB76  0.951  1.967  0.04244  20.4  0.348  1.459 
  2001  VF75  0.924  3.196  0.15156  21.7  0.552  2.06 
  2001  VG16  0.998  2.512  0.01676  25.3  0.431  1.755 
  2001  VM5  0.999  3.796  0.01403  24.9  0.583  2.398 
  2001  VK5  0.617  1.922  0.00021  17.8  0.514  1.269 
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  2001  VE2  0.906  1.306  0.01295  25  0.181  1.106 
  2001  VC2  0.903  1.178  0.01858  21.2  0.132  1.041 
  2001  VB  0.24  4.429  0.02001  18.4  0.897  2.334 
  2001  UF18  0.446  1.837  0.31292  18.9  0.609  1.141 
  2001  UN16  0.987  2.605  0.00949  23.4  0.45  1.796 
  2001  UF5  0.69  3.907  0.00584  22.7  0.7  2.299 
  2001  UD5  0.761  3.791  0.00266  22.6  0.666  2.276 
  2001  UX4  0.426  3.077  0.10788  18.9  0.757  1.752 
  2001  UO  0.843  4.254  0.01317  24.1  0.669  2.549 
  2001  TO48  0.86  2.885  0.04937  19.5  0.541  1.872 
  2001  TE45  0.97  2.642  0.09643  22.9  0.463  1.806 
  2001  TC45  0.794  3.642  0.021  19.3  0.642  2.218 
  2001  TE2  0.87  1.297  0.06599  19.8  0.197  1.084 
  2001  TA2  0.624  2.876  0.03668  21.4  0.643  1.75 
  2001  TY1  0.98  3.837  0.00217  25  0.593  2.408 
  2001  TX1  0.542  1.553  0.0423  21.1  0.483  1.047 
  2001  TB  0.815  2.617  0.00339  24.4  0.525  1.716 
  2001  SG286  0.887  1.83  0.00499  20.9  0.347  1.358 
  2001  SF286  0.45  2.087  0.3554  19  0.645  1.268 
  2001  SD286  0.904  3.292  0.01121  25.2  0.569  2.098 
  2001  SH276  0.843  1.214  0.09214  19.7  0.181  1.028 
  2001  SE270  0.631  1.797  0.01534  25.1  0.48  1.214 
  2001  SA270  0.345  2.26  0.40391  18  0.735  1.302 
  2001  SZ269  0.793  3.93  0.03397  19.6  0.664  2.361 
  2001  SY269  0.676  2.682  0.02036  21.5  0.597  1.679 
  2001  SW269  0.501  1.744  0.23015  19.5  0.554  1.122 
  2001  SP263  0.919  3.134  0.00329  25.7  0.547  2.026 
  2001  SG262  0.821  3.105  0.03158  19.2  0.582  1.963 
  2001  SB170  0.73  1.997  0.00406  22.6  0.465  1.364 
  2001  SY169  0.726  1.731  0.0057  22.7  0.409  1.228 
  2001  SK9  0.378  3.193  0.22377  18  0.788  1.785 
  2001  SQ3  0.828  1.393  0.02914  21.6  0.254  1.11 
  2001  RW17  0.793  3.899  0.0583  19.7  0.662  2.346 
  2001  RB12  0.651  1.453  0.06693  20.7  0.381  1.052 
  2001  QM163  0.617  4.024  0.15153  19.8  0.734  2.32 
  2001  QL163  0.981  2.541  0.05703  22.5  0.443  1.761 
  2001  QK153  0.754  4.119  0.11706  20.6  0.691  2.437 
  2001  QO142  0.541  3.715  0.0875  19.3  0.746  2.128 
  2001  QN142  0.971  5.209  0.10908  21.8  0.686  3.09 
  2001  QM142  0.715  1.723  0.03257  23.3  0.413  1.219 
  2001  QL142  0.526  1.573  0.04679  17.9  0.499  1.049 
  2001  QJ142  0.971  1.154  0.00984  23.5  0.086  1.062 
  2001  QJ96  0.32  2.894  0.00196  22  0.801  1.607 
  2001  QF96  0.985  2.102  0.03283  24.5  0.362  1.544 
  2001  QD96  0.642  1.907  0.23298  18.2  0.497  1.274 
  2001  QC96  0.829  1.843  0.07262  20.7  0.38  1.336 
  2001  QE71  0.907  1.249  0.00685  24.4  0.158  1.078 
  2001  QE34  0.568  3.737  0.06306  18.4  0.736  2.152 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2001  QC34  0.917  1.339  0.0292  20  0.187  1.128 
  2001  PJ29  0.88  2.015  0.02426  23  0.392  1.448 
  2001  PG14  0.979  1.969  0.07846  22.5  0.336  1.474 
  2001  PT9  0.801  2.137  0.02846  20.2  0.455  1.469 
  2001  OC36  0.731  2.111  0.00428  22.9  0.486  1.421 
  2001  OA14  0.63  1.548  0.24594  18.4  0.421  1.089 
  2001  ND13  0.851  2.164  0.09995  21.5  0.436  1.508 
  2001  MS3  0.991  3.276  0.02398  24  0.535  2.133 
  2001  LD  0.886  1.895  0.03616  20.1  0.363  1.39 
  2001  KF54  0.817  3.862  0.02056  20.3  0.651  2.34 
  2001  KM20  0.936  1.431  0.0168  23.6  0.209  1.184 
  2001  KO2  0.989  4.027  0.03086  20.4  0.606  2.508 
  2001  JW2  0.868  2.527  0.08256  19  0.489  1.698 
  2001  JV1  0.963  2.447  0.02122  21.3  0.435  1.705 
  2001  HL31  0.536  4.061  0.05395  20.3  0.767  2.298 
  2001  HJ31  0.857  3.295  0.0042  23.8  0.587  2.076 
  2001  HZ7  0.737  2.2  0.04636  19.8  0.498  1.469 
  2001  HA4  0.55  4.817  0.01818  17.5  0.795  2.683 
  2001  HB  0.402  2.225  0.01379  20.4  0.694  1.314 
  2001  GT2  0.876  3.92  0.04419  19.9  0.635  2.398 
  2001  GR2  0.705  3.009  0.01356  21  0.62  1.857 
  2001  GQ2  0.603  1.825  0.00548  20.1  0.503  1.214 
  2001  GP2  0.961  1.115  0.00198  26.9  0.074  1.038 
  2001  GO2  0.838  1.176  0.0036  24.3  0.168  1.007 
  2001  GM2  0.863  2.492  0.11114  19.8  0.486  1.678 
  2001  GL2  0.951  4.373  0.05329  20.6  0.643  2.662 
  2001  FR128  0.741  1.746  0.14008  19.6  0.404  1.243 
  2001  FF90  0.963  4.216  0.17214  16.8  0.628  2.59 
  2001  FE90  0.976  2.892  0.0142  20.7  0.495  1.934 
  2001  FB90  0.543  4.216  0.03138  19.9  0.772  2.38 
  2001  FC58  0.67  1.37  0.01438  20.4  0.343  1.02 
  2001  FA58  0.642  3.885  0.03433  21.8  0.716  2.264 
  2001  FP32  0.906  1.843  0.0531  23.6  0.341  1.375 
  2001  FO32  0.295  3.107  0.00503  17.7  0.826  1.701 
  2001  FA7  0.931  3.082  0.10341  17.1  0.536  2.007 
  2001  EB18  0.86  1.247  0.02764  19.3  0.184  1.053 
  2001  EC16  0.856  1.835  0.01151  22.3  0.364  1.345 
  2001  EC  0.586  4.569  0.00254  18.6  0.773  2.578 
  2001  DZ76  0.918  3.781  0.00339  25.3  0.609  2.35 
  2001  DG47  0.973  1.921  0.09761  23  0.328  1.447 
  2001  DF47  0.765  1.665  0.01722  20.3  0.371  1.215 
  2001  DR8  0.63  3.22  0.07907  18.9  0.673  1.925 
  2001  DQ8  0.181  3.502  0.10747  18  0.902  1.842 
  2001  CA21  0.361  3.865  0.05006  18.6  0.829  2.113 
  2001  BN61  0.98  2.677  0.0231  25  0.464  1.829 
  2001  BE16  0.748  1.762  0.06151  19.8  0.404  1.255 
  2001  BD16  0.516  2.719  0.06805  19.6  0.681  1.617 
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  2001  BX15  0.784  3.195  0.08175  21.5  0.606  1.99 
  2001  BF10  0.902  2.323  0.00082  22.6  0.441  1.612 
  2001  AV43  0.973  1.581  0.00156  24.9  0.238  1.277 
  2001  AD2  0.354  1.725  0.00877  19.6  0.66  1.039 
  2001  XV266  0.966  1.427  0.1058  19.7  0.193  1.197 
  2001  LC  0.34  1.769  0.21751  19.1  0.677  1.055 
  2001  WA25  0.848  2.664  0.09667  18.6  0.517  1.756 
  2001  VG5  0.888  3.716  0.11884  16.7  0.614  2.302 
  2001  UY4  0.309  2.597  0.02659  18.3  0.787  1.453 
  2001  SG10  0.834  2.063  0.01764  20.3  0.424  1.449 
  2001  RT17  0.264  2.273  0.16304  18  0.792  1.268 
  2001  LE6  0.37  2.042  0.12673  17.8  0.693  1.206 
  2001  YJ4  0.987  3.565  0.03404  16.4  0.567  2.276 
  2001  XR30  0.823  1.771  0.02062  21  0.365  1.297 
  2001  UX16  0.895  1.939  0.06347  21.9  0.368  1.417 
  2001  UA5  0.991  2.583  0.03163  17.4  0.446  1.787 
  2001  RR17  0.793  2.312  0.19862  16.6  0.489  1.553 
  2001  RA12  0.926  3.146  0.02222  18  0.545  2.036 
  2001  OY13  0.815  1.821  0.01242  20.8  0.382  1.318 
  2001  MT18  0.61  1.932  0.14596  18.2  0.52  1.271 
  2001  LL5  0.796  1.613  0.10032  19  0.339  1.205 
  2001  JV2  0.995  1.615  0.08758  18.8  0.238  1.305 
  2001  FD58  0.464  1.72  0.03287  18.6  0.575  1.092 
  2001  BO61  0.458  3.093  0.01257  17.9  0.742  1.775 
  2001  WN5  0.912  2.51  0.00166  18.3  0.467  1.711 
  2001  VH75  0.545  3.662  0.06737  18  0.741  2.103 
  2001  RN  0.593  2.235  0.14025  19.8  0.581  1.414 
  2001  PJ9  0.647  2.949  0.05035  18.3  0.64  1.798 
  2001  NH6  0.681  1.794  0.09949  19.1  0.45  1.237 
  2001  MG1  0.893  4.116  0.03126  17.1  0.643  2.505 
  2001  CL42  0.93  2.183  0.19287  17.2  0.402  1.557 
  2001  CB32  0.687  2.876  0.11886  18  0.614  1.782 
  2001  BW15  0.867  3.369  0.05932  15  0.591  2.118 
  2001  AU47  0.61  1.988  0.39938  17.2  0.531  1.299 
  2001  XS30  0.2  2.129  0.30318  17.5  0.828  1.165 
  2001  XT1  0.643  2.413  0.04146  18.8  0.579  1.528 
  2001  XR1  0.56  1.931  0.1021  17.5  0.55  1.246 
  2001  SN289  0.879  2.688  0.01585  16.4  0.507  1.784 
  2001  SX169  0.726  1.968  0.02621  18.2  0.461  1.347 
  2001  SO73  0.785  2.854  0.04649  18.3  0.569  1.82 
  2001  QQ142  0.98  1.866  0.01178  18.3  0.311  1.423 
  2001  ME1  0.355  4.945  0.01149  16.7  0.866  2.65 
  2001  KA67  0.538  3.073  0.26592  16.7  0.702  1.806 
  2001  KR1  0.2  2.319  0.17888  17.6  0.841  1.26 
  2001  CB21  0.69  1.38  0.02392  18.4  0.334  1.035 
  2001  BA40  0.835  1.403  0.17986  18.4  0.254  1.119 
  2001  BK16  0.667  3.478  0.06202  17.5  0.678  2.072 
  2001  XU10  0.983  2.524  0.02808  15.1  0.439  1.754 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2001  PL9  0.79  1.681  0.19219  17.8  0.361  1.235 
  2001  KY66  0.919  2.814  0.04717  16.2  0.507  1.867 
  2001  CC21  0.806  1.259  0.08302  18.5  0.219  1.032 
  2001  TZ44  0.751  2.696  0.05147  17.6  0.564  1.724 
  2001  SL9  0.775  1.348  0.19677  17.6  0.27  1.061 
  2001  FM129  0.438  1.926  0.00991  17.3  0.629  1.182 
  2001  XR31  0.961  2.452  0.02429  17  0.437  1.706 
  2001  PM9  0.946  2.291  0.00311  18.9  0.416  1.618 
  2001  LO7  0.339  3.964  0.38583  14.7  0.842  2.152 
  2001  KZ66  0.879  2.136  0.03779  17  0.417  1.508 
  2001  EA16  0.864  2.155  0.05804  17  0.428  1.51 
  2001  CV26  0.889  1.75  0.02344  16.3  0.326  1.319 
  2001  WG2  0.546  3.044  0.33655  16.3  0.696  1.795 
  2001  TC2  0.853  1.347  0.14572  18.8  0.225  1.1 
  2001  TN41  0.863  1.976  0.10921  16.4  0.392  1.42 
  2002  YC12  0.962  2.472  0.02206  25.3  0.44  1.717 
  2002  YB12  0.757  2.617  0.07061  18.4  0.551  1.687 
  2002  YZ3  0.397  3.491  0.32083  17.9  0.796  1.944 
  2002  YN2  0.513  1.972  0.34276  18.5  0.587  1.243 
  2002  XC91  0.606  2.348  0.12235  20.6  0.59  1.477 
  2002  XV90  0.985  2.172  0.00064  25.5  0.376  1.579 
  2002  XT90  0.799  1.26  0.17184  18.8  0.224  1.03 
  2002  XQ90  0.932  3.412  0.0294  22.1  0.571  2.172 
  2002  XP90  0.859  3.3  0.05142  18.4  0.587  2.08 
  2002  XE84  0.947  4.682  0.11517  20.7  0.663  2.815 
  2002  XS40  0.991  2.003  0.15408  20.2  0.338  1.497 
  2002  XQ40  0.699  1.449  0.00665  22.5  0.349  1.074 
  2002  XF40  0.964  2.398  0.02102  24.9  0.426  1.681 
  2002  XB40  0.827  2.879  0.00993  23.9  0.554  1.853 
  2002  XM35  0.375  4.323  0.01963  23  0.84  2.349 
  2002  XO14  0.986  4.586  0.00343  22.1  0.646  2.786 
  2002  XN14  0.989  2.546  0.07938  19.8  0.441  1.768 
  2002  XT4  0.929  2.29  0.0192  24  0.423  1.61 
  2002  WX12  0.596  2.907  0.12633  20  0.66  1.752 
  2002  WQ4  0.872  3.048  0.01936  19.8  0.555  1.96 
  2002  WZ2  0.285  4.637  0.13178  17.1  0.884  2.461 
  2002  VU114  0.843  1.52  0.03403  22.8  0.286  1.182 
  2002  VZ91  0.97  2.18  0.00743  26.1  0.384  1.575 
  2002  VY91  0.968  3.674  0.00368  26.3  0.583  2.321 
  2002  VS85  0.631  2.25  0.03209  24.1  0.562  1.44 
  2002  VR85  0.719  2.915  0.02612  20.4  0.604  1.817 
  2002  VP69  0.949  3.086  0.02982  18  0.53  2.017 
  2002  VO69  0.938  1.94  0.05665  22.9  0.348  1.439 
  2002  VU17  0.936  3.997  0.00836  24.9  0.62  2.466 
  2002  VS14  0.704  1.314  0.12658  21.9  0.302  1.009 
  2002  VR14  0.815  2.438  0.02757  22.3  0.499  1.626 
  2002  UV36  0.99  3.928  0.00185  26.5  0.597  2.459 
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  2002  UQ12  0.531  2.988  0.02624  22.2  0.698  1.759 
  2002  UK11  0.562  2.085  0.0116  21.7  0.576  1.323 
  2002  UR3  0.285  2.473  0.15695  16.4  0.793  1.379 
  2002  TR190  0.905  1.249  0.00546  19  0.16  1.077 
  2002  TB70  0.984  1.283  0.01479  21.6  0.132  1.133 
  2002  TA69  0.952  3.603  0.07999  18.2  0.582  2.277 
  2002  TA67  0.746  1.57  0.00913  22.8  0.356  1.158 
  2002  TG66  0.871  2.933  0.01568  23.9  0.542  1.902 
  2002  TA60  0.551  1.755  0.12237  20.7  0.522  1.153 
  2002  TZ59  0.41  4.837  0.01546  23.2  0.844  2.624 
  2002  TY59  0.781  1.257  0.00329  25.5  0.234  1.019 
  2002  TA58  0.933  4.008  0.00197  26.8  0.622  2.471 
  2002  TZ57  0.924  1.5  0.04291  24.6  0.238  1.212 
  2002  TX55  0.956  3.503  0.00343  23.7  0.571  2.23 
  2002  TV55  0.974  4.776  0.13486  20.8  0.661  2.875 
  2002  SQ41  0.519  4.696  0.00796  20.1  0.801  2.608 
  2002  SZ  0.735  1.86  0.00078  20.4  0.433  1.298 
  2002  SR  0.948  1.411  0.05165  21.7  0.196  1.18 
  2002  SQ  0.878  1.965  0.08373  19.5  0.383  1.421 
  2002  RB182  0.89  4.136  0.00198  23.1  0.646  2.513 
  2002  RT129  0.451  3.214  0.09974  19.5  0.754  1.833 
  2002  RS129  0.692  1.371  0.01754  23  0.329  1.031 
  2002  RB126  0.397  2.462  0.08334  18.7  0.722  1.43 
  2002  RZ125  0.659  2.169  0.17158  19.8  0.534  1.414 
  2002  RC117  0.899  3.99  0.00101  24.9  0.632  2.445 
  2002  RQ25  0.771  1.452  0.05055  20.4  0.306  1.111 
  2002  RT  0.411  2.593  0.16738  20.9  0.726  1.502 
  2002  QW47  0.953  2.992  0.0053  20.8  0.517  1.972 
  2002  QG46  0.906  3.963  0.10144  19.9  0.628  2.434 
  2002  QQ40  0.529  1.901  0.02804  21.1  0.564  1.215 
  2002  QD7  0.853  3.988  0.09974  18  0.648  2.421 
  2002  QC7  0.94  1.398  0.0492  19.9  0.196  1.169 
  2002  PE130  0.972  4.144  0.02785  18.3  0.62  2.558 
  2002  PD43  0.11  4.908  0.03008  19.1  0.956  2.509 
  2002  PD11  0.303  4.14  0.1051  20.1  0.864  2.222 
  2002  PP6  0.805  3.845  0.1471  18.8  0.654  2.325 
  2002  PN  0.945  1.084  0.00407  24.8  0.069  1.015 
  2002  PB  0.704  1.44  0.16799  20.6  0.343  1.072 
  2002  OY21  0.449  2.261  0.08687  20.7  0.669  1.355 
  2002  OM4  0.655  2.338  0.29732  16.9  0.562  1.496 
  2002  NY40  0.596  3.502  0.00091  19  0.709  2.049 
  2002  NV16  0.965  1.51  0.0279  21.4  0.22  1.238 
  2002  NX  0.986  2.497  0.10482  19.3  0.434  1.741 
  2002  NW  0.534  2.688  0.01371  24.2  0.669  1.611 
  2002  MT3  0.871  4.743  0.03564  19.9  0.69  2.807 
  2002  MS3  0.93  3.855  0.08778  19.1  0.611  2.392 
  2002  MR3  0.572  2.445  0.04326  21.4  0.621  1.508 
  2002  MX  0.51  4.499  0.01479  21.7  0.797  2.504 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2002  MN  0.912  2.719  0.00078  23.6  0.498  1.815 
  2002  LZ45  0.845  3.755  0.00813  23  0.633  2.3 
  2002  LS32  0.54  3.027  0.12511  18.2  0.697  1.783 
  2002  LE31  0.909  3.074  0.08915  20  0.544  1.991 
  2002  LR24  1  1.508  0.02268  24.3  0.203  1.254 
  2002  LG3  0.596  4.126  0.10279  19.6  0.747  2.361 
  2002  LX  0.824  4.2  0.03831  21.1  0.672  2.512 
  2002  LW  0.913  1.12  0.03337  22.4  0.102  1.017 
  2002  LV  0.917  3.714  0.01118  16.6  0.604  2.315 
  2002  LK  0.939  1.269  0.02371  24.2  0.149  1.104 
  2002  KJ4  0.999  3.534  0.01893  19.5  0.559  2.266 
  2002  KG4  0.992  4.886  0.03346  20.9  0.663  2.939 
  2002  KM3  0.831  1.699  0.04771  22.3  0.343  1.265 
  2002  KL3  0.489  3.413  0.06453  18.3  0.749  1.951 
  2002  JD109  0.707  3.333  0.30014  18.3  0.65  2.02 
  2002  JQ100  0.568  1.793  0.24092  19.2  0.519  1.181 
  2002  JU15  0.932  1.428  0.00428  26.2  0.21  1.18 
  2002  JR9  0.866  3.905  0.07352  17.6  0.637  2.386 
  2002  JQ9  0.7  1.613  0.04935  19.3  0.395  1.157 
  2002  JE9  0.623  1.513  0.00513  21.2  0.417  1.068 
  2002  JD9  0.59  1.524  0.05391  22.7  0.442  1.057 
  2002  JC9  0.381  4.119  0.17439  18.6  0.83  2.25 
  2002  JB9  0.584  4.852  0.0324  15.9  0.785  2.718 
  2002  JZ8  0.972  4.514  0.00247  21.1  0.646  2.743 
  2002  JY8  0.944  3.72  0.06589  17.7  0.595  2.332 
  2002  JS2  0.37  3.885  0.09073  18  0.826  2.127 
  2002  HP11  0.486  3.65  0.01643  20.4  0.765  2.068 
  2002  GJ8  0.509  5.414  0.09119  19.5  0.828  2.962 
  2002  GG8  0.985  3.622  0.03451  24.7  0.572  2.304 
  2002  GQ5  0.602  1.706  0.09797  20.7  0.478  1.154 
  2002  GO5  0.443  3.351  0.03479  17.9  0.767  1.897 
  2002  GM5  0.649  3.58  0.00891  21.5  0.693  2.115 
  2002  GM2  0.422  3.975  0.01061  18.5  0.808  2.198 
  2002  GK1  0.951  4.112  0.00503  22.5  0.624  2.531 
  2002  GJ1  0.994  2.997  0.03269  23.3  0.502  1.996 
  2002  GS  0.807  1.898  0.05273  20  0.404  1.353 
  2002  GR  0.952  1.451  0.00648  23.2  0.208  1.201 
  2002  GA  0.967  3.041  0.11169  20.1  0.518  2.004 
  2002  FD6  0.812  1.655  0.00483  22.3  0.342  1.233 
  2002  FU5  0.759  4.27  0.05011  21  0.698  2.514 
  2002  FQ5  0.787  3.044  0.03293  20.7  0.589  1.915 
  2002  FC  0.961  4.702  0.02203  18.9  0.661  2.832 
  2002  FB  0.98  1.434  0.01477  27.6  0.188  1.207 
  2002  EW11  0.869  2.167  0.01271  24.8  0.428  1.518 
  2002  EV11  0.228  3.964  0.04681  20  0.891  2.096 
  2002  EU11  0.748  3.944  0.01436  21.9  0.681  2.346 
  2002  EX8  0.857  2.928  0.06607  20.7  0.547  1.892 
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  2002  EN7  0.796  1.699  0.05952  21.3  0.362  1.247 
  2002  EM6  0.996  1.323  0.05272  20.1  0.141  1.159 
  2002  EL6  0.967  3.63  0.0423  18  0.579  2.298 
  2002  EC3  0.842  1.741  0.05702  21.1  0.348  1.291 
  2002  EY2  0.886  2.566  0.00113  19.2  0.487  1.726 
  2002  EY  0.79  3.484  0.10809  19.9  0.63  2.137 
  2002  EW  0.332  2.795  0.06706  20.7  0.788  1.563 
  2002  EA  0.794  1.969  0.03601  22.4  0.425  1.382 
  2002  DJ5  0.605  2.196  0.03978  20.1  0.568  1.4 
  2002  DU3  0.873  1.418  0.0072  20.7  0.238  1.145 
  2002  DO3  0.934  2.788  0.0282  22  0.498  1.861 
  2002  DH2  0.938  3.161  0.06704  20.3  0.542  2.049 
  2002  CT118  0.831  1.728  0.04924  25.6  0.351  1.279 
  2002  CY58  0.841  1.891  0.05982  20.8  0.384  1.366 
  2002  CX58  0.952  4.644  0.03334  22.1  0.66  2.798 
  2002  CU46  0.755  2.715  0.0948  21.1  0.565  1.735 
  2002  CE26  0.984  3.483  0.10152  16.8  0.559  2.233 
  2002  CB26  0.537  3.435  0.00039  26.9  0.729  1.986 
  2002  CA26  0.807  4.026  0.00228  27.3  0.666  2.416 
  2002  CB19  0.703  1.863  0.00114  25  0.452  1.283 
  2002  CN15  0.403  2.247  0.06133  20.8  0.696  1.325 
  2002  CD14  0.749  2.807  0.0278  20.6  0.579  1.778 
  2002  CV11  0.94  2.213  0.03537  23.9  0.404  1.577 
  2002  CY9  0.811  2.483  0.00599  19.5  0.508  1.647 
  2002  BG25  0.944  1.52  0.05245  20.9  0.234  1.232 
  2002  BF25  0.836  1.313  0.01868  22.3  0.222  1.074 
  2002  BJ2  0.71  3.388  0.07722  17.2  0.653  2.049 
  2002  BM  0.984  4.196  0.00485  24.1  0.62  2.59 
  2002  AN129  0.865  2.689  0.00204  26.2  0.513  1.777 
  2002  AJ129  0.117  2.625  0.00646  18.5  0.915  1.371 
  2002  AJ69  0.702  1.659  0.21631  21.2  0.405  1.18 
  2002  AV31  0.984  1.639  0.14396  20.5  0.25  1.311 
  2002  AL31  0.886  1.467  0.01255  24.5  0.247  1.176 
  2002  AE29  0.924  3.845  0.02214  24.9  0.613  2.384 
  2002  AD29  0.924  2.593  0.25006  21  0.475  1.758 
  2002  AC29  0.815  2.468  0.07249  17.7  0.503  1.641 
  2002  AT15  0.994  2.794  0.31178  18.3  0.475  1.894 
  2002  AL14  0.907  1.168  0.07323  17.8  0.126  1.038 
  2002  AK14  0.909  1.124  0.08077  21.6  0.106  1.017 
  2002  AW11  0.969  1.925  0.17993  18.5  0.331  1.447 
  2002  AE9  0.633  1.612  0.20101  18.9  0.436  1.122 
  2002  AC9  0.748  2.657  0.02883  21  0.561  1.703 
  2002  AU5  0.494  3.542  0.13704  17.8  0.755  2.018 
  2002  AC5  0.891  2.625  0.04766  19.9  0.493  1.758 
  2002  AS4  0.252  2.272  0.03824  22  0.8  1.262 
  2002  AF3  0.723  3.087  0.15451  17.7  0.621  1.905 
  2002  AZ1  0.706  3.518  0.01686  22  0.666  2.112 
  2002  AW  0.796  1.344  0.00466  20.8  0.256  1.07 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2002  AV  0.837  4.095  0.01907  20.9  0.661  2.466 
  2002  AC  0.795  3.716  0.08606  18  0.648  2.256 
  2002  AA  0.801  1.495  0.05661  19.3  0.302  1.148 
  2002  FB6  0.817  2.775  0.09984  17.6  0.545  1.796 
  2002  TE66  0.906  2.008  0.09568  18.3  0.378  1.457 
  2002  EB3  0.555  2.961  0.07014  17.7  0.684  1.758 
  2002  CT11  0.581  1.935  0.39614  17  0.538  1.258 
  2002  BK25  0.576  4.015  0.04658  18.1  0.749  2.295 
  2002  TW55  0.711  3.523  0.02566  18  0.664  2.117 
  2002  EA3  0.757  3.47  0.07812  20.1  0.642  2.114 
  2002  XY4  0.792  2.895  0.14125  19  0.571  1.844 
  2002  TD66  0.866  2.851  0.00636  20.3  0.534  1.858 
  2002  XR14  0.712  3.096  0.01109  18.1  0.626  1.904 
  2002  UO3  0.594  5.341  0.29329  17.7  0.8  2.967 
  2002  YP2  0.492  2.663  0.02108  18.9  0.688  1.577 
  2002  XG84  0.79  2.2  0.07178  19.1  0.472  1.495 
  2002  RN129  0.732  1.592  0.23665  18.9  0.37  1.162 
  2002  PZ39  0.666  2.273  0.00306  19  0.547  1.47 
  2002  OD20  0.861  1.867  0.02666  18.8  0.369  1.364 
  2002  LJ  0.442  2.214  0.50071  17.1  0.667  1.328 
  2002  HW  0.889  4.055  0.05614  19.3  0.64  2.472 
  2002  GT  0.894  1.795  0.01511  18.5  0.335  1.345 
  2002  EQ9  0.984  2.688  0.06446  19.4  0.464  1.836 
  2002  CU11  0.86  1.581  0.00053  18.3  0.295  1.22 
  2002  AG29  0.866  1.308  0.07662  18.4  0.203  1.087 
  2002  AP3  0.837  3.244  0.00979  19.8  0.59  2.041 
  2002  PQ142  0.48  2.911  0.21392  17.7  0.717  1.696 
  2002  LB6  0.561  3.046  0.28286  16.2  0.689  1.804 
  2002  HQ11  0.748  2.953  0.05547  19.4  0.596  1.851 
  2002  XK4  0.569  3.13  0.2716  15.8  0.692  1.85 
  2002  VX94  0.873  2.08  0.03334  18.1  0.409  1.476 
  2002  UQ3  0.753  2.686  0.03927  17.7  0.562  1.719 
  2002  UO  0.638  1.78  0.1417  19.2  0.472  1.209 
  2002  TB9  0.737  2.872  0.1829  16.5  0.592  1.804 
  2002  SY50  0.529  2.882  0.00266  17.6  0.69  1.705 
  2002  SR41  0.551  1.614  0.0355  20.3  0.491  1.083 
  2002  SM  0.963  2.78  0.02486  18  0.485  1.872 
  2002  RM129  0.809  2.214  0.1763  17.9  0.465  1.511 
  2002  JN97  0.521  3.182  0.15706  16.6  0.719  1.852 
  2002  CV59  0.566  1.854  0.42498  17.5  0.532  1.21 
  2002  CA10  0.632  2.451  0.1531  19.2  0.59  1.542 
  2002  CZ9  0.848  1.803  0.02533  22  0.36  1.326 
  2002  AM31  0.934  2.475  0.03141  18.2  0.452  1.705 
  2002  AB29  0.612  4.455  0.07856  17.4  0.758  2.533 
  2002  AD9  0.339  3.208  0.41146  16.5  0.809  1.773 
  2002  PM6  0.179  2.217  0.03701  17.7  0.85  1.198 
  2002  JV15  0.753  2.495  0.03897  19.4  0.536  1.624 
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  2002  FG7  0.565  2.463  0.04209  18.8  0.627  1.514 
  2002  FA6  0.687  1.341  0.31434  19.9  0.322  1.014 
  2002  FV5  0.299  1.875  0.03575  17.9  0.725  1.087 
  2002  EZ11  0.22  2.008  0.00112  18.2  0.802  1.114 
  2002  AV4  0.587  2.721  0.16717  15.9  0.645  1.654 
  2002  YK14  0.985  1.963  0.18803  18.5  0.332  1.474 
  2002  VU94  0.911  3.361  0.02782  15.7  0.573  2.136 
  2002  NT7  0.818  2.653  0.00038  16.5  0.529  1.735 
  2002  LY45  0.187  3.097  0.00183  16.9  0.886  1.642 
  2002  QF15  0.693  1.42  0.00696  16.4  0.344  1.057 
  2003  YH136  0.247  4.444  0.00747  19.4  0.895  2.346 
  2003  YL118  0.581  1.679  0.0216  21.8  0.486  1.13 
  2003  YG118  0.812  3.753  0.01196  17.1  0.644  2.283 
  2003  YS117  0.837  1.662  0.12466  18.3  0.33  1.249 
  2003  YR117  0.924  2.799  0.02299  22.9  0.504  1.861 
  2003  YH111  0.729  2.107  0.00804  24.5  0.486  1.418 
  2003  YS70  0.983  1.593  0.00109  29.1  0.237  1.288 
  2003  YD45  0.757  4.228  0.02711  21  0.696  2.493 
  2003  YN7  0.84  4.697  0.13379  20.6  0.696  2.769 
  2003  YP3  0.683  2.011  0.07368  20.2  0.493  1.347 
  2003  YO3  0.919  1.98  0.05948  18.7  0.366  1.449 
  2003  YS1  0.475  5.715  0.22819  19.7  0.847  3.095 
  2003  YP1  0.926  4.357  0.03533  21.8  0.649  2.642 
  2003  YO1  0.696  1.62  0.22744  19.4  0.399  1.158 
  2003  XB22  0.852  1.959  0.01186  19.3  0.394  1.406 
  2003  XZ12  0.988  1.89  0.01615  24.4  0.313  1.439 
  2003  XF11  0.332  4.055  0.12544  16.8  0.849  2.193 
  2003  XV10  0.46  2.41  0.10415  19.5  0.68  1.435 
  2003  XH10  1  1.643  0.01846  25.5  0.243  1.321 
  2003  XJ7  0.664  1.822  0.00098  26.4  0.466  1.243 
  2003  XV  0.861  2.986  0.00185  26.9  0.552  1.924 
  2003  XK  0.67  3.996  0.00103  25.9  0.713  2.333 
  2003  WH166  0.855  3.011  0.00455  22  0.558  1.933 
  2003  WD158  0.843  2.011  0.0484  18.9  0.409  1.427 
  2003  WC158  0.967  4.295  0.03302  20.5  0.632  2.631 
  2003  WE157  0.975  3.52  0.14211  21.2  0.566  2.247 
  2003  WX153  0.87  3.502  0.08588  17.9  0.602  2.186 
  2003  WO151  0.52  2.57  0.25477  20.4  0.663  1.545 
  2003  WH98  0.997  3.265  0.01189  26.6  0.532  2.131 
  2003  WW26  0.482  4.311  0.0118  22.5  0.799  2.396 
  2003  WY25  0.965  5.136  0.01212  21.1  0.684  3.051 
  2003  WR25  0.974  5.741  0.09188  19.6  0.71  3.357 
  2003  WL25  0.622  4.175  0.3011  16.7  0.741  2.398 
  2003  WR21  0.826  1.412  0.02855  19.6  0.262  1.119 
  2003  WP21  0.492  4.026  0.03141  21.8  0.782  2.259 
  2003  WQ7  0.983  2.618  0.19219  19.7  0.454  1.8 
  2003  WP7  0.821  3.763  0.00142  24.2  0.642  2.292 
  2003  WG  0.528  4.353  0.03194  19.1  0.783  2.441 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2003  WE  0.909  1.486  0.02819  24.6  0.241  1.197 
  2003  VE1  0.981  2.905  0.04481  19.4  0.495  1.943 
  2003  UX34  0.421  1.769  0.01538  20.2  0.616  1.095 
  2003  UW29  0.189  2.15  0.01775  20.7  0.838  1.17 
  2003  UX26  0.733  1.577  0.00875  24.5  0.366  1.155 
  2003  UR25  0.978  2.92  0.03989  25.5  0.498  1.949 
  2003  UQ25  0.81  4.266  0.0165  24.1  0.681  2.538 
  2003  UO25  0.784  1.249  0.16541  22.7  0.229  1.016 
  2003  UG22  0.92  1.929  0.12415  21.4  0.354  1.424 
  2003  UD22  0.797  1.541  0.13618  19.7  0.318  1.169 
  2003  UB22  0.945  1.482  0.0472  24.6  0.221  1.213 
  2003  UQ12  0.813  2.595  0.00999  24.9  0.523  1.704 
  2003  UP12  0.909  2.662  0.02922  25.5  0.491  1.785 
  2003  UO12  0.957  4.652  0.01454  24.4  0.659  2.805 
  2003  UL12  0.99  5.602  0.26834  17.3  0.7  3.296 
  2003  UV11  0.344  2.558  0.0073  19.3  0.763  1.451 
  2003  UC10  0.884  3.998  0.01212  23.9  0.638  2.441 
  2003  UL9  0.788  1.25  0.12996  22.4  0.227  1.019 
  2003  UX5  0.95  1.932  0.04978  20.4  0.341  1.441 
  2003  UC5  0.215  2.155  0.11261  20.1  0.818  1.185 
  2003  UM3  0.767  1.975  0.00022  28.1  0.44  1.371 
  2003  UL3  0.453  4.035  0.22973  18  0.798  2.244 
  2003  TT9  0.801  1.392  0.04696  22.9  0.27  1.096 
  2003  TR9  0.491  2.792  0.0224  21.2  0.701  1.641 
  2003  TO9  0.962  3.892  0.01906  21.9  0.604  2.427 
  2003  TK2  0.819  3.867  0.02245  19.9  0.65  2.343 
  2003  TJ2  0.693  1.943  0.11107  19.1  0.474  1.318 
  2003  TH2  0.809  4.095  0.00534  22.8  0.67  2.452 
  2003  TM1  0.596  2.128  0.02897  22.1  0.563  1.362 
  2003  SQ222  0.725  2.287  0.00029  30.1  0.519  1.506 
  2003  SM215  0.922  3.289  0.00363  27.5  0.562  2.106 
  2003  SN214  0.918  3.153  0.07454  22.7  0.549  2.036 
  2003  SU84  0.921  2.077  0.13441  22.4  0.385  1.499 
  2003  SS84  0.829  3.032  0.00498  21.8  0.57  1.931 
  2003  SR84  0.893  2.52  0.00303  26  0.476  1.707 
  2003  SK84  0.651  4.416  0.04485  21.2  0.743  2.534 
  2003  SL36  0.839  1.99  0.00765  26.4  0.407  1.415 
  2003  SY17  0.857  3.234  0.05541  18.1  0.581  2.046 
  2003  SR15  0.922  1.633  0.07075  21.6  0.278  1.277 
  2003  SQ15  0.902  2.429  0.05977  18.9  0.459  1.666 
  2003  SY4  0.962  3.997  0.0053  26.5  0.612  2.479 
  2003  SF  0.483  3.843  0.07064  19.8  0.777  2.163 
  2003  RW11  0.466  4.806  0.07787  18.8  0.823  2.636 
  2003  RB5  0.995  2.738  0.02516  21.2  0.467  1.866 
  2003  RC2  0.959  2.091  0.25689  19.4  0.371  1.525 
  2003  QR79  0.888  1.669  0.07016  20.8  0.305  1.279 
  2003  QA31  0.786  2.687  0.05167  19.1  0.548  1.736 
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  2003  QB30  0.716  1.747  0.0027  26.8  0.419  1.232 
  2003  QZ29  0.985  3.972  0.10886  19.1  0.603  2.479 
  2003  QC10  0.369  2.386  0.00145  18  0.732  1.378 
  2003  QU5  0.968  1.91  0.02956  24.2  0.327  1.439 
  2003  QH5  0.982  1.538  0.00816  20.2  0.22  1.26 
  2003  QA  0.682  3.996  0.16767  18.5  0.708  2.339 
  2003  OT13  0.972  1.375  0.03679  23.3  0.172  1.173 
  2003  OC3  0.901  3.595  0.05111  18.6  0.599  2.248 
  2003  OV  0.316  4.159  0.08161  18.4  0.859  2.238 
  2003  OU  0.688  3.923  0.30505  16.6  0.702  2.306 
  2003  NW1  0.875  3.978  0.03136  18.7  0.639  2.426 
  2003  MT9  0.2  4.872  0.05483  18.7  0.921  2.536 
  2003  MW7  0.529  1.803  0.09175  21.5  0.546  1.166 
  2003  MD7  0.595  2.339  0.0982  20.2  0.595  1.467 
  2003  MK4  0.885  1.276  0.00181  20.9  0.181  1.08 
  2003  MH4  0.952  2.973  0.00254  20  0.515  1.963 
  2003  MS2  0.91  1.173  0.02223  21.1  0.126  1.042 
  2003  ME1  0.725  1.356  0.00549  23.6  0.303  1.041 
  2003  MO  0.242  3.698  0.21481  18.2  0.877  1.97 
  2003  MN  0.917  3.685  0.01417  23.8  0.601  2.301 
  2003  MM  0.783  1.323  0.13187  21.7  0.256  1.053 
  2003  LW2  0.977  2.776  0.00136  26  0.479  1.877 
  2003  LG  0.507  3.322  0.18368  18.6  0.735  1.915 
  2003  KN18  0.897  2.599  0.09381  18.7  0.487  1.748 
  2003  KX16  0.562  2.107  0.30047  18.5  0.579  1.335 
  2003  KF4  0.987  3.664  0.00465  23.3  0.575  2.326 
  2003  KU2  0.875  4.517  0.0285  17.7  0.675  2.696 
  2003  JC17  0.668  4.022  0.19969  18.1  0.715  2.345 
  2003  JV14  0.687  2.58  0.06803  21.5  0.579  1.634 
  2003  JP14  0.965  3.263  0.07147  22.3  0.544  2.114 
  2003  JO14  0.807  1.643  0.01388  25.2  0.341  1.225 
  2003  JN14  0.515  3.118  0.08016  19.7  0.717  1.816 
  2003  JC13  0.73  1.402  0.1427  20.2  0.315  1.066 
  2003  JD11  0.8  2.678  0.02218  24.3  0.54  1.739 
  2003  JY2  0.568  2.289  0.01471  24.6  0.602  1.428 
  2003  JX2  0.844  1.384  0.00933  26.4  0.242  1.114 
  2003  HR32  0.546  2.95  0.14126  18.1  0.688  1.748 
  2003  HP32  0.599  4.796  0.05081  19.7  0.778  2.698 
  2003  HW10  0.841  2.755  0.00122  27  0.532  1.798 
  2003  HG2  0.919  1.205  0.03936  21.8  0.135  1.062 
  2003  HN  0.994  3.058  0.10502  19.9  0.509  2.026 
  2003  GP51  0.855  3.455  0.03759  22  0.603  2.155 
  2003  GD42  0.998  1.591  0.0131  24.7  0.229  1.295 
  2003  GU41  0.68  3.409  0.26528  18.6  0.667  2.045 
  2003  GB34  0.829  4.317  0.12368  18.8  0.678  2.573 
  2003  GR22  0.601  2.551  0.00674  22.5  0.618  1.576 
  2003  GG21  0.618  3.662  0.00285  22  0.711  2.14 
  2003  GF21  0.903  2.657  0.0138  22.2  0.493  1.78 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2003  GY  0.942  1.818  0.02219  20.1  0.317  1.38 
  2003  GW  0.954  2.688  0.3252  16.8  0.476  1.821 
  2003  GR  0.945  1.825  0.20944  20.7  0.318  1.385 
  2003  FJ8  0.883  2.744  0.00273  26.7  0.513  1.814 
  2003  FF5  0.953  1.784  0.02594  23.5  0.303  1.369 
  2003  FC5  0.749  3.085  0.03379  18.2  0.609  1.917 
  2003  FB5  0.531  4.55  0.02411  23.5  0.791  2.54 
  2003  FJ1  0.401  3.945  0.33382  17.7  0.815  2.173 
  2003  FH1  0.663  1.704  0.20376  18.1  0.44  1.184 
  2003  FH  0.638  2.14  0.01308  18.9  0.541  1.389 
  2003  FG  0.354  2.129  0.04287  19.7  0.715  1.242 
  2003  FB  0.822  2.124  0.06526  18.7  0.442  1.473 
  2003  EW59  0.613  3.17  0.01388  23.3  0.676  1.891 
  2003  ED50  0.642  2.19  0.02588  20.8  0.547  1.416 
  2003  EC50  0.91  3.507  0.03077  22.9  0.588  2.209 
  2003  EG16  0.754  4.046  0.01169  19.2  0.686  2.4 
  2003  EP4  0.483  2.236  0.00093  23.9  0.645  1.36 
  2003  EG  0.496  2.98  0.36075  16.4  0.714  1.738 
  2003  DA16  0.974  4.215  0.31267  17.9  0.625  2.594 
  2003  DZ15  0.626  1.814  0.00023  22.2  0.487  1.22 
  2003  DY15  0.826  1.634  0.00342  26.3  0.328  1.23 
  2003  DX10  0.811  1.94  0.04473  20.3  0.411  1.376 
  2003  DW10  0.924  1.968  0.00048  26.1  0.361  1.446 
  2003  DG6  0.792  3.216  0.065  20.7  0.605  2.004 
  2003  DN4  0.599  1.692  0.28763  19.3  0.477  1.145 
  2003  CO20  0.994  3.319  0.02808  23.1  0.539  2.157 
  2003  CL18  0.906  4.177  0.11893  20.6  0.644  2.541 
  2003  CN17  0.89  2.803  0.2174  18.9  0.518  1.846 
  2003  CG11  0.68  4.491  0.02094  20.5  0.737  2.586 
  2003  CR1  0.781  2.127  0.0276  19.8  0.463  1.454 
  2003  CA  0.387  2.372  0.05017  19  0.72  1.379 
  2003  BH84  0.552  3.367  0.30519  16.9  0.718  1.96 
  2003  BR47  0.814  2.442  0.00801  21.4  0.5  1.628 
  2003  BK47  0.8  4.685  0.0267  18.5  0.708  2.742 
  2003  BC44  0.933  3.276  0.0522  25.5  0.557  2.105 
  2003  BV35  0.706  2.723  0.05053  22.1  0.588  1.715 
  2003  BS35  0.996  1.52  0.02651  24.8  0.209  1.258 
  2003  BX33  0.682  1.682  0.09802  21  0.423  1.182 
  2003  BW33  0.99  3.2  0.1672  21.3  0.527  2.095 
  2003  BB21  0.988  3.47  0.02248  21  0.557  2.229 
  2003  BA21  0.184  2.017  0.13191  19.3  0.833  1.1 
  2003  BM4  0.795  1.599  0.01992  25.1  0.336  1.197 
  2003  BN1  0.786  2.238  0.05453  20.2  0.48  1.512 
  2003  BH  0.938  1.973  0.02881  20.5  0.356  1.456 
  2003  AA83  0.538  4.567  0.06716  22.8  0.789  2.553 
  2003  AL73  0.779  4.308  0.10431  19.4  0.694  2.543 
  2003  AK73  0.749  4.153  0.05643  19.5  0.694  2.451 
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  2003  AS42  0.989  2.013  0.02412  25.7  0.341  1.501 
  2003  AD23  0.39  2.901  0.03446  18.7  0.763  1.645 
  2003  AC23  0.9  3.389  0.00573  21.9  0.58  2.145 
  2003  AB23  0.896  2.213  0.08182  19.9  0.424  1.555 
  2003  AL18  0.983  2.386  0.1337  17.7  0.416  1.684 
  2003  AY2  0.793  2.851  0.02234  19.4  0.565  1.822 
  2003  HF2  0.361  1.866  0.00336  19.6  0.675  1.114 
  2003  SG170  0.736  2.983  0.12966  17.7  0.604  1.859 
  2003  YL  0.421  1.871  0.05167  19.8  0.632  1.146 
  2003  RM10  0.755  2.939  0.00711  20.2  0.591  1.847 
  2003  NC  0.273  2.538  0.03947  19.3  0.806  1.406 
  2003  QZ30  0.893  3.946  0.04602  17.4  0.631  2.419 
  2003  EE16  0.547  2.288  0.00012  19.8  0.614  1.418 
  2003  BM47  0.485  1.835  0.15702  20.2  0.582  1.16 
  2003  YM137  0.818  4.388  0.00431  18.7  0.686  2.603 
  2003  WM7  0.303  4.667  0.07232  17.3  0.878  2.485 
  2003  YT1  0.786  1.434  0.00376  16.2  0.292  1.11 
  2003  YK  0.895  2.128  0.08426  19.3  0.408  1.512 
  2003  RX7  0.793  1.665  0.02665  18.4  0.355  1.229 
  2003  OS13  0.336  2.256  0.08823  17.4  0.741  1.296 
  2003  KP2  0.837  4.669  0.15553  15.4  0.696  2.753 
  2003  EF54  0.848  2.369  0.04171  20  0.473  1.609 
  2003  EB50  0.755  2.386  0.05376  16.5  0.519  1.571 
  2003  CY18  0.899  2.153  0.09168  18  0.411  1.526 
  2003  WO25  0.791  2.323  0.20332  18.2  0.492  1.557 
  2003  MA3  0.661  1.551  0.01317  21.8  0.402  1.106 
  2003  HA  0.497  1.872  0.11563  16.6  0.58  1.184 
  2003  CJ11  0.433  4.745  0.3434  15.3  0.833  2.589 
  2003  YQ117  0.752  3.609  0.10382  15.3  0.655  2.181 
  2003  QQ47  0.882  1.288  0.00294  17.4  0.187  1.085 
  2003  LP6  0.203  3.289  0.33816  16.3  0.884  1.746 
  2003  HM16  0.833  3.099  0.05162  15.8  0.577  1.966 
  2003  CR20  0.569  3.674  0.00072  18.7  0.732  2.122 
  2003  BD44  0.777  3.156  0.01759  16.7  0.605  1.967 
  2003  YK118  0.86  2.528  0.00055  18.7  0.492  1.694 
  2003  YE45  0.889  1.581  0.03506  17.8  0.28  1.235 
  2003  LC5  0.663  1.648  0.15178  17.7  0.426  1.155 
  2004  YR32  0.916  5.206  0.2396  17.6  0.701  3.061 
  2004  YD5  0.494  4.056  0.00023  29.3  0.783  2.275 
  2004  YC5  0.737  3.119  0.13766  18  0.618  1.928 
  2004  YG1  0.849  1.169  0.06157  21.5  0.159  1.009 
  2004  YR  0.995  2.452  0.18425  20.3  0.423  1.724 
  2004  YQ  0.912  2.646  0.03774  24.4  0.488  1.779 
  2004  YA  0.782  1.705  0.05129  24.9  0.371  1.244 
  2004  XO63  0.984  4.075  0.00094  26.2  0.611  2.53 
  2004  XD51  0.944  1.541  0.02537  25  0.24  1.242 
  2004  XC51  0.547  3.592  0.10568  19.9  0.736  2.069 
  2004  XN50  0.373  2.991  0.00779  18.8  0.778  1.682 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2004  XK50  0.451  2.453  0.04348  19.2  0.689  1.452 
  2004  XB45  0.649  2.452  0.00029  26.2  0.582  1.55 
  2004  XA45  0.771  2.316  0.07939  21  0.501  1.544 
  2004  XP35  0.928  3.086  0.01564  23.4  0.537  2.007 
  2004  XL35  0.978  1.733  0.00649  19.4  0.278  1.355 
  2004  XO29  0.406  2.058  0.15934  21.5  0.671  1.232 
  2004  XN29  0.714  4.139  0.0251  22  0.706  2.426 
  2004  XM29  0.784  3.494  0.00156  22.9  0.633  2.139 
  2004  XL29  0.494  2.257  0.33147  19.3  0.641  1.375 
  2004  XK29  0.851  3.941  0.05975  20.3  0.645  2.396 
  2004  XJ29  0.951  3.049  0.05528  21.3  0.525  2 
  2004  XH29  0.686  2.078  0.27186  18.9  0.504  1.382 
  2004  XG29  0.968  1.851  0.00202  25.6  0.313  1.41 
  2004  XP14  0.885  1.218  0.0005  19.4  0.159  1.052 
  2004  XD6  0.845  3.046  0.06573  22.3  0.566  1.946 
  2004  XK3  0.908  1.548  0.00117  24.4  0.261  1.228 
  2004  XH3  0.936  2.899  0.00683  24.1  0.512  1.917 
  2004  XO  0.935  1.135  0.01752  21.6  0.097  1.035 
  2004  XK  0.938  2.181  0.01503  26  0.398  1.559 
  2004  WK1  0.293  1.876  0.04314  21.1  0.73  1.084 
  2004  WH1  0.955  1.439  0.00198  24  0.202  1.197 
  2004  VQ65  0.96  3.003  0.01272  22.3  0.515  1.982 
  2004  VM24  0.65  1.628  0.00111  25.7  0.429  1.139 
  2004  VC17  0.36  3.432  0.00286  18.4  0.81  1.896 
  2004  VZ14  0.726  2.338  0.00351  25.3  0.526  1.532 
  2004  VY14  0.687  3.224  0.05832  20.1  0.649  1.955 
  2004  VH1  0.82  2.284  0.15122  21.8  0.472  1.552 
  2004  VA1  0.513  1.59  0.17282  20.5  0.512  1.051 
  2004  VW  0.729  2.276  0.00327  23.1  0.515  1.503 
  2004  VV  0.822  3.332  0.1828  17.2  0.604  2.077 
  2004  VP  0.944  2.365  0.10182  21  0.429  1.655 
  2004  VC  0.84  1.427  0.03604  18.8  0.259  1.133 
  2004  VB  0.862  2.055  0.04328  20.8  0.409  1.459 
  2004  UV1  0.98  4.656  0.01931  17.9  0.652  2.818 
  2004  UU1  0.891  1.562  0.02741  21.2  0.274  1.226 
  2004  US1  0.705  1.865  0.06488  20.8  0.451  1.285 
  2004  UR1  0.829  3.517  0.01717  20.5  0.618  2.173 
  2004  UR  0.927  2.191  0.01255  23.2  0.405  1.559 
  2004  UL  0.093  2.44  0.019  18.8  0.927  1.266 
  2004  UE  0.918  4.318  0.00079  21.2  0.649  2.618 
  2004  UB  0.522  2.212  0.06955  20.3  0.618  1.367 
  2004  TP20  0.872  1.815  0.11694  20  0.351  1.344 
  2004  TD18  0.793  2.703  0.00447  22.2  0.546  1.748 
  2004  TC18  0.85  1.818  0.02927  24  0.363  1.334 
  2004  TB18  0.997  2.634  0.01981  17.6  0.451  1.815 
  2004  TR13  0.546  3.49  0.07865  18.5  0.729  2.018 
  2004  TL10  0.925  4.4  0.00386  21.4  0.652  2.663 
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  2004  TJ10  0.876  1.737  0.04487  25.1  0.33  1.306 
  2004  TH10  0.214  2.287  0.1707  18.6  0.829  1.25 
  2004  TG10  0.309  4.173  0.01537  19.5  0.862  2.241 
  2004  TF10  0.942  1.898  0.05907  20.8  0.336  1.42 
  2004  TE10  0.844  4.17  0.00436  24.2  0.663  2.507 
  2004  TC10  0.664  1.578  0.13939  20.4  0.407  1.121 
  2004  TB10  1  1.206  0.01237  21.3  0.094  1.103 
  2004  TE8  0.563  2.944  0.25898  18.9  0.679  1.753 
  2004  TP1  0.788  1.793  0.02797  20.7  0.389  1.29 
  2004  TN1  0.831  4.662  0.00143  21.8  0.697  2.747 
  2004  TN  0.805  2.051  0.15584  19.1  0.436  1.428 
  2004  SW55  0.951  1.903  0.03067  20.7  0.334  1.427 
  2004  SV55  0.601  2.917  0.08992  18  0.658  1.759 
  2004  SU26  0.651  2.233  0.01852  24.9  0.549  1.442 
  2004  ST26  0.574  2.937  0.00032  26.3  0.673  1.756 
  2004  SS26  0.888  2.349  0.03439  23.1  0.451  1.619 
  2004  SE26  0.941  2.518  0.00734  25.8  0.456  1.73 
  2004  SD26  0.461  3.615  0.08211  18.7  0.774  2.038 
  2004  SB20  0.694  1.672  0.26831  18.5  0.413  1.183 
  2004  SA20  0.698  4.117  0.03286  22.8  0.71  2.408 
  2004  SB1  0.611  1.748  0.07901  20.5  0.482  1.18 
  2004  SR  0.963  1.331  0.02647  23.8  0.16  1.147 
  2004  RH340  0.801  1.789  0.16023  19.3  0.382  1.295 
  2004  RU331  0.939  1.544  0.10527  20.6  0.244  1.241 
  2004  RQ252  0.688  1.564  0.00026  22.5  0.389  1.126 
  2004  RD252  0.839  3.36  0.11851  19  0.6  2.1 
  2004  RN251  0.782  2.526  0.00394  26.1  0.527  1.654 
  2004  RZ164  0.987  4.12  0.01359  19  0.613  2.554 
  2004  RX164  0.879  2.534  0.08096  21.2  0.485  1.706 
  2004  RW164  0.929  2.052  0.05126  18.6  0.377  1.49 
  2004  RY109  0.936  2.32  0.0492  19  0.425  1.628 
  2004  RX109  0.417  3.998  0.28221  18.1  0.811  2.208 
  2004  RU109  0.783  2.279  0.00064  26.4  0.489  1.531 
  2004  RJ84  0.755  1.435  0.20631  18.4  0.311  1.095 
  2004  RF84  0.858  3.471  0.03478  18.4  0.604  2.165 
  2004  RE84  0.661  2.683  0.02003  22.2  0.605  1.672 
  2004  RC11  0.974  2.676  0.00487  23.6  0.466  1.825 
  2004  RY10  0.633  2.711  0.04257  21.4  0.621  1.672 
  2004  RW10  0.966  3.745  0.0356  21.1  0.59  2.356 
  2004  RV10  0.984  1.77  0.23158  19.5  0.286  1.377 
  2004  RW2  0.99  1.859  0.03925  24.4  0.305  1.425 
  2004  RK  0.972  1.805  0.16505  19.4  0.3  1.389 
  2004  QT24  0.847  1.418  0.00759  18.3  0.252  1.133 
  2004  QD20  0.647  3.687  0.28668  18.3  0.701  2.167 
  2004  QV16  0.754  2.784  0.11339  18.2  0.574  1.769 
  2004  QF14  0.971  2.982  0.01732  22.9  0.509  1.976 
  2004  QJ7  0.967  1.92  0.09178  18.4  0.33  1.444 
  2004  QO5  0.998  2.983  0.03346  25.9  0.499  1.991 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2004  QR4  0.987  2.949  0.00666  26.9  0.498  1.968 
  2004  QD3  0.898  2.035  0.10247  19.5  0.388  1.467 
  2004  QY2  0.567  1.601  0.04596  14.7  0.477  1.084 
  2004  QX2  0.125  2.447  0.03708  21.7  0.903  1.286 
  2004  QZ1  0.542  3.189  0.09327  20.7  0.71  1.866 
  2004  QF1  0.746  1.355  0.24221  18.2  0.29  1.05 
  2004  QB  0.737  3.487  0.0087  19.8  0.651  2.112 
  2004  PR92  0.748  1.516  0.02515  25.1  0.339  1.132 
  2004  PU42  0.875  2.278  0.00098  26.7  0.445  1.577 
  2004  PZ19  0.917  3.166  0.00133  24.5  0.551  2.042 
  2004  PJ2  0.933  1.903  0.0235  21.4  0.342  1.418 
  2004  OW10  0.919  1.523  0.00431  24.5  0.247  1.221 
  2004  OD4  0.988  3.093  0.00159  27  0.516  2.041 
  2004  OB  0.958  2.404  0.01192  18.9  0.43  1.681 
  2004  NK8  0.954  1.699  0.03707  23.5  0.281  1.326 
  2004  MP7  0.778  4.701  0.02949  21.7  0.716  2.739 
  2004  MO7  0.57  1.64  0.05585  18.8  0.484  1.105 
  2004  MQ6  0.644  2.989  0.06977  19.9  0.645  1.817 
  2004  MB6  0.755  4.389  0.05562  19.5  0.706  2.572 
  2004  MO3  0.818  1.648  0.01107  22.3  0.336  1.233 
  2004  MX2  0.797  4.752  0.00367  19.3  0.713  2.775 
  2004  MW2  0.414  1.876  0.07306  19.2  0.638  1.145 
  2004  MV2  0.951  2.746  0.06854  23.5  0.485  1.849 
  2004  MS1  0.933  3.615  0.00539  22.3  0.59  2.274 
  2004  MR1  0.954  2.091  0.00123  25.6  0.373  1.523 
  2004  MQ1  0.705  4.105  0.12017  18  0.707  2.405 
  2004  MP1  0.999  2.556  0.02557  25.2  0.438  1.778 
  2004  MN1  0.843  1.963  0.01723  24.6  0.399  1.403 
  2004  MD  0.889  2.947  0.01685  20.2  0.536  1.918 
  2004  LY5  0.406  3.249  0.01634  21.5  0.778  1.827 
  2004  LV3  0.892  1.571  0.01101  18.8  0.276  1.231 
  2004  LC2  0.495  3.235  0.02716  18.6  0.735  1.865 
  2004  LB2  0.572  2.091  0.01006  22.3  0.57  1.331 
  2004  LB1  0.966  1.595  0.03443  23.2  0.246  1.28 
  2004  LV  0.627  2.724  0.02541  24.1  0.626  1.676 
  2004  LJ  0.585  1.589  0.02669  20.2  0.462  1.087 
  2004  LG  0.212  3.919  0.51454  18  0.897  2.066 
  2004  LE  0.431  4.861  0.56201  16.6  0.837  2.646 
  2004  LC  0.936  3.26  0.01228  24.4  0.554  2.098 
  2004  LB  0.995  1.107  0.01875  21.8  0.053  1.051 
  2004  KK17  0.623  2.311  0.31259  18.4  0.576  1.467 
  2004  KF17  0.968  2.731  0.00517  26.1  0.477  1.849 
  2004  KZ  0.806  1.771  0.01269  25.5  0.374  1.288 
  2004  KT  0.624  3.084  0.18509  17.9  0.664  1.854 
  2004  KB  0.844  1.529  0.02225  21.1  0.289  1.187 
  2004  JV20  0.869  1.768  0.03827  24  0.341  1.318 
  2004  JO20  0.833  2.106  0.00804  26.2  0.433  1.47 
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  2004  JO2  0.983  3.599  0.1083  17.5  0.571  2.291 
  2004  JN2  0.418  1.717  0.28594  20.4  0.608  1.068 
  2004  JQ1  0.656  1.731  0.03208  20.1  0.45  1.194 
  2004  JP1  0.886  1.383  0.0067  22.8  0.219  1.134 
  2004  JO1  0.538  1.505  0.05769  20.9  0.473  1.022 
  2004  JN1  0.895  1.276  0.02322  23.7  0.176  1.085 
  2004  JR  0.668  3.113  0.23898  18.7  0.647  1.891 
  2004  JC  0.816  4.089  0.12035  20.5  0.667  2.452 
  2004  JA  0.504  2.208  0.13852  17.9  0.628  1.356 
  2004  HR56  0.876  2.248  0.0609  23.3  0.439  1.562 
  2004  HX53  0.794  1.591  0.02042  23.6  0.334  1.193 
  2004  HW53  0.912  3.442  0.26369  19.7  0.581  2.177 
  2004  HC39  0.906  2.742  0.00679  21.5  0.503  1.824 
  2004  HA39  0.995  3.304  0.21314  20.9  0.537  2.15 
  2004  HG12  0.945  1.936  0.02731  22.4  0.344  1.44 
  2004  HF12  0.746  3.522  0.02134  20.5  0.65  2.134 
  2004  HD2  0.386  4.268  0.0336  21.1  0.834  2.327 
  2004  HC2  0.955  1.819  0.0689  19.4  0.312  1.387 
  2004  HQ1  0.809  1.409  0.00246  23.1  0.27  1.109 
  2004  HA1  0.757  4.654  0.06445  21.7  0.72  2.705 
  2004  HZ  0.727  1.88  0.00021  22.6  0.442  1.303 
  2004  HW  0.976  4.4  0.00882  17.2  0.637  2.688 
  2004  HM  0.786  1.878  0.00366  23.2  0.41  1.332 
  2004  HE  0.695  2.854  0.00025  26.8  0.609  1.774 
  2004  HB  0.981  3.894  0.02221  23.9  0.598  2.438 
  2004  GC19  0.949  3.333  0.03599  24.1  0.557  2.141 
  2004  GB19  0.862  1.834  0.01038  23  0.361  1.348 
  2004  GZ14  0.938  1.832  0.0286  23.9  0.323  1.385 
  2004  GE2  0.599  3.476  0.00562  21.5  0.706  2.038 
  2004  GB2  0.74  3.498  0.01907  21  0.651  2.119 
  2004  GD  0.737  1.391  0.0064  23.7  0.307  1.064 
  2004  FM32  0.92  1.278  0.00177  27.1  0.163  1.099 
  2004  FY31  0.959  3.373  0.02438  21.9  0.557  2.166 
  2004  FX31  0.704  1.818  0.06577  17.5  0.442  1.261 
  2004  FJ31  0.861  1.687  0.02224  24.4  0.324  1.274 
  2004  FH29  0.99  2.319  0.01609  24  0.402  1.655 
  2004  FF29  0.734  3.1  0.0703  18.2  0.617  1.917 
  2004  FC18  0.673  3.116  0.01972  24.4  0.645  1.894 
  2004  FY15  0.967  2.744  0.00199  26.1  0.479  1.856 
  2004  FJ11  0.99  3.51  0.02204  21  0.56  2.25 
  2004  FG11  0.438  2.74  0.02144  21  0.724  1.589 
  2004  FN8  1  1.338  0.0105  27.1  0.144  1.169 
  2004  FE5  0.498  1.992  0.03572  20  0.6  1.245 
  2004  FA5  0.915  1.695  0.0248  24.5  0.299  1.305 
  2004  FU4  0.928  1.593  0.00194  18.5  0.264  1.26 
  2004  FM4  0.821  3.203  0.01006  25.1  0.592  2.012 
  2004  FY3  0.875  3.055  0.00407  25.4  0.555  1.965 
  2004  FZ1  0.841  2.746  0.22844  18.3  0.531  1.794 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2004  FY1  0.805  3.049  0.00072  26.3  0.582  1.927 
  2004  FX1  0.83  1.438  0.0184  25.3  0.268  1.134 
  2004  FW1  0.458  2.747  0.04839  21.1  0.714  1.602 
  2004  FD  0.424  2.179  0.01578  22.9  0.674  1.302 
  2004  FA  0.871  3.38  0.01761  23.2  0.59  2.125 
  2004  EU22  0.984  1.366  0.00886  24  0.163  1.175 
  2004  EM20  0.526  1.685  0.09013  20.2  0.524  1.105 
  2004  EV9  0.323  2.619  0.10905  17.8  0.78  1.471 
  2004  EK1  0.936  1.565  0.03564  22.1  0.251  1.251 
  2004  EH1  0.945  3.082  0.03748  22.4  0.531  2.013 
  2004  DM44  0.716  4.236  0.04161  20.7  0.711  2.476 
  2004  DF2  0.575  2.742  0.00482  26.1  0.653  1.659 
  2004  DL1  0.554  2.999  0.02206  24.4  0.688  1.777 
  2004  DD  0.859  2.319  0.12973  18.8  0.459  1.589 
  2004  DC  0.981  2.286  0.00731  18.1  0.399  1.634 
  2004  CO49  0.841  1.91  0.02107  21.7  0.388  1.375 
  2004  CK39  0.393  4.203  0.05405  19.3  0.829  2.298 
  2004  CE39  0.625  1.429  0.07721  21.4  0.391  1.027 
  2004  CA2  0.817  3.405  0.00671  23.7  0.613  2.111 
  2004  CZ1  0.84  2.24  0.0041  24.4  0.455  1.54 
  2004  CL1  0.924  3.037  0.06784  19.9  0.533  1.98 
  2004  CL  0.596  1.973  0.02297  20.6  0.536  1.285 
  2004  CC  0.989  1.866  0.01224  23.6  0.307  1.427 
  2004  BB103  0.721  3.093  0.03267  17.2  0.622  1.907 
  2004  BL86  0.897  2.108  0.00812  18.9  0.403  1.502 
  2004  BK86  0.707  2.146  0.00096  25.4  0.504  1.427 
  2004  BG86  0.523  2.182  0.15948  19.2  0.613  1.353 
  2004  BF85  0.507  3.093  0.05667  20.4  0.718  1.8 
  2004  BA75  0.652  2.621  0.01327  24.4  0.601  1.637 
  2004  BZ74  0.329  5.771  0.02896  18.7  0.892  3.05 
  2004  BE68  0.978  2.542  0.01033  18.4  0.444  1.76 
  2004  BD68  0.324  3.479  0.19821  18.6  0.83  1.901 
  2004  BW58  0.904  2.006  0.03848  18.6  0.379  1.455 
  2004  BO41  0.517  1.521  0.08774  17.4  0.493  1.019 
  2004  BN41  0.99  3.107  0.0074  26.1  0.517  2.049 
  2004  BH41  0.597  1.792  0.39284  19.3  0.5  1.195 
  2004  BG41  0.979  4.05  0.01315  24.4  0.611  2.514 
  2004  BV18  0.995  1.674  0.01231  25.9  0.254  1.335 
  2004  BM11  0.688  2.213  0.06238  22.1  0.526  1.45 
  2004  BL11  0.315  2.205  0.13088  19.3  0.75  1.26 
  2004  BH11  0.851  1.681  0.01816  24.1  0.328  1.266 
  2004  BG11  0.911  2.641  0.22786  18.6  0.487  1.776 
  2004  BX1  0.374  4.417  0.27305  18.3  0.844  2.396 
  2004  BV1  0.929  1.994  0.01048  19.9  0.365  1.462 
  2004  BB  0.955  3.008  0.11465  19.5  0.518  1.981 
  2004  AE6  0.928  2.055  0.05556  24.4  0.378  1.492 
  2004  AY1  0.806  2.971  0.08244  21.1  0.573  1.888 
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  2004  AR1  0.836  2.317  0.03113  19.8  0.47  1.577 
  2004  AD1  0.837  2.994  0.02838  22.5  0.563  1.916 
  2004  AE  0.955  1.909  0.0227  20.7  0.333  1.432 
  2004  AD  0.928  1.589  0.02478  24.4  0.263  1.258 
  2004  AC  0.591  3.033  0.19563  19.1  0.674  1.812 
  2004  VA  0.767  3.035  0.02423  17.3  0.597  1.901 
  2004  JN13  0.866  4.871  0.13041  14.9  0.698  2.868 
  2004  HO  0.902  2.789  0.06021  18.7  0.511  1.845 
  2004  NL8  0.716  4.416  0.02809  17.1  0.721  2.566 
  2004  DG2  0.545  1.951  0.25252  18.7  0.563  1.248 
  2004  HE12  0.984  2.706  0.00883  17.5  0.467  1.845 
  2004  VA64  0.269  4.657  0.29948  17.2  0.891  2.463 
  2004  GA1  0.806  4.069  0.01462  17.5  0.669  2.438 
  2004  FN32  0.389  2.021  0.23703  19.1  0.677  1.205 
  2004  FE31  0.861  2.285  0.07273  18.1  0.452  1.573 
  2004  VW14  0.847  3.395  0.01003  19.4  0.601  2.121 
  2004  XM14  0.348  1.961  0.49646  17.5  0.699  1.154 
  2004  HK33  0.904  2.871  0.0092  17.6  0.521  1.888 
  2004  QQ  0.752  3.746  0.06137  16.7  0.665  2.249 
  2004  BU58  0.555  1.953  0.45643  18.1  0.557  1.254 
  2004  BV102  0.464  2.624  0.10333  17.6  0.7  1.544 
  2004  WS2  0.53  2.143  0.02946  18  0.603  1.337 
  2004  RN9  0.982  1.628  0.0949  20.8  0.247  1.305 
  2004  OT11  0.94  3.368  0.01178  17.2  0.564  2.154 
  2004  JA27  0.961  2.371  0.03275  19.4  0.423  1.666 
  2004  GU9  0.864  1.137  0.00162  21.2  0.136  1.001 
  2004  EC  0.281  3.714  0.41443  15.6  0.86  1.997 
  2004  BF68  0.889  2.365  0.05478  19.4  0.454  1.627 
  2004  LJ1  0.922  3.608  0.01996  15.5  0.593  2.265 
  2004  XN35  0.482  2.53  0.15256  18.5  0.68  1.506 
  2004  LB6  0.824  2.412  0.05786  18.4  0.491  1.618 
  2004  FA18  0.598  1.595  0.15353  19.3  0.455  1.097 
  2004  FE3  0.816  3.806  0.15168  16.3  0.647  2.311 
  2004  EP20  0.582  1.536  0.23593  18.8  0.451  1.059 
  2004  WG1  0.785  2.496  0.05532  17.4  0.521  1.64 
  2004  VD17  0.62  2.396  0.00154  18.9  0.589  1.508 
  2004  LA12  0.633  4.391  0.35112  15.6  0.748  2.512 
  2004  EW9  0.896  2.94  0.08891  16.6  0.533  1.918 
  2004  AF  0.881  3.062  0.03488  16.1  0.553  1.972 
  2005  YP180  0.526  2.22  0.01647  19.3  0.617  1.373 
  2005  YO180  0.817  2.143  0.03743  20.4  0.448  1.48 
  2005  YX128  0.583  3.775  0.05578  18.8  0.732  2.179 
  2005  YN128  0.927  2.365  0.01895  24.1  0.437  1.646 
  2005  YL128  0.749  1.962  0.12526  20.8  0.447  1.355 
  2005  YY93  0.302  4.871  0.07493  17.1  0.883  2.586 
  2005  YU55  0.651  1.63  0.0011  21.9  0.429  1.141 
  2005  YA37  0.988  1.572  0.03568  22.4  0.228  1.28 
  2005  YU8  0.921  3.102  0.02535  23.7  0.542  2.012 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2005  YS8  0.798  2.593  0.00692  20  0.529  1.696 
  2005  YU3  0.407  4.699  0.04348  19.8  0.841  2.553 
  2005  YY1  0.87  1.457  0.03259  23.1  0.252  1.163 
  2005  YK  0.735  1.388  0.00835  26.9  0.308  1.061 
  2005  YD  0.95  2.354  0.02214  24.5  0.425  1.652 
  2005  XL80  0.884  2.568  0.04259  18.1  0.488  1.726 
  2005  XX77  0.998  2.054  0.03261  23.9  0.346  1.526 
  2005  XO66  0.926  2.399  0.00955  24.6  0.443  1.663 
  2005  XN27  0.882  3.929  0.00272  24.5  0.633  2.405 
  2005  XJ8  0.733  3.13  0.01693  17  0.62  1.932 
  2005  XA8  0.798  2.044  0.00156  25.7  0.438  1.421 
  2005  XY4  0.424  1.688  0.01185  23.5  0.598  1.056 
  2005  XX4  0.96  2.542  0.01685  24.3  0.452  1.751 
  2005  XW4  0.302  1.774  0.06799  21.4  0.709  1.038 
  2005  XO4  0.92  3.599  0.02283  22.2  0.593  2.259 
  2005  XN4  0.786  2.969  0.15336  19.8  0.581  1.878 
  2005  XK4  0.534  2.171  0.0197  24.5  0.605  1.353 
  2005  XB1  0.657  1.605  0.07072  21.7  0.419  1.131 
  2005  XX  0.938  3.669  0.00493  26.8  0.593  2.304 
  2005  XA  0.875  4.225  0.00255  26.3  0.657  2.55 
  2005  WG57  0.912  2.682  0.00165  23.6  0.493  1.797 
  2005  WK56  0.985  2.258  0.03186  22.6  0.393  1.621 
  2005  WY55  0.691  4.279  0.0041  20.7  0.722  2.485 
  2005  WK4  0.772  1.252  0.00454  20.1  0.237  1.012 
  2005  WG4  0.971  3.872  0.06985  24.9  0.599  2.421 
  2005  WR3  0.915  1.678  0.12895  21.3  0.294  1.297 
  2005  WQ3  0.65  2.838  0.01165  24.3  0.627  1.744 
  2005  WN3  0.686  4.655  0.0001  29.9  0.743  2.671 
  2005  WR2  0.695  2.369  0.0752  19.3  0.546  1.532 
  2005  WY1  0.974  3.634  0.03849  23  0.577  2.304 
  2005  WC1  0.719  2.082  0.01454  20.7  0.487  1.401 
  2005  WB1  0.815  1.713  0.04698  20.9  0.355  1.264 
  2005  WA1  0.831  3.182  0.01935  21.6  0.586  2.006 
  2005  WY  0.938  2.649  0.00182  27.1  0.477  1.794 
  2005  WX  0.997  2.198  0.00955  26.9  0.376  1.597 
  2005  WE  0.862  1.441  0.12628  19.9  0.252  1.151 
  2005  WC  0.599  1.557  0.01394  25.2  0.444  1.078 
  2005  WA  0.866  1.377  0.0078  23.9  0.228  1.122 
  2005  VP118  0.622  3.569  0.14451  18.8  0.703  2.096 
  2005  VT7  0.96  2.523  0.01718  23  0.449  1.742 
  2005  VR7  0.772  1.394  0.0306  21.3  0.287  1.083 
  2005  VG7  0.901  3.102  0.00769  24.5  0.55  2.002 
  2005  VE7  0.661  4  0.12117  18.4  0.716  2.33 
  2005  VO5  0.883  3.136  0.03958  19.8  0.561  2.009 
  2005  VA2  0.822  1.592  0.09557  21  0.319  1.207 
  2005  VY1  0.986  2.362  0.00887  26.4  0.411  1.674 
  2005  VN1  0.943  1.851  0.01226  25.1  0.325  1.397 
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  2005  VR  0.921  2.931  0.28181  20.6  0.522  1.926 
  2005  VQ  0.576  1.676  0.30833  18.9  0.489  1.126 
  2005  VP  0.961  3.683  0.03018  25.6  0.586  2.322 
  2005  VO  0.801  4.069  0.0023  27.9  0.671  2.435 
  2005  VN  0.931  3.237  0.00957  22.9  0.553  2.084 
  2005  VE  0.771  1.356  0.19805  20.7  0.275  1.064 
  2005  VC  0.84  3.323  0.01885  17.2  0.597  2.081 
  2005  UJ159  0.566  6.132  0.03016  17.6  0.831  3.349 
  2005  UN157  0.369  4.674  0.42922  18.3  0.854  2.521 
  2005  UT64  0.871  2.774  0.04564  20.1  0.522  1.823 
  2005  US64  0.976  1.304  0.02771  23  0.144  1.14 
  2005  UY6  0.287  4.215  0.18127  18  0.872  2.251 
  2005  UW6  0.525  3.549  0.01628  21.8  0.742  2.037 
  2005  UV6  0.991  3.271  0.00957  27.3  0.535  2.131 
  2005  US6  0.953  2.238  0.01642  24.8  0.403  1.595 
  2005  UL6  0.976  4.097  0.00434  24.5  0.615  2.536 
  2005  UJ6  0.624  1.514  0.1246  21.5  0.416  1.069 
  2005  UH6  0.368  1.633  0.02333  18.6  0.632  1.001 
  2005  UA6  0.915  3.91  0.01917  23.3  0.621  2.413 
  2005  UX5  0.744  2.781  0.06444  21.2  0.578  1.763 
  2005  UW5  0.845  1.949  0.00133  27.5  0.395  1.397 
  2005  UO5  0.986  1.335  0.09865  20.3  0.15  1.16 
  2005  UM5  0.542  1.881  0.05037  20.8  0.552  1.211 
  2005  UG5  0.855  1.257  0.01673  24.3  0.19  1.056 
  2005  UU3  0.669  1.883  0.14051  22  0.476  1.276 
  2005  UH3  0.782  2.67  0.08092  17.7  0.547  1.726 
  2005  UC3  0.991  3.367  0.00126  27.1  0.545  2.179 
  2005  UK1  0.761  4.237  0.01094  18  0.695  2.499 
  2005  UH1  0.663  2.809  0.1174  19.6  0.618  1.736 
  2005  UA1  0.815  3.431  0.00137  26.2  0.616  2.123 
  2005  UR  0.267  4.237  0.03402  21.6  0.882  2.252 
  2005  UO  0.564  2.137  0.00281  22  0.582  1.351 
  2005  UL  0.531  3.228  0.10397  19  0.717  1.879 
  2005  UF  0.813  2.526  0.00433  26.1  0.513  1.67 
  2005  UB  0.496  3.296  0.46103  16.7  0.738  1.896 
  2005  TM173  0.934  4.811  0.00813  24  0.675  2.872 
  2005  TV51  0.986  3.072  0.01404  26.4  0.514  2.029 
  2005  TC51  0.699  1.317  0.00373  27.3  0.307  1.008 
  2005  TU50  0.576  2.277  0.01078  21.4  0.596  1.427 
  2005  TR50  0.879  2.35  0.00741  20.2  0.455  1.615 
  2005  TK50  0.724  3.109  0.0008  29.1  0.622  1.917 
  2005  TF50  0.293  4.241  0.11573  20.3  0.871  2.267 
  2005  TU45  0.994  2.953  0.25447  17.1  0.496  1.974 
  2005  TH45  0.66  1.913  0.00779  26.3  0.487  1.287 
  2005  TS15  0.815  1.704  0.0043  20.9  0.353  1.26 
  2005  TP15  0.967  1.727  0.00878  25.2  0.282  1.347 
  2005  TF15  0.791  3.794  0.18117  19.5  0.655  2.293 
  2005  TE15  0.791  1.618  0.05478  19.9  0.344  1.204 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2005  TB15  0.443  3.184  0.06718  19.2  0.756  1.813 
  2005  TP  0.941  3.618  0.03628  20.8  0.587  2.28 
  2005  TE  0.739  2.76  0.02996  23.9  0.578  1.749 
  2005  TD  0.977  1.89  0.0558  23.5  0.319  1.434 
  2005  TA  0.96  1.601  0.0014  27.2  0.25  1.281 
  2005  SE71  0.861  1.278  0.0021  18.2  0.195  1.07 
  2005  SB71  0.939  1.589  0.0871  21.1  0.257  1.264 
  2005  SZ70  0.907  2.336  0.01717  24.4  0.441  1.621 
  2005  SK26  0.956  2.622  0.01167  25.5  0.466  1.789 
  2005  SH26  0.756  1.44  0.19001  20.8  0.311  1.098 
  2005  SJ19  0.968  2.162  0.05277  24  0.381  1.565 
  2005  SH19  0.322  4.218  0.47944  17.1  0.858  2.27 
  2005  SW9  0.857  3.162  0.11376  19.6  0.574  2.009 
  2005  SQ9  0.929  1.96  0.03874  22.9  0.357  1.445 
  2005  SV4  0.968  3.824  0.02691  22.7  0.596  2.396 
  2005  SS4  0.363  2.557  0.19034  19  0.751  1.46 
  2005  ST1  0.913  1.99  0.12855  20.4  0.371  1.451 
  2005  SS1  0.962  2.994  0.00704  26.1  0.513  1.978 
  2005  SP1  0.788  3.968  0.01395  23.2  0.669  2.378 
  2005  SO1  0.918  3.418  0.00668  25.4  0.577  2.168 
  2005  SQ  0.704  2.607  0.00503  20.3  0.574  1.656 
  2005  SL  0.79  1.462  0.02481  22.9  0.298  1.126 
  2005  SF  0.678  3.228  0.12819  19  0.653  1.953 
  2005  SC  0.766  3.882  0.0719  20.2  0.67  2.324 
  2005  RD34  0.976  1.677  0.13077  20.3  0.265  1.326 
  2005  RV24  0.178  2.833  0.07499  20.6  0.882  1.506 
  2005  RR6  0.905  5.045  0.04032  18.4  0.696  2.975 
  2005  RP6  0.959  3.594  0.12537  21.2  0.579  2.277 
  2005  RX3  0.719  2.348  0.02322  22.3  0.531  1.533 
  2005  RW3  0.754  3.459  0.02326  22.8  0.642  2.106 
  2005  RA3  0.985  1.939  0.04984  22.3  0.326  1.462 
  2005  RZ2  0.992  1.22  0.07946  23.7  0.103  1.106 
  2005  RJ  0.869  4.291  0.04766  22.3  0.663  2.58 
  2005  RA  0.872  4.235  0.04083  22.2  0.659  2.553 
  2005  QZ151  0.813  3.061  0.00434  20  0.58  1.937 
  2005  QY151  0.774  1.988  0.06542  17.7  0.44  1.381 
  2005  QG88  0.875  2.581  0.09818  20.5  0.494  1.728 
  2005  QK76  0.674  2.124  0.00047  25.1  0.518  1.399 
  2005  QQ30  0.799  2.711  0.16106  20  0.545  1.755 
  2005  QB5  0.84  1.405  0.01685  23.7  0.252  1.122 
  2005  QC  0.41  3.194  0.20122  18.9  0.772  1.802 
  2005  PA17  0.986  3.637  0.02251  24  0.574  2.311 
  2005  PY16  0.939  3.013  0.04133  19.3  0.525  1.976 
  2005  PJ2  0.408  1.988  0.04424  19.5  0.659  1.198 
  2005  PH2  0.562  2.287  0.09083  20.4  0.605  1.425 
  2005  PO  0.785  1.72  0.01769  19.8  0.373  1.252 
  2005  OF3  0.981  3.786  0.0503  22  0.588  2.384 
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  2005  OD3  0.942  3.806  0.01004  21.2  0.603  2.374 
  2005  OU2  0.774  1.696  0.12331  19.1  0.373  1.235 
  2005  OR2  0.913  3.148  0.02117  23.5  0.55  2.031 
  2005  OX  0.509  2.152  0.01691  20.4  0.617  1.331 
  2005  ND63  0.949  1.771  0.0055  26.2  0.302  1.36 
  2005  NG56  0.984  4.653  0.01863  22.4  0.651  2.818 
  2005  NB56  0.866  2.419  0.01694  22.9  0.473  1.643 
  2005  NX55  0.627  2.462  0.03331  22.1  0.594  1.545 
  2005  NX44  0.206  4.225  0.13216  17.2  0.907  2.216 
  2005  NX39  0.304  4.624  0.09145  19.7  0.876  2.464 
  2005  NE7  0.722  3.372  0.0474  19  0.647  2.047 
  2005  NB7  0.986  3.102  0.00748  18.7  0.518  2.044 
  2005  NZ6  0.249  3.419  0.00848  17.6  0.864  1.834 
  2005  NL1  0.987  3.085  0.05823  21.4  0.515  2.036 
  2005  NK1  0.406  2.678  0.54882  17.3  0.737  1.542 
  2005  NJ1  0.746  3.521  0.02286  18.5  0.65  2.133 
  2005  NG  0.882  2.669  0.00375  24.2  0.503  1.775 
  2005  ML13  0.865  1.431  0.06132  22.4  0.246  1.148 
  2005  MW9  0.405  6.766  0.15257  19.2  0.887  3.586 
  2005  MD  0.69  2.826  0.25466  18.8  0.608  1.758 
  2005  MA  0.852  3.215  0.00449  26.9  0.581  2.033 
  2005  LQ40  0.954  2.61  0.08934  23.3  0.465  1.782 
  2005  LP40  0.89  3.038  0.11801  19.5  0.547  1.964 
  2005  LW39  0.565  3.411  0.02604  20  0.716  1.988 
  2005  LX36  0.437  1.622  0.02185  20.8  0.575  1.03 
  2005  LV30  0.645  4  0.19451  19.1  0.722  2.323 
  2005  LG8  0.303  3.207  0.31122  16.9  0.827  1.755 
  2005  LW3  0.769  2.093  0.00078  21.7  0.462  1.431 
  2005  LU3  0.731  1.383  0.01268  26.2  0.308  1.057 
  2005  LW  0.527  2.408  0.05189  18.9  0.641  1.468 
  2005  LD  0.968  2.125  0.01139  22.9  0.374  1.546 
  2005  KJ10  0.792  3.006  0.02889  21.3  0.583  1.899 
  2005  KD7  0.519  1.815  0.22662  20.6  0.555  1.167 
  2005  KR  0.79  1.488  0.13794  21.6  0.306  1.139 
  2005  JT108  0.736  2.708  0.12208  19.5  0.572  1.722 
  2005  JF108  0.404  3.492  0.40076  18.1  0.792  1.948 
  2005  JU81  0.806  1.427  0.02905  21.9  0.278  1.116 
  2005  JQ81  0.526  4.704  0.14691  19.9  0.799  2.615 
  2005  JE46  0.852  2.956  0.02965  17.7  0.553  1.904 
  2005  JD46  0.57  4.725  0.18481  18  0.785  2.648 
  2005  JB22  0.679  1.446  0.0294  24.9  0.361  1.062 
  2005  JR5  0.98  1.339  0.05522  22.2  0.155  1.16 
  2005  JO3  0.913  1.814  0.0609  19.8  0.331  1.364 
  2005  JU1  0.74  3.934  0.03007  21.8  0.683  2.337 
  2005  JT1  0.99  1.846  0.00383  25.7  0.302  1.418 
  2005  HC4  0.071  3.568  0.06091  20.7  0.961  1.82 
  2005  HF  0.973  3.402  0.01485  23.4  0.555  2.188 
  2005  GK141  0.938  4.59  0.01258  22.4  0.661  2.764 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2005  GC120  0.599  1.787  0.00644  19.7  0.498  1.193 
  2005  GA120  0.79  1.782  0.0044  25.1  0.386  1.286 
  2005  GZ110  0.944  2.368  0.06104  22.5  0.43  1.656 
  2005  GY110  0.58  3.117  0.21391  18.3  0.686  1.849 
  2005  GH81  0.887  3.009  0.04347  21.6  0.545  1.948 
  2005  GD60  0.832  1.825  0.03319  21.9  0.374  1.329 
  2005  GO59  0.485  3.105  0.08318  20.4  0.73  1.795 
  2005  GE59  0.842  3.378  0.0337  18  0.601  2.11 
  2005  GB34  0.996  1.832  0.00726  25.4  0.296  1.414 
  2005  GQ33  0.631  4.055  0.01933  23.7  0.731  2.343 
  2005  GO22  0.337  3.493  0.019  18.7  0.824  1.915 
  2005  GL9  0.222  4.06  0.18012  17.1  0.896  2.141 
  2005  GY8  0.672  3.426  0.0024  21.8  0.672  2.049 
  2005  GJ8  0.793  2.74  0.02858  20.3  0.551  1.767 
  2005  GU  0.598  2.505  0.01295  20  0.615  1.552 
  2005  GL  0.733  1.38  0.00578  21.2  0.306  1.056 
  2005  GK  0.904  1.78  0.10807  20  0.326  1.342 
  2005  GG  0.695  3.388  0.25041  16  0.66  2.041 
  2005  FN4  0.627  4.698  0.0511  18.6  0.765  2.662 
  2005  FL4  0.76  4.576  0.25189  16.9  0.715  2.668 
  2005  FE3  0.985  3.242  0.02741  19.4  0.534  2.114 
  2005  FC3  0.816  3.135  0.07679  19.1  0.587  1.975 
  2005  FV2  0.599  3.734  0.21323  18.7  0.723  2.167 
  2005  FK  0.898  2.161  0.04911  23.4  0.413  1.53 
  2005  FH  0.926  4.467  0.0392  17.5  0.657  2.696 
  2005  FG  0.883  1.36  0.01653  23.9  0.213  1.122 
  2005  FD  0.885  2.036  0.09786  19.6  0.394  1.46 
  2005  FA  0.814  3.546  0.00494  25.2  0.627  2.18 
  2005  EJ225  0.729  2.685  0.01574  18.9  0.573  1.707 
  2005  ED224  0.651  3.083  0.00136  24.3  0.651  1.867 
  2005  EZ223  0.806  2.704  0.0227  22.4  0.541  1.755 
  2005  EM169  0.738  4.903  0.00977  24.8  0.738  2.821 
  2005  EJ169  0.87  3.168  0.02529  22.9  0.569  2.019 
  2005  EG169  0.758  2.086  0.03662  24.6  0.467  1.422 
  2005  EE169  0.984  3.505  0.01282  24.2  0.562  2.245 
  2005  EY95  0.5  1.667  0.03981  20.3  0.538  1.084 
  2005  EV95  0.876  2.398  0.09092  22.1  0.465  1.637 
  2005  EU95  0.759  1.595  0.09552  20.5  0.355  1.177 
  2005  ES95  0.937  3.078  0.03362  25.8  0.533  2.007 
  2005  EQ95  0.786  2.549  0.00363  23.4  0.528  1.668 
  2005  EH94  0.891  1.544  0.02534  23.8  0.268  1.218 
  2005  EG94  0.859  2.35  0.05577  18.4  0.465  1.604 
  2005  ET70  0.365  3.893  0.05294  20.7  0.829  2.129 
  2005  ER70  0.952  1.497  0.02413  24.7  0.223  1.224 
  2005  EM70  0.98  2.229  0.06327  24.8  0.389  1.604 
  2005  EL70  0.17  4.454  0.01268  24  0.927  2.312 
  2005  EO33  0.842  3.101  0.04097  21.3  0.573  1.971 
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  2005  EU2  0.975  2.041  0.00083  23.1  0.354  1.508 
  2005  ET2  0.866  3.528  0.06083  20.7  0.606  2.197 
  2005  ES1  0.956  1.755  0.00707  26.8  0.295  1.355 
  2005  EY  0.278  4.763  0.23474  17.4  0.89  2.52 
  2005  EE  0.759  1.501  0.01799  20.9  0.328  1.13 
  2005  EA  0.469  2.133  0.03232  21  0.639  1.301 
  2005  DO  0.92  4.032  0.07032  19.7  0.628  2.476 
  2005  DD  0.835  3.031  0.03007  20.1  0.568  1.933 
  2005  CD69  0.884  1.293  0.01003  24.3  0.188  1.088 
  2005  CU61  0.474  2.977  0.0148  22.6  0.725  1.725 
  2005  CG41  0.685  1.433  0.11182  23.9  0.354  1.059 
  2005  CF41  0.682  2.615  0.20711  18.5  0.586  1.649 
  2005  CE41  0.859  2.711  0.00439  23.9  0.519  1.785 
  2005  CU38  0.757  2.726  0.03321  23.9  0.565  1.741 
  2005  CP38  0.672  1.367  0.06254  23.7  0.341  1.019 
  2005  CC37  0.971  3.453  0.00093  22.7  0.561  2.212 
  2005  CZ36  0.944  3.524  0.01521  17.5  0.578  2.234 
  2005  CV25  0.866  1.648  0.14407  19.7  0.311  1.257 
  2005  CQ7  0.932  2.787  0.02945  24.5  0.499  1.86 
  2005  CP7  0.99  3.537  0.00682  25.4  0.563  2.264 
  2005  CM7  0.631  2.788  0.0035  26.2  0.631  1.71 
  2005  CL7  0.943  1.154  0.0629  19.6  0.101  1.049 
  2005  CN  0.827  1.203  0.02905  22.8  0.185  1.015 
  2005  CL  0.493  3.487  0.02352  20.3  0.752  1.99 
  2005  CJ  0.83  2.668  0.00728  20.4  0.525  1.749 
  2005  BG28  0.793  1.259  0.01012  25.6  0.227  1.026 
  2005  BS27  0.686  1.547  0.14878  20.5  0.385  1.117 
  2005  BH14  0.404  1.932  0.07  21.5  0.654  1.168 
  2005  BG14  0.541  3.444  0.02579  18.6  0.728  1.993 
  2005  BY2  0.85  1.688  0.04002  20.4  0.33  1.269 
  2005  BE2  0.758  3.275  0.08883  18.3  0.624  2.017 
  2005  BY1  0.973  5.333  0.19145  18.1  0.691  3.153 
  2005  BW1  0.328  4.78  0.24038  18.2  0.872  2.554 
  2005  BU1  0.952  1.982  0.07276  23.8  0.351  1.467 
  2005  BT1  0.381  2.279  0.36477  19.1  0.714  1.33 
  2005  BS1  0.85  3.08  0.00005  27.5  0.568  1.965 
  2005  BN1  0.796  2.782  0.01963  23.7  0.555  1.789 
  2005  BM1  0.846  1.177  0.02786  25.4  0.164  1.011 
  2005  BC  0.859  1.52  0.04615  18  0.278  1.19 
  2005  AZ28  0.966  1.968  0.0229  24  0.342  1.467 
  2005  AX28  0.742  3.57  0.0111  25.2  0.656  2.156 
  2005  AV27  0.786  3.724  0.04013  20.5  0.651  2.255 
  2005  AN26  0.848  3.799  0.03719  18.2  0.635  2.323 
  2005  AH14  0.9  3.723  0.08779  17.2  0.611  2.312 
  2005  AD13  0.476  3.421  0.01539  17.9  0.756  1.949 
  2005  AV3  0.979  3.709  0.19709  20.2  0.582  2.344 
  2005  AU3  0.656  1.839  0.0015  26.1  0.474  1.247 
  2005  AK3  0.91  3.406  0.00448  24.4  0.578  2.158 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2005  AC  0.506  1.594  0.0739  18.1  0.518  1.05 
  2005  EO1  0.747  4.323  0.097  18  0.705  2.535 
  2005  SN25  0.897  1.563  0.02788  19.7  0.271  1.23 
  2005  CW25  0.849  2.403  0.05831  18.8  0.478  1.626 
  2005  XH8  0.408  2.237  0.32284  18  0.692  1.322 
  2005  RC  0.531  3.769  0.19504  17.2  0.753  2.15 
  2005  YY128  0.442  2.856  0.02905  18.3  0.732  1.649 
  2005  QE30  0.627  3.407  0.07887  17.2  0.689  2.017 
  2005  JS108  0.919  1.793  0.01944  19.1  0.322  1.356 
  2005  GN59  0.882  2.431  0.04956  17.4  0.468  1.656 
  2005  CV69  0.961  2.348  0.22075  18  0.419  1.655 
  2005  UD  0.163  2.387  0.07899  17.5  0.872  1.275 
  2005  TB  0.822  1.701  0.11063  17.5  0.348  1.261 
  2005  EA94  0.51  2.523  0.07445  17.8  0.664  1.516 
  2006  YP44  0.95  4.219  0.00158  23.6  0.632  2.585 
  2006  YO44  0.206  4.973  0.1504  18.2  0.921  2.59 
  2006  YT13  0.76  1.887  0.03597  18.3  0.426  1.323 
  2006  YC13  0.91  2.015  0.13661  20.3  0.378  1.463 
  2006  YX2  0.842  1.176  0.06638  24.1  0.166  1.009 
  2006  YV1  0.7  1.811  0.05694  21.6  0.443  1.255 
  2006  YP  0.903  1.385  0.02626  23.7  0.211  1.144 
  2006  YF  0.888  1.33  0.05674  20.9  0.199  1.109 
  2006  YE  0.977  2.512  0.00172  27.3  0.44  1.744 
  2006  YD  0.803  4.442  0.10565  17.4  0.694  2.622 
  2006  XW4  0.952  1.132  0.00705  24.3  0.086  1.042 
  2006  XV4  0.97  4.212  0.0048  24.9  0.626  2.591 
  2006  XR4  0.76  1.321  0.00291  26.2  0.269  1.041 
  2006  XA3  0.89  3.842  0.01428  25.2  0.624  2.366 
  2006  XZ2  0.906  2.486  0.00244  27.1  0.466  1.696 
  2006  XK2  0.543  2.537  0.05359  20.5  0.648  1.54 
  2006  XH2  0.603  4.001  0.01349  24.4  0.738  2.302 
  2006  XE2  0.794  1.507  0.05852  22  0.31  1.15 
  2006  XD2  0.728  1.807  0.01734  21  0.425  1.268 
  2006  XK1  0.733  4.276  0.19496  19.3  0.707  2.505 
  2006  XF1  0.629  2.087  0.26998  19.3  0.537  1.358 
  2006  XY  0.991  2.005  0.007  24  0.338  1.498 
  2006  XB  0.879  2.619  0.06034  20.7  0.497  1.749 
  2006  XA  0.992  3.402  0.09159  17.3  0.549  2.197 
  2006  WZ184  0.917  1.821  0.00203  26.3  0.33  1.369 
  2006  WO130  0.905  2.423  0.02207  26.1  0.456  1.664 
  2006  WK130  0.669  3.541  0.01918  22.3  0.682  2.105 
  2006  WJ130  0.98  1.285  0.03601  24.1  0.135  1.133 
  2006  WG130  0.963  3.837  0.02982  24.7  0.599  2.4 
  2006  WE129  0.895  2.559  0.10871  19.7  0.482  1.727 
  2006  WD129  0.939  2.82  0.01374  26.3  0.5  1.88 
  2006  WQ127  0.643  1.974  0.01118  23.3  0.509  1.308 
  2006  WP127  0.589  4.475  0.09209  18.3  0.767  2.532 
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  2006  WA30  0.941  2.316  0.03259  25.6  0.422  1.629 
  2006  WZ29  0.966  3.589  0.01824  24.8  0.576  2.278 
  2006  WX29  0.628  4.046  0.00117  27.8  0.731  2.337 
  2006  WV29  0.609  2.157  0.00051  26.5  0.559  1.383 
  2006  WS29  0.9  2.425  0.0416  25  0.458  1.663 
  2006  WQ29  0.971  2.231  0.02163  18  0.393  1.601 
  2006  WZ3  0.739  2.755  0.0616  20.2  0.577  1.747 
  2006  WY3  0.854  4.003  0.01135  22.8  0.648  2.429 
  2006  WX3  0.976  4.429  0.1119  22.3  0.639  2.703 
  2006  WP3  0.896  1.818  0.02299  23.4  0.34  1.357 
  2006  WN3  0.896  2.713  0.07839  19.8  0.504  1.804 
  2006  WM3  0.895  3.076  0.00308  23.2  0.549  1.986 
  2006  WA3  0.983  1.465  0.02816  22.3  0.197  1.224 
  2006  WW1  0.703  2.134  0.11749  19.1  0.505  1.418 
  2006  WT1  0.985  3.956  0.0037  20.1  0.601  2.47 
  2006  WS1  0.657  1.808  0.21382  19.6  0.467  1.233 
  2006  WR1  0.515  2.152  0.23519  17.6  0.614  1.333 
  2006  WP1  0.671  2.742  0.00063  28.2  0.607  1.706 
  2006  WX  0.985  3.976  0.00643  25.1  0.603  2.481 
  2006  WW  0.368  5.018  0.43102  16.2  0.863  2.693 
  2006  WV  0.715  2.354  0.0018  27.2  0.534  1.534 
  2006  VT13  0.949  4.194  0.00563  20.8  0.631  2.572 
  2006  VQ13  0.609  1.59  0.00899  20.1  0.446  1.1 
  2006  VF13  0.991  1.654  0.01295  23.2  0.251  1.322 
  2006  VE13  0.87  2.877  0.00559  26.6  0.536  1.874 
  2006  VA3  0.515  2.691  0.29052  17.2  0.679  1.603 
  2006  VZ2  0.999  4.069  0.08298  19.7  0.606  2.534 
  2006  VW2  0.872  1.6  0.0149  21.2  0.295  1.236 
  2006  VV2  0.944  3.832  0.01236  16.8  0.605  2.388 
  2006  VT2  0.35  2.176  0.24835  18.2  0.723  1.263 
  2006  VB2  0.381  3.186  0.22998  19.7  0.786  1.784 
  2006  VC  0.987  2.897  0.01956  20  0.492  1.942 
  2006  VB  0.995  2.462  0.03863  25.1  0.424  1.728 
  2006  UP217  0.615  1.79  0.00103  24.9  0.489  1.202 
  2006  UL217  0.931  1.929  0.02184  20.8  0.349  1.43 
  2006  UK217  0.494  2.487  0.25305  18.9  0.669  1.49 
  2006  UR216  0.784  2.565  0.08103  19.7  0.532  1.674 
  2006  UQ216  0.924  1.283  0.00125  27.3  0.162  1.104 
  2006  UA216  0.996  1.913  0.01497  23.6  0.315  1.455 
  2006  UY215  0.747  2.01  0.01409  23.1  0.458  1.379 
  2006  UJ185  0.712  2.673  0.00059  27.9  0.579  1.693 
  2006  UF185  0.486  1.971  0.13237  21.5  0.604  1.229 
  2006  UC185  0.92  2.132  0.01204  23.4  0.397  1.526 
  2006  UE64  0.812  1.832  0.00029  28  0.386  1.322 
  2006  UD64  0.439  3.787  0.14802  20.2  0.792  2.113 
  2006  UC64  0.604  3.469  0.00341  24.9  0.703  2.036 
  2006  UB64  0.632  3.559  0.16196  20.7  0.698  2.096 
  2006  UU17  0.969  3.676  0.00549  26.6  0.583  2.322 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2006  UF17  0.472  4.506  0.02672  21.5  0.811  2.489 
  2006  UE17  0.785  1.567  0.0554  21.8  0.333  1.176 
  2006  UA17  0.979  1.777  0.10195  23.8  0.29  1.378 
  2006  UO  0.944  4.708  0.03063  21  0.666  2.826 
  2006  UK  0.688  2.295  0.01442  20.1  0.539  1.492 
  2006  UA  0.786  2.272  0.07246  20.1  0.486  1.529 
  2006  TC8  0.514  3.791  0.12504  19.9  0.761  2.152 
  2006  TA8  0.914  5.21  0.00531  20.9  0.701  3.062 
  2006  TR7  0.826  1.829  0.00735  25.2  0.378  1.327 
  2006  TH7  0.418  4.645  0.23279  19.3  0.835  2.531 
  2006  TD  0.965  2.218  0.01747  22.4  0.394  1.591 
  2006  TC  0.136  2.941  0.14004  18.8  0.912  1.538 
  2006  SX217  0.974  1.848  0.03038  18.8  0.31  1.411 
  2006  SV217  0.858  1.761  0.00465  24.5  0.345  1.31 
  2006  SO198  0.257  3.74  0.00198  23.9  0.872  1.998 
  2006  SN198  0.614  1.902  0.00517  26.1  0.512  1.258 
  2006  SV134  0.97  2.764  0.12968  18.8  0.48  1.867 
  2006  SS134  0.654  1.689  0.03047  21.4  0.442  1.171 
  2006  SQ134  0.929  1.556  0.03986  24.7  0.252  1.243 
  2006  SP134  0.542  3.561  0.21781  16.9  0.736  2.051 
  2006  SK134  0.872  2.887  0.13227  18.4  0.536  1.879 
  2006  SR131  0.896  1.807  0.00091  28  0.337  1.352 
  2006  SP131  0.775  1.471  0.02929  25.3  0.31  1.123 
  2006  SR78  0.947  3.374  0.22694  20.2  0.562  2.161 
  2006  SQ78  0.775  1.569  0.18963  18.8  0.339  1.172 
  2006  SO78  0.827  2.933  0.16336  18.9  0.56  1.88 
  2006  SO77  0.977  2.659  0.00207  26.5  0.463  1.818 
  2006  SU49  0.972  1.854  0.00008  19.5  0.312  1.413 
  2006  SO19  0.904  1.58  0.10591  19.4  0.272  1.242 
  2006  SG7  0.457  1.629  0.01841  22.9  0.561  1.043 
  2006  SF7  0.822  1.258  0.04389  22.3  0.209  1.04 
  2006  SC6  0.504  1.901  0.4653  18  0.581  1.203 
  2006  SY5  0.884  1.202  0.10488  22.1  0.152  1.043 
  2006  SC  0.723  1.502  0.00067  25.2  0.35  1.113 
  2006  SB  0.923  1.38  0.01084  25.8  0.198  1.151 
  2006  RJ7  0.77  2.839  0.00148  23.7  0.573  1.804 
  2006  RH7  0.531  3.87  0.06057  20.6  0.759  2.201 
  2006  RH2  0.998  1.175  0.01348  27.2  0.082  1.087 
  2006  RG2  0.94  4.449  0.09938  18.2  0.651  2.695 
  2006  RK1  0.943  2.95  0.02823  21.8  0.516  1.947 
  2006  RZ  0.88  4.046  0.01166  20.3  0.643  2.463 
  2006  QN111  0.999  3.963  0.00812  23.8  0.597  2.481 
  2006  QM111  0.7  4.481  0.0011  27.6  0.73  2.59 
  2006  QY110  0.822  3.027  0.03108  18.1  0.573  1.925 
  2006  QV89  0.924  1.459  0.00017  25.3  0.224  1.192 
  2006  QT89  0.782  2.187  0.06281  20.1  0.473  1.484 
  2006  QE89  0.85  3.062  0.09447  20.9  0.565  1.956 
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  2006  QZ57  0.591  4.402  0.03351  22.7  0.763  2.497 
  2006  QK40  0.907  3.333  0.00605  24  0.572  2.12 
  2006  QB31  0.457  1.897  0.10069  21  0.612  1.177 
  2006  QA31  0.65  1.746  0.20452  19.9  0.458  1.198 
  2006  QS23  0.593  1.792  0.10756  20.3  0.503  1.193 
  2006  QE  0.565  1.712  0.13934  19.6  0.503  1.139 
  2006  PY17  0.684  3.113  0.02528  19.2  0.64  1.898 
  2006  PF1  0.271  4.118  0.12841  19.5  0.876  2.195 
  2006  PA1  0.915  3.153  0.02991  19.7  0.55  2.034 
  2006  PW  0.481  2.281  0.31989  18.1  0.652  1.381 
  2006  OG15  0.949  4.14  0.19656  19.8  0.627  2.545 
  2006  OY10  0.769  2.844  0.13583  18.7  0.574  1.807 
  2006  OT9  0.919  1.328  0.06058  20.1  0.182  1.124 
  2006  OS9  0.266  5.226  0.12563  18.6  0.903  2.746 
  2006  OE7  0.341  2.707  0.08947  20.3  0.776  1.524 
  2006  OC5  0.835  3.965  0.01442  19.2  0.652  2.4 
  2006  OA5  0.947  2.1  0.12304  19.7  0.378  1.523 
  2006  OZ4  0.58  1.465  0.12252  21.7  0.433  1.023 
  2006  OK3  0.807  2.551  0.00155  27.1  0.519  1.679 
  2006  ON1  0.985  4.11  0.02877  21.5  0.613  2.548 
  2006  MB14  0.916  1.152  0.00593  25.4  0.114  1.034 
  2006  MY13  0.494  2.032  0.19635  20.4  0.609  1.263 
  2006  MJ10  0.777  2.975  0.15823  18.7  0.586  1.876 
  2006  MV1  0.998  1.631  0.00746  26.8  0.241  1.314 
  2006  LD1  0.701  3.96  0.02165  20.9  0.699  2.33 
  2006  LM  0.972  2.454  0.00892  25  0.433  1.713 
  2006  LH  0.742  1.427  0.00861  24.8  0.316  1.084 
  2006  LF  0.74  3.544  0.11891  18.6  0.654  2.142 
  2006  LC  0.952  2.015  0.03144  23.1  0.358  1.484 
  2006  LA  0.252  2.858  0.05921  18.8  0.838  1.555 
  2006  KZ112  0.285  4.763  0.52945  16.7  0.887  2.524 
  2006  KM103  0.981  2.168  0.01213  20.2  0.377  1.574 
  2006  KV89  0.836  1.464  0.01421  21.5  0.273  1.15 
  2006  KN89  0.839  2.74  0.02482  21.4  0.531  1.79 
  2006  KK89  0.848  1.206  0.09944  22.5  0.174  1.027 
  2006  KZ86  0.302  4.081  0.21443  18.2  0.862  2.191 
  2006  KY86  0.803  3.784  0.04676  19.7  0.65  2.293 
  2006  KV86  0.966  2.12  0.00193  18.7  0.374  1.543 
  2006  KY67  0.964  3.184  0.02112  23  0.535  2.074 
  2006  KD40  0.985  3.05  0.03898  18.6  0.512  2.017 
  2006  KC40  0.785  2.551  0.02689  23.2  0.529  1.668 
  2006  KS38  0.778  2.086  0.02305  23.9  0.457  1.432 
  2006  KP21  0.992  2.972  0.05463  23.6  0.5  1.982 
  2006  KK21  0.348  5.108  0.0329  20.6  0.872  2.728 
  2006  KR1  0.693  1.632  0.29096  20.2  0.404  1.163 
  2006  KD1  0.535  4.43  0.41217  17.2  0.785  2.482 
  2006  KB1  0.774  4.148  0.00496  24.4  0.685  2.461 
  2006  KC  0.643  1.799  0.03221  22.2  0.474  1.221 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2006  KA  0.716  2.55  0.06857  19.3  0.561  1.633 
  2006  JY26  0.922  1.089  0.00144  28.4  0.083  1.006 
  2006  JV26  0.41  3.62  0.00561  25.2  0.797  2.015 
  2006  JY25  0.586  1.665  0.06698  20.3  0.479  1.126 
  2006  JO  0.787  3.966  0.01257  25.1  0.669  2.377 
  2006  JF  0.371  1.799  0.22774  19.5  0.658  1.085 
  2006  JE  0.434  3.095  0.01207  23.9  0.754  1.765 
  2006  HX57  0.914  2.697  0.00151  25.2  0.494  1.806 
  2006  HH56  0.922  1.807  0.03121  24  0.324  1.364 
  2006  HY51  0.08  5.122  0.08897  17.1  0.969  2.601 
  2006  HY50  0.959  4.209  0.24175  19.5  0.629  2.584 
  2006  HW50  1  1.471  0.02102  24.4  0.191  1.235 
  2006  HU50  0.97  1.605  0.00242  24.7  0.247  1.287 
  2006  HV30  1  2.145  0.14253  22.7  0.364  1.572 
  2006  HU30  0.844  2.066  0.11779  19.5  0.42  1.455 
  2006  HT30  0.985  4.152  0.01048  20.2  0.616  2.569 
  2006  HJ18  0.74  1.428  0.1439  21.8  0.317  1.084 
  2006  HF6  0.633  2.181  0.0024  24.4  0.55  1.407 
  2006  HZ5  0.954  1.45  0.01081  24.5  0.206  1.202 
  2006  HE2  0.898  1.232  0.00447  26.5  0.157  1.065 
  2006  HD2  0.804  3.253  0.02736  20.9  0.604  2.028 
  2006  HC2  0.877  2.542  0.01588  21.8  0.487  1.71 
  2006  GY2  0.938  2.777  0.00563  18.8  0.495  1.858 
  2006  GX2  0.799  2.716  0.09368  20.7  0.545  1.757 
  2006  GV2  0.332  3.647  0.22938  19.6  0.833  1.99 
  2006  GU2  0.804  1.356  0.00128  27.8  0.256  1.08 
  2006  GQ2  0.69  1.892  0.12468  17.9  0.466  1.291 
  2006  GC1  0.313  3.098  0.01016  21  0.816  1.705 
  2006  GB1  0.807  1.46  0.00978  23.6  0.288  1.134 
  2006  GZ  0.947  2.108  0.08395  19.4  0.38  1.527 
  2006  GC  0.926  3.437  0.03847  24.4  0.575  2.181 
  2006  GA  0.942  3.973  0.0852  21.5  0.617  2.457 
  2006  FV35  0.623  1.379  0.10464  21.6  0.378  1.001 
  2006  FW33  0.203  1.858  0.06595  20.2  0.803  1.03 
  2006  FX  0.839  2.151  0.00201  20  0.439  1.495 
  2006  FW  0.864  1.894  0.08814  22.8  0.374  1.379 
  2006  FU  0.894  2.13  0.00961  25.6  0.409  1.512 
  2006  FJ  0.84  1.518  0.08443  20.6  0.288  1.179 
  2006  FE  0.647  2.101  0.07582  20.3  0.529  1.374 
  2006  EK53  0.495  1.555  0.0136  23  0.517  1.025 
  2006  EH1  0.876  3.213  0.00388  26.5  0.571  2.045 
  2006  EF1  0.83  1.7  0.02761  22.8  0.344  1.265 
  2006  EE1  0.87  1.535  0.07365  19.8  0.276  1.203 
  2006  EC1  0.585  4.193  0.18481  18.5  0.755  2.389 
  2006  EW  0.988  2.322  0.02943  23.6  0.403  1.655 
  2006  EC  0.89  1.385  0.00094  26.6  0.218  1.138 
  2006  EB  0.503  2.929  0.00353  22.5  0.707  1.716 
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  2006  DO63  0.864  2.059  0.01766  25.8  0.409  1.461 
  2006  DU62  0.429  2.851  0.00371  18  0.738  1.64 
  2006  DS62  0.975  3.552  0.01077  26.7  0.569  2.264 
  2006  DQ62  0.637  3.59  0.09773  19.5  0.699  2.114 
  2006  DP62  0.496  2.553  0.01314  22.1  0.675  1.525 
  2006  DO62  0.936  2.771  0.00124  28.5  0.495  1.853 
  2006  DT14  0.828  2.994  0.12491  19.8  0.567  1.911 
  2006  DR14  0.865  4.115  0.00527  26.1  0.653  2.49 
  2006  DQ14  0.973  1.082  0.01428  27.1  0.053  1.028 
  2006  DP14  0.306  2.425  0.01555  18.9  0.776  1.365 
  2006  DP11  0.562  3.158  0.12198  19.5  0.698  1.86 
  2006  DD1  0.777  3.824  0.00135  26.5  0.662  2.301 
  2006  DA1  0.811  2.327  0.02451  24.8  0.483  1.569 
  2006  DY  0.994  3.647  0.235  18.5  0.571  2.321 
  2006  DX  0.952  1.332  0.04742  24.4  0.166  1.142 
  2006  DV  0.754  3.155  0.12711  19.6  0.614  1.954 
  2006  DN  1  1.76  0.00425  24.5  0.276  1.38 
  2006  DL  0.647  4.336  0.01023  22.5  0.74  2.491 
  2006  CU10  0.815  2.135  0.09169  20.2  0.447  1.475 
  2006  CT10  0.976  4.809  0.03614  21.2  0.663  2.893 
  2006  CM10  0.638  3.63  0.01934  21.7  0.701  2.134 
  2006  CL10  0.945  2.467  0.10096  21.4  0.446  1.706 
  2006  CF10  0.959  2.09  0.05727  25.4  0.371  1.524 
  2006  CW9  0.952  1.656  0.01866  24.4  0.27  1.304 
  2006  CT9  0.387  2.001  0.24653  20.4  0.676  1.194 
  2006  CV  0.709  1.583  0.05868  19.8  0.381  1.146 
  2006  CU  0.825  2.193  0.00864  21.7  0.453  1.509 
  2006  CT  0.844  1.351  0.00132  22.3  0.231  1.098 
  2006  CS  0.883  4.953  0.09919  16.6  0.697  2.918 
  2006  CL  0.977  2.35  0.02017  25.4  0.413  1.663 
  2006  CK  0.851  1.314  0.01054  25.8  0.214  1.082 
  2006  CF  0.728  3.856  0.02151  19.7  0.682  2.292 
  2006  BA148  0.629  2.632  0.23499  18.4  0.614  1.631 
  2006  BZ147  0.923  1.125  0.00142  25.4  0.099  1.024 
  2006  BP147  0.978  1.596  0.04706  26.5  0.24  1.287 
  2006  BH99  0.658  2.645  0.00079  27.2  0.602  1.652 
  2006  BF99  0.785  1.73  0.02843  23.9  0.376  1.258 
  2006  BF56  0.487  4.226  0.0014  29.6  0.793  2.356 
  2006  BN55  0.834  2.908  0.05643  19.8  0.554  1.871 
  2006  BM55  0.666  4.48  0.00111  23  0.741  2.573 
  2006  BJ55  0.896  1.161  0.02638  24.2  0.129  1.029 
  2006  BG55  0.591  2.35  0.20671  18.4  0.598  1.47 
  2006  BE55  0.688  1.704  0.02364  21.9  0.425  1.196 
  2006  BD55  0.899  1.897  0.0734  24.5  0.357  1.398 
  2006  BX39  0.69  3.084  0.00884  21.4  0.634  1.887 
  2006  BW39  0.917  3.037  0.01626  23.7  0.536  1.977 
  2006  BV39  0.834  1.454  0.00029  29.1  0.271  1.144 
  2006  BN26  0.977  3.011  0.02593  23.5  0.51  1.994 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2006  BB9  0.901  4.481  0.0168  25.8  0.665  2.691 
  2006  BY8  0.814  4.162  0.00187  26.6  0.673  2.488 
  2006  BM8  0.725  2.359  0.0031  25.3  0.53  1.542 
  2006  BL8  0.787  1.46  0.00198  24.7  0.299  1.124 
  2006  BC8  0.697  1.758  0.00164  25.1  0.432  1.227 
  2006  BB8  0.917  2.359  0.01508  24.5  0.44  1.638 
  2006  BZ7  0.944  2.035  0.03692  17.4  0.366  1.49 
  2006  BX7  0.818  1.46  0.00782  24.6  0.282  1.139 
  2006  BW7  0.873  2.087  0.00438  26.5  0.41  1.48 
  2006  BT7  0.559  2.486  0.25234  18.3  0.633  1.522 
  2006  BP7  0.975  3.689  0.0638  23.3  0.582  2.332 
  2006  BO7  0.857  2.014  0.00109  29.3  0.403  1.435 
  2006  BQ6  0.876  2.068  0.00808  19.7  0.405  1.472 
  2006  BP6  0.96  3.82  0.24002  20.7  0.598  2.39 
  2006  BN6  0.746  4.352  0.18908  17.4  0.707  2.549 
  2006  BG  0.451  2.914  0.06743  18.6  0.732  1.683 
  2006  BF  0.897  2.046  0.01224  23.6  0.391  1.472 
  2006  BC  0.242  2.584  0.14978  19  0.829  1.413 
  2006  BA  0.876  1.365  0.00345  27.6  0.218  1.12 
  2006  AM8  0.385  3.353  0.15193  19.6  0.794  1.869 
  2006  AL8  0.377  6.301  0.05677  18.3  0.887  3.339 
  2006  AK4  0.984  4.322  0.10137  23.2  0.629  2.653 
  2006  AU3  0.985  3.545  0.00166  26.3  0.565  2.265 
  2006  AS3  0.896  1.779  0.04302  24.7  0.33  1.338 
  2006  AR3  0.887  4.039  0.00625  20.5  0.64  2.463 
  2006  AQ3  0.89  4.008  0.22693  21.5  0.637  2.449 
  2006  AR2  0.866  2.11  0.06239  19.8  0.418  1.488 
  2006  AW  0.895  3.54  0.07107  18.4  0.596  2.217 
  2006  AN  0.853  1.333  0.00604  24.5  0.22  1.093 
  2006  AD  0.535  1.562  0.17307  16.7  0.49  1.048 
  2006  BC10  0.684  3.342  0.00664  19.5  0.66  2.013 
  2006  WO127  0.987  3.4  0.07058  16.1  0.55  2.193 
  2006  WH1  0.861  2.486  0.02326  20.2  0.486  1.673 
  2006  SU19  0.632  2.422  0.03506  19  0.586  1.527 
  2006  EV52  0.589  3.443  0.25644  16.9  0.708  2.016 
  2006  AS2  0.762  3.432  0.01069  20.4  0.637  2.097 
  2006  KE89  0.211  1.895  0.22933  16.4  0.799  1.053 
  2006  MZ1  0.812  2.326  0.01285  20.5  0.483  1.569 
  2006  GA1  0.553  3.681  0.07241  18.3  0.739  2.117 
  2007  YZ58  0.449  2.175  0.33775  19.6  0.658  1.312 
  2007  YV56  0.595  2.556  0.00522  21  0.622  1.576 
  2007  YT56  0.922  1.667  0.04716  23.4  0.288  1.295 
  2007  YR56  0.975  3.048  0.01696  26.1  0.515  2.012 
  2007  YQ56  0.812  1.469  0.01286  19.9  0.288  1.141 
  2007  YP56  0.581  3.395  0.00057  25.8  0.708  1.988 
  2007  YO56  0.823  1.738  0.14578  20.1  0.357  1.28 
  2007  YN56  0.722  1.436  0.04207  23  0.331  1.079 
  2007  YM56  0.859  1.636  0.02876  22.4  0.312  1.247 Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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  2007  YV29  0.883  1.863  0.04603  18.9  0.357  1.373 
  2007  YB2  0.977  5.219  0.04006  18.4  0.685  3.098 
  2007  YN1  0.756  4.622  0.00233  25  0.719  2.689 
  2007  YH1  0.9  3.256  0.02984  25  0.567  2.078 
  2007  YZ  0.666  1.419  0.10803  19.6  0.361  1.042 
  2007  YM  0.987  3.831  0.0024  26.2  0.59  2.409 
  2007  YJ  0.795  1.412  0.05127  21.7  0.28  1.103 
  2007  YH  0.822  3.484  0.16184  20.1  0.618  2.153 
  2007  YG  0.748  1.794  0.04072  23.1  0.412  1.271 
  2007  XW23  0.891  2.018  0.02393  25.8  0.387  1.455 
  2007  XV23  1  4.707  0.02012  25.1  0.65  2.853 
  2007  XB23  0.985  1.098  0.00167  27.1  0.054  1.041 
  2007  XJ20  0.678  2.708  0.14827  18.5  0.6  1.693 
  2007  XF18  0.768  2.195  0.0913  20.5  0.482  1.482 
  2007  XN16  0.979  3.945  0.00693  25.5  0.602  2.462 
  2007  XH16  0.908  1.466  0.01379  19.7  0.235  1.187 
  2007  XD10  0.721  3.587  0.02785  20.8  0.665  2.154 
  2007  XB10  0.884  3.532  0.05299  17.5  0.599  2.208 
  2007  XZ9  0.843  3.254  0.00143  24.8  0.588  2.048 
  2007  XY9  0.779  3.318  0.01006  21  0.62  2.048 
  2007  XT3  0.95  3.583  0.09981  21.5  0.581  2.267 
  2007  XP3  0.252  4.235  0.07815  19.1  0.888  2.243 
  2007  XO  0.579  1.812  0.00969  25.6  0.516  1.195 
  2007  XN  0.959  3.477  0.03776  19.9  0.568  2.218 
  2007  WE55  0.814  3.005  0.09194  20.1  0.574  1.91 
  2007  WD5  0.994  3.962  0.02679  24.3  0.599  2.478 
  2007  WB5  0.57  2.966  0.28117  19  0.677  1.768 
  2007  WZ4  0.979  1.746  0.01859  24.3  0.282  1.363 
  2007  WW4  0.594  3.599  0.1179  19.5  0.717  2.096 
  2007  WV4  0.831  2.14  0.01685  19.3  0.441  1.486 
  2007  WY3  0.647  4.94  0.09893  18.2  0.768  2.793 
  2007  WV3  0.913  2.423  0.09222  19.7  0.453  1.668 
  2007  WU3  0.804  1.22  0.03971  23.4  0.205  1.012 
  2007  WT3  0.655  4.058  0.00232  24.2  0.722  2.357 
  2007  WP3  0.822  2.15  0.00351  23.5  0.447  1.486 
  2007  WN3  0.945  4.115  0.08673  21.4  0.626  2.53 
  2007  WL3  0.682  2.837  0.04536  24.2  0.612  1.76 
  2007  WJ3  0.749  1.637  0.00752  26.2  0.372  1.193 
  2007  WB  0.485  2.854  0.18844  18.8  0.71  1.669 
  2007  WA  0.877  1.193  0.0095  24.7  0.153  1.035 
  2007  VP243  0.937  3.574  0.02173  21.4  0.584  2.256 
  2007  VN243  0.834  3.468  0.00075  22.4  0.612  2.151 
  2007  VM243  0.71  1.435  0.15441  21  0.338  1.072 
  2007  VE191  0.711  3.118  0.00004  23.6  0.629  1.914 
  2007  VD191  0.839  1.385  0.01931  24.6  0.245  1.112 
  2007  VB191  0.918  3.87  0.00981  25.1  0.616  2.394 
  2007  VJ189  0.955  1.292  0.07648  25.7  0.15  1.124 
  2007  VH189  0.722  4.737  0.00161  23.2  0.736  2.73 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2007  VF189  0.742  1.672  0.00121  28.3  0.385  1.207 
  2007  VM184  0.563  1.8  0.03298  21  0.523  1.182 
  2007  VK184  0.742  2.71  0.00064  22  0.57  1.726 
  2007  VJ184  0.909  2.463  0.07187  21.2  0.461  1.686 
  2007  VG184  0.789  3.989  0.14321  17.4  0.67  2.389 
  2007  VF184  0.918  1.508  0.027  25.4  0.243  1.213 
  2007  VD184  0.965  2.921  0.00127  23.1  0.503  1.943 
  2007  VE138  0.79  1.925  0.00828  25.8  0.418  1.357 
  2007  VD138  0.997  4.586  0.01511  24.5  0.643  2.791 
  2007  VZ137  0.71  2.67  0.02279  21.5  0.58  1.69 
  2007  VW137  0.584  3.876  0.03918  18.1  0.738  2.23 
  2007  VX83  0.673  1.774  0.00526  27.8  0.45  1.224 
  2007  VU83  0.979  3.721  0.00975  25.3  0.583  2.35 
  2007  VT83  0.918  1.684  0.03752  24.3  0.295  1.301 
  2007  VR29  0.993  2.62  0.04809  24.5  0.45  1.807 
  2007  VD12  0.728  1.564  0.01097  20  0.365  1.146 
  2007  VK8  0.645  2.175  0.05776  23.1  0.542  1.41 
  2007  VF8  0.972  2.588  0.04225  22.5  0.454  1.78 
  2007  VD8  0.932  3.661  0.00734  27.9  0.594  2.296 
  2007  VY7  0.901  2.73  0.05245  19.5  0.504  1.816 
  2007  VV7  0.997  2.556  0.01333  26.8  0.439  1.777 
  2007  VX6  0.874  3.66  0.0776  20.9  0.614  2.267 
  2007  VT6  0.695  3.206  0.02631  20.3  0.644  1.95 
  2007  VS6  0.685  1.783  0.01431  26.3  0.445  1.234 
  2007  VN3  0.945  3.541  0.02769  21.4  0.579  2.243 
  2007  VL3  0.797  2.092  0.00692  26.1  0.448  1.445 
  2007  VJ3  0.819  3.436  0.01078  24.9  0.615  2.127 
  2007  VE3  0.683  3.904  0.01636  23.1  0.702  2.293 
  2007  VC3  0.769  1.497  0.00915  24.8  0.321  1.133 
  2007  VA3  0.955  3.952  0.00984  25.9  0.611  2.454 
  2007  VG  0.656  3.254  0.00793  21  0.665  1.955 
  2007  UB66  0.79  3.386  0.13536  18.5  0.622  2.088 
  2007  US51  0.806  3.549  0.00126  27.2  0.63  2.178 
  2007  UR51  0.509  2.781  0.0127  21.5  0.691  1.645 
  2007  UK40  0.86  2.015  0.03271  23.4  0.402  1.438 
  2007  UQ13  0.67  1.66  0.29139  19.8  0.425  1.165 
  2007  UN12  0.99  1.118  0.00124  28.7  0.06  1.054 
  2007  UL12  0.382  3.559  0.02049  20.9  0.806  1.97 
  2007  UO6  0.91  3.635  0.00011  27.3  0.599  2.273 
  2007  UF6  0.931  2.976  0.01644  25.8  0.523  1.953 
  2007  UE6  0.665  2.414  0.02335  24  0.568  1.539 
  2007  UD6  0.933  1.531  0.00084  28.3  0.243  1.232 
  2007  UC6  0.639  2.543  0.01443  23.1  0.598  1.591 
  2007  UU3  0.932  2.748  0.02607  23.8  0.493  1.84 
  2007  US3  0.963  2.062  0.14941  22.3  0.363  1.513 
  2007  UT  0.978  2.063  0.13863  21.5  0.357  1.52 
  2007  UJ  0.984  1.305  0.02089  25.2  0.14  1.145 
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  2007  TH72  0.73  3.346  0.00007  24.2  0.642  2.038 
  2007  TH71  0.921  1.761  0.01129  26.5  0.313  1.341 
  2007  TG71  0.988  1.644  0.04386  26.4  0.249  1.316 
  2007  TD71  0.927  1.646  0.02966  18.5  0.28  1.286 
  2007  TZ68  0.955  2.321  0.00883  28.3  0.417  1.638 
  2007  TX68  0.95  3.111  0.01182  26.8  0.532  2.03 
  2007  TE66  0.84  1.272  0.15938  21.4  0.204  1.056 
  2007  TC66  0.6  3.542  0.13992  19.4  0.71  2.071 
  2007  TR65  0.507  1.802  0.2974  18.8  0.561  1.154 
  2007  TW24  0.873  3.412  0.0078  26.1  0.592  2.143 
  2007  TU24  0.951  3.136  0.0003  20.3  0.535  2.043 
  2007  TS24  0.971  4.586  0.0175  24.5  0.65  2.778 
  2007  TR24  0.622  3.12  0.04652  20.5  0.668  1.871 
  2007  TL23  0.299  1.97  0.01705  21.4  0.736  1.134 
  2007  TX22  0.894  2.221  0.00051  28.4  0.426  1.558 
  2007  TS19  0.541  1.626  0.02767  20.6  0.5  1.084 
  2007  TV18  0.806  1.663  0.00138  23.4  0.347  1.235 
  2007  TT18  0.856  3.819  0.03497  23  0.634  2.337 
  2007  TL16  0.876  2.043  0.00238  26.2  0.4  1.46 
  2007  TM15  0.823  2.528  0.20071  21.3  0.509  1.676 
  2007  TL15  0.633  2.131  0.0102  24.3  0.542  1.382 
  2007  TE15  0.927  2.716  0.03269  25.5  0.491  1.821 
  2007  TC14  0.404  3.78  0.0237  22.1  0.807  2.092 
  2007  TB14  0.904  4.08  0.02452  24.4  0.637  2.492 
  2007  TG8  0.988  4.304  0.19049  18.6  0.627  2.646 
  2007  TK5  0.551  2.675  0.05411  23.5  0.658  1.613 
  2007  TH1  0.793  1.931  0.02209  22  0.418  1.362 
  2007  TC1  0.964  1.563  0.0741  23.7  0.237  1.263 
  2007  SV11  0.878  2.591  0.10867  18.2  0.494  1.734 
  2007  SR11  0.959  4.436  0.02064  22  0.644  2.698 
  2007  SQ6  0.891  1.195  0.00954  21.9  0.146  1.043 
  2007  SN6  0.731  3.988  0.00473  25.2  0.69  2.359 
  2007  SU1  0.985  3.83  0.00946  25.5  0.591  2.407 
  2007  SR1  0.526  1.574  0.29904  19.8  0.499  1.05 
  2007  SJ  0.937  3.093  0.04435  16.5  0.535  2.015 
  2007  SH  0.911  2.537  0.0111  26.2  0.471  1.724 
  2007  RS146  0.85  3.893  0.02396  23.3  0.641  2.372 
  2007  RQ133  0.951  4.581  0.2042  18.7  0.656  2.766 
  2007  RN133  0.752  3.721  0.03352  25.2  0.664  2.237 
  2007  RA20  0.796  3.529  0.05719  20  0.632  2.163 
  2007  RY19  0.828  1.384  0.00196  22.5  0.252  1.106 
  2007  RX19  0.913  2.999  0.24972  18.4  0.533  1.956 
  2007  RW19  0.921  2.495  0.02536  24.7  0.461  1.708 
  2007  RV17  0.666  3.556  0.1201  18.9  0.684  2.111 
  2007  RU17  0.351  3.734  0.03853  18.2  0.828  2.043 
  2007  RT17  0.961  3.112  0.03499  25.6  0.528  2.037 
  2007  RQ17  0.996  2.17  0.02188  22.6  0.371  1.583 
  2007  RT12  0.854  1.179  0.0446  23.9  0.16  1.017 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2007  RR12  0.545  3.474  0.07513  19.8  0.729  2.01 
  2007  RQ12  0.944  2.653  0.00151  23.6  0.475  1.798 
  2007  RU10  0.711  3.84  0.09777  19.1  0.688  2.275 
  2007  RV9  0.841  3.039  0.01756  20.2  0.566  1.94 
  2007  RU9  0.711  3.128  0.00045  20.7  0.63  1.92 
  2007  RT9  0.69  2.642  0.23523  18.8  0.586  1.666 
  2007  RP9  0.948  2.156  0.08786  23  0.389  1.552 
  2007  RY8  0.683  1.98  0.01514  25.2  0.487  1.331 
  2007  RX8  0.898  1.379  0.02238  24.5  0.211  1.138 
  2007  RF5  0.656  1.472  0.20974  18.4  0.383  1.064 
  2007  RF2  0.581  2.88  0.0075  20.7  0.664  1.731 
  2007  RT1  0.447  3.185  0.07516  20.6  0.754  1.816 
  2007  RS1  0.758  1.731  0.00029  30.9  0.391  1.244 
  2007  RO1  0.893  3.631  0.01688  23.5  0.605  2.262 
  2007  RJ1  0.891  2.008  0.00386  25.2  0.386  1.449 
  2007  QE3  0.829  4.044  0.07861  19.9  0.66  2.436 
  2007  PF28  0.426  3.864  0.01396  19.3  0.801  2.145 
  2007  PV27  0.801  1.746  0.00002  20.2  0.371  1.273 
  2007  PR25  0.303  3.552  0.01131  22  0.843  1.928 
  2007  PH25  0.472  4.604  0.47757  16.6  0.814  2.538 
  2007  PR10  0.132  2.334  0.13461  20.7  0.893  1.233 
  2007  PS9  0.992  1.156  0.03755  23.6  0.076  1.074 
  2007  PP6  0.363  3.978  0.25735  17.1  0.833  2.17 
  2007  PF6  0.758  1.839  0.03079  20.7  0.416  1.299 
  2007  PF2  0.609  2.445  0.00135  24.4  0.601  1.527 
  2007  OX  0.981  2.03  0.12921  21.1  0.348  1.505 
  2007  NC5  0.277  4.615  0.19946  18  0.887  2.446 
  2007  NS4  0.754  2.995  0.03945  19.1  0.598  1.874 
  2007  NL1  0.931  1.548  0.10442  21.6  0.249  1.24 
  2007  MB24  0.563  3.189  0.02733  18.2  0.7  1.876 
  2007  MT20  0.714  2.977  0.16352  18.7  0.613  1.845 
  2007  MM13  0.604  2.198  0.16219  17.7  0.569  1.401 
  2007  MK13  0.881  1.168  0.03244  20  0.14  1.024 
  2007  MJ13  0.894  2.001  0.00777  24.6  0.382  1.447 
  2007  MK6  0.196  1.966  0.0882  19.9  0.819  1.081 
  2007  MB4  0.939  3.532  0.01526  22.6  0.58  2.235 
  2007  MR  0.758  1.287  0.06933  21.8  0.259  1.023 
  2007  MQ  0.637  4.29  0.01215  23.6  0.741  2.463 
  2007  MG  0.679  1.872  0.10335  20.9  0.468  1.275 
  2007  LW19  0.986  3.717  0.01862  23.5  0.581  2.351 
  2007  LV19  1  1.944  0.08922  19.8  0.321  1.472 
  2007  LU19  0.889  3.859  0.00766  21.5  0.625  2.374 
  2007  LQ19  0.972  4.248  0.00107  17.3  0.628  2.61 
  2007  LC15  0.344  2.291  0.28818  18.6  0.739  1.317 
  2007  LT  0.929  2.072  0.0057  22.5  0.381  1.5 
  2007  LS  0.856  4.533  0.06261  17.8  0.682  2.694 
  2007  LF  0.976  2.389  0.00242  20.5  0.42  1.683 
  2007  LE  0.889  2.788  0.04762  19.1  0.517  1.839 Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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  2007  LD  0.968  2.485  0.0386  19.1  0.439  1.726 
  2007  LA  0.63  2.452  0.10398  21.3  0.591  1.541 
  2007  KG7  0.237  3.318  0.01125  20.6  0.867  1.777 
  2007  KO4  0.925  1.281  0.00794  23.2  0.162  1.103 
  2007  KV2  0.767  1.465  0.00658  24.6  0.313  1.116 
  2007  KE  0.799  2.559  0.03929  22.5  0.524  1.679 
  2007  JH22  0.856  3.505  0.04084  21.7  0.607  2.18 
  2007  JZ20  0.871  1.751  0.06535  18.4  0.335  1.311 
  2007  JF16  0.656  3.402  0.2439  18.7  0.677  2.029 
  2007  JZ2  0.856  2.833  0.01341  25.9  0.536  1.844 
  2007  JY2  0.686  3.717  0.00032  21.7  0.688  2.201 
  2007  JX2  0.808  2.608  0.03163  19.5  0.527  1.708 
  2007  JD  0.53  5.135  0.00022  23.1  0.813  2.832 
  2007  HA59  0.688  4.334  0.28393  15  0.726  2.511 
  2007  HZ58  0.968  3.227  0.05296  24.9  0.538  2.098 
  2007  HG44  0.697  4.241  0.09133  19.2  0.718  2.469 
  2007  HE15  0.986  3.304  0.00979  19.7  0.54  2.145 
  2007  HD15  0.928  1.636  0.00246  24  0.276  1.282 
  2007  HB15  0.933  1.571  0.00094  27.8  0.255  1.252 
  2007  HX4  0.881  1.754  0.10329  17.8  0.332  1.317 
  2007  HW4  0.348  2.596  0.01451  23.7  0.763  1.472 
  2007  HV4  0.971  2.712  0.00422  28.7  0.473  1.841 
  2007  HW3  0.964  4.275  0.19297  20.4  0.632  2.619 
  2007  HR  0.276  1.858  0.1112  20.7  0.742  1.067 
  2007  HP  0.482  3.473  0.00789  22.9  0.756  1.977 
  2007  HC  0.916  1.396  0.00307  25.2  0.208  1.156 
  2007  GY5  0.911  2.082  0.07593  24  0.391  1.497 
  2007  GX5  0.7  2.458  0.01342  24.3  0.557  1.579 
  2007  GV5  0.419  4.306  0.12627  21.9  0.823  2.362 
  2007  GW4  0.764  1.391  0.23423  20.5  0.291  1.077 
  2007  GU4  0.654  1.751  0.01782  22.4  0.456  1.202 
  2007  GS4  0.957  1.62  0.11674  21  0.257  1.289 
  2007  GT3  0.12  3.866  0.12707  19.7  0.94  1.993 
  2007  GS3  0.924  1.198  0.02099  19.4  0.129  1.061 
  2007  GQ3  0.992  2.617  0.02126  22  0.45  1.805 
  2007  GY1  0.788  3.16  0.00955  22.6  0.601  1.974 
  2007  GU1  0.788  3.629  0.00079  25  0.643  2.208 
  2007  GF  0.809  1.793  0.12722  21.1  0.379  1.301 
  2007  FY20  0.894  2.02  0.0016  24.8  0.386  1.457 
  2007  FT3  0.781  1.469  0.01618  20  0.306  1.125 
  2007  FS3  0.922  2.24  0.00549  26.1  0.417  1.581 
  2007  FR3  0.921  2.767  0.00182  27.5  0.5  1.844 
  2007  FP3  0.844  1.984  0.00013  28.4  0.403  1.414 
  2007  FO3  0.892  1.652  0.04097  24.5  0.299  1.272 
  2007  FC3  0.92  1.768  0.00624  25.5  0.315  1.344 
  2007  FF1  0.786  2.262  0.03495  21.8  0.484  1.524 
  2007  FE1  0.918  3.124  0.06294  18.8  0.546  2.021 
  2007  FE  0.974  2.614  0.02745  19.5  0.457  1.794 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2007  FD  0.821  3.299  0.09788  17  0.602  2.06 
  2007  FC  0.983  2.443  0.03575  26.1  0.426  1.713 
  2007  FB  0.967  1.658  0.02775  26.2  0.263  1.312 
  2007  FA  0.918  1.583  0.0266  20.2  0.266  1.25 
  2007  EF126  0.988  3.933  0.13275  19.8  0.598  2.46 
  2007  EE126  0.351  6.553  0.00162  25.6  0.898  3.452 
  2007  ED125  0.799  3.052  0.00894  21.1  0.585  1.926 
  2007  EO88  0.749  1.51  0.00147  26.4  0.337  1.13 
  2007  EN88  0.891  3.449  0.00098  26.6  0.589  2.17 
  2007  EL88  0.535  1.704  0.03556  18.9  0.522  1.12 
  2007  EJ88  0.519  4.152  0.02869  23.4  0.778  2.335 
  2007  EH88  0.627  1.618  0.13352  19.8  0.441  1.123 
  2007  EN26  0.869  1.716  0.01535  22.5  0.328  1.293 
  2007  EK26  0.643  3.051  0.00202  25  0.652  1.847 
  2007  EH26  0.627  3.215  0.00597  24.2  0.673  1.921 
  2007  EE26  0.946  1.548  0.00574  26.1  0.241  1.247 
  2007  EZ25  0.603  3.654  0.00092  25.5  0.717  2.129 
  2007  EY25  0.712  2.984  0.00691  25.1  0.615  1.848 
  2007  EZ  0.73  2.684  0.09507  19.8  0.573  1.707 
  2007  EV  0.755  1.429  0.00303  25  0.309  1.092 
  2007  ES  0.631  2.522  0.35648  18.5  0.6  1.577 
  2007  EQ  0.9  2.359  0.05952  21.1  0.448  1.629 
  2007  EK  0.82  1.433  0.00132  29.3  0.272  1.126 
  2007  EJ  0.926  4.073  0.05774  18.2  0.63  2.499 
  2007  EH  0.743  3.589  0.00105  27.6  0.657  2.166 
  2007  DT103  0.942  3.476  0.01521  19.2  0.573  2.209 
  2007  DD49  0.858  3.488  0.07522  19.1  0.605  2.173 
  2007  DN41  0.905  4.868  0.00416  26.4  0.687  2.887 
  2007  DM41  0.558  1.806  0.00766  21.8  0.528  1.182 
  2007  DL41  0.763  2.15  0.04564  20.7  0.476  1.457 
  2007  DZ40  0.859  4.837  0.10228  18.5  0.698  2.848 
  2007  DY40  0.701  2.734  0.0242  20.8  0.592  1.717 
  2007  DX40  0.71  2.357  0.00063  24.6  0.537  1.534 
  2007  DQ40  0.736  3.273  0.01243  23  0.633  2.005 
  2007  DL8  0.624  4.701  0.16621  17.3  0.766  2.662 
  2007  DK8  0.958  2.341  0.2108  19  0.419  1.65 
  2007  DG8  0.851  1.863  0.02163  25.3  0.373  1.357 
  2007  DF8  0.997  2.646  0.05866  20.3  0.453  1.821 
  2007  DS7  0.707  1.657  0.00071  25.8  0.402  1.182 
  2007  DY  0.99  3.895  0.30741  19.6  0.595  2.443 
  2007  DW  0.513  1.646  0.15664  20.4  0.525  1.079 
  2007  DK  0.628  2.165  0.08944  19.3  0.55  1.396 
  2007  DJ  0.978  2.757  0.0179  24.3  0.476  1.868 
  2007  DC  0.914  1.784  0.00413  27.5  0.323  1.349 
  2007  DA  0.431  1.589  0.02006  22.4  0.574  1.01 
  2007  CX50  0.934  1.481  0.01596  24.7  0.226  1.208 
  2007  CC27  0.856  2.524  0.001  27  0.493  1.69 
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  2007  CL26  0.967  2.234  0.07681  23.6  0.396  1.6 
  2007  CK26  0.964  2.629  0.24011  19  0.464  1.796 
  2007  CC19  0.619  2.729  0.00269  27  0.63  1.674 
  2007  CA19  0.484  5.09  0.00033  17.6  0.826  2.787 
  2007  CU18  0.936  3.125  0.01563  24.4  0.539  2.031 
  2007  CH15  0.987  1.774  0.10591  21.5  0.285  1.38 
  2007  CR5  0.898  2.336  0.0137  25.4  0.445  1.617 
  2007  BE49  0.639  2.496  0.10276  21.3  0.592  1.568 
  2007  BZ48  0.952  2.618  0.0052  26  0.467  1.785 
  2007  BY48  0.996  1.799  0.02957  22.6  0.287  1.398 
  2007  BX48  0.888  1.885  0.12266  20  0.36  1.386 
  2007  BJ29  0.38  3.982  0.02236  18.9  0.826  2.181 
  2007  BM8  0.375  2.308  0.40648  18.5  0.721  1.342 
  2007  BD8  0.83  2.038  0.03099  24.4  0.421  1.434 
  2007  BD7  0.784  2.34  0.03799  21.1  0.498  1.562 
  2007  BJ  0.943  4.949  0.08374  22.6  0.68  2.946 
  2007  AG12  0.719  3.461  0.04718  19.7  0.656  2.09 
  2007  AB12  0.649  3.95  0.0029  18.9  0.718  2.299 
  2007  AV2  0.757  2.116  0.03712  21.2  0.473  1.436 
  2007  AU2  0.823  2.388  0.01217  24.1  0.487  1.606 
  2007  AS2  0.973  4.204  0.04249  22.1  0.624  2.589 
  2007  AF2  0.995  2.446  0.05027  21.4  0.422  1.72 
  2007  AC2  0.624  4.21  0.01733  21.8  0.742  2.417 
  2007  AB2  0.871  2.965  0.01322  20.3  0.546  1.918 
  2007  AA2  0.908  1.157  0.01298  24.6  0.12  1.032 
  2007  DA41  0.819  2.103  0.16855  17.5  0.44  1.461 
  2007  PA8  0.957  4.7  0.02462  16.3  0.662  2.828 
  2007  AE12  0.725  2.645  0.00629  19.5  0.57  1.685 
  2008  YC33  0.981  1.69  0.09416  24.3  0.266  1.335 
  2008  YZ32  0.394  1.681  0.05146  20.2  0.621  1.037 
  2008  YY32  0.938  3.242  0.00407  25.2  0.551  2.09 
  2008  YX32  0.751  1.715  0.16425  20.8  0.391  1.233 
  2008  YV32  0.897  2.164  0.00194  26.3  0.414  1.53 
  2008  YU32  0.622  2.455  0.00668  19.9  0.596  1.538 
  2008  YT30  0.92  1.619  0.07003  19.3  0.275  1.269 
  2008  YH30  0.893  2.491  0.0087  26.8  0.472  1.692 
  2008  YG30  0.883  2.681  0.00232  24.6  0.504  1.782 
  2008  YF30  0.887  1.733  0.04972  24.5  0.323  1.31 
  2008  YE30  0.632  4.097  0.0495  21.2  0.733  2.364 
  2008  YF29  0.937  3.903  0.00274  24.1  0.613  2.42 
  2008  YB29  1  3.743  0.01846  25.7  0.579  2.371 
  2008  YZ28  0.949  4.049  0.09382  20  0.62  2.499 
  2008  YR27  0.561  3.95  0.12269  18.2  0.751  2.256 
  2008  YQ27  0.906  1.702  0.0006  22.6  0.305  1.304 
  2008  YN27  0.887  3.498  0.06125  22  0.596  2.192 
  2008  YM27  0.905  2.435  0.04219  23.4  0.458  1.67 
  2008  YJ3  0.804  2.264  0.05736  20.2  0.476  1.534 
  2008  YC3  0.967  1.059  0.00404  25.3  0.046  1.013 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2008  YQ2  0.77  1.298  0.01941  24.8  0.255  1.034 
  2008  YO2  0.687  2.634  0.00048  25.2  0.586  1.661 
  2008  YN2  0.809  1.268  0.00704  26.3  0.221  1.039 
  2008  YL2  0.731  2.447  0.01169  24.5  0.54  1.589 
  2008  YJ2  0.85  2.732  0.08952  21  0.525  1.791 
  2008  YF  0.914  2.342  0.00253  20.9  0.438  1.628 
  2008  YA  0.458  4.838  0.46577  18  0.827  2.648 
  2008  XW2  0.592  1.537  0.03965  20.7  0.444  1.065 
  2008  XU2  0.927  3.972  0.00555  25.6  0.622  2.45 
  2008  XQ2  0.989  3.414  0.00229  20  0.551  2.202 
  2008  XB2  0.721  1.591  0.00576  25.1  0.376  1.156 
  2008  XA2  0.914  3.949  0.00974  21.4  0.624  2.432 
  2008  XM1  0.5  4.221  0.00941  22  0.788  2.36 
  2008  XC1  0.864  3.239  0.00584  23.7  0.579  2.052 
  2008  XB1  0.836  1.829  0.04643  20.9  0.373  1.333 
  2008  XN  0.883  3.442  0.029  21.4  0.592  2.163 
  2008  XM  0.111  2.333  0.00506  19.8  0.909  1.222 
  2008  XK  0.896  3.749  0.00074  27.2  0.614  2.322 
  2008  XH  0.747  1.948  0.01691  22.7  0.446  1.348 
  2008  WK96  0.874  2.618  0.00066  23.1  0.499  1.746 
  2008  WJ96  0.995  3.899  0.02507  25.6  0.593  2.447 
  2008  WH96  0.818  1.927  0.01753  23.1  0.404  1.373 
  2008  WG96  0.532  1.569  0.00347  26.2  0.494  1.05 
  2008  WZ94  0.344  2.7  0.04032  20.2  0.774  1.522 
  2008  WY94  0.963  1.39  0.00014  25.6  0.181  1.177 
  2008  WM64  0.897  1.112  0.03304  20.6  0.107  1.005 
  2008  WL64  0.369  2.284  0.1457  18.6  0.722  1.326 
  2008  WQ63  0.682  2.788  0.00826  20.1  0.607  1.735 
  2008  WS62  0.867  1.671  0.0135  25.2  0.317  1.269 
  2008  WM61  0.988  1.972  0.00899  26.7  0.332  1.48 
  2008  WK61  0.963  2.353  0.02156  20.7  0.419  1.658 
  2008  WB59  0.848  1.241  0.16054  19.4  0.188  1.045 
  2008  WY32  0.45  1.895  0.05323  22.3  0.616  1.173 
  2008  WX32  0.938  3.498  0.14232  19  0.577  2.218 
  2008  WM32  0.934  3.528  0.11717  19.8  0.581  2.231 
  2008  WK32  0.867  1.925  0.06779  19.3  0.379  1.396 
  2008  WG14  0.85  2.465  0.01204  24.8  0.487  1.658 
  2008  WE14  0.999  2.267  0.05472  25.4  0.388  1.633 
  2008  WD14  0.976  3.487  0.00273  22.9  0.563  2.231 
  2008  WA14  0.722  1.805  0.00214  23  0.428  1.263 
  2008  WZ13  0.88  3.118  0.00736  18.7  0.56  1.999 
  2008  WY13  0.637  4.186  0.0502  21.6  0.736  2.412 
  2008  WP2  0.977  2.03  0.03957  25  0.35  1.504 
  2008  WO2  0.832  1.218  0.00268  29.8  0.188  1.025 
  2008  WN2  0.976  1.86  0.04891  20.8  0.312  1.418 
  2008  WM  0.922  1.225  0.04396  26.8  0.141  1.074 
  2008  WL  0.974  4.487  0.08518  21.8  0.643  2.731 
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  2008  WC  0.944  2.542  0.00573  26.5  0.458  1.743 
  2008  VL14  0.403  4.016  0.00434  21.1  0.817  2.21 
  2008  VK14  0.762  2.322  0.08407  19.4  0.506  1.542 
  2008  VU4  0.545  4.211  0.18723  17.6  0.771  2.378 
  2008  VB4  0.904  3.765  0.00019  28.2  0.613  2.335 
  2008  VZ3  0.88  2.828  0.01092  24.4  0.525  1.854 
  2008  VU3  0.945  4.026  0.00756  23.4  0.62  2.486 
  2008  VB1  0.926  1.629  0.01958  20.6  0.275  1.278 
  2008  VM  0.839  1.945  0.00005  30.2  0.397  1.392 
  2008  VL  0.926  3.916  0.00143  27.6  0.618  2.421 
  2008  VK  0.868  2.29  0.02337  23.4  0.45  1.579 
  2008  VJ  0.911  2.459  0.17173  22.7  0.459  1.685 
  2008  VE  0.983  4.41  0.06427  22.2  0.636  2.697 
  2008  VD  0.94  1.549  0.04716  24.2  0.245  1.244 
  2008  VC  0.928  1.314  0.00679  26.9  0.172  1.121 
  2008  UC202  0.94  1.077  0.00479  28.3  0.068  1.009 
  2008  UA202  0.962  1.104  0.00024  29.4  0.068  1.033 
  2008  UP100  0.907  2.192  0.04054  23.9  0.415  1.55 
  2008  UW99  0.943  3.986  0.0067  24.7  0.617  2.464 
  2008  UV99  0.892  1.442  0.01701  19.6  0.236  1.167 
  2008  UU95  0.813  4.223  0.01204  23.4  0.677  2.518 
  2008  UT95  0.772  2.86  0.00051  27.4  0.575  1.816 
  2008  UD95  0.988  1.299  0.04357  25.6  0.136  1.143 
  2008  UZ94  0.938  3.443  0.02505  17.6  0.572  2.191 
  2008  UY91  0.745  3.826  0.12896  24.1  0.674  2.285 
  2008  UW91  0.491  1.802  0.02105  21.7  0.572  1.146 
  2008  UV91  0.847  3.57  0.11687  20  0.616  2.208 
  2008  UF7  0.651  2.647  0.2354  19.1  0.605  1.649 
  2008  UE7  0.909  2.387  0.00872  20.4  0.448  1.648 
  2008  UC7  0.734  1.904  0.0114  27  0.443  1.319 
  2008  UB7  0.502  1.967  0.00089  23.9  0.593  1.235 
  2008  US4  0.854  3.812  0.07696  20.9  0.634  2.333 
  2008  UN3  0.807  1.299  0.13533  22  0.234  1.053 
  2008  UT2  0.932  2.676  0.02437  25.1  0.483  1.804 
  2008  UR2  0.896  1.944  0.00363  27  0.369  1.42 
  2008  UU1  0.401  2.814  0.02026  20  0.751  1.607 
  2008  UT1  0.875  2.344  0.08034  22.3  0.457  1.61 
  2008  UM1  0.785  2.904  0.00015  32.1  0.574  1.845 
  2008  UF1  0.683  3.042  0.00967  26  0.633  1.862 
  2008  UD1  0.919  2.513  0.05047  19.3  0.464  1.716 
  2008  US  0.647  2.197  0.00006  31.6  0.545  1.422 
  2008  UR  0.959  1.668  0.02015  26.9  0.27  1.313 
  2008  UQ  0.717  1.435  0.17073  21.7  0.334  1.076 
  2008  UD  0.663  1.378  0.06369  24.9  0.35  1.02 
  2008  TD27  0.791  3.613  0.11359  20  0.641  2.202 
  2008  TT26  0.999  1.691  0.00828  23.6  0.257  1.345 
  2008  TS26  0.769  2.024  0.00026  33.2  0.449  1.397 
  2008  TQ26  0.91  2.673  0.01804  23.4  0.492  1.791 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
690  |  Page     
Name  Designation  q  Q  E‐MOID  H  e  a 
  2008  TP26  0.78  1.409  0.0786  23.8  0.287  1.094 
  2008  TN26  0.669  2.979  0.13783  20.2  0.633  1.824 
  2008  TM26  0.918  2.429  0.02778  23.3  0.451  1.674 
  2008  TV25  0.918  2.852  0.05789  20  0.513  1.885 
  2008  TP10  0.851  3.506  0.00639  22.5  0.609  2.179 
  2008  TM10  0.794  3.74  0.05735  19.3  0.65  2.267 
  2008  TX9  0.936  2.89  0.01738  26.2  0.511  1.913 
  2008  TN9  0.836  1.561  0.00152  27.8  0.302  1.198 
  2008  TE4  0.927  2.008  0.01482  24.1  0.368  1.467 
  2008  TD4  0.697  2.946  0.08989  19.7  0.617  1.822 
  2008  TA4  0.954  1.221  0.01383  25.1  0.123  1.088 
  2008  TZ3  0.97  2.22  0.01727  20.4  0.392  1.595 
  2008  TX3  0.959  1.4  0.02092  24.9  0.187  1.179 
  2008  TC3  0.908  1.633  0.00001  30.4  0.285  1.271 
  2008  TC2  0.735  1.397  0.01888  23.3  0.31  1.066 
  2008  TC1  0.946  3.317  0.05294  24  0.556  2.131 
  2008  TA1  0.77  2.023  0.14366  18.7  0.448  1.397 
  2008  TL  0.91  2.585  0.0074  27.5  0.479  1.747 
  2008  TH  0.589  2.138  0.04051  25.1  0.568  1.364 
  2008  TE  0.831  2.207  0.00007  27.7  0.453  1.519 
  2008  TB  0.979  3.973  0.02629  25.4  0.605  2.476 
  2008  TA  0.487  2.27  0.0033  23.8  0.647  1.379 
  2008  SZ150  0.943  1.87  0.02806  23.9  0.329  1.406 
  2008  SY150  0.93  1.841  0.02609  24.7  0.329  1.385 
  2008  SW150  0.783  2.79  0.06132  19.4  0.562  1.786 
  2008  SX148  0.781  1.46  0.04041  23.7  0.303  1.12 
  2008  SJ148  0.742  1.686  0.00999  24.3  0.389  1.214 
  2008  SH148  0.945  4.562  0.009  26.1  0.657  2.753 
  2008  SE85  0.771  2.475  0.02496  19.6  0.525  1.623 
  2008  SW11  0.671  1.597  0.10521  21.2  0.408  1.134 
  2008  SV11  0.727  4.51  0.01889  18.4  0.722  2.619 
  2008  ST7  0.94  2.93  0.00157  24.1  0.514  1.935 
  2008  SQ7  0.951  1.757  0.15489  19.8  0.298  1.354 
  2008  SU1  0.525  3.77  0.14567  19.2  0.755  2.148 
  2008  ST1  0.965  1.794  0.00435  27.2  0.3  1.38 
  2008  SR1  0.834  3.916  0.03845  20.3  0.649  2.375 
  2008  SD  0.532  3.541  0.20951  19.4  0.739  2.036 
  2008  SC  0.325  1.861  0.03385  21.7  0.703  1.093 
  2008  SA  0.885  1.768  0.00492  25  0.333  1.326 
  2008  RM98  0.933  4.2  0.00866  20.6  0.637  2.567 
  2008  RG98  0.507  3.874  0.17547  17.2  0.768  2.19 
  2008  RZ24  0.954  3.401  0.07873  20.1  0.562  2.178 
  2008  RW24  0.875  2.625  0.00841  22.9  0.5  1.75 
  2008  RS24  0.807  3.376  0.10148  22.6  0.614  2.092 
  2008  RR24  0.702  1.861  0.05419  21.2  0.452  1.282 
  2008  RH1  0.892  1.236  0.07022  22.6  0.162  1.064 
  2008  RG1  0.733  1.898  0.01408  20.8  0.443  1.316 
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  2008  RV  0.994  3.549  0.00462  21.7  0.562  2.272 
  2008  RU  0.742  3.494  0.0363  22.3  0.65  2.118 
  2008  QU11  0.9  2.668  0.02061  25.5  0.496  1.784 
  2008  QT11  0.855  1.894  0.03461  22.5  0.378  1.374 
  2008  QS11  0.963  2.758  0.00801  19.9  0.482  1.861 
  2008  QT3  0.951  3.074  0.00969  18.8  0.528  2.012 
  2008  QY  0.489  1.845  0.02995  18.5  0.581  1.167 
  2008  QB  0.315  2.1  0.05388  20.7  0.739  1.207 
  2008  PV16  0.762  2.976  0.06626  21.3  0.592  1.869 
  2008  PK9  0.451  2.827  0.00475  23.2  0.725  1.639 
  2008  PJ9  0.86  4.232  0.00977  21.9  0.662  2.546 
  2008  PG7  0.966  2.092  0.16433  21.6  0.368  1.529 
  2008  PW4  0.845  1.477  0.00396  22.4  0.273  1.161 
  2008  PK3  0.76  3.024  0.00133  22  0.598  1.892 
  2008  PJ3  0.426  3.125  0.16963  20.4  0.76  1.776 
  2008  PG1  0.904  1.817  0.01775  20.5  0.336  1.36 
  2008  PF1  0.689  2.016  0.0076  22.3  0.491  1.353 
  2008  ON13  0.411  4.019  0.04316  19.9  0.814  2.215 
  2008  ON10  0.975  1.345  0.02947  24.7  0.159  1.16 
  2008  OS9  0.564  2.639  0.05768  19.4  0.648  1.601 
  2008  OC9  0.865  1.44  0.07015  23.3  0.249  1.152 
  2008  OB9  0.784  5.652  0.00569  17.5  0.756  3.218 
  2008  OP8  0.712  3.701  0.05075  19.7  0.677  2.207 
  2008  OT7  0.779  1.492  0.00075  27.1  0.314  1.135 
  2008  OS7  0.675  3.137  0.01223  20.5  0.646  1.906 
  2008  OY2  0.995  4.282  0.00292  27.3  0.623  2.639 
  2008  OX2  0.417  1.678  0.03187  20.1  0.602  1.048 
  2008  OX1  0.872  1.542  0.03695  21.5  0.278  1.207 
  2008  OO1  0.929  3.922  0.01714  24.6  0.617  2.425 
  2008  OO  0.63  3.581  0.01522  19.8  0.701  2.106 
  2008  NP3  0.669  1.341  0.01563  23.3  0.334  1.005 
  2008  NO3  0.914  4.664  0.03401  18.6  0.672  2.789 
  2008  NS1  0.467  4.364  0.20017  17.3  0.807  2.416 
  2008  MB5  0.908  1.947  0.13522  19.2  0.364  1.427 
  2008  MV1  0.791  3.716  0.02252  22.2  0.649  2.253 
  2008  MP1  0.823  2.957  0.00193  21.9  0.565  1.89 
  2008  LW16  0.956  1.176  0.02539  19.9  0.103  1.066 
  2008  LV16  0.785  3.391  0.0043  20.2  0.624  2.088 
  2008  LQ16  0.448  2.966  0.10363  20.3  0.738  1.707 
  2008  LC2  0.493  1.546  0.02255  23.8  0.517  1.019 
  2008  LB  0.962  3.942  0.00181  26.7  0.608  2.452 
  2008  LA  0.948  3.511  0.00158  23.1  0.575  2.23 
  2008  KN11  0.805  2.612  0.00065  23.2  0.529  1.708 
  2008  KE6  0.809  2.584  0.02228  20.6  0.523  1.697 
  2008  KD6  0.729  1.891  0.12826  19.6  0.443  1.31 
  2008  KC6  0.759  1.948  0.01903  25.1  0.439  1.354 
  2008  KB6  0.922  2.411  0.08434  24.3  0.446  1.667 
  2008  KA6  0.79  1.551  0.02983  23.3  0.325  1.17 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2008  KW2  0.442  2.447  0.15269  19.6  0.694  1.445 
  2008  KT  0.928  1.103  0.0009  28.2  0.087  1.015 
  2008  KP  0.231  1.97  0.3626  19  0.79  1.101 
  2008  KO  0.564  3.823  0.0002  24.4  0.743  2.194 
  2008  JY30  0.571  4.175  0.17709  18.6  0.759  2.373 
  2008  JM26  0.946  1.79  0.02303  25.6  0.309  1.368 
  2008  JP24  0.902  1.596  0.00147  26.7  0.278  1.249 
  2008  JL24  0.928  1.149  0.00035  29.6  0.107  1.038 
  2008  JM20  0.417  1.627  0.16423  21  0.592  1.022 
  2008  JW19  0.623  2.736  0.07487  20.8  0.629  1.679 
  2008  JP14  0.708  3.002  0.1416  19.4  0.618  1.855 
  2008  JO14  0.409  3.598  0.07521  21.1  0.796  2.004 
  2008  JZ7  0.933  4.382  0.15672  18.6  0.649  2.657 
  2008  JL3  0.983  3.334  0.00105  25.4  0.544  2.159 
  2008  JW2  0.9  3.997  0.01208  19.6  0.633  2.448 
  2008  JQ  0.907  1.126  0.00586  25.6  0.108  1.016 
  2008  JP  0.544  2.548  0.13854  20.8  0.648  1.546 
  2008  JO  0.686  2.332  0.08596  18.3  0.545  1.509 
  2008  JN  0.212  1.942  0.15898  20.7  0.803  1.077 
  2008  JG  0.741  1.364  0.04941  20.9  0.296  1.052 
  2008  JC  0.561  1.53  0.00636  26.5  0.463  1.046 
  2008  HC38  0.663  1.905  0.00044  26.3  0.484  1.284 
  2008  HB38  0.941  2.761  0.0032  21.1  0.492  1.851 
  2008  HR3  0.819  4.012  0.00234  24.8  0.661  2.416 
  2008  HQ3  1  1.713  0.00776  27.5  0.263  1.356 
  2008  HO3  0.985  4.802  0.09942  18  0.66  2.893 
  2008  HJ3  0.97  2.701  0.05349  23.2  0.471  1.835 
  2008  HE3  0.733  4.482  0.10826  19  0.719  2.607 
  2008  HD3  0.752  1.511  0.17928  19.7  0.336  1.131 
  2008  HF2  0.431  2.965  0.17489  19.6  0.746  1.698 
  2008  HD2  0.813  2.122  0.00658  25  0.446  1.468 
  2008  HC2  0.594  1.894  0.34062  20.2  0.523  1.244 
  2008  HZ1  0.634  3.259  0.21019  19.2  0.674  1.946 
  2008  HY1  0.922  2.342  0.12001  23.7  0.435  1.632 
  2008  HX1  0.916  3.496  0.01309  23.7  0.585  2.206 
  2008  HW1  0.101  5.065  0.1047  17.5  0.961  2.583 
  2008  HL  0.986  3.555  0.0589  20.3  0.566  2.27 
  2008  HJ  0.969  2.297  0.00157  25.8  0.407  1.633 
  2008  HH  0.88  1.852  0.02433  21.9  0.356  1.366 
  2008  HE  0.113  4.42  0.08382  18  0.95  2.266 
  2008  GE128  0.976  2.666  0.00467  25.8  0.464  1.821 
  2008  GJ110  0.279  2.84  0.0951  20.5  0.821  1.559 
  2008  GH110  0.915  1.63  0.06204  19.8  0.281  1.273 
  2008  GF110  0.537  2.013  0.21492  18.7  0.579  1.275 
  2008  GD110  0.762  1.282  0.00018  24.5  0.254  1.022 
  2008  GC110  0.923  1.259  0.04257  22.2  0.154  1.091 
  2008  GY21  0.667  1.478  0.00111  27.6  0.378  1.072 
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  2008  GW20  0.933  3.847  0.01311  22.1  0.61  2.39 
  2008  GV20  0.758  3.26  0.2519  18.7  0.623  2.009 
  2008  GO20  0.964  2.822  0.0082  22.3  0.491  1.893 
  2008  GA4  0.586  2.953  0.10942  19.2  0.669  1.769 
  2008  GX3  0.988  2.784  0.01387  26.3  0.476  1.886 
  2008  GV3  0.947  3.846  0.25053  18.4  0.605  2.397 
  2008  GP3  0.712  1.632  0.00824  25.4  0.393  1.172 
  2008  GM2  0.887  1.217  0.0016  28.3  0.157  1.052 
  2008  GL2  0.979  1.268  0.01869  27.2  0.129  1.123 
  2008  GK2  0.893  3.357  0.05479  22.9  0.58  2.125 
  2008  GF1  0.658  1.798  0.00073  28.3  0.464  1.228 
  2008  GD1  0.889  3.695  0.05524  22.5  0.612  2.292 
  2008  GR  0.975  2.52  0.01715  25.6  0.442  1.748 
  2008  GK  0.717  2.644  0.02664  23.5  0.573  1.68 
  2008  GH  0.584  4.509  0.02275  23.8  0.771  2.546 
  2008  GG  0.255  2.485  0.14613  20.2  0.814  1.37 
  2008  GF  0.994  2.007  0.20131  20.7  0.338  1.5 
  2008  GD  0.267  2.128  0.11838  19.7  0.777  1.198 
  2008  FJ7  0.804  1.463  0.00796  25.9  0.291  1.133 
  2008  FW6  0.826  3.707  0.0368  21  0.636  2.267 
  2008  FU6  0.57  2.077  0.10094  17.9  0.569  1.324 
  2008  FW5  0.975  3.306  0.01616  21.5  0.545  2.14 
  2008  FH5  0.941  2.962  0.00385  27  0.518  1.951 
  2008  FF5  0.079  4.48  0.00719  23.1  0.965  2.279 
  2008  FE5  0.983  1.866  0.18051  22.1  0.31  1.424 
  2008  FP  0.281  4.927  0.00113  26.3  0.892  2.604 
  2008  FO  0.898  1.583  0.00389  23.2  0.276  1.241 
  2008  FN  0.766  3.023  0.07067  18.5  0.596  1.894 
  2008  FM  0.991  2.752  0.06793  24.7  0.47  1.871 
  2008  FK  0.819  2.999  0.00021  27.3  0.571  1.909 
  2008  FH  0.784  2.417  0.01574  24.3  0.51  1.6 
  2008  FG  0.58  3.004  0.27367  19.8  0.676  1.792 
  2008  FC  0.993  2.038  0.00381  24.8  0.345  1.516 
  2008  EM85  0.563  3.427  0.11328  19.7  0.718  1.995 
  2008  EL85  0.843  3  0.00353  25.6  0.561  1.922 
  2008  EK85  0.999  1.76  0.01112  28.4  0.276  1.379 
  2008  EJ85  0.894  1.526  0.0015  25.1  0.261  1.21 
  2008  EH85  0.827  1.425  0.07549  23.8  0.266  1.126 
  2008  EG85  0.961  2.236  0.0421  25  0.399  1.598 
  2008  EF85  0.959  3.202  0.01294  26.8  0.539  2.08 
  2008  EE85  0.748  1.688  0.00834  22.7  0.386  1.218 
  2008  ED85  0.976  2.004  0.00417  29.9  0.345  1.49 
  2008  EC85  0.834  5.571  0.30281  21  0.74  3.202 
  2008  EB85  0.689  1.835  0.04314  23.7  0.454  1.262 
  2008  EZ84  0.858  1.162  0.0005  26.2  0.15  1.01 
  2008  EY84  0.85  1.211  0.01429  26.8  0.175  1.031 
  2008  EW84  0.737  2.639  0.01377  24.5  0.563  1.688 
  2008  EV84  0.983  4.082  0.02234  25.4  0.612  2.533 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2008  ED69  0.723  5.05  0.28251  17  0.75  2.887 
  2008  EU68  0.527  2.411  0.05042  21.5  0.642  1.469 
  2008  EM68  0.611  2.874  0.00004  27.5  0.649  1.742 
  2008  EL68  0.982  1.467  0.00056  27.7  0.198  1.224 
  2008  EK68  0.913  2.822  0.00449  28.6  0.511  1.867 
  2008  EJ68  0.624  2.729  0.0222  25.9  0.628  1.676 
  2008  EG32  0.913  2.29  0.00397  27.1  0.43  1.601 
  2008  EF32  0.766  2.758  0.00018  29.4  0.565  1.762 
  2008  EC32  0.719  3.356  0.00519  26.7  0.647  2.037 
  2008  EM9  0.291  3.628  0.13453  17.4  0.852  1.96 
  2008  EG9  0.864  1.941  0.01456  25.2  0.384  1.403 
  2008  EF9  0.858  3.433  0.04839  22.5  0.6  2.145 
  2008  EE9  0.626  2.024  0.04695  22.3  0.528  1.325 
  2008  EA9  0.975  1.144  0.00107  27.7  0.08  1.059 
  2008  ED8  0.991  3.396  0.00125  23.9  0.548  2.194 
  2008  EZ7  0.991  2.603  0.00055  27  0.448  1.797 
  2008  ER7  0.559  2.415  0.00136  20  0.624  1.487 
  2008  EP7  0.929  1.711  0.05708  23.6  0.296  1.32 
  2008  EM7  0.937  1.54  0.01685  21.2  0.243  1.238 
  2008  EP6  0.855  1.564  0.04685  19.4  0.293  1.209 
  2008  EN6  0.788  2.178  0.20426  19.2  0.469  1.483 
  2008  EM6  0.937  2.764  0.0455  25.7  0.494  1.85 
  2008  EL6  0.899  2.558  0.02048  21  0.48  1.728 
  2008  EX5  0.828  1.892  0.00065  23.8  0.391  1.36 
  2008  ES5  0.708  3.237  0.01733  24.7  0.641  1.972 
  2008  EK1  0.684  2.404  0.05439  20.3  0.557  1.544 
  2008  EJ1  0.981  3.186  0.27676  15.8  0.529  2.083 
  2008  ES  0.568  4.038  0.14918  18.3  0.753  2.303 
  2008  ER  0.903  1.527  0.09069  21.4  0.257  1.215 
  2008  EQ  0.95  2.555  0.0037  24.1  0.458  1.752 
  2008  EO  0.631  1.745  0.01762  24.2  0.469  1.188 
  2008  EN  0.951  2.36  0.06722  24.5  0.425  1.656 
  2008  EM  0.984  1.325  0.09318  24.3  0.148  1.155 
  2008  EL  0.509  1.698  0.01048  22.2  0.539  1.103 
  2008  EJ  0.575  1.646  0.35927  20  0.483  1.111 
  2008  EH  0.965  3.704  0.01937  22.8  0.587  2.334 
  2008  EF  0.988  3.51  0.12532  21.9  0.561  2.249 
  2008  DX22  0.712  1.991  0.02285  24.5  0.473  1.351 
  2008  DV22  0.984  4.43  0.09457  23.4  0.637  2.707 
  2008  DU22  0.83  1.93  0.00571  26.3  0.398  1.38 
  2008  DT22  0.971  2.538  0.15923  23.5  0.447  1.755 
  2008  DL5  0.577  1.614  0.04164  21.9  0.474  1.095 
  2008  DK5  0.599  2.511  0.00914  21.4  0.615  1.555 
  2008  DJ5  0.73  1.768  0.10361  19.9  0.416  1.249 
  2008  DH5  0.753  2.284  0.01198  24.2  0.504  1.518 
  2008  DG5  0.951  1.561  0.01911  19.7  0.243  1.256 
  2008  DG4  0.893  4.092  0.01026  23.8  0.642  2.492 
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  2008  DV  0.949  2.512  0.21349  18.3  0.452  1.73 
  2008  DJ  0.786  3.179  0.00047  20.5  0.603  1.983 
  2008  DB  0.809  1.3  0.00193  25.7  0.233  1.055 
  2008  CG119  0.871  2.457  0.06822  19  0.477  1.664 
  2008  CE119  0.996  1.436  0.04795  25.6  0.181  1.216 
  2008  CD119  0.645  1.366  0.04302  25.5  0.359  1.005 
  2008  CY118  0.817  1.791  0.07559  25  0.373  1.304 
  2008  CR118  0.899  2.778  0.02792  18.9  0.511  1.839 
  2008  CQ116  0.807  1.201  0.02826  23.9  0.196  1.004 
  2008  CO116  0.915  2.36  0.06487  21.1  0.441  1.638 
  2008  CN116  0.779  1.661  0.00677  26.6  0.361  1.22 
  2008  CM116  0.549  2.712  0.31528  17.4  0.663  1.631 
  2008  CL116  0.799  5.362  0.03339  20.3  0.741  3.08 
  2008  CK116  0.584  2.193  0.02192  23.4  0.579  1.389 
  2008  CM74  0.929  1.249  0.0013  28.1  0.147  1.089 
  2008  CD71  0.364  2.548  0.25769  19.6  0.75  1.456 
  2008  CC71  0.918  1.971  0.00059  24.9  0.365  1.444 
  2008  CL70  0.716  3.637  0.07316  23  0.671  2.176 
  2008  CK70  0.586  1.619  0.0003  25.4  0.469  1.103 
  2008  CE70  0.972  1.973  0.02363  25.3  0.34  1.473 
  2008  CD70  0.989  1.166  0.01032  27.2  0.082  1.078 
  2008  CF22  0.884  3.176  0.00052  26  0.564  2.03 
  2008  CE22  0.84  1.601  0.00244  26.4  0.312  1.22 
  2008  CC22  0.848  3.069  0.01963  24  0.567  1.958 
  2008  CB22  0.812  3.906  0.04969  19.7  0.656  2.359 
  2008  CA22  0.556  3.511  0.10599  20.6  0.726  2.034 
  2008  CX21  0.94  2.914  0.06278  24.6  0.512  1.927 
  2008  CE6  0.993  2.809  0.01256  23.4  0.477  1.901 
  2008  CD6  0.8  3.216  0.00232  23.7  0.602  2.008 
  2008  CC6  0.285  2.237  0.01979  22  0.774  1.261 
  2008  CB6  0.949  2.257  0.00223  26.9  0.408  1.603 
  2008  CA6  0.908  2.511  0.06635  20.7  0.469  1.71 
  2008  CE5  0.364  1.803  0.17799  20.7  0.664  1.084 
  2008  CA5  0.758  2.966  0.09399  19.8  0.593  1.862 
  2008  CZ4  0.807  1.792  0.02172  24.9  0.379  1.299 
  2008  CS1  0.772  1.683  0.00966  20.2  0.371  1.228 
  2008  CR1  0.618  1.681  0.3777  19.6  0.462  1.149 
  2008  CH1  0.811  1.592  0.11305  21.7  0.325  1.201 
  2008  CQ  0.796  1.708  0.01141  25.4  0.364  1.252 
  2008  CM  0.927  2.206  0.04407  17.2  0.408  1.566 
  2008  CK  0.997  3.181  0.0242  26.2  0.523  2.089 
  2008  CH  0.725  3.938  0.02014  20.2  0.689  2.332 
  2008  CG  0.769  1.287  0.12464  22  0.252  1.028 
  2008  BT18  0.894  3.54  0.0135  18.3  0.597  2.217 
  2008  BO16  0.466  4.403  0.01385  22.9  0.809  2.434 
  2008  BN16  0.694  3.613  0.01162  26  0.678  2.154 
  2008  BH16  0.837  2.73  0.16245  20.5  0.531  1.783 
  2008  BE15  0.842  4.138  0.01045  24.8  0.662  2.49 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2008  BD15  0.928  1.229  0.01155  20.6  0.14  1.079 
  2008  BC15  0.629  3.705  0.00117  26.6  0.71  2.167 
  2008  BW2  0.932  1.857  0.00257  29.7  0.332  1.394 
  2008  BU2  0.36  2.253  0.25318  18.4  0.724  1.307 
  2008  BS2  0.839  2.335  0.15545  18.2  0.471  1.587 
  2008  BC  0.968  3.876  0.01096  24.2  0.6  2.422 
  2008  AO112  0.884  2.53  0.04514  20  0.482  1.707 
  2008  AP33  0.694  1.984  0.02663  23.9  0.482  1.339 
  2008  AN33  0.794  4.352  0.09345  19  0.691  2.573 
  2008  AK33  0.622  3.816  0.02155  20.6  0.72  2.219 
  2008  AH33  0.953  3.258  0.03607  19.3  0.547  2.105 
  2008  AG33  0.968  1.954  0.01493  19.9  0.337  1.461 
  2008  AZ30  0.462  2.203  0.02809  21.9  0.654  1.332 
  2008  AV28  0.789  1.59  0.22149  19.5  0.337  1.19 
  2008  AU28  0.932  3.075  0.00978  24.8  0.535  2.004 
  2008  AS28  0.651  4.218  0.06703  19.4  0.732  2.435 
  2008  AH4  0.828  3.59  0.08737  21.6  0.625  2.209 
  2008  AG4  0.921  1.357  0.03247  24.7  0.192  1.139 
  2008  AF4  0.815  1.95  0.00232  19.7  0.411  1.383 
  2008  AF3  0.976  1.44  0.0026  26.1  0.192  1.208 
  2008  AX1  0.81  2.283  0.02953  21.3  0.476  1.547 
  2008  AG1  0.786  2.79  0.05027  21.2  0.561  1.788 
  2008  AD  0.547  2.864  0.10521  20.1  0.679  1.706 
  2009  VZ39  0.879  2.641  0.00713  26.1  0.501  1.76 
  2009  VA26  0.927  2.111  0.03292  20.8  0.39  1.519 
  2009  VZ25  0.885  2.56  0.00141  26.2  0.486  1.722 
  2009  VR25  0.818  2.173  0.01915  23.4  0.453  1.496 
  2009  VQ25  0.813  2.521  0.18356  18.6  0.512  1.667 
  2009  VO24  0.833  2.298  0.0721  19.6  0.468  1.565 
  2009  VM24  0.856  1.373  0.03495  26.6  0.232  1.114 
  2009  VL24  0.785  2.864  0.01042  24.4  0.57  1.824 
  2009  VJ24  0.945  2.657  0.06667  22.1  0.475  1.801 
  2009  VT1  0.987  2.983  0.00046  29.5  0.503  1.985 
  2009  VN1  0.827  1.19  0.11532  24.2  0.18  1.008 
  2009  VC1  0.881  2.748  0.0082  26.8  0.514  1.814 
  2009  VZ  0.953  1.868  0.02152  21.3  0.324  1.411 
  2009  VX  0.855  4.207  0.00674  26.2  0.662  2.531 
  2009  VW  0.629  2.257  0.02799  21.6  0.564  1.443 
  2009  VT  0.816  1.951  0.01064  22.1  0.41  1.383 
  2009  VS  0.859  1.72  0.03783  24.9  0.334  1.289 
  2009  VR  0.949  2.177  0.01395  28.1  0.393  1.563 
  2009  VP  0.918  1.827  0.07723  22.7  0.331  1.372 
  2009  VA  0.918  1.931  0.00013  28.6  0.356  1.425 
  2009  UY87  0.691  3.574  0.07204  19.3  0.676  2.132 
  2009  UX87  0.971  1.221  0.02478  25.3  0.114  1.096 
  2009  UW87  0.888  2.983  0.00331  28  0.541  1.935 
  2009  UL28  0.946  3.112  0.02124  24.8  0.534  2.029 
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  2009  UY19  0.988  1.051  0.01123  23.5  0.031  1.019 
  2009  UX19  0.21  2.297  0.16046  18.8  0.832  1.253 
  2009  UW19  0.981  2.302  0.13885  23.2  0.402  1.641 
  2009  US19  0.925  2.568  0.02731  23.4  0.471  1.746 
  2009  UD19  0.974  2.351  0.0393  24  0.414  1.662 
  2009  UC19  0.759  1.404  0.0174  25.1  0.298  1.081 
  2009  UW18  0.717  1.841  0.10623  19.6  0.439  1.279 
  2009  UZ17  0.918  3.963  0.03488  22.4  0.624  2.44 
  2009  UK14  0.933  2.553  0.01105  25.5  0.465  1.743 
  2009  UN3  0.987  3.668  0.02432  17.7  0.576  2.327 
  2009  UM3  0.514  4.349  0.11686  17.9  0.789  2.432 
  2009  UE2  0.814  2.189  0.08333  20  0.458  1.502 
  2009  UD2  0.943  1.842  0.03818  22.2  0.323  1.392 
  2009  UU1  0.798  1.588  0.00401  24.7  0.331  1.193 
  2009  UP1  0.906  2.101  0.06985  20.3  0.397  1.504 
  2009  UO1  0.805  2.232  0.00747  24.4  0.47  1.518 
  2009  UL1  0.768  1.9  0.05619  23.7  0.424  1.334 
  2009  UK1  0.946  3.421  0.00273  26.2  0.567  2.184 
  2009  UQ  0.83  2.747  0.01751  21.7  0.536  1.788 
  2009  UM  0.673  1.467  0.17661  20.6  0.371  1.07 
  2009  UL  0.731  1.755  0.12708  22.2  0.412  1.243 
  2009  UJ  0.88  4.254  0.01397  26.1  0.657  2.567 
  2009  UE  0.984  2.998  0.00522  25.4  0.506  1.991 
  2009  UD  0.912  1.165  0.00565  27.2  0.122  1.038 
  2009  UB  0.947  1.716  0.01926  25.5  0.289  1.332 
  2009  TD17  0.879  1.375  0.00016  27.7  0.22  1.127 
  2009  TK12  0.704  2.687  0.0138  20.6  0.585  1.696 
  2009  TE10  0.758  1.26  0.24332  18.7  0.249  1.009 
  2009  TQ8  0.741  1.829  0.00532  24.3  0.423  1.285 
  2009  TO8  0.935  3.1  0.0036  26.1  0.537  2.017 
  2009  TM8  0.926  2.248  0.00099  28.4  0.416  1.587 
  2009  TH8  0.833  3.25  0.00881  24.9  0.592  2.041 
  2009  TF8  0.977  2.27  0.01192  26.5  0.398  1.624 
  2009  TC8  0.956  3.082  0.05586  18.8  0.526  2.019 
  2009  TB8  0.659  3.879  0.08697  18.1  0.709  2.269 
  2009  TS7  0.867  3.616  0.01478  23  0.613  2.241 
  2009  TJ4  0.954  1.227  0.02653  26.1  0.125  1.091 
  2009  TA1  0.771  3.811  0.08089  20.1  0.664  2.291 
  2009  TU  0.761  2.686  0.00178  27.3  0.558  1.724 
  2009  TT  1  3.646  0.02916  25.1  0.57  2.323 
  2009  TS  0.975  2.682  0.02409  25.5  0.467  1.828 
  2009  TQ  0.96  1.55  0.01974  25.9  0.235  1.255 
  2009  TP  0.799  1.26  0.00216  23.6  0.224  1.029 
  2009  TJ  0.846  3.286  0.02424  22.7  0.59  2.066 
  2009  TB  0.912  2.293  0.00048  29.2  0.431  1.603 
  2009  SU171  0.626  1.81  0.0587  23.5  0.486  1.218 
  2009  SR171  0.876  1.529  0.04809  26  0.272  1.203 
  2009  SP171  0.873  1.838  0.06149  19.1  0.356  1.355 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
698  |  Page     
Name  Designation  q  Q  E‐MOID  H  e  a 
  2009  SC170  0.988  1.844  0.01182  28  0.302  1.416 
  2009  SB170  0.347  2.342  0.10205  20.5  0.742  1.345 
  2009  SU104  0.735  4.298  0.00484  25.6  0.708  2.517 
  2009  ST104  0.841  3.052  0.04258  25.3  0.568  1.947 
  2009  SR104  0.969  3.324  0.04751  25.4  0.549  2.146 
  2009  SQ104  0.925  1.642  0.03835  20.9  0.279  1.284 
  2009  SP104  0.51  1.671  0.00178  26.7  0.533  1.09 
  2009  SL104  0.993  2.584  0.04473  23.4  0.445  1.788 
  2009  ST103  0.748  4.63  0.04809  18.1  0.722  2.689 
  2009  SS103  0.774  1.309  0.21059  22.4  0.257  1.041 
  2009  SR103  0.948  2.013  0.05318  25.2  0.36  1.48 
  2009  SO103  0.673  3.334  0.14657  17.3  0.664  2.004 
  2009  SN103  0.954  1.645  0.00068  27.6  0.266  1.3 
  2009  SA100  0.817  1.466  0.0121  23.9  0.284  1.142 
  2009  SO98  0.99  1.451  0.03226  24.3  0.189  1.22 
  2009  SM98  0.728  4.139  0.00342  22.3  0.701  2.434 
  2009  SW19  0.849  1.675  0.09862  19.8  0.327  1.262 
  2009  SU19  0.209  3.953  0.12644  17.9  0.9  2.081 
  2009  ST19  0.965  3.764  0.00334  18.3  0.592  2.365 
  2009  SG18  0.991  5.05  0.02319  17.9  0.672  3.02 
  2009  SW17  0.808  3.216  0.04317  19.8  0.598  2.012 
  2009  SD15  0.876  3.801  0.00721  26.9  0.625  2.339 
  2009  SB15  0.66  3.436  0.06872  20.5  0.678  2.048 
  2009  SL2  0.786  1.307  0.15119  22.1  0.249  1.046 
  2009  SK2  0.909  2.53  0.1681  18.8  0.471  1.719 
  2009  SG2  0.93  1.312  0.03591  20.1  0.17  1.121 
  2009  SX1  0.952  2.493  0.07364  18.8  0.447  1.723 
  2009  SW1  0.916  3.307  0.01713  23.7  0.566  2.111 
  2009  SH1  0.905  1.471  0.00404  29.4  0.239  1.188 
  2009  SD1  0.85  2.59  0.02612  22.3  0.506  1.72 
  2009  SC1  0.87  2.613  0.03823  24.6  0.501  1.741 
  2009  SY  0.691  1.856  0.11451  22.9  0.457  1.274 
  2009  SQ  0.369  5.044  0.2611  19  0.864  2.706 
  2009  SN  0.968  1.863  0.01304  21.7  0.316  1.415 
  2009  SJ  0.904  1.554  0.01994  25.8  0.264  1.229 
  2009  SD  0.751  2.729  0.00028  25.4  0.568  1.74 
  2009  SB  0.432  3.98  0.02537  20.5  0.804  2.206 
  2009  RZ3  0.718  3.704  0.04344  18.7  0.675  2.211 
  2009  RY3  0.555  1.555  0.00577  24.6  0.474  1.055 
  2009  RG2  0.974  2.143  0.01079  25.7  0.375  1.559 
  2009  RV1  0.979  4.423  0.02153  21.9  0.637  2.701 
  2009  RU1  0.838  1.862  0.00903  24.3  0.379  1.35 
  2009  RR  0.752  2.058  0.0023  25.5  0.465  1.405 
  2009  RH  0.865  1.63  0.02  23.8  0.307  1.247 
  2009  QC36  0.915  2.071  0.07548  22  0.387  1.493 
  2009  QB36  0.478  4.007  0.26209  17.6  0.787  2.243 
  2009  QC35  0.942  3.44  0.00455  25.4  0.57  2.191 
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  2009  QE34  0.99  1.589  0.00676  23.6  0.232  1.289 
  2009  QL32  0.805  3.252  0.02645  24.6  0.603  2.028 
  2009  QK9  0.841  2.819  0.00573  23.2  0.54  1.83 
  2009  QL8  0.886  2.977  0.02798  19.4  0.541  1.932 
  2009  QH6  0.861  1.255  0.00814  22.7  0.186  1.058 
  2009  QN5  0.397  4.385  0.11637  19.3  0.834  2.391 
  2009  QG2  0.998  3.583  0.02028  23.2  0.564  2.291 
  2009  QS  0.853  3.368  0.04219  22  0.596  2.11 
  2009  QR  0.983  1.704  0.00084  27.4  0.268  1.343 
  2009  PA3  0.777  1.989  0.00963  25.3  0.438  1.383 
  2009  PT2  0.914  2.51  0.04591  23.5  0.466  1.712 
  2009  PU1  0.915  1.292  0.05525  22.4  0.171  1.103 
  2009  PQ1  0.765  2.231  0.02232  22.5  0.49  1.498 
  2009  OO9  0.305  3.175  0.07472  19  0.825  1.74 
  2009  OY7  0.995  1.753  0.03791  24.8  0.276  1.374 
  2009  OZ4  0.967  4.392  0.15696  19.3  0.639  2.679 
  2009  OG  0.382  5.028  0.04157  16.2  0.859  2.705 
  2009  OF  0.95  3.765  0.01025  21.5  0.597  2.358 
  2009  NL  0.904  4.761  0.08642  19.8  0.681  2.833 
  2009  NJ  0.638  3.104  0.07975  18.6  0.659  1.871 
  2009  NE  0.361  4.987  0.44262  16  0.865  2.674 
  2009  MX6  0.94  3.361  0.09173  19.2  0.563  2.15 
  2009  MH1  0.281  1.808  0.38794  19.1  0.731  1.044 
  2009  MG1  0.75  3.288  0.01514  24  0.629  2.019 
  2009  MU  0.898  3.675  0.0037  24.6  0.607  2.287 
  2009  MS  0.864  3.147  0.04156  16  0.569  2.005 
  2009  LW2  0.893  1.519  0.04125  19.8  0.259  1.206 
  2009  LV2  0.61  2.385  0.16303  22.4  0.593  1.498 
  2009  LU2  0.692  2.133  0.00406  22.6  0.51  1.413 
  2009  LS  0.895  1.631  0.08974  18  0.291  1.263 
  2009  LQ  0.626  2.481  0.04254  21.7  0.597  1.554 
  2009  LE  0.999  1.61  0.01875  23.6  0.234  1.305 
  2009  LA  0.859  1.63  0.00754  26.3  0.31  1.244 
  2009  KV21  0.989  3.752  0.03032  24.6  0.583  2.37 
  2009  KR21  0.836  2.672  0.00124  26.7  0.523  1.754 
  2009  KL8  0.906  2.516  0.01194  24.3  0.471  1.711 
  2009  KK8  0.968  3.826  0.01044  18.8  0.596  2.397 
  2009  KD5  0.773  1.32  0.04955  18.2  0.262  1.046 
  2009  KN4  0.921  2.959  0.01134  18.3  0.525  1.94 
  2009  KE3  0.761  4.532  0.03532  18.2  0.712  2.647 
  2009  KD3  0.703  3.684  0.02785  21.4  0.68  2.194 
  2009  KC3  0.964  5.447  0.00838  18  0.699  3.205 
  2009  KY1  0.93  1.365  0.03919  23.7  0.19  1.148 
  2009  KM  0.523  4.354  0.10247  20.2  0.786  2.439 
  2009  KL  0.816  3.16  0.0168  23.8  0.59  1.988 
  2009  KK  0.818  2.186  0.00003  20.4  0.455  1.502 
  2009  KJ  0.351  2.13  0.08719  17.1  0.717  1.24 
  2009  JR5  0.812  1.692  0.02415  20.3  0.351  1.252 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2009  JM2  0.944  3.852  0.10479  19.4  0.606  2.398 
  2009  JL2  0.98  2.73  0.00034  26  0.472  1.855 
  2009  JG2  0.693  3.376  0.00004  22.6  0.659  2.034 
  2009  JM1  0.565  1.504  0.01881  23.2  0.454  1.035 
  2009  JL1  0.978  1.382  0.07649  21  0.171  1.18 
  2009  JF1  0.493  3.291  0.00124  27.1  0.739  1.892 
  2009  JE1  0.922  1.898  0.01051  26.8  0.346  1.41 
  2009  JS  0.863  1.828  0.00874  25.7  0.359  1.345 
  2009  JR  0.883  2.578  0.03324  21.4  0.49  1.731 
  2009  JA  0.959  1.887  0.01772  25.5  0.326  1.423 
  2009  HM82  0.888  1.634  0.06902  22.6  0.296  1.261 
  2009  HF82  0.869  2.257  0.07206  20  0.444  1.563 
  2009  HD82  0.656  1.851  0.081  21.7  0.477  1.253 
  2009  HC82  0.487  4.569  0.14227  16.1  0.807  2.528 
  2009  HK73  0.893  1.598  0.00117  26.3  0.283  1.246 
  2009  HZ67  0.785  3.196  0.05977  21.2  0.605  1.991 
  2009  HY67  0.908  2.68  0.20746  21.7  0.494  1.794 
  2009  HW67  0.509  3.656  0.0013  26.1  0.756  2.082 
  2009  HV67  0.897  4.493  0.21724  20.2  0.667  2.695 
  2009  HG60  0.705  3.263  0.00074  22.7  0.645  1.984 
  2009  HV58  0.826  3.14  0.02697  19.6  0.583  1.983 
  2009  HU58  0.186  3.948  0.27107  19  0.91  2.067 
  2009  HX51  0.925  2.087  0.05335  21  0.386  1.506 
  2009  HV44  0.96  2.368  0.2006  18.9  0.423  1.664 
  2009  HS44  0.764  4.377  0.00563  26.5  0.703  2.57 
  2009  HL21  0.924  2.403  0.00789  22.5  0.445  1.664 
  2009  HJ21  0.574  2.673  0.00231  27.5  0.647  1.623 
  2009  HE21  0.348  4.443  0.00727  24.5  0.855  2.395 
  2009  HD21  0.856  4.673  0.01756  18.2  0.69  2.764 
  2009  HC21  0.985  1.352  0.04483  22.2  0.157  1.168 
  2009  HA21  0.396  2.526  0.04667  20.4  0.729  1.461 
  2009  HV2  0.821  2.459  0.03304  21.3  0.499  1.64 
  2009  HS2  0.443  5.343  0.11071  21.8  0.847  2.893 
  2009  HR2  0.739  2.542  0.02753  25  0.549  1.641 
  2009  HF  0.902  2.23  0.07509  22.7  0.424  1.566 
  2009  HE  0.778  1.814  0.07473  20.9  0.4  1.296 
  2009  HC  0.909  1.17  0.01077  24.7  0.126  1.039 
  2009  HB  0.989  3.873  0.12422  18  0.593  2.431 
  2009  FH44  0.919  1.962  0.05433  22.7  0.362  1.441 
  2009  FT32  0.979  4.311  0.08632  23.8  0.63  2.645 
  2009  FS32  0.984  1.118  0.03204  25.8  0.063  1.051 
  2009  FQ32  0.994  1.459  0.0078  26.8  0.19  1.226 
  2009  FP32  0.794  3.197  0.00183  27.7  0.602  1.996 
  2009  FO32  0.664  2.034  0.00911  25.7  0.508  1.349 
  2009  FU30  0.967  3.816  0.01034  24.9  0.596  2.392 
  2009  FJ30  0.868  3.604  0.00556  22.6  0.612  2.236 
  2009  FP28  0.905  3.109  0.08284  20.8  0.549  2.007 
  2009  FO28  0.882  3.714  0.10071  21.1  0.616  2.298 Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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  2009  FL25  0.558  3.852  0.19595  19.4  0.747  2.205 
  2009  FT23  0.664  1.732  0.01178  25.9  0.446  1.198 
  2009  FG19  0.812  5.005  0.0202  18  0.721  2.909 
  2009  FF19  0.716  1.71  0.00405  21.3  0.409  1.213 
  2009  FZ10  0.859  3.402  0.00944  25.5  0.597  2.13 
  2009  FY10  0.552  1.927  0.3751  19.8  0.555  1.24 
  2009  FX10  0.844  1.557  0.02424  24.3  0.297  1.2 
  2009  FZ4  0.764  1.864  0.00525  25.4  0.419  1.314 
  2009  FY4  0.681  1.344  0.04362  20.9  0.327  1.012 
  2009  FX4  0.873  1.694  0.00639  25.4  0.32  1.284 
  2009  FW4  0.804  2.92  0.00685  24.6  0.568  1.862 
  2009  FV4  0.732  2.826  0.17144  18.4  0.588  1.779 
  2009  FU4  0.909  3.847  0.03428  17.9  0.618  2.378 
  2009  FJ1  0.888  1.387  0.05617  23.1  0.219  1.138 
  2009  FG1  0.87  1.519  0.12732  18.8  0.272  1.194 
  2009  FT  0.434  2.709  0.12251  19  0.724  1.571 
  2009  FS  0.929  3.931  0.01269  24.2  0.618  2.43 
  2009  FR  1  3.176  0.01205  26.4  0.521  2.088 
  2009  FP  0.877  2.905  0.01034  23  0.536  1.891 
  2009  FK  0.959  2.089  0.0002  28.3  0.371  1.524 
  2009  FJ  0.952  3.459  0.00043  24.9  0.568  2.205 
  2009  FH  0.975  1.976  0.00018  26.6  0.339  1.476 
  2009  FG  0.925  3.012  0.00047  25.5  0.53  1.969 
  2009  FF  0.784  2.163  0.0151  21.7  0.468  1.473 
  2009  FE  0.997  4.083  0.00382  21.4  0.607  2.54 
  2009  FD  0.59  1.737  0.00229  22.2  0.493  1.163 
  2009  EH3  0.77  3.23  0.00498  24.2  0.615  2 
  2009  EG3  0.619  2.089  0.08576  21.3  0.543  1.354 
  2009  EF3  0.728  1.37  0.19637  21.5  0.306  1.049 
  2009  EO2  0.888  2.534  0.01429  19.6  0.481  1.711 
  2009  EN2  0.787  2.529  0.13947  18  0.525  1.658 
  2009  EK1  0.956  1.527  0.03131  21.4  0.23  1.242 
  2009  EJ1  0.856  2.078  0.00001  28.4  0.417  1.467 
  2009  EH1  0.763  1.585  0.00032  27.9  0.35  1.174 
  2009  EF1  0.864  1.894  0.03901  24.2  0.373  1.379 
  2009  EC1  0.997  2.682  0.09283  22.8  0.458  1.839 
  2009  EB1  0.593  1.622  0.20305  20.4  0.464  1.108 
  2009  EY  0.878  2.799  0.01131  26.5  0.522  1.839 
  2009  EW  0.768  1.746  0.00178  26.4  0.389  1.257 
  2009  EV  0.824  2.633  0.03101  20  0.523  1.728 
  2009  EU  0.917  2.88  0.00278  26.6  0.517  1.899 
  2009  ES  0.962  1.908  0.04027  20.2  0.33  1.435 
  2009  EP  0.869  3.024  0.02861  23.8  0.553  1.947 
  2009  ED  0.689  1.599  0.317  21.6  0.398  1.144 
  2009  EA  0.995  3.336  0.01606  26.5  0.541  2.165 
  2009  DO111  0.756  1.343  0.00244  22.9  0.28  1.049 
  2009  DE47  0.794  1.398  0.14277  18.7  0.276  1.096 
  2009  DJ46  0.862  1.679  0.02218  25.6  0.321  1.271 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2009  DM45  0.742  1.601  0.00834  21.3  0.367  1.171 
  2009  DD45  0.987  1.495  0.00045  25.8  0.205  1.241 
  2009  DC45  0.89  1.932  0.00874  27.6  0.369  1.411 
  2009  DV43  0.766  3.64  0.01943  23.7  0.652  2.203 
  2009  DT43  0.856  4.256  0.00189  26.7  0.665  2.556 
  2009  DS43  0.67  1.802  0.0167  25.8  0.458  1.236 
  2009  DC43  0.919  2.682  0.09272  18.1  0.49  1.8 
  2009  DB43  0.913  1.292  0.0072  26.5  0.172  1.102 
  2009  DA43  0.896  1.136  0.08255  24.6  0.119  1.016 
  2009  DM40  0.875  1.789  0.00385  26.8  0.343  1.332 
  2009  DH39  0.741  2.957  0.01681  18.7  0.599  1.849 
  2009  DR36  0.949  2.444  0.14964  20.6  0.441  1.697 
  2009  DC12  0.99  1.673  0.04132  22.9  0.257  1.331 
  2009  DB12  0.509  1.834  0.11387  21.4  0.566  1.172 
  2009  DU10  0.97  2  0.00583  26.9  0.347  1.485 
  2009  DT10  0.788  3.373  0.0167  22.9  0.621  2.081 
  2009  DS10  0.909  3.515  0.03876  21  0.589  2.212 
  2009  DQ4  0.963  2.172  0.10195  21.2  0.386  1.568 
  2009  DP4  0.929  2.363  0.07929  23  0.436  1.646 
  2009  DN4  0.934  1.523  0.00696  26  0.24  1.229 
  2009  DR3  0.869  3.082  0.00949  21.5  0.56  1.976 
  2009  DE1  0.673  2.786  0.00038  24.3  0.611  1.73 
  2009  DB1  0.689  1.771  0.03887  22.9  0.44  1.23 
  2009  DA1  0.759  4.385  0.04  22.3  0.705  2.572 
  2009  DV  0.529  3.31  0.0097  24.9  0.725  1.919 
  2009  CT5  0.278  3.696  0.10365  18.7  0.86  1.987 
  2009  CS5  0.505  2.443  0.24954  19.4  0.657  1.474 
  2009  CR5  0.794  1.358  0.06642  22  0.262  1.076 
  2009  CP5  0.84  1.611  0.05882  21.4  0.314  1.225 
  2009  CN5  0.826  2.263  0.03448  20  0.465  1.545 
  2009  CB3  0.294  1.835  0.01073  19.5  0.724  1.065 
  2009  CA3  0.751  2.534  0.07809  20  0.543  1.642 
  2009  CZ2  0.734  4.076  0.08993  18.9  0.695  2.405 
  2009  CX2  0.93  3.886  0.05456  23.9  0.614  2.408 
  2009  CD2  0.972  3.019  0.01728  25.9  0.513  1.996 
  2009  CC2  0.612  3.165  0.00123  27.8  0.676  1.888 
  2009  CA2  0.784  2.229  0.18249  18.7  0.48  1.507 
  2009  CZ1  0.765  3.745  0.00111  24.5  0.661  2.255 
  2009  CV1  0.857  2.777  0.03315  26  0.528  1.817 
  2009  CS1  0.903  1.786  0.07533  21  0.328  1.345 
  2009  CZ  0.647  3.912  0.31893  17.9  0.716  2.279 
  2009  CV  0.946  1.279  0.01249  24.3  0.15  1.112 
  2009  CT  0.669  3.034  0.05804  19.6  0.639  1.852 
  2009  CS  0.812  3.203  0.04067  19.8  0.595  2.008 
  2009  CQ  0.862  1.928  0.02312  26.7  0.382  1.395 
  2009  CP  0.976  3.324  0.01904  26.8  0.546  2.15 
  2009  CG  0.985  1.837  0.08321  22.9  0.302  1.411 
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  2009  BG81  0.969  2.619  0.00808  27.9  0.46  1.794 
  2009  BF81  0.927  3.187  0.00299  25.2  0.549  2.057 
  2009  BE81  0.99  2.054  0.03247  21  0.349  1.522 
  2009  BD81  0.936  4.243  0.04475  20.7  0.639  2.589 
  2009  BE77  0.45  4.613  0.2815  18.2  0.822  2.531 
  2009  BD77  0.823  1.287  0.08268  20.4  0.22  1.055 
  2009  BP58  0.643  2.247  0.20724  18.6  0.555  1.445 
  2009  BL58  0.899  2.476  0.00691  24.7  0.467  1.688 
  2009  BK58  0.961  4.131  0.00417  25.8  0.623  2.546 
  2009  BJ58  0.534  3.169  0.01251  19.1  0.712  1.851 
  2009  BH58  0.996  3.03  0.01082  23.5  0.505  2.013 
  2009  BG58  0.995  3.053  0.01463  26  0.508  2.024 
  2009  BF58  0.941  2.082  0.00069  27.3  0.377  1.512 
  2009  BD58  0.89  2.507  0.06513  22.2  0.476  1.699 
  2009  BH11  0.861  3.96  0.00413  26.4  0.643  2.41 
  2009  BG11  0.894  1.353  0.03868  22.4  0.204  1.124 
  2009  BC11  0.918  3.689  0.04396  22.2  0.601  2.304 
  2009  BA11  0.995  2.829  0.02847  24  0.48  1.912 
  2009  BU5  0.534  2.782  0.06905  21.7  0.678  1.658 
  2009  BS5  0.972  2.198  0.00561  27.4  0.387  1.585 
  2009  BR5  0.69  3.351  0.00462  22.1  0.658  2.021 
  2009  BQ5  0.427  2.062  0.06357  23.2  0.657  1.244 
  2009  BP5  0.665  3.587  0.00053  22.7  0.687  2.126 
  2009  BO5  0.958  1.88  0.00466  26.8  0.325  1.419 
  2009  BW2  0.877  1.161  0.01645  25.1  0.139  1.019 
  2009  BN2  0.897  2.68  0.0073  24.9  0.498  1.789 
  2009  BK2  0.797  1.228  0.02561  25.3  0.213  1.013 
  2009  BG2  0.565  4.377  0.19486  20.2  0.771  2.471 
  2009  BF2  0.867  1.258  0.00973  25.9  0.184  1.062 
  2009  BG  0.804  1.407  0.00811  25.5  0.273  1.106 
  2009  BE  0.816  2.16  0.00054  26.1  0.452  1.488 
  2009  BD  0.967  1.05  0.00356  28.8  0.041  1.009 
  2009  BC  0.496  1.666  0.04966  22.8  0.541  1.081 
  2009  BB  0.373  4.464  0.21897  18.4  0.846  2.418 
  2009  AH16  0.475  3.462  0.27133  17.6  0.759  1.969 
  2009  AG16  0.581  2.514  0.05713  21.2  0.624  1.547 
  2009  AE16  0.47  2.97  0.02805  18.7  0.727  1.72 
  2009  AC16  0.705  2.347  0.01196  21.4  0.538  1.526 
  2009  AK15  0.748  1.871  0.20846  19.4  0.429  1.31 
  2009  AV  0.954  1.106  0.02085  18  0.074  1.03 
  2009  AL  0.811  4.144  0.01226  21.8  0.673  2.477 
  2009  AK  0.96  4.214  0.08753  19.7  0.629  2.587 
  5025  P‐L  0.645  4.41  0.05345  15.8  0.745  2.528 
  6344  P‐L  0.932  4.674  0.02828  20.4  0.667  2.803 
Ptah  6743  P‐L  0.817  2.454  0.02493  17.1  0.5  1.636 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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Eros  1898  DQ  1.133  1.783  0.14885  11.16  0.223  1.458 
Albert  1911  MT  1.175  4.08  0.18383  15.8  0.553  2.628 
Alinda  1918  DB  1.074  3.884  0.09283  13.4  0.567  2.479 
Ganymed  1924  TD  1.242  4.088  0.34211  9.45  0.534  2.665 
Ivar  1929  SH  1.124  2.603  0.11301  13.2  0.397  1.863 
Amor  1932  EA1  1.086  2.754  0.10986  17.7  0.434  1.92 
Tezcatlipoca  1950  LA  1.086  2.334  0.24576  13.92  0.365  1.71 
Betulia  1950  KA  1.125  3.268  0.13619  14.52  0.488  2.196 
Boreas  1953  RA  1.253  3.295  0.25531  14.93  0.449  2.274 
Quetzalcoatl  1953  EA  1.089  3.995  0.1048  18.97  0.572  2.542 
Anza  1960  UA  1.048  3.482  0.05364  16.56  0.537  2.265 
Baboquivari  1963  UA  1.243  4.046  0.2505  15.8  0.53  2.644 
Cuyo  1968  AA  1.066  3.235  0.07643  13.9  0.504  2.151 
  1972  RB  1.102  3.197  0.10105  19.7  0.487  2.149 
Pele  1972  RA  1.118  3.463  0.1459  17.6  0.512  2.29 
Anteros  1973  EC  1.064  1.796  0.06334  15.75  0.256  1.43 
  1977  VA  1.13  2.601  0.13734  19.2  0.394  1.865 
  1977  QQ5  1.189  3.262  0.35783  15.4  0.466  2.226 
Beltrovata  1977  RA  1.234  2.976  0.23284  15.21  0.414  2.105 
Seneca  1978  DA  1.061  3.946  0.11349  17.52  0.576  2.504 
  1979  QB  1.299  3.363  0.2952  17.1  0.443  2.331 
Bivoj  1980  AA  1.052  2.735  0.06965  19.1  0.444  1.893 
  1980  WF  1.083  3.385  0.11383  19  0.515  2.234 
Nyx  1980  PA  1.043  2.812  0.05756  17.4  0.459  1.927 
  1981  QB  1.078  3.402  0.3001  16  0.519  2.24 
McAuliffe  1981  CW  1.184  2.573  0.2013  15.6  0.37  1.879 
Florence  1981  ET3  1.021  2.516  0.04543  14.2  0.423  1.768 
Krok  1981  QA  1.187  3.116  0.18709  15.6  0.448  2.151 
  1982  YA  1.119  6.166  0.20834  18.1  0.693  3.643 
  1982  XB  1.018  2.652  0.03804  18.95  0.445  1.835 
Bede  1982  FT  1.27  2.278  0.35166  14.9  0.284  1.774 
Seleucus  1982  DV  1.102  2.962  0.09956  15.3  0.458  2.032 
Ul  1982  RB  1.27  2.933  0.27784  16.7  0.396  2.102 
Nefertiti  1982  RA  1.127  2.021  0.21673  14.84  0.284  1.574 
  1983  LB  1.194  3.382  0.24965  17.1  0.478  2.288 
Tara  1983  RB  1.094  3.347  0.2332  15.5  0.507  2.221 
Don Quixote  1983  SA  1.209  7.241  0.30201  13  0.714  4.225 
Verenia  1983  RD  1.074  3.112  0.07597  16.75  0.487  2.093 
                                                           
 
2 IAU Minor Planet Centre, List of Amor Minor Planets (2009), at 
<http://www.cfa.harvard.edu/iau/lists/Amors.html>, 19 November 2009, last accessed on 19 
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Dionysus  1984  KD  1.007  3.389  0.02137  16.3  0.542  2.198 
  1985  WA  1.128  4.556  0.13784  18.2  0.603  2.842 
Aditi  1985  TB  1.124  4.04  0.3306  15.8  0.565  2.582 
Magellan  1985  DO2  1.227  2.414  0.24075  14.6  0.326  1.82 
Mera  1985  JA  1.118  2.171  0.29479  16.5  0.32  1.645 
  1986  NA  1.17  3.084  0.18157  19.3  0.45  2.127 
  1986  DA  1.165  4.457  0.1766  15.1  0.586  2.811 
Taranis  1986  RA  1.22  5.453  0.22855  15.7  0.634  3.336 
  1986  LA  1.055  2.034  0.17813  17.7  0.317  1.545 
  1987  WC  1.044  1.681  0.11598  19.9  0.234  1.362 
  1987  SF3  1.045  3.461  0.05276  18.5  0.536  2.253 
  1987  QB  1.146  4.472  0.13536  19.5  0.592  2.809 
  1987  PA  1.202  4.249  0.20451  18.4  0.559  2.726 
Lyapunov  1987  SL  1.142  4.784  0.19922  15.2  0.615  2.963 
Pocahontas  1987  UA  1.217  2.243  0.21971  17.1  0.297  1.73 
  1988  NE  1.247  3.27  0.23341  18.2  0.448  2.258 
  1988  PA  1.274  3.019  0.27966  17.4  0.406  2.147 
  1988  SM  1.092  2.238  0.13371  18.3  0.344  1.665 
Tanith  1988  VN4  1.23  2.394  0.31033  17  0.321  1.812 
Ninkasi  1988  TJ1  1.139  1.601  0.15043  18  0.168  1.37 
  1989  VB  1.005  2.726  0.01734  19.9  0.461  1.865 
  1989  RC  1.121  3.504  0.10932  18.9  0.515  2.313 
  1989  ML  1.099  1.446  0.08343  19.5  0.137  1.273 
Abhramu  1989  OB  1.208  4.207  0.24948  16.5  0.554  2.708 
Saunders  1989  RS1  1.199  3.412  0.19554  18.7  0.48  2.306 
Cleobulus  1989  WM  1.283  4.121  0.3026  15.6  0.525  2.702 
  1990  UP  1.101  1.548  0.19969  21.3  0.169  1.325 
  1990  SA  1.123  2.904  0.30844  16.8  0.442  2.014 
Belenus  1990  BA  1.154  2.328  0.16935  17.8  0.337  1.741 
ESA  1990  VB  1.145  3.735  0.28603  16  0.531  2.44 
Gordonmoore  1990  KA  1.253  3.148  0.25085  16.6  0.43  2.201 
  1990  TR  1.207  3.079  0.21032  14.3  0.437  2.143 
Jasonwheeler  1990  OA  1.243  3.073  0.23635  17  0.424  2.158 
  1990  SB  1.083  3.702  0.30009  13.6  0.547  2.392 
Davidaguilar  1990  DA  1.176  3.151  0.30485  14.6  0.457  2.163 
Brucemurray  1990  XJ  1.223  1.908  0.42531  15.1  0.219  1.565 
Eric  1990  SQ  1.103  2.899  0.1957  12.6  0.449  2.001 
  1991  XB  1.206  4.673  0.22154  18.8  0.59  2.94 
  1991  TT  1.002  1.386  0.03181  26  0.161  1.194 
  1991  RJ2  1.262  3.157  0.26317  19.4  0.429  2.209 
  1991  JR  1.039  1.764  0.0454  23.4  0.259  1.401 
  1991  FB  1.027  3.714  0.07052  19  0.567  2.371 
Pygmalion  1991  NT3  1.26  2.38  0.33308  16.4  0.308  1.82 
  1991  JG1  1.12  1.628  0.14702  18.5  0.185  1.374 
  1991  PM5  1.281  2.158  0.29751  17.8  0.255  1.72 
  1991  DB  1.026  2.406  0.10264  18.4  0.402  1.716 
  1991  FA  1.095  2.864  0.12254  17.2  0.447  1.979 
  1991  OA  1.029  3.977  0.04949  18.5  0.589  2.503 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  1991  FE  1.199  3.192  0.21498  14.7  0.454  2.195 
  1992  YD3  1.006  1.325  0.02337  26  0.137  1.166 
  1992  SZ  1.18  3.176  0.20248  20.1  0.458  2.178 
  1992  JD  1.002  1.068  0.01748  25  0.032  1.035 
  1992  BA  1.251  1.433  0.27673  20.1  0.068  1.342 
  1992  NA  1.059  3.731  0.05637  16.3  0.558  2.395 
  1992  SL  1.093  2.19  0.0935  18.7  0.334  1.642 
Gielgud  1992  JG  1.299  3.229  0.29898  17.5  0.426  2.264 
  1992  BL2  1.3  2.113  0.30974  14.4  0.238  1.707 
  1992  JE  1.178  3.204  0.19402  16  0.462  2.191 
Akka  1992  LR  1.082  2.579  0.07523  17.9  0.409  1.83 
  1992  TC  1.108  2.023  0.16782  18  0.292  1.566 
Ishtar  1992  AA  1.206  2.754  0.22322  16.7  0.391  1.98 
Golombek  1992  OM  1.299  3.089  0.2869  15.9  0.408  2.194 
Miwablock  1992  AE  1.243  3.164  0.2719  15.4  0.436  2.203 
Almeria  1992  CH1  1.155  2.095  0.168  17.9  0.289  1.625 
Zao  1992  AC  1.212  2.994  0.24413  14.6  0.424  2.103 
Camarillo  1992  WD5  1.248  2.341  0.28257  15.4  0.305  1.794 
  1993  VC  1.297  4.253  0.30905  20.5  0.533  2.775 
  1993  UD  1.063  1.576  0.18285  20.2  0.194  1.32 
  1993  TQ2  1.152  2.82  0.20015  20  0.42  1.986 
  1993  RA  1.121  2.716  0.17013  19.1  0.416  1.919 
  1993  KA  1.007  1.505  0.00513  26  0.198  1.256 
  1993  FA1  1.014  1.838  0.02554  25.9  0.289  1.426 
  1993  FS  1.278  3.173  0.28473  19.8  0.426  2.225 
  1993  BU3  1.17  3.644  0.19507  21.5  0.514  2.407 
  1993  BD3  1.021  2.247  0.0371  26.2  0.375  1.634 
  1993  BD2  1.286  2.961  0.4487  19  0.394  2.124 
  1993  BX3  1.003  1.786  0.04762  21  0.281  1.395 
  1993  OM7  1.039  1.525  0.06078  17.8  0.19  1.282 
  1993  HA  1.094  1.462  0.16847  20.1  0.144  1.278 
  1993  DQ1  1.035  3.041  0.03038  16.5  0.492  2.038 
  1993  UB  1.225  3.326  0.25145  16.9  0.461  2.275 
  1993  QP  1.224  3.392  0.23578  18.7  0.47  2.308 
  1993  HO1  1.156  2.817  0.19986  16.6  0.418  1.986 
  1993  QA  1.011  1.941  0.06319  18.3  0.315  1.476 
Ondaatje  1993  MO  1.267  1.985  0.25637  16.5  0.221  1.626 
  1993  BW3  1.013  3.282  0.22272  15.1  0.528  2.147 
  1993  MF  1.142  3.747  0.19214  13.9  0.533  2.444 
  1994  US  1.181  4.291  0.21981  21  0.568  2.736 
  1994  TE2  1.259  3.23  0.26272  22.7  0.439  2.244 
  1994  TA2  1.256  4.015  0.27158  20.3  0.523  2.635 
  1994  NK  1.078  3.617  0.09754  20  0.541  2.347 
  1994  JX  1.18  4.343  0.17996  17.3  0.573  2.762 
  1994  FA  1.008  2.455  0.04131  25.2  0.418  1.732 
  1994  CJ1  1.005  1.973  0.03166  21.4  0.325  1.489 
  1994  BB  1.159  2.876  0.17604  23.5  0.425  2.018 
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  1994  AB1  1.136  4.524  0.14848  16.5  0.599  2.83 
  1994  GY  1.278  4.093  0.2733  17.1  0.524  2.685 
  1994  VA1  1.298  1.848  0.31609  18.9  0.175  1.573 
  1994  LY  1.054  2.726  0.06448  15.8  0.442  1.89 
  1994  RH  1.256  3.237  0.45122  15.8  0.441  2.246 
  1994  EF2  1.106  3.478  0.24438  17.6  0.517  2.292 
  1994  LW  1.224  5.157  0.33589  16.9  0.617  3.19 
Lucianotesi  1994  QC  1.168  1.481  0.24981  18.6  0.118  1.325 
  1994  PN  1.088  3.664  0.23199  15.8  0.542  2.376 
  1994  TW1  1.093  4.086  0.29292  14.8  0.578  2.59 
  1994  ND  1.044  3.287  0.1372  17.9  0.518  2.165 
Norwan  1994  PC  1.071  2.064  0.16177  17.2  0.317  1.568 
  1995  UC2  1.158  2.273  0.40313  21  0.325  1.716 
  1995  SA4  1.053  3.947  0.05184  22.3  0.579  2.5 
  1995  SD1  1.201  4.366  0.2018  20.6  0.568  2.784 
  1995  SC1  1.116  3.127  0.11349  22.7  0.474  2.122 
  1995  SB  1.207  1.434  0.28158  22.2  0.086  1.321 
  1995  NA  1.027  2.347  0.05255  23.2  0.391  1.687 
  1995  MA1  1.082  4.145  0.37025  17.6  0.586  2.614 
  1995  LA  1.021  3.225  0.02109  24  0.519  2.123 
  1995  HM  1.139  1.781  0.13044  23  0.22  1.46 
  1995  FX  1.035  3.483  0.0716  20  0.542  2.259 
  1995  FG  1.16  2.539  0.15471  23  0.373  1.85 
  1995  BK2  1.081  3.828  0.10015  22.6  0.56  2.455 
  1995  WL8  1.221  3.51  0.3012  18.1  0.484  2.366 
  1995  BC2  1.093  2.742  0.13705  17.3  0.43  1.918 
  1995  QN3  1.174  5.428  0.27302  17.3  0.644  3.301 
  1995  LE  1.105  4.061  0.12001  17.3  0.572  2.583 
Oze  1995  YA3  1.093  3.304  0.12334  14.4  0.503  2.198 
  1996  XB27  1.12  1.258  0.11598  22.2  0.058  1.189 
  1996  VZ4  1.024  2.19  0.04369  24  0.363  1.607 
  1996  TE9  1.208  2.378  0.21058  18.8  0.326  1.793 
  1996  RY3  1.026  1.355  0.11925  21.1  0.138  1.19 
  1996  MQ  1.019  3.811  0.02184  24.5  0.578  2.415 
  1996  KE  1.193  3.942  0.19625  19.2  0.535  2.568 
  1996  HN  1.297  3.11  0.29709  21.5  0.411  2.204 
  1996  GQ  1.003  3.033  0.02022  22.9  0.503  2.018 
  1996  FQ3  1.078  2.986  0.07216  21  0.469  2.032 
  1996  FO3  1.024  1.862  0.0414  20.5  0.29  1.443 
  1996  BA1  1.245  2.723  0.25814  21  0.373  1.984 
  1996  AE2  1.016  1.718  0.12103  19.5  0.257  1.367 
  1996  BZ3  1.258  4.027  0.28199  18.2  0.524  2.643 
  1996  DH  1.148  2.026  0.13636  16.6  0.277  1.587 
  1996  TR6  1.299  1.871  0.38081  18.6  0.18  1.585 
  1996  PC1  1.009  2.67  0.09045  20.4  0.451  1.84 
Didymos  1996  GT  1.013  2.276  0.04048  18  0.384  1.645 
  1996  AS1  1.118  2.382  0.10366  18.5  0.361  1.75 
  1996  TO5  1.143  3.612  0.31623  16.8  0.519  2.378 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  1996  HW1  1.128  2.965  0.12383  15.4  0.449  2.046 
  1997  YR10  1.145  2.293  0.16584  20.1  0.334  1.719 
  1997  YM3  1.091  5.45  0.11581  17.2  0.666  3.271 
  1997  XV11  1.274  2.46  0.58441  18.4  0.318  1.867 
  1997  XS2  1.283  4.049  0.31855  19.6  0.519  2.666 
  1997  VN4  1.076  3.808  0.08569  23.5  0.56  2.442 
  1997  VG  1.048  2.486  0.08354  22.2  0.407  1.767 
  1997  UZ10  1.076  4.594  0.08401  23  0.62  2.835 
  1997  UR  1.004  1.915  0.01811  23.2  0.312  1.459 
  1997  TT25  1.238  3.01  0.25034  19.3  0.417  2.124 
  1997  RT  1.065  3.426  0.05561  19.8  0.526  2.246 
  1997  QK1  1.008  4.592  0.00523  20.2  0.64  2.8 
  1997  PN  1.287  3.163  0.27837  19.7  0.422  2.225 
  1997  GH28  1.259  2.749  0.30501  17.9  0.372  2.004 
  1997  GK3  1.01  1.818  0.08913  23  0.286  1.414 
  1997  EN23  1.199  5.332  0.20563  22.8  0.633  3.266 
Ogmios  1997  NJ6  1.152  1.848  0.22347  19.1  0.232  1.5 
  1997  ET30  1.176  3.098  0.20602  16.9  0.45  2.137 
  1997  AE12  1.06  3.677  0.09137  17.8  0.553  2.368 
  1997  WT22  1.031  1.941  0.13034  18.8  0.306  1.486 
  1997  SE5  1.236  6.213  0.23347  14.8  0.668  3.725 
  1997  TD  1.192  3.306  0.18548  16.3  0.47  2.249 
  1997  WS22  1.116  1.423  0.11033  17.3  0.121  1.27 
  1997  GH3  1.079  3.91  0.09028  17.1  0.568  2.494 
  1998  YR11  1.06  2.999  0.15445  18.1  0.478  2.03 
  1998  YF10  1.121  1.86  0.22217  20.7  0.248  1.491 
  1998  YB8  1.289  3.556  0.30911  18.9  0.468  2.423 
  1998  XA5  1.08  2.037  0.13124  18.8  0.307  1.559 
  1998  XM2  1.19  2.419  0.41458  17.1  0.34  1.805 
  1998  WT7  1.025  1.278  0.08529  18.8  0.11  1.152 
  1998  WR5  1.247  3.904  0.41945  18.5  0.516  2.575 
  1998  WC2  1.118  3.989  0.43696  18.4  0.562  2.554 
  1998  WA2  1.102  4.315  0.23065  19.7  0.593  2.709 
  1998  WY1  1.038  2.201  0.06859  21.8  0.359  1.619 
  1998  VS  1.011  1.788  0.04124  22.3  0.277  1.4 
  1998  VP  1.013  2.738  0.30392  18.9  0.46  1.875 
  1998  UN1  1.179  1.848  0.37831  18.2  0.221  1.514 
  1998  UM1  1.017  2.371  0.015  23  0.399  1.694 
  1998  UR  1.025  2.263  0.1047  22.9  0.376  1.644 
  1998  TT3  1.163  3.49  0.26091  18.8  0.5  2.326 
  1998  SR49  1.158  3.803  0.29983  17.2  0.533  2.48 
  1998  SE36  1.208  1.474  0.21288  19.4  0.099  1.341 
  1998  SE35  1.238  4.798  0.28662  19.2  0.59  3.018 
  1998  SB15  1.028  1.424  0.1128  21  0.161  1.226 
  1998  SZ14  1.248  3.553  0.26647  19.2  0.48  2.401 
  1998  ST4  1.128  4.499  0.15743  16.5  0.599  2.813 
  1998  SS4  1.113  3.434  0.10913  21.5  0.511  2.273 
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  1998  SG2  1.215  3.279  0.21765  19.7  0.459  2.247 
  1998  RN1  1.075  4.15  0.21926  18.9  0.589  2.612 
  1998  QA105  1.258  4.142  0.27646  21.5  0.534  2.7 
  1998  QQ52  1.146  3.069  0.15918  20.7  0.456  2.108 
  1998  QH28  1.166  4.104  0.1852  23  0.557  2.635 
  1998  QB28  1.287  2.862  0.27214  20.3  0.38  2.074 
  1998  QR15  1.221  4.316  0.26353  18.1  0.559  2.769 
  1998  QV3  1.131  3.501  0.16112  20.5  0.511  2.316 
  1998  QE2  1.049  3.806  0.04621  16.5  0.568  2.428 
  1998  QH1  1.134  3.94  0.16668  20.7  0.553  2.537 
  1998  OP4  1.052  3.469  0.04456  24  0.535  2.26 
  1998  MR24  1.086  2.829  0.10853  19.2  0.445  1.958 
  1998  ME3  1.128  3.229  0.11625  19.3  0.482  2.179 
  1998  MS2  1.035  2.43  0.08191  20.5  0.403  1.733 
  1998  LD  1.193  1.693  0.18387  20.1  0.173  1.443 
  1998  KJ17  1.027  2.946  0.02405  23.5  0.483  1.987 
  1998  KH9  1.195  3.213  0.18085  18.6  0.458  2.204 
  1998  KG3  1.023  1.299  0.09654  22.2  0.119  1.161 
  1998  KF3  1.235  3.021  0.25851  18.9  0.42  2.128 
  1998  KD3  1.003  3.088  0.05517  20.6  0.51  2.045 
  1998  HG49  1.066  1.337  0.07738  22  0.113  1.201 
  1998  HN3  1.19  5.032  0.23841  18.3  0.617  3.111 
  1998  HM3  1.169  1.324  0.193  18.9  0.062  1.247 
  1998  HK1  1.231  3.08  0.22881  19.6  0.429  2.156 
  1998  HH1  1.054  3.267  0.05135  23.2  0.512  2.16 
  1998  GL10  1.055  5.301  0.15555  18.5  0.668  3.178 
  1998  GC1  1.019  1.867  0.13445  21  0.294  1.443 
  1998  FX134  1.283  3.226  0.28923  18.6  0.431  2.255 
  1998  FJ74  1.103  3.673  0.35925  18.8  0.538  2.388 
  1998  FN9  1.067  1.726  0.09524  20.6  0.236  1.396 
  1998  FM9  1.278  3.303  0.29563  19.4  0.442  2.29 
  1998  QQ63  1.062  3.664  0.06912  18.9  0.55  2.363 
  1998  WT30  1.202  2.424  0.21061  19.7  0.337  1.813 
  1998  SF35  1.224  2.146  0.41438  17.8  0.274  1.685 
  1998  HK3  1.28  2.377  0.48992  18  0.3  1.828 
  1998  XC9  1.285  4.211  0.33715  18.1  0.532  2.748 
  1998  YQ11  1.13  2.617  0.22823  17.4  0.397  1.874 
  1998  HL1  1.013  1.479  0.04223  18.9  0.187  1.246 
  1998  UL1  1.2  1.854  0.19626  16.6  0.214  1.527 
  1998  KU2  1.008  3.498  0.06103  16.7  0.552  2.253 
  1998  WP5  1.106  1.642  0.24609  18.8  0.195  1.374 
  1998  UC50  1.292  3.244  0.3051  16.5  0.43  2.268 
  1998  JH2  1.19  3.079  0.21875  16.5  0.442  2.135 
  1998  HJ41  1.193  1.534  0.26441  18.4  0.125  1.363 
  1998  MQ  1.056  2.511  0.12995  16.6  0.408  1.783 
  1998  FM5  1.012  3.523  0.09716  16.1  0.554  2.267 
  1998  YO4  1.244  2.064  0.24159  16.3  0.248  1.654 
  1998  WQ5  1.111  2.331  0.37307  15.3  0.355  1.721 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  1998  SG36  1.091  2.201  0.12346  16  0.337  1.646 
  1998  KV2  1.064  2.122  0.14318  16.9  0.332  1.593 
  1998  MX5  1.132  4.703  0.1784  18.5  0.612  2.918 
  1998  OR2  1.037  3.746  0.03549  15.9  0.566  2.392 
  1998  MN14  1.206  1.903  0.19492  17.7  0.224  1.555 
  1998  FF2  1.105  2.018  0.21196  18.8  0.292  1.562 
  1998  BG9  1.155  3.868  0.17101  19.4  0.54  2.511 
  1998  PB1  1.155  2.903  0.14131  17.1  0.431  2.029 
  1998  PG  1.226  2.805  0.23449  17.3  0.392  2.015 
  1998  BP26  1.28  2.166  0.29187  17.3  0.257  1.723 
  1998  BX7  1.299  3.913  0.35759  16.2  0.502  2.606 
  1998  RO4  1.228  3.051  0.23487  17.9  0.426  2.14 
  1998  TX6  1.134  3.145  0.15643  19.2  0.47  2.14 
  1998  EC3  1.035  3.225  0.0863  16.7  0.514  2.13 
  1998  FX2  1.092  3.21  0.10097  18.2  0.492  2.151 
  1998  NU  1.209  3.509  0.22135  16.1  0.487  2.359 
Rhiannon  1998  EP8  1.274  2.229  0.32259  18.2  0.272  1.751 
  1998  YP11  1.052  2.389  0.20276  16.3  0.389  1.72 
  1999  YD  1.002  3.922  0.02645  21.1  0.593  2.462 
  1999  YA  1.108  2.246  0.36921  18.2  0.339  1.677 
  1999  XX262  1.254  1.812  0.31027  18  0.182  1.533 
  1999  XR35  1.157  3.581  0.35932  17.8  0.511  2.369 
  1999  VU25  1.055  2.979  0.06767  24  0.477  2.017 
  1999  VG22  1.104  2.19  0.12336  18.6  0.33  1.647 
  1999  VX15  1.19  4.807  0.31039  18.8  0.603  2.999 
  1999  VQ11  1.151  4.488  0.15485  17.6  0.592  2.819 
  1999  VN11  1.108  3.76  0.17089  20.4  0.545  2.434 
  1999  VM11  1.15  2.039  0.17803  20.7  0.279  1.595 
  1999  VQ6  1.275  3.915  0.50204  18.5  0.509  2.595 
  1999  VN6  1.091  2.375  0.16758  19.5  0.371  1.733 
  1999  VT  1.029  2.979  0.15288  19.8  0.486  2.004 
  1999  UQ  1.077  1.112  0.07245  21.8  0.016  1.094 
  1999  TU16  1.289  3.866  0.29279  22.1  0.5  2.577 
  1999  TM13  1.074  3.964  0.07641  24.7  0.574  2.519 
  1999  TN12  1.149  2.625  0.19285  17.4  0.391  1.887 
  1999  TK12  1.021  2.345  0.1952  18.2  0.393  1.683 
  1999  TA10  1.142  1.869  0.30519  18  0.242  1.506 
  1999  TE5  1.153  3.325  0.15319  20.5  0.485  2.239 
  1999  TD5  1.158  3.769  0.17978  19.4  0.53  2.464 
  1999  TB5  1.194  2.741  0.33532  19  0.393  1.967 
  1999  TA5  1.223  3.566  0.23993  20.6  0.489  2.395 
  1999  TZ4  1.277  1.752  0.3651  19.7  0.157  1.515 
  1999  SE10  1.219  5.204  0.22629  20  0.62  3.211 
  1999  SO5  1.015  1.157  0.01493  20.9  0.065  1.086 
  1999  RO36  1.231  3.537  0.23016  20.7  0.484  2.384 
  1999  RK33  1.015  4.035  0.03909  22.4  0.598  2.525 
  1999  RJ33  1.017  1.493  0.02825  22.5  0.189  1.255 
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  1999  RC32  1.045  2.632  0.31864  18.4  0.432  1.839 
  1999  RB32  1.047  3.817  0.06159  19.8  0.57  2.432 
  1999  RZ31  1.034  4.162  0.02729  23.8  0.602  2.598 
  1999  RQ28  1.099  2.718  0.1241  20.7  0.424  1.908 
  1999  RP28  1.121  1.832  0.13345  22.6  0.241  1.477 
  1999  RN28  1.182  3.156  0.17834  20.9  0.455  2.169 
  1999  RV2  1.198  3.679  0.2093  18.8  0.509  2.439 
  1999  RU2  1.252  4.382  0.2581  20.2  0.556  2.817 
  1999  PS3  1.045  3.044  0.07205  21.7  0.489  2.045 
  1999  PJ1  1.073  2.277  0.30829  18  0.36  1.675 
  1999  OQ3  1.093  2.7  0.08711  20  0.424  1.897 
  1999  NA5  1.08  1.792  0.08387  20.7  0.248  1.436 
  1999  LD30  1.076  4.63  0.07818  20.3  0.623  2.853 
  1999  LP28  1.109  1.33  0.1574  19.9  0.091  1.219 
  1999  LN28  1.143  3.141  0.12959  19.4  0.466  2.142 
  1999  LV7  1.169  3.248  0.17523  19.2  0.471  2.208 
  1999  LE6  1.101  2.184  0.08669  20.6  0.33  1.643 
  1999  LT1  1.024  4.936  0.03936  17.6  0.656  2.98 
  1999  LJ1  1.121  2.122  0.11118  22.2  0.309  1.622 
  1999  KK1  1.143  3.09  0.1587  18.2  0.46  2.116 
  1999  JO8  1.111  4.167  0.12844  16.9  0.579  2.639 
  1999  JU6  1.174  1.764  0.27515  19.4  0.201  1.469 
  1999  HX1  1.109  4.007  0.17322  19.9  0.566  2.558 
  1999  HW1  1.292  3.464  0.36158  19.8  0.456  2.378 
  1999  HV1  1.184  3.953  0.20543  17.7  0.539  2.568 
  1999  HE1  1.01  3.719  0.05285  18  0.573  2.364 
  1999  HC1  1.005  3.078  0.00866  24.5  0.508  2.041 
  1999  FN19  1.003  2.29  0.01635  22.5  0.391  1.646 
  1999  EF5  1.277  3.181  0.27946  19.4  0.427  2.229 
  1999  EE5  1.199  2.139  0.20982  18.4  0.282  1.669 
  1999  EO3  1.059  4.26  0.20836  19.1  0.602  2.659 
  1999  DJ3  1.134  2.227  0.27348  21.1  0.325  1.681 
  1999  DY2  1.093  2.985  0.10851  21.9  0.464  2.039 
  1999  DB2  1.143  4.863  0.23947  19.1  0.619  3.003 
  1999  BL33  1.261  4.132  0.27714  21.9  0.532  2.697 
  1999  BO  1.169  3.072  0.26233  19.1  0.449  2.12 
  1999  AU23  1.273  3.046  0.40127  17.2  0.411  2.159 
  1999  AF4  1.075  4.569  0.11329  18.2  0.619  2.822 
  1999  HY1  1.205  1.567  0.34277  18.2  0.131  1.386 
  1999  RP36  1.297  3.157  0.30759  18.8  0.418  2.227 
  1999  YF3  1.274  1.7  0.31221  18.3  0.143  1.487 
  1999  VL12  1.217  1.97  0.24826  17  0.236  1.594 
  1999  RL45  1.142  2.511  0.24177  18.8  0.375  1.826 
  1999  OP3  1.059  4.364  0.38423  14.7  0.609  2.712 
  1999  LF6  1.014  1.804  0.06492  18.2  0.28  1.409 
  1999  GT6  1.153  4.448  0.15706  17.1  0.588  2.8 
  1999  DK3  1.176  3.054  0.44605  17.3  0.444  2.115 
  1999  AP10  1.011  3.743  0.07046  16  0.575  2.377 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  1999  TB10  1.047  1.679  0.09763  18.4  0.232  1.363 
  1999  YT  1.151  2.402  0.43748  17.1  0.352  1.777 
  1999  YB  1.222  1.42  0.21657  18.6  0.075  1.321 
  1999  XP35  1.171  1.699  0.19415  18.7  0.184  1.435 
  1999  KX4  1.031  1.884  0.19004  16.9  0.293  1.457 
  1999  CT3  1.239  1.615  0.38096  18.4  0.132  1.427 
  1999  WK11  1.14  3.127  0.14851  17.8  0.466  2.134 
  1999  NC5  1.231  2.828  0.43775  16.4  0.393  2.029 
  1999  FP59  1.259  2.14  0.24892  18.3  0.259  1.699 
  1999  WK13  1.175  2.513  0.27948  17.5  0.363  1.844 
  1999  WA2  1.112  2.821  0.34281  15.7  0.434  1.966 
  1999  RM28  1.229  2.405  0.36435  16.4  0.324  1.817 
  1999  BY9  1.278  2.384  0.28203  18  0.302  1.831 
  1999  XO35  1.092  3.978  0.26856  16.9  0.569  2.535 
  1999  LQ28  1.054  1.342  0.0957  19.1  0.12  1.198 
  1999  JW6  1.292  1.724  0.40993  17.1  0.143  1.508 
  1999  GJ2  1.231  1.839  0.24896  17  0.198  1.535 
  1999  VM40  1.189  3.431  0.20001  14.7  0.485  2.31 
  1999  TY16  1.25  2.947  0.28975  16.4  0.404  2.098 
  1999  AR7  1.292  1.997  0.40989  16.7  0.214  1.645 
  1999  ML  1.239  3.293  0.23203  17.6  0.453  2.266 
  1999  FQ5  1.254  1.736  0.25823  17.7  0.161  1.495 
  1999  JT3  1.299  3.039  0.30823  15.8  0.401  2.169 
  1999  GU3  1.029  3.148  0.03156  19.6  0.507  2.088 
  1999  TX16  1.035  2.067  0.13527  16.4  0.333  1.551 
  1999  ND43  1.045  2.001  0.07894  19.2  0.314  1.523 
Robwhiteley  1999  LO28  1.104  2.65  0.33153  15.2  0.412  1.877 
  1999  YN4  1.295  2.076  0.43175  16.3  0.232  1.685 
  1999  RH27  1.174  4.53  0.20683  16.8  0.588  2.852 
  2000  YT134  1.035  2.205  0.31726  18.7  0.361  1.62 
  2000  YH29  1.046  3.389  0.269  17.9  0.528  2.217 
  2000  YK4  1.045  2.288  0.16808  19.7  0.373  1.667 
  2000  YG4  1.101  3.325  0.1204  21  0.503  2.213 
  2000  XH47  1.182  1.869  0.31211  19.9  0.225  1.526 
  2000  XF44  1.109  3.987  0.12243  21.3  0.565  2.548 
  2000  WO148  1.023  2.26  0.05511  20.7  0.377  1.642 
  2000  WN148  1.046  1.486  0.05988  22.4  0.174  1.266 
  2000  WL107  1.031  4.812  0.0466  24.8  0.647  2.921 
  2000  WK107  1.19  3.997  0.45969  18.4  0.541  2.593 
  2000  WC67  1.148  4.236  0.23249  18.6  0.574  2.692 
  2000  WL63  1.004  1.859  0.16044  19.8  0.299  1.432 
  2000  WJ63  1.169  4.518  0.18723  20.9  0.589  2.844 
  2000  WH63  1.103  3.633  0.12026  21.7  0.534  2.368 
  2000  WG63  1.003  2.783  0.0182  23.2  0.47  1.893 
  2000  WY28  1.164  2.113  0.17741  20.3  0.29  1.638 
  2000  WX28  1.157  4.549  0.19505  20.8  0.594  2.853 
  2000  WM10  1.022  3.388  0.03657  25.8  0.536  2.205 
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  2000  VH61  1.266  4.247  0.32992  19.2  0.541  2.756 
  2000  UY33  1.063  1.185  0.11906  22.3  0.054  1.124 
  2000  UW13  1.09  1.46  0.12775  20.6  0.145  1.275 
  2000  TV28  1.271  3.752  0.27991  21.6  0.494  2.512 
  2000  TG2  1.148  1.895  0.16356  19.7  0.245  1.522 
  2000  TE2  1.038  1.604  0.04065  24.9  0.214  1.321 
  2000  TJ1  1.067  1.255  0.09951  19  0.081  1.161 
  2000  TH1  1.056  3.559  0.07692  22.6  0.542  2.308 
  2000  SC241  1.182  3.812  0.18491  20.2  0.526  2.497 
  2000  SY162  1.246  3.343  0.25437  19.2  0.457  2.294 
  2000  SZ44  1.212  3.675  0.23691  20.5  0.504  2.443 
  2000  SS43  1.022  2.444  0.02132  24.8  0.41  1.733 
  2000  SR43  1.147  3.945  0.39472  19.4  0.55  2.546 
  2000  SB25  1.199  2.513  0.23657  20.5  0.354  1.856 
  2000  SV20  1.146  2.219  0.20838  18.9  0.319  1.683 
  2000  SU20  1.188  5.203  0.18594  19.8  0.628  3.195 
  2000  ST20  1.293  2.456  0.40831  19.1  0.31  1.875 
  2000  SN10  1.124  3.867  0.12002  21.1  0.55  2.495 
  2000  SJ8  1.191  4.138  0.22271  20.3  0.553  2.665 
  2000  SF8  1.08  2.219  0.08804  20.6  0.345  1.649 
  2000  SE8  1.007  3.955  0.00821  23  0.594  2.481 
  2000  SB8  1.183  3.372  0.21398  19.1  0.481  2.277 
  2000  RK60  1.114  3.242  0.13379  21.6  0.488  2.178 
  2000  RJ60  1.237  2.426  0.40182  18.7  0.325  1.832 
  2000  RD53  1.022  2.551  0.02515  20.1  0.428  1.787 
  2000  RF52  1.062  3.608  0.05692  24  0.545  2.335 
  2000  RD52  1.225  3.181  0.21837  20.6  0.444  2.203 
  2000  RD34  1.282  2.645  0.31381  17.7  0.347  1.964 
  2000  RJ12  1.114  3.19  0.11591  22.3  0.482  2.152 
  2000  QO130  1.224  3.274  0.21652  20.5  0.456  2.249 
  2000  QN130  1.246  4.551  0.25906  18  0.57  2.899 
  2000  QL130  1.203  3.969  0.20805  19.9  0.535  2.586 
  2000  QJ130  1.253  3.718  0.24806  19.4  0.496  2.486 
  2000  QY69  1.193  1.66  0.27723  19.8  0.164  1.427 
  2000  QW7  1.036  2.858  0.03125  19.8  0.468  1.947 
  2000  QT7  1.156  3.446  0.15436  20  0.498  2.301 
  2000  PO30  1.102  2.57  0.12018  19.3  0.4  1.836 
  2000  PQ27  1.291  3.165  0.30382  20.3  0.421  2.228 
  2000  PQ9  1.081  2.726  0.06838  18.2  0.432  1.904 
  2000  PP9  1.04  3.615  0.04182  19.3  0.553  2.327 
  2000  PH8  1.101  2.919  0.08526  24.4  0.452  2.01 
  2000  PG5  1.133  3.039  0.11955  20.3  0.457  2.086 
  2000  PF5  1.11  5.285  0.13255  20.3  0.653  3.197 
  2000  OB22  1.275  4.252  0.27461  17.1  0.539  2.763 
  2000  OH8  1.2  3.615  0.19071  20.8  0.502  2.407 
  2000  OG8  1.222  4.115  0.24  17.7  0.542  2.668 
  2000  NQ11  1.299  2.809  0.30172  19.6  0.367  2.054 
  2000  LK10  1.26  2.993  0.26106  19.9  0.408  2.127 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2000  LF6  1.135  4.69  0.1577  19.7  0.61  2.912 
  2000  KO44  1.119  2.541  0.22528  17.5  0.389  1.83 
  2000  KN44  1.184  4.248  0.44593  18.5  0.564  2.716 
  2000  KL33  1.203  3.022  0.19219  19.7  0.431  2.112 
  2000  KC  1.202  3.305  0.18878  20.2  0.467  2.254 
  2000  JO78  1.208  3.093  0.19551  17.8  0.438  2.151 
  2000  JQ66  1.255  3.075  0.27515  18.1  0.42  2.165 
  2000  JN10  1.287  3.228  0.44321  17.8  0.43  2.258 
  2000  JZ8  1.132  1.813  0.12943  20.8  0.231  1.473 
  2000  JY8  1.099  4.467  0.17568  17  0.605  2.783 
  2000  JX8  1.025  2.051  0.01886  25.4  0.333  1.538 
  2000  JB6  1.169  2.403  0.15472  19.1  0.345  1.786 
  2000  JQ3  1.255  3.661  0.25519  18.2  0.49  2.458 
  2000  JA3  1.228  3.283  0.22724  18.6  0.456  2.255 
  2000  JF1  1.196  3.174  0.21603  19.6  0.453  2.185 
  2000  HD74  1.189  4.664  0.29203  18.2  0.594  2.926 
  2000  HP40  1.085  1.498  0.08095  23.9  0.16  1.292 
  2000  HW23  1.241  3.067  0.26215  18.5  0.424  2.154 
  2000  GG147  1.152  2.428  0.3761  18  0.357  1.79 
  2000  GC147  1.066  4.477  0.08893  20.3  0.615  2.771 
  2000  GS146  1.047  1.562  0.21471  17.9  0.197  1.304 
  2000  GV127  1.067  4.58  0.06692  19.2  0.622  2.824 
  2000  GT127  1.282  3.588  0.29457  22.6  0.474  2.435 
  2000  GB2  1.002  3.889  0.10714  19  0.59  2.446 
  2000  FX13  1.209  2.44  0.30701  19.9  0.337  1.825 
  2000  FP10  1.098  1.782  0.10724  21.6  0.238  1.44 
  2000  FL1  1.291  4.177  0.30912  15.4  0.528  2.734 
  2000  EB107  1.26  4.805  0.34275  16.9  0.584  3.033 
  2000  EV106  1.074  2.224  0.28112  19.1  0.349  1.649 
  2000  EC104  1.121  2.456  0.13477  21.3  0.373  1.788 
  2000  EC14  1.223  4.048  0.24907  20.5  0.536  2.636 
  2000  DV110  1.282  2.901  0.27799  19.6  0.387  2.091 
  2000  DQ110  1.238  5.47  0.69988  16.4  0.631  3.354 
  2000  DH8  1.277  2.4  0.30982  18.4  0.306  1.838 
  2000  CR101  1.278  2.112  0.29348  19.8  0.246  1.695 
  2000  CK59  1.017  1.938  0.03818  24.1  0.312  1.477 
  2000  CO33  1.005  3.644  0.01847  21.1  0.568  2.325 
  2000  CN33  1.074  4.125  0.09237  19.2  0.587  2.6 
  2000  CL33  1.103  3.838  0.16439  18.4  0.553  2.47 
  2000  BK19  1.01  3.803  0.04412  22.2  0.58  2.406 
  2000  BH19  1.102  2.95  0.11893  19.5  0.456  2.026 
  2000  BG19  1.184  4.152  0.29012  17.8  0.556  2.668 
  2000  AG205  1.096  3.486  0.26437  19.6  0.522  2.291 
  2000  AE205  1.004  1.324  0.03025  23  0.137  1.164 
  2000  AE6  1.216  4.221  0.31599  17.5  0.553  2.718 
  2000  AD6  1.275  3.151  0.31796  18.4  0.424  2.213 
  2000  AX93  1.147  3.269  0.27404  17.6  0.48  2.208 
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  2000  TO64  1.053  4.446  0.06251  17.1  0.617  2.749 
  2000  EL26  1.168  2.212  0.37418  18.6  0.309  1.69 
  2000  FJ10  1.01  1.625  0.05474  21.2  0.234  1.318 
  2000  RL77  1.189  3.924  0.33137  16.8  0.535  2.556 
  2000  VA45  1.181  2.674  0.27532  18.5  0.387  1.927 
  2000  UT16  1.261  3.884  0.54412  16.6  0.51  2.573 
  2000  ER70  1.28  2.435  0.31451  16.9  0.311  1.857 
  2000  CG59  1.26  3.688  0.27525  17.6  0.491  2.474 
  2000  SQ43  1.131  3.457  0.13045  18.6  0.507  2.294 
  2000  YJ11  1.008  1.617  0.03048  20.8  0.232  1.313 
  2000  XL44  1.277  3.177  0.29448  17.7  0.426  2.227 
  2000  WG6  1.165  3.474  0.19522  17.5  0.498  2.32 
  2000  WF6  1.226  3.699  0.26483  18.4  0.502  2.462 
  2000  UN30  1.086  3.152  0.33716  18.2  0.487  2.119 
  2000  SS164  1.266  3.894  0.30338  16.4  0.509  2.58 
  2000  SA10  1.081  2.254  0.21214  18.4  0.352  1.667 
  2000  RJ34  1.124  4.149  0.17882  15.2  0.574  2.636 
  2000  LL  1.11  1.408  0.16972  19.1  0.118  1.259 
  2000  HO14  1.256  3.272  0.25594  18.4  0.445  2.264 
  2000  UV16  1.209  3.486  0.20034  17  0.485  2.348 
  2000  QK25  1.297  2.321  0.31596  18.2  0.283  1.809 
  2000  DJ8  1.055  1.768  0.24801  17.9  0.253  1.411 
  2000  YM29  1.181  2.998  0.19675  18.4  0.435  2.089 
  2000  GC2  1.125  1.642  0.28047  17.3  0.187  1.384 
  2000  FN10  1.055  2.822  0.18281  17  0.456  1.938 
  2000  CQ101  1.158  3.42  0.15527  18.1  0.494  2.289 
  2000  YL29  1.007  2.065  0.14024  16.7  0.344  1.536 
  2000  VE62  1.154  2.084  0.15776  16.7  0.287  1.619 
  2000  TQ64  1.289  2.887  0.2999  18.1  0.383  2.088 
  2000  OJ8  1.026  3.697  0.03564  16.7  0.566  2.361 
  2000  ES70  1.231  2.386  0.43002  17.1  0.32  1.809 
  2000  DK79  1.041  2.512  0.05021  15.8  0.414  1.776 
  2000  AB246  1.17  3.44  0.17076  17.6  0.493  2.305 
  2000  NF11  1.152  1.69  0.21451  18.8  0.189  1.421 
  2000  GB147  1.242  2.354  0.28201  18.6  0.309  1.798 
  2000  XH44  1.218  2.796  0.22941  16  0.393  2.007 
  2000  YJ66  1.266  3.4  0.27553  15.7  0.457  2.333 
  2000  YK29  1.2  1.553  0.22934  18.2  0.129  1.377 
  2000  LY27  1.03  1.587  0.04686  17  0.213  1.309 
  2000  UJ1  1.062  1.892  0.08777  17.7  0.281  1.477 
  2000  LM  1.262  2.159  0.35555  17.1  0.262  1.711 
  2000  GQ146  1.067  1.592  0.1263  17.7  0.197  1.329 
  2000  ED104  1.002  1.739  0.04926  17.3  0.269  1.37 
  2000  HZ23  1.243  1.909  0.23799  20.1  0.211  1.576 
  2000  UR13  1.264  2.872  0.27753  16.6  0.389  2.068 
  2000  DN8  1.127  2.623  0.44468  15.9  0.399  1.875 
  2000  VN2  1.102  2.846  0.15067  16.3  0.442  1.974 
  2000  PM8  1.006  3.416  0.0828  14.7  0.545  2.211 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2000  OY21  1.092  2.556  0.25618  16.2  0.401  1.824 
  2000  SE45  1.204  4.278  0.22214  16.4  0.561  2.741 
  2000  NF5  1.241  3.224  0.22628  16  0.444  2.233 
  2000  QL7  1.19  3.662  0.36886  15.6  0.509  2.426 
  2000  NG11  1.189  2.573  0.19159  17.5  0.368  1.881 
Blume  2000  NX3  1.193  3.697  0.19625  17.7  0.512  2.445 
  2000  LC16  1.2  4.244  0.19226  16.7  0.559  2.722 
  2001  YX11  1.07  2.435  0.10958  20  0.39  1.752 
  2001  YM4  1.051  2.392  0.30885  20.3  0.39  1.721 
  2001  YU3  1.04  2.846  0.15383  20.3  0.465  1.943 
  2001  YT3  1.268  3.473  0.28365  21.4  0.465  2.37 
  2001  YR3  1.054  2.331  0.09143  23.3  0.377  1.693 
  2001  YO3  1.118  1.561  0.17458  22.8  0.166  1.339 
  2001  YP2  1.041  2.962  0.26516  18.9  0.48  2.002 
  2001  YM2  1.012  3.741  0.07292  19.7  0.574  2.377 
  2001  YB1  1.182  2.147  0.19772  22  0.29  1.664 
  2001  YA1  1.139  3.183  0.16034  20.8  0.473  2.161 
  2001  XW266  1.26  3.314  0.26176  19.5  0.449  2.287 
  2001  XK105  1.063  3.195  0.08006  24.2  0.501  2.129 
  2001  XP88  1.085  1.609  0.13858  20.7  0.194  1.347 
  2001  XQ31  1.203  4.499  0.24384  19.2  0.578  2.851 
  2001  XS1  1.188  4.156  0.20802  18.8  0.555  2.672 
  2001  XE1  1.265  1.942  0.42728  19.2  0.211  1.603 
  2001  XQ  1.039  6.245  0.06011  19.2  0.715  3.642 
  2001  WP15  1.138  1.656  0.15343  21.4  0.186  1.397 
  2001  WL15  1.045  2.933  0.06559  18.2  0.474  1.989 
  2001  WR5  1.047  4.547  0.06855  22.7  0.626  2.797 
  2001  WJ2  1.093  1.799  0.21092  19.8  0.244  1.446 
  2001  WH2  1.172  2.913  0.19664  20.1  0.426  2.042 
  2001  WW1  1.063  1.358  0.10929  22.1  0.122  1.21 
  2001  WS1  1.008  4.19  0.00682  17  0.612  2.599 
  2001  WN1  1.047  1.957  0.12825  19.5  0.303  1.502 
  2001  VJ75  1.067  4.286  0.08069  20.3  0.601  2.676 
  2001  VH5  1.036  1.512  0.12878  21  0.187  1.274 
  2001  VF2  1.119  2.517  0.13468  20.3  0.385  1.818 
  2001  VD2  1.018  3.818  0.03564  25.6  0.579  2.418 
  2001  VB2  1.038  2.398  0.07937  18.8  0.396  1.718 
  2001  UQ163  1.101  3.239  0.15095  21  0.492  2.17 
  2001  UU92  1.052  5.284  0.11774  20.1  0.668  3.168 
  2001  UP27  1.295  1.675  0.31006  20.5  0.128  1.485 
  2001  UO27  1.26  4.004  0.30579  19.9  0.521  2.632 
  2001  UG18  1.111  3.714  0.16197  20.6  0.54  2.412 
  2001  UE18  1.114  1.609  0.19309  22.5  0.182  1.361 
  2001  UD18  1.007  2.586  0.01277  27.6  0.44  1.796 
  2001  UW17  1.196  1.92  0.23497  20.5  0.232  1.558 
  2001  UZ16  1.009  2.508  0.03084  19.4  0.426  1.759 
  2001  UW16  1.121  1.607  0.24155  19.5  0.178  1.364 
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  2001  UU16  1.01  2.448  0.03048  24.9  0.416  1.729 
  2001  UT16  1.015  3.308  0.02483  25.5  0.53  2.162 
  2001  UQ16  1.222  4.197  0.23278  21.3  0.549  2.709 
  2001  UP16  1.292  3.143  0.30245  20.8  0.417  2.217 
  2001  UE5  1.076  3.358  0.14566  19  0.515  2.217 
  2001  UC5  1.023  4.466  0.06117  21.3  0.627  2.745 
  2001  UB5  1.122  2.302  0.12974  21.9  0.344  1.712 
  2001  UZ4  1.283  4.486  0.29189  20.6  0.555  2.885 
  2001  TP103  1.153  2.449  0.1862  19.9  0.36  1.801 
  2001  TB45  1.27  4.721  0.34225  19  0.576  2.996 
  2001  TY44  1.136  3.587  0.1568  20.4  0.519  2.361 
  2001  TB2  1.13  1.792  0.13649  21.5  0.227  1.461 
  2001  TZ1  1.126  2.896  0.17001  19  0.44  2.011 
  2001  TC  1.064  3.559  0.15697  20.7  0.54  2.312 
  2001  SD348  1.266  2.504  0.37862  18.8  0.328  1.885 
  2001  SS287  1.056  5.436  0.06866  18.3  0.675  3.246 
  2001  SE286  1.108  2.965  0.1401  17.8  0.456  2.036 
  2001  SD270  1.077  3.73  0.1611  21.4  0.552  2.404 
  2001  SX269  1.229  2.528  0.22593  21.5  0.346  1.879 
  2001  SL264  1.28  2.992  0.28763  19.5  0.401  2.136 
  2001  SR263  1.287  3.23  0.29366  20.5  0.43  2.259 
  2001  SO263  1.252  3.204  0.24721  21.8  0.438  2.228 
  2001  SJ262  1.251  4.642  0.25822  20  0.575  2.946 
  2001  SF262  1.296  2.087  0.29342  18.5  0.234  1.691 
  2001  SD170  1.077  3.476  0.1407  18.1  0.527  2.276 
  2001  SC170  1.05  3.448  0.1722  20.4  0.533  2.249 
  2001  SA170  1.044  3.183  0.04215  23.1  0.506  2.113 
  2001  SZ169  1.028  1.643  0.02629  25.1  0.23  1.335 
  2001  SK169  1.3  4.712  0.49551  17.1  0.568  3.006 
  2001  SJ9  1.274  2.832  0.27389  19.6  0.379  2.053 
  2001  RX47  1.166  2.879  0.1639  20.1  0.423  2.022 
  2001  RB18  1.075  3.621  0.07669  18.5  0.542  2.348 
  2001  RA18  1.062  4.146  0.0846  19.3  0.592  2.604 
  2001  RX17  1.227  4.001  0.25361  20  0.531  2.614 
  2001  RQ17  1.016  2.991  0.0228  22.4  0.493  2.003 
  2001  RP17  1.282  3.994  0.32179  18  0.514  2.638 
  2001  RC12  1.165  5.29  0.17191  15.8  0.639  3.227 
  2001  RZ11  1.08  3.304  0.08884  16.3  0.507  2.192 
  2001  RY11  1.063  1.903  0.1988  17.3  0.283  1.483 
  2001  RX11  1.263  4.277  0.30774  17.7  0.544  2.77 
  2001  RE8  1.178  1.894  0.16424  19.4  0.233  1.536 
  2001  RQ3  1.268  3.538  0.3309  18.9  0.472  2.403 
  2001  RP3  1.035  3.658  0.04461  23.4  0.559  2.346 
  2001  RO3  1.01  3.984  0.01625  23.5  0.596  2.497 
  2001  QP181  1.06  3.422  0.07317  18  0.527  2.241 
  2001  QL153  1.294  3.362  0.39908  19  0.444  2.328 
  2001  QA143  1.15  3.372  0.20319  19.6  0.491  2.261 
  2001  QP142  1.028  3.761  0.03584  24.1  0.571  2.394 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2001  QH142  1.189  1.866  0.34593  18.3  0.222  1.527 
  2001  QG142  1.068  3.667  0.14843  18.1  0.549  2.367 
  2001  QG96  1.249  2.167  0.24933  19.7  0.269  1.708 
  2001  QE96  1.274  1.347  0.30158  23.2  0.028  1.311 
  2001  QD34  1.041  3.234  0.05858  22.7  0.513  2.137 
  2001  QB34  1.285  3.127  0.30225  19.5  0.418  2.206 
  2001  QJ  1.256  3.433  0.24597  21.7  0.464  2.344 
  2001  PF14  1.252  2.99  0.26873  19.5  0.41  2.121 
  2001  PU9  1.113  3.377  0.12195  19.3  0.504  2.245 
  2001  PH9  1.232  4.194  0.24575  20.9  0.546  2.713 
  2001  PE1  1.101  4.421  0.10285  18.2  0.601  2.761 
  2001  PD1  1.213  3.257  0.24369  18.2  0.457  2.235 
  2001  PJ  1.053  3.159  0.07242  21.3  0.5  2.106 
  2001  OE84  1.206  3.355  0.21295  17.9  0.471  2.281 
  2001  OG25  1.078  1.795  0.09702  19.8  0.249  1.437 
  2001  OF25  1.056  2.199  0.05961  21.4  0.351  1.628 
  2001  OX13  1.281  3.484  0.28378  19.1  0.462  2.383 
  2001  OV13  1.095  2.884  0.0847  22.9  0.45  1.99 
  2001  OE3  1.07  2.151  0.1081  20.3  0.336  1.61 
  2001  OD3  1.25  3.971  0.26363  19.1  0.521  2.611 
  2001  NE13  1.222  2.994  0.21142  20.1  0.42  2.108 
  2001  NJ6  1.281  3.062  0.27318  20.3  0.41  2.172 
  2001  NZ1  1.202  2.831  0.1883  17.9  0.404  2.016 
  2001  NY1  1.04  3.46  0.02526  23.2  0.538  2.25 
  2001  MY7  1.104  4.767  0.12473  21.9  0.624  2.936 
  2001  MR3  1.29  3.438  0.28469  19.1  0.454  2.364 
  2001  MQ3  1.214  3.251  0.20938  19.1  0.456  2.233 
  2001  MF1  1.119  4.176  0.33669  16.8  0.577  2.648 
  2001  MD1  1.066  3.147  0.06492  21.4  0.494  2.107 
  2001  LD6  1.053  4.453  0.1387  19.4  0.617  2.753 
  2001  LM5  1.189  1.274  0.22301  19.3  0.035  1.232 
  2001  LB  1.002  1.47  0.07393  20.8  0.189  1.236 
  2001  KD68  1.177  3.586  0.16521  22.8  0.506  2.382 
  2001  KU66  1.002  1.585  0.01534  24.1  0.226  1.293 
  2001  KD55  1.267  5.429  0.25805  20.6  0.622  3.348 
  2001  KO41  1.134  2.911  0.1518  20.7  0.439  2.022 
  2001  KO20  1.072  1.368  0.14874  20.7  0.121  1.22 
  2001  KW18  1.046  1.439  0.03387  26  0.158  1.243 
  2001  JW1  1.097  1.259  0.15007  20.2  0.069  1.178 
  2001  HK31  1.047  3.836  0.12365  21  0.571  2.442 
  2001  HW15  1.14  1.911  0.13467  20.2  0.253  1.525 
  2001  HA8  1.12  3.647  0.11919  17  0.53  2.384 
  2001  HX7  1.114  3.421  0.20004  20.4  0.509  2.268 
  2001  HW7  1.065  3.282  0.14463  20.8  0.51  2.173 
  2001  GS2  1.099  2.461  0.13389  20.3  0.383  1.78 
  2001  FD90  1.072  3.023  0.10313  19.1  0.476  2.048 
  2001  FC90  1.132  2.507  0.1371  21.4  0.378  1.82 
  2001  FB58  1.114  2.362  0.12003  21.6  0.359  1.738 Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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  2001  FE7  1.075  3.082  0.07845  23.6  0.483  2.079 
  2001  FA1  1.205  2.561  0.25666  17.7  0.36  1.883 
  2001  FZ  1.039  3.82  0.10334  21.2  0.572  2.429 
  2001  DC77  1.272  3.816  0.27715  19.6  0.5  2.544 
  2001  DT8  1.211  3.33  0.22495  19.5  0.467  2.27 
  2001  DS8  1.034  3.22  0.0606  22.7  0.514  2.127 
  2001  DB3  1.185  4.185  0.44013  17.3  0.559  2.685 
  2001  CK42  1.022  1.82  0.06147  20  0.281  1.421 
  2001  CC32  1.073  2.214  0.28341  19  0.347  1.644 
  2001  CA32  1.185  3.263  0.30313  19.5  0.467  2.224 
  2001  BP61  1.003  1.97  0.14029  20.3  0.325  1.487 
  2001  BM61  1.121  1.63  0.15855  21  0.185  1.375 
  2001  BO60  1.189  2.042  0.43458  19.3  0.264  1.616 
  2001  BB40  1.006  2.279  0.03332  24.6  0.388  1.642 
  2001  BZ39  1.151  2.826  0.16727  18.6  0.421  1.988 
  2001  BY15  1.282  4.027  0.4095  18.9  0.517  2.655 
  2001  AO2  1.197  4.931  0.39216  18.1  0.609  3.064 
  2001  QK142  1.155  3.817  0.16746  16.6  0.535  2.486 
  2001  AA50  1.059  1.582  0.13319  18.5  0.198  1.321 
  2001  DV8  1.139  1.608  0.16653  20.6  0.171  1.374 
  2001  BJ16  1.17  1.556  0.17503  18.6  0.141  1.363 
  2001  FX9  1.292  2.572  0.3145  18.7  0.331  1.932 
  2001  XN254  1.017  3.625  0.03923  17.6  0.562  2.321 
  2001  SG276  1.078  1.787  0.08476  17.7  0.248  1.433 
  2001  QH96  1.112  2.387  0.16936  18.1  0.364  1.749 
  2001  TA45  1.183  1.743  0.22036  19.2  0.191  1.463 
  2001  MA8  1.264  3.473  0.24952  17.6  0.466  2.368 
  2001  PK9  1.078  2.482  0.11705  17.9  0.394  1.78 
  2001  JU2  1.11  1.925  0.11066  19.4  0.269  1.517 
  2001  WR1  1.019  1.536  0.07623  17.8  0.202  1.277 
  2001  JM1  1.006  1.915  0.04712  19  0.311  1.461 
  2001  FZ6  1.247  1.745  0.28179  18.4  0.166  1.496 
  2001  UY16  1.003  3.161  0.12362  19.2  0.518  2.082 
  2001  SE170  1.161  3.087  0.26631  18.2  0.453  2.124 
  2001  SW169  1.184  1.313  0.18128  19.1  0.052  1.248 
  2001  SK162  1.013  2.838  0.03002  17.9  0.474  1.925 
  2001  OB36  1.117  4.759  0.41  16.9  0.62  2.938 
  2001  HG31  1.215  3.955  0.25509  15.8  0.53  2.585 
  2001  FB7  1.28  1.522  0.28804  19  0.086  1.401 
  2001  DE47  1.125  1.52  0.21273  18.6  0.149  1.323 
  2001  TO103  1.252  3.176  0.47386  17  0.435  2.214 
  2001  SJ276  1.255  2.006  0.3511  18.6  0.23  1.63 
  2001  HH31  1.176  2.133  0.29175  17.8  0.289  1.654 
  2001  FF7  1.173  3.037  0.34533  17.9  0.443  2.105 
  2001  XT30  1.17  4.307  0.18986  16.2  0.573  2.739 
  2001  SN263  1.038  2.938  0.05192  16.5  0.478  1.988 
  2001  JL1  1.216  3.887  0.50524  16.8  0.523  2.552 
  2001  XQ30  1.022  2.703  0.18993  18.9  0.451  1.863 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2001  XV4  1.01  2.624  0.14889  17.2  0.444  1.817 
  2001  WC47  1.061  1.736  0.07852  18.7  0.241  1.398 
  2001  VG75  1.068  1.97  0.24598  18  0.297  1.519 
  2001  GN2  1.02  2.701  0.02644  18  0.452  1.86 
  2001  FY  1.268  2.504  0.27399  19.1  0.328  1.886 
  2001  EB16  1.143  2.582  0.16325  17.4  0.386  1.862 
  2001  AU43  1.181  2.612  0.21203  15.9  0.377  1.897 
  2001  AE2  1.239  1.46  0.23445  19.1  0.082  1.35 
  2001  LF  1.169  2.038  0.16173  17.9  0.271  1.603 
  2001  VS78  1.237  2.338  0.44446  15.6  0.308  1.787 
  2001  US16  1.013  1.698  0.02878  20.2  0.253  1.356 
  2001  KN20  1.175  3.121  0.17131  16.9  0.453  2.148 
  2001  KQ1  1.192  3.002  0.37645  15.3  0.432  2.097 
  2001  OZ13  1.253  1.782  0.27869  17.6  0.174  1.517 
  2001  MK3  1.256  2.083  0.30209  16  0.248  1.67 
  2001  FC7  1.271  1.6  0.26455  18.4  0.114  1.436 
  2001  MZ7  1.265  2.286  0.29197  15.1  0.287  1.776 
  2001  EB  1.211  2.048  0.41297  17.1  0.257  1.629 
  2001  DU8  1.17  2.384  0.43458  16.3  0.342  1.777 
  2001  RM  1.161  3.346  0.34962  15.4  0.485  2.253 
  2001  KP41  1.289  4.451  0.2873  15.5  0.551  2.87 
  2001  CP44  1.287  3.837  0.28322  13.3  0.498  2.562 
  2002  YD12  1.11  3.328  0.1329  21.7  0.5  2.219 
  2002  YR5  1.1  3.955  0.16666  22.5  0.565  2.528 
  2002  YQ5  1.128  1.446  0.22905  19.7  0.124  1.287 
  2002  YG4  1.011  1.913  0.02782  24  0.309  1.462 
  2002  YF4  1.168  2.341  0.43024  18.6  0.334  1.755 
  2002  YO2  1.059  1.943  0.07611  22.7  0.295  1.501 
  2002  XM90  1.113  2.468  0.31625  17.8  0.378  1.791 
  2002  XU66  1.266  4.234  0.52812  18.2  0.54  2.75 
  2002  XP40  1.157  2.132  0.18261  19.9  0.296  1.645 
  2002  XO40  1.004  3.956  0.09432  20.7  0.595  2.48 
  2002  XN40  1.247  3.094  0.31429  18.1  0.425  2.171 
  2002  XA40  1.173  3.353  0.18812  17  0.482  2.263 
  2002  XY39  1.206  1.69  0.24532  21.6  0.167  1.448 
  2002  XZ38  1.148  3.285  0.28062  18.2  0.482  2.216 
  2002  XS14  1.009  3.004  0.02673  24.2  0.497  2.007 
  2002  XM14  1.04  1.534  0.11801  21.5  0.192  1.287 
  2002  XX4  1.281  2.297  0.44831  19.8  0.284  1.789 
  2002  XW4  1.206  3.635  0.22503  21.7  0.502  2.42 
  2002  XU4  1.142  1.518  0.20579  22.1  0.141  1.33 
  2002  XH4  1.173  2.043  0.18496  19.3  0.27  1.608 
  2002  XG4  1.178  3.352  0.30993  18.2  0.48  2.265 
  2002  XO1  1.19  4.423  0.21074  20.9  0.576  2.806 
  2002  XA  1.067  4.6  0.08872  19.4  0.623  2.834 
  2002  WW17  1.052  5.007  0.30275  17.5  0.653  3.03 
  2002  WY12  1.116  2.824  0.131  19.5  0.433  1.97 
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  2002  WQ  1.2  3.376  0.24663  18.5  0.476  2.288 
  2002  WP  1.137  1.763  0.15236  18.3  0.216  1.45 
  2002  VD118  1.223  1.633  0.29834  20.2  0.144  1.428 
  2002  VX99  1.284  3.985  0.5138  18.4  0.513  2.634 
  2002  VY94  1.108  5.375  0.17117  16.8  0.658  3.242 
  2002  VT94  1.264  4.899  0.27912  19.7  0.59  3.082 
  2002  VR94  1.05  3.712  0.07376  19.2  0.559  2.381 
  2002  VC92  1.054  1.868  0.15103  18.8  0.279  1.461 
  2002  VT85  1.28  3.311  0.29719  18  0.442  2.295 
  2002  VP85  1.068  2.377  0.14194  20.1  0.38  1.723 
  2002  VO85  1.034  1.624  0.15639  21.6  0.222  1.329 
  2002  VX17  1.058  3.878  0.0765  22.1  0.571  2.468 
  2002  VQ14  1.264  3.905  0.2758  21.2  0.511  2.585 
  2002  UL11  1.24  4.382  0.25771  21.1  0.559  2.811 
  2002  UN3  1.294  2.193  0.34156  18.7  0.258  1.744 
  2002  UX  1.233  1.714  0.35135  17.9  0.163  1.473 
  2002  UN  1.17  4.836  0.25427  17.2  0.61  3.003 
  2002  TC70  1.1  1.639  0.08601  21.1  0.197  1.37 
  2002  TS69  1.023  1.329  0.03063  24.6  0.13  1.176 
  2002  TP69  1.033  2.858  0.05029  21.9  0.469  1.945 
  2002  TB69  1.26  2.962  0.29421  18.9  0.403  2.111 
  2002  TZ68  1.021  3.338  0.02244  26.4  0.532  2.179 
  2002  TY68  1.078  3.357  0.21387  18.8  0.514  2.217 
  2002  TH68  1.07  1.801  0.08932  21.6  0.254  1.436 
  2002  TS67  1.194  3.498  0.2272  19  0.491  2.346 
  2002  TR67  1.032  2.103  0.04057  22.7  0.342  1.568 
  2002  TD60  1.103  1.301  0.11677  19.3  0.083  1.202 
  2002  TC60  1.283  3.808  0.45703  18.4  0.496  2.545 
  2002  TX59  1.045  1.402  0.08082  24.2  0.146  1.224 
  2002  TD58  1.094  3.897  0.09981  23  0.562  2.495 
  2002  TY57  1.292  2.551  0.30194  19.5  0.328  1.922 
  2002  TN30  1.294  3.376  0.4938  16.8  0.446  2.335 
  2002  SS41  1.299  2.91  0.60115  17.2  0.383  2.105 
  2002  SV  1.071  1.736  0.09376  19.8  0.237  1.403 
  2002  SN  1.212  2.686  0.21826  20.5  0.378  1.949 
  2002  SL  1.103  3.301  0.10052  19.4  0.499  2.202 
  2002  SF  1.298  2.97  0.30156  20.4  0.392  2.134 
  2002  RA182  1.258  3.044  0.27245  20.9  0.415  2.151 
  2002  RP137  1.066  1.257  0.12789  23  0.082  1.162 
  2002  RO137  1.183  3.128  0.18767  21.1  0.451  2.155 
  2002  RA126  1.042  4.476  0.06354  22.8  0.622  2.759 
  2002  RC118  1.279  4.621  0.36866  16.7  0.566  2.95 
  2002  RV112  1.135  3.307  0.15176  17.9  0.489  2.221 
  2002  RH52  1.005  2.953  0.22081  16.8  0.492  1.979 
  2002  RN38  1.243  6.381  0.26455  16.9  0.674  3.812 
  2002  RP28  1.013  2.311  0.10814  21.2  0.391  1.662 
  2002  RO28  1.005  1.999  0.02242  25.4  0.331  1.502 
  2002  RD27  1.253  4.115  0.46204  17.9  0.533  2.684 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2002  RU25  1.126  3.229  0.24896  17.4  0.483  2.177 
  2002  RT25  1.087  2.779  0.33067  18.7  0.438  1.933 
  2002  RB  1.243  3.148  0.23311  20.3  0.434  2.196 
  2002  QE47  1.16  2.497  0.17081  22.2  0.366  1.829 
  2002  QG24  1.166  3.406  0.18358  17.8  0.49  2.286 
  2002  QH10  1.038  3.685  0.04955  20.3  0.56  2.362 
  2002  QE7  1.203  1.736  0.2924  19.6  0.181  1.47 
  2002  QZ6  1.096  2.836  0.08504  19.7  0.442  1.966 
  2002  PD130  1.234  2.528  0.28713  19.9  0.344  1.881 
  2002  PC130  1.212  3.474  0.3946  18.2  0.483  2.343 
  2002  PH80  1.176  3.164  0.17398  19.7  0.458  2.17 
  2002  PG80  1.132  2.893  0.14421  18.5  0.438  2.012 
  2002  PO75  1.095  2.443  0.08685  19.1  0.381  1.769 
  2002  PG43  1.298  3.05  0.2932  18.3  0.403  2.174 
  2002  PF43  1.042  2.246  0.03581  20.8  0.366  1.644 
  2002  PE43  1.029  3.127  0.0186  24.1  0.505  2.078 
  2002  PY39  1.047  3.03  0.08147  21.5  0.486  2.039 
  2002  PX39  1.003  3.909  0.01284  23.4  0.592  2.456 
  2002  PW39  1.114  3.307  0.16205  21.2  0.496  2.211 
  2002  PC11  1.252  3.187  0.25707  19.5  0.436  2.22 
  2002  PQ6  1.197  3.921  0.20912  20.4  0.532  2.559 
  2002  PO6  1.074  3.395  0.19657  20.6  0.519  2.235 
  2002  PN6  1.262  3.278  0.27549  20.9  0.444  2.27 
  2002  PR1  1.025  3.956  0.03983  21.9  0.588  2.491 
  2002  OS4  1.05  2.796  0.29866  18.2  0.454  1.923 
  2002  NY31  1.006  3.419  0.31778  17.2  0.545  2.213 
  2002  NA31  1.185  2.147  0.219  20  0.289  1.666 
  2002  NX18  1.055  4.149  0.06797  17.4  0.595  2.602 
  2002  NW16  1.075  1.143  0.06873  18  0.031  1.109 
  2002  NP1  1.042  1.454  0.08119  17.6  0.165  1.248 
  2002  NV  1.021  4.313  0.30805  17.9  0.617  2.667 
  2002  MT1  1.193  3.556  0.19907  21.3  0.498  2.374 
  2002  MY  1.053  1.618  0.04324  22.4  0.211  1.335 
  2002  LD31  1.089  1.84  0.10007  21.2  0.256  1.464 
  2002  LE27  1.193  3.168  0.18885  19.2  0.453  2.18 
  2002  LS24  1.013  3.513  0.05958  22.1  0.552  2.263 
  2002  LH3  1.161  3.086  0.15128  20.3  0.453  2.123 
  2002  KK8  1.046  2.862  0.0335  21  0.465  1.954 
  2002  KF4  1.218  4.573  0.21467  17.2  0.579  2.895 
  2002  KK3  1.064  3.838  0.0956  18.8  0.566  2.451 
  2002  KJ3  1.16  3.377  0.18425  19.2  0.489  2.269 
  2002  KH3  1.139  4.248  0.15231  17.6  0.577  2.693 
  2002  JQ97  1.064  3.117  0.04941  22.9  0.491  2.091 
  2002  JA9  1.026  2.944  0.08794  18.7  0.483  1.985 
  2002  HU11  1.188  4.161  0.1745  17.9  0.556  2.674 
  2002  HF8  1.175  3.455  0.18494  18.2  0.492  2.315 
  2002  HE8  1.132  1.453  0.12755  20.3  0.124  1.292 
  2002  GD10  1.058  1.375  0.06034  22.6  0.13  1.217 Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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  2002  GM9  1.214  2.517  0.37728  18.6  0.349  1.865 
  2002  GZ8  1.017  4.636  0.04027  18.2  0.64  2.826 
  2002  GK8  1.102  2.58  0.40695  19.7  0.401  1.841 
  2002  GF8  1.247  3.319  0.24666  20.6  0.454  2.283 
  2002  GP5  1.234  2.307  0.25763  20.3  0.303  1.771 
  2002  GN5  1.138  2.069  0.13946  22.2  0.29  1.604 
  2002  GG1  1.015  3.632  0.04091  23.5  0.563  2.324 
  2002  GF1  1.233  2.9  0.22639  20.5  0.403  2.067 
  2002  FS6  1.004  2.637  0.03708  25.1  0.448  1.821 
  2002  FW5  1.029  1.601  0.22432  19.3  0.218  1.315 
  2002  FP5  1.22  2.262  0.22333  21.1  0.299  1.741 
  2002  FQ4  1.226  1.817  0.34987  20.5  0.194  1.521 
  2002  FD  1.022  1.826  0.23359  19.3  0.282  1.424 
  2002  EG116  1.288  1.506  0.31676  20.8  0.078  1.397 
  2002  EY11  1.155  3.284  0.18301  22.2  0.48  2.219 
  2002  EX11  1.113  2.661  0.1296  20.9  0.41  1.887 
  2002  ET11  1.129  3.666  0.23028  21  0.529  2.398 
  2002  ES11  1.089  2.547  0.13109  21.9  0.401  1.818 
  2002  EZ2  1.192  1.307  0.18981  20  0.046  1.249 
  2002  EV  1.027  3.886  0.03894  23.2  0.582  2.457 
  2002  EC  1.034  3.272  0.04552  23.4  0.52  2.153 
  2002  DY3  1.082  1.901  0.14313  18.5  0.275  1.492 
  2002  DQ3  1.034  1.741  0.05044  23.8  0.255  1.387 
  2002  DC3  1.016  2.385  0.02756  26.1  0.403  1.701 
  2002  CZ58  1.169  3.206  0.37913  19.1  0.466  2.187 
  2002  CW46  1.203  2.466  0.29299  18.9  0.344  1.835 
  2002  CV46  1.136  1.697  0.17083  21.5  0.198  1.417 
  2002  CT46  1.107  3.615  0.1178  20.9  0.531  2.361 
  2002  CF26  1.057  2.151  0.09422  17.2  0.341  1.604 
  2002  CC26  1.039  3.474  0.05934  24.4  0.54  2.257 
  2002  CS11  1.203  2.835  0.21983  21.4  0.404  2.019 
  2002  CR11  1.024  3.961  0.17549  20.2  0.589  2.492 
  2002  CP4  1.083  2.411  0.14634  21.1  0.38  1.747 
  2002  CM1  1.239  3.361  0.57958  16.9  0.461  2.3 
  2002  BP26  1.027  2.365  0.05622  19  0.394  1.696 
  2002  BM26  1.017  2.648  0.03018  20.1  0.445  1.832 
  2002  BM5  1.083  2.006  0.12128  22.3  0.299  1.545 
  2002  BA1  1.121  3.003  0.13259  21.5  0.456  2.062 
  2002  BG  1.102  1.535  0.14149  20.5  0.164  1.318 
  2002  AR129  1.203  4.498  0.22813  17.8  0.578  2.85 
  2002  AH29  1.053  3.763  0.1065  21.6  0.563  2.408 
  2002  AF29  1.259  5.246  0.31106  19.2  0.613  3.253 
  2002  AN11  1.208  2.427  0.33333  18.2  0.335  1.817 
  2002  AP7  1.237  1.492  0.33024  19.3  0.093  1.364 
  2002  AT5  1.225  4.119  0.23555  17.8  0.542  2.672 
  2002  AT4  1.031  2.701  0.04022  21.2  0.447  1.866 
  2002  AR4  1.079  4.881  0.16185  20  0.638  2.98 
  2002  AY3  1.086  2.255  0.10229  20.7  0.35  1.67 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2002  AQ2  1.045  4.282  0.07454  18.6  0.608  2.664 
  2002  AD2  1.072  1.774  0.09708  20.6  0.247  1.423 
  2002  AA2  1.068  3.445  0.08698  20.2  0.527  2.256 
  2002  CC19  1.139  1.43  0.16019  17.5  0.113  1.285 
  2002  JM97  1.257  4.213  0.30434  16.8  0.54  2.735 
  2002  WC1  1.083  4.064  0.12851  19.7  0.579  2.573 
  2002  RV25  1.048  2.766  0.14813  17.3  0.451  1.907 
  2002  GD11  1.194  3.068  0.18612  17.7  0.44  2.131 
  2002  GH1  1.24  4.142  0.25166  15.6  0.539  2.691 
  2002  AO7  1.071  4.773  0.1912  18.3  0.633  2.922 
  2002  CZ46  1.151  2.256  0.26187  17.9  0.324  1.703 
  2002  AQ3  1.135  3.087  0.3154  17.1  0.462  2.111 
  2002  AC2  1.086  2.262  0.10382  16.5  0.351  1.674 
  2002  KL6  1.041  3.572  0.06406  17.5  0.549  2.307 
  2002  FA5  1.291  2.377  0.36935  17.1  0.296  1.834 
  2002  CY46  1.015  2.766  0.08808  16.4  0.463  1.891 
  2002  BY  1.189  2.449  0.17902  17.9  0.346  1.819 
  2002  AC3  1.207  2.465  0.24856  18.6  0.343  1.836 
  2002  UM11  1.195  2.706  0.31234  15.9  0.387  1.951 
  2002  TR69  1.089  2.231  0.10254  17  0.344  1.66 
  2002  TX68  1.183  2.165  0.25236  18.2  0.293  1.674 
  2002  TB58  1.141  4.119  0.41985  16.2  0.566  2.63 
  2002  TC9  1.043  1.424  0.05957  18.2  0.154  1.233 
  2002  RX211  1.119  3.012  0.14566  18.3  0.458  2.065 
  2002  QE15  1.093  2.242  0.11663  16.2  0.345  1.667 
  2002  PO34  1.195  2.474  0.27915  17.8  0.348  1.835 
  2002  MP3  1.062  2.938  0.39258  16.2  0.469  2 
  2002  MC  1.267  3.889  0.27006  17.3  0.508  2.578 
  2002  JS100  1.227  3.541  0.22113  16.5  0.485  2.384 
  2002  CW59  1.173  3.586  0.18666  17  0.507  2.38 
  2002  AJ29  1.09  2.888  0.08722  17.3  0.452  1.989 
  2002  RS28  1.126  3.314  0.41286  15.5  0.493  2.22 
  2002  KH4  1.26  3.279  0.25177  15.6  0.445  2.269 
  2002  LJ3  1.059  1.865  0.12123  18.1  0.276  1.462 
  2002  CE  1.023  3.131  0.02742  14.7  0.508  2.077 
  2003  YJ136  1.298  2.983  0.31826  20.4  0.394  2.141 
  2003  YT124  1.209  3.43  0.24303  20.8  0.479  2.32 
  2003  YQ94  1.012  4.294  0.1393  17.6  0.618  2.653 
  2003  YP94  1.009  3.319  0.0546  23.8  0.534  2.164 
  2003  YT70  1.039  2.145  0.05471  25.8  0.348  1.592 
  2003  YR70  1.078  2.713  0.09237  20  0.431  1.895 
  2003  YP17  1.026  2.974  0.0501  19  0.487  2 
  2003  YW1  1.172  2.16  0.18847  22.6  0.297  1.666 
  2003  YQ1  1.15  2.341  0.16782  22  0.341  1.746 
  2003  YN1  1.011  1.66  0.04232  24.9  0.243  1.335 
  2003  YM1  1.248  3.973  0.30437  18.3  0.522  2.611 
  2003  XM  1.031  5.376  0.05196  19.4  0.678  3.203 
  2003  XE  1.107  2.317  0.1353  18.3  0.353  1.712 Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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  2003  WY153  1.005  3.947  0.02043  24.4  0.594  2.476 
  2003  WU153  1.285  2.442  0.36707  19.4  0.311  1.864 
  2003  WJ98  1.003  1.517  0.04576  23.1  0.204  1.26 
  2003  WY87  1.171  3.652  0.18378  22.6  0.514  2.412 
  2003  WX87  1.164  3.437  0.2105  18.4  0.494  2.301 
  2003  WW87  1.106  4.082  0.12239  17  0.574  2.594 
  2003  WX25  1.213  4.605  0.29075  18.6  0.583  2.909 
  2003  WM25  1.131  4.101  0.22719  17.6  0.568  2.616 
  2003  WB25  1.27  2.3  0.31847  17.9  0.288  1.785 
  2003  WQ21  1.129  1.561  0.14344  22.4  0.161  1.345 
  2003  WO7  1.215  3.089  0.24321  18.8  0.435  2.152 
  2003  VO2  1.183  1.447  0.21568  20.9  0.1  1.315 
  2003  VG1  1.146  4.251  0.19251  18.8  0.575  2.698 
  2003  VF1  1.041  2.31  0.31457  17.3  0.379  1.675 
  2003  UP25  1.069  1.464  0.07945  23.7  0.156  1.267 
  2003  UP24  1.128  3.348  0.26259  20.3  0.496  2.238 
  2003  UF22  1.169  2.6  0.17981  20.1  0.38  1.885 
  2003  UE22  1.058  3.623  0.06339  24.7  0.548  2.341 
  2003  UC22  1.257  3.06  0.26492  22.1  0.418  2.159 
  2003  UY19  1.027  3.891  0.07305  18.6  0.582  2.459 
  2003  UR12  1.05  3.813  0.24022  17.9  0.568  2.431 
  2003  UN12  1.286  3.027  0.30266  18.4  0.404  2.157 
  2003  UE8  1.021  2.846  0.0281  24.9  0.472  1.933 
  2003  UD8  1.278  4.176  0.28155  16.7  0.531  2.727 
  2003  UW5  1.045  3.895  0.06452  24.3  0.577  2.47 
  2003  UD5  1.022  3.66  0.0381  23.4  0.563  2.341 
  2003  UB5  1.054  4.177  0.07118  19.4  0.597  2.616 
  2003  UQ3  1.25  4  0.25847  19.6  0.524  2.625 
  2003  UE  1.292  3.398  0.33857  20.2  0.449  2.345 
  2003  TX9  1.135  3.168  0.21385  20.7  0.472  2.152 
  2003  TX7  1.148  1.748  0.35781  19.3  0.207  1.448 
  2003  TN1  1.238  1.627  0.29314  19.6  0.136  1.433 
  2003  TL1  1.252  3.895  0.27998  19.9  0.513  2.574 
  2003  TK1  1.076  1.967  0.08005  24.4  0.293  1.521 
  2003  TK  1.139  2.994  0.12523  19.5  0.449  2.067 
  2003  SV222  1.065  2.425  0.23007  17.6  0.39  1.745 
  2003  SN215  1.16  4.015  0.17948  22.4  0.552  2.587 
  2003  SL215  1.283  4.155  0.30568  20.7  0.528  2.719 
  2003  SK215  1.025  2.678  0.24255  21.5  0.446  1.852 
  2003  SJ215  1.27  3.142  0.28757  19.7  0.424  2.206 
  2003  SH215  1.258  3.225  0.25279  24.9  0.439  2.242 
  2003  SU214  1.199  3.966  0.23425  18.9  0.536  2.583 
  2003  SS214  1.097  3.63  0.11026  20.2  0.536  2.364 
  2003  SD201  1.088  4.973  0.29632  17.9  0.641  3.03 
  2003  SJ170  1.141  4.023  0.24003  19.6  0.558  2.582 
  2003  SF170  1.268  3.138  0.44575  19.5  0.425  2.203 
  2003  SD170  1.166  3.234  0.15088  19  0.47  2.2 
  2003  SV159  1.039  3.286  0.06326  22.9  0.52  2.162 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2003  SA85  1.069  3.181  0.09697  21.6  0.497  2.125 
  2003  SM84  1.033  1.218  0.05222  22.7  0.082  1.125 
  2003  SJ84  1.244  2.232  0.34892  19.4  0.284  1.738 
  2003  SH84  1.164  2.237  0.17557  23.1  0.316  1.7 
  2003  SK36  1.23  3.442  0.22526  21.7  0.473  2.336 
  2003  SC11  1.022  1.858  0.20256  20.6  0.29  1.44 
  2003  SL5  1.11  3.114  0.14841  19.2  0.474  2.112 
  2003  SK5  1.14  3.055  0.14614  20  0.457  2.098 
  2003  RW10  1.214  3.086  0.2275  19.3  0.435  2.15 
  2003  RN10  1.024  3.438  0.01085  15.9  0.541  2.231 
  2003  RL10  1.09  3.809  0.15364  19.5  0.555  2.45 
  2003  RP8  1.099  2.368  0.1054  18.6  0.366  1.733 
  2003  RD5  1.053  1.744  0.04598  23.4  0.247  1.398 
  2003  RE2  1.13  3.802  0.1227  23  0.542  2.466 
  2003  RS1  1.043  4.57  0.03662  21.8  0.629  2.806 
  2003  RM  1.151  4.674  0.1689  19.7  0.605  2.913 
  2003  QL96  1.054  4.555  0.0744  21.4  0.624  2.804 
  2003  QB90  1.214  3.42  0.20982  18.1  0.476  2.317 
  2003  QF70  1.184  3.242  0.20255  20  0.465  2.213 
  2003  QN47  1.095  2.375  0.13955  18.1  0.369  1.735 
  2003  QB31  1.224  3.067  0.2333  21.6  0.43  2.145 
  2003  QA30  1.076  3.63  0.10562  21.8  0.543  2.353 
  2003  QY29  1.079  4.187  0.0742  22.3  0.59  2.633 
  2003  QQ10  1.296  3.209  0.29071  19.7  0.425  2.253 
  2003  QK5  1.064  1.469  0.10269  22.6  0.16  1.267 
  2003  QC  1.205  3.94  0.21747  20.8  0.532  2.573 
  2003  PC11  1.228  4.531  0.22607  17.2  0.573  2.88 
  2003  PN5  1.037  1.833  0.059  23.2  0.277  1.435 
  2003  OQ13  1.093  1.512  0.09321  20.5  0.161  1.302 
  2003  OB4  1.293  4.517  0.31633  19.3  0.555  2.905 
  2003  OA3  1.177  2.434  0.20413  19.6  0.348  1.805 
  2003  NL7  1.173  3.104  0.16254  20  0.451  2.139 
  2003  NO4  1.178  2.251  0.16817  18.1  0.313  1.715 
  2003  ND  1.219  3.221  0.21039  18.6  0.451  2.22 
  2003  NB  1.273  2.98  0.26583  19.7  0.402  2.127 
  2003  MV7  1.26  2.053  0.25597  20  0.239  1.657 
  2003  ME7  1.256  2.304  0.24511  20.5  0.294  1.78 
  2003  MC7  1.121  1.627  0.23752  19  0.184  1.374 
  2003  MJ4  1.014  3.602  0.09305  19  0.561  2.308 
  2003  MT2  1.246  4.119  0.36795  16  0.535  2.683 
  2003  MU  1.038  3.069  0.02694  20.4  0.495  2.053 
  2003  MT  1.213  4.348  0.28369  19.1  0.564  2.781 
  2003  MA  1.146  2.137  0.14672  18.9  0.302  1.642 
  2003  LO6  1.233  4.583  0.22193  16.9  0.576  2.908 
  2003  LX5  1.296  4.302  0.29868  17.7  0.537  2.799 
  2003  LS3  1.264  4.046  0.25496  17.8  0.524  2.655 
  2003  LW1  1.038  3.197  0.03935  23.2  0.51  2.118 
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  2003  KQ18  1.125  1.773  0.13337  21  0.223  1.449 
  2003  KW16  1.132  1.919  0.20696  20.1  0.258  1.525 
  2003  JD17  1.102  3.814  0.14506  21.1  0.552  2.458 
  2003  JD13  1.225  2.138  0.21914  19.7  0.272  1.681 
  2003  JC11  1.293  4.563  0.46262  18.9  0.558  2.928 
  2003  JG4  1.252  3.313  0.24888  22.9  0.452  2.282 
  2003  HS42  1.282  1.636  0.27701  20.2  0.121  1.459 
  2003  HQ32  1.296  2.663  0.4807  17.9  0.345  1.979 
  2003  HA22  1.136  2.617  0.12081  19.4  0.395  1.876 
  2003  HN16  1.017  1.56  0.02293  22.3  0.211  1.288 
  2003  HW11  1.254  3.449  0.24704  17.2  0.467  2.352 
  2003  HB6  1.148  4.256  0.15074  17.6  0.575  2.702 
  2003  GS22  1.14  4.337  0.15108  23.1  0.584  2.739 
  2003  GJ21  1.087  2.535  0.09138  22.9  0.4  1.811 
  2003  GH21  1.092  1.848  0.15773  21.9  0.257  1.47 
  2003  GX  1.054  1.606  0.05699  24.1  0.207  1.33 
  2003  GJ  1.299  4.039  0.30021  19.7  0.513  2.669 
  2003  GD  1.015  2.185  0.03147  22.1  0.366  1.6 
  2003  GA  1.036  1.526  0.06147  21.2  0.191  1.281 
  2003  FR6  1.197  2.777  0.42698  19.2  0.398  1.987 
  2003  FQ6  1.191  1.551  0.18561  20.8  0.132  1.371 
  2003  FV3  1.127  3.242  0.26827  20.8  0.484  2.184 
  2003  FT3  1.143  4.2  0.15175  18.5  0.572  2.671 
  2003  FS2  1.185  3.628  0.20186  18.8  0.508  2.407 
  2003  EJ59  1.22  5.205  0.2302  19.9  0.62  3.213 
  2003  EZ16  1.012  1.34  0.06741  22.9  0.14  1.176 
  2003  EP16  1.038  2.396  0.09808  23  0.395  1.717 
  2003  EH16  1.097  3.589  0.29713  20.5  0.532  2.343 
  2003  ER  1.156  1.869  0.30272  19.9  0.236  1.513 
  2003  DF16  1.004  2.561  0.24946  19.7  0.437  1.783 
  2003  DC14  1.252  4.509  0.26575  16.5  0.565  2.88 
  2003  DH6  1.006  1.924  0.01544  24.3  0.313  1.465 
  2003  DF6  1.01  1.431  0.13661  21.2  0.173  1.221 
  2003  DE6  1.141  2.258  0.29192  19.1  0.328  1.7 
  2003  CQ20  1.047  3.138  0.05757  20.4  0.5  2.092 
  2003  CH11  1.11  3.52  0.1977  19.1  0.521  2.315 
  2003  CC11  1.279  4.986  0.29313  19.3  0.592  3.132 
  2003  CC  1.01  1.991  0.03634  20.2  0.327  1.5 
  2003  BT47  1.19  3.485  0.21438  17.5  0.491  2.338 
  2003  BS47  1.007  3.208  0.0214  25.8  0.522  2.107 
  2003  BC46  1.235  2.807  0.25855  23.6  0.389  2.021 
  2003  BT35  1.156  1.633  0.21397  18.7  0.171  1.395 
  2003  BQ35  1.076  1.774  0.10089  19.8  0.245  1.425 
  2003  BN4  1.052  1.486  0.06853  24.8  0.171  1.269 
  2003  BO1  1.222  1.436  0.23475  20.6  0.081  1.329 
  2003  BL1  1.165  2.26  0.32164  19.2  0.32  1.712 
  2003  AJ73  1.177  2.445  0.18414  18.6  0.35  1.811 
  2003  AO4  1.187  3.144  0.35037  18.7  0.452  2.166 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2003  AM4  1.086  3.603  0.13958  21.4  0.537  2.344 
  2003  AA3  1.01  1.833  0.03199  20.2  0.289  1.421 
  2003  AZ2  1.102  1.738  0.09046  18.3  0.224  1.42 
  2003  AD1  1.231  2.407  0.31496  18.2  0.323  1.819 
  2003  AC1  1.098  5.201  0.18674  20.7  0.651  3.149 
  2003  AA  1.244  2.211  0.29547  19.5  0.28  1.728 
  2003  UB10  1.063  2.137  0.1  18.3  0.336  1.6 
  2003  RB  1.003  2.577  0.04488  18.7  0.44  1.79 
  2003  QM47  1.248  2.336  0.37627  18.2  0.304  1.792 
  2003  EH1  1.191  5.058  0.21266  16.2  0.619  3.125 
  2003  XE11  1.149  2.54  0.16014  17.6  0.377  1.845 
  2003  HU42  1.217  2.472  0.22804  17.9  0.34  1.845 
  2003  WC25  1.185  3.407  0.18201  16.8  0.484  2.296 
  2003  XL  1.075  3.967  0.1059  17.3  0.574  2.521 
  2003  SW222  1.249  2.072  0.271  17.1  0.248  1.661 
  2003  OR14  1.258  3.774  0.29071  16.4  0.5  2.516 
  2003  DP13  1.197  4.076  0.25711  17.2  0.546  2.637 
  2003  BB43  1.151  3.676  0.34792  17.1  0.523  2.413 
  2003  MX2  1.243  3.337  0.26842  16.5  0.457  2.29 
  2003  SA224  1.107  2.192  0.1511  16.4  0.329  1.649 
  2003  QO104  1.015  3.255  0.00496  16  0.525  2.135 
  2003  NP7  1.274  3.09  0.28263  18.3  0.416  2.182 
  2003  EN16  1.076  2.246  0.19155  18.7  0.352  1.661 
  2003  BQ46  1.264  2.635  0.28171  17.6  0.352  1.949 
  2003  BC21  1.28  3.918  0.30645  15.9  0.507  2.599 
  2003  RD6  1.138  2.2  0.39589  17.3  0.318  1.669 
  2003  SZ219  1.294  1.959  0.31815  18.8  0.204  1.627 
  2004  YZ23  1.108  5.742  0.31923  15.3  0.677  3.425 
  2004  YY23  1.151  6.743  0.16838  19.4  0.708  3.947 
  2004  YU5  1.258  3.355  0.3306  18.9  0.455  2.307 
  2004  YK1  1.101  2.668  0.18513  21.3  0.416  1.885 
  2004  YJ1  1.099  1.723  0.17136  20.7  0.221  1.411 
  2004  YE  1.028  3.567  0.04305  24.9  0.553  2.298 
  2004  XM130  1.245  3.409  0.26348  17  0.465  2.327 
  2004  XJ50  1.096  3.383  0.32406  19.5  0.511  2.24 
  2004  XD50  1.136  2.514  0.27679  18.4  0.377  1.825 
  2004  XN44  1.019  3.826  0.04826  18.4  0.579  2.422 
  2004  XO35  1.136  4.039  0.20676  21.8  0.561  2.588 
  2004  XM35  1.285  2.389  0.30702  19.8  0.301  1.837 
  2004  XK35  1.139  2.766  0.29535  18.1  0.416  1.952 
  2004  XJ35  1.291  2.943  0.3069  20.3  0.39  2.117 
  2004  XO14  1.19  4.152  0.46665  16.1  0.555  2.671 
  2004  XE6  1.207  2.517  0.30134  19.6  0.352  1.862 
  2004  XL4  1.191  2.548  0.20955  20.9  0.363  1.869 
  2004  XK4  1.183  2.472  0.22943  21  0.353  1.828 
  2004  XJ3  1.279  4.472  0.32904  17.5  0.555  2.876 
  2004  VB61  1.16  3.437  0.17515  22.1  0.495  2.299 
  2004  VZ60  1.045  3.892  0.05759  24.8  0.577  2.468 Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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  2004  VT60  1.174  2.977  0.37813  17.6  0.434  2.076 
  2004  VS60  1.166  3.188  0.38335  18.2  0.465  2.177 
  2004  VB17  1.234  2.273  0.25927  19.8  0.296  1.754 
  2004  VA15  1.164  4.604  0.20106  18.5  0.596  2.884 
  2004  TO20  1.014  1.864  0.08417  23.4  0.296  1.439 
  2004  TL19  1.173  3.867  0.18604  20.7  0.535  2.52 
  2004  TE18  1.252  2.976  0.26708  21.2  0.408  2.114 
  2004  TK14  1.24  2.001  0.30708  20.1  0.235  1.62 
  2004  TQ13  1.293  4.059  0.30569  18.3  0.517  2.676 
  2004  TT12  1.136  3.862  0.13985  24  0.545  2.499 
  2004  TW11  1.003  1.764  0.05493  24  0.275  1.383 
  2004  TV11  1.092  3.447  0.10563  24.4  0.519  2.269 
  2004  TU11  1.192  3.812  0.20676  21.1  0.524  2.502 
  2004  SU55  1.05  1.701  0.05211  24.7  0.237  1.376 
  2004  SV26  1.297  3.404  0.32187  18.4  0.448  2.35 
  2004  SR26  1.014  1.783  0.01159  26.6  0.275  1.398 
  2004  SZ19  1.253  2.341  0.24968  18.7  0.303  1.797 
  2004  ST9  1.27  3.227  0.32139  18  0.435  2.248 
  2004  SY4  1.004  3.824  0.02654  24.4  0.584  2.414 
  2004  SA1  1.007  1.364  0.02297  25.3  0.151  1.185 
  2004  SX  1.187  2.342  0.3226  19  0.327  1.765 
  2004  SS  1.038  3.352  0.03604  22  0.527  2.195 
  2004  SA  1.047  3.48  0.04341  26.1  0.537  2.263 
  2004  RN335  1.289  3.131  0.31382  19.3  0.417  2.21 
  2004  RC252  1.136  1.468  0.19003  21.3  0.127  1.302 
  2004  RL251  1.039  4.03  0.03649  22.7  0.59  2.535 
  2004  RX165  1.143  3.516  0.15589  21.1  0.509  2.33 
  2004  RY164  1.183  2.27  0.30678  20.7  0.315  1.726 
  2004  RV164  1.011  3.793  0.0007  24.3  0.579  2.402 
  2004  RU164  1.286  5.447  0.33104  20.7  0.618  3.366 
  2004  RG164  1.001  2.221  0.00701  25.8  0.379  1.611 
  2004  RN111  1.012  2.322  0.0356  25  0.393  1.667 
  2004  RS109  1.175  3.486  0.1797  19.1  0.496  2.331 
  2004  RQ109  1.214  4.9  0.27835  20.6  0.603  3.057 
  2004  RD84  1.064  2.577  0.2988  19  0.416  1.821 
  2004  RC80  1.05  2.054  0.04494  24.4  0.323  1.552 
  2004  RS25  1.107  3.148  0.11512  20.4  0.48  2.127 
  2004  RB11  1.042  3.181  0.03935  23.7  0.507  2.111 
  2004  RA11  1.096  2.553  0.39574  18.8  0.399  1.824 
  2004  RQ10  1.041  2.689  0.03344  20.9  0.442  1.865 
  2004  RK9  1.055  2.62  0.111  21.2  0.426  1.837 
  2004  RJ9  1.047  4.518  0.05153  19.9  0.624  2.783 
  2004  RV2  1.077  1.704  0.09846  20.7  0.226  1.391 
  2004  QU24  1.283  5.37  0.54011  16  0.614  3.326 
  2004  QN22  1.018  3.976  0.01407  24.2  0.592  2.497 
  2004  QG20  1.288  3.395  0.29656  19.2  0.45  2.342 
  2004  QD17  1.167  2.311  0.17826  19.8  0.329  1.739 
  2004  QC17  1.21  3.096  0.23296  18.7  0.438  2.153 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2004  QB17  1.135  3.444  0.15712  18.6  0.504  2.29 
  2004  QJ13  1.051  3.004  0.04205  25.3  0.482  2.028 
  2004  QN5  1.255  2.963  0.24461  21.3  0.405  2.109 
  2004  QZ2  1.14  3.377  0.15459  18.1  0.495  2.259 
  2004  QA2  1.029  3.217  0.03112  22.3  0.515  2.123 
  2004  PD97  1.158  3.415  0.14581  21.6  0.494  2.286 
  2004  PB97  1.034  1.435  0.02931  25.3  0.163  1.234 
  2004  PS92  1.292  3.882  0.51908  18.9  0.501  2.587 
  2004  PS42  1.034  1.451  0.04888  21.1  0.168  1.243 
  2004  PY27  1.294  3.319  0.29429  20.8  0.439  2.306 
  2004  PX27  1.157  3.404  0.23232  18.5  0.493  2.281 
  2004  PG20  1.056  1.825  0.04908  24.5  0.267  1.441 
  2004  PF20  1.106  2.031  0.11207  22.5  0.295  1.569 
  2004  PE20  1.26  3.165  0.25275  20.2  0.431  2.212 
  2004  PM2  1.223  3.923  0.22709  19.3  0.525  2.573 
  2004  PJ  1.055  3.453  0.06117  22.8  0.532  2.254 
  2004  OF6  1.284  3.093  0.32145  21.1  0.413  2.188 
  2004  NC9  1.194  4.191  0.42343  17.2  0.557  2.693 
  2004  NM8  1.215  3.799  0.20817  21.7  0.515  2.507 
  2004  NU7  1.026  3.438  0.01483  24.4  0.54  2.232 
  2004  NF3  1.074  3.078  0.05931  24.5  0.483  2.076 
  2004  ME6  1.006  3.726  0.02916  22.6  0.575  2.366 
  2004  MO4  1.039  2.359  0.02471  24.9  0.388  1.699 
  2004  MP3  1.249  3.952  0.25124  18.5  0.52  2.6 
  2004  MO1  1.048  3.702  0.07139  23.2  0.559  2.375 
  2004  MC  1.007  3.879  0.00769  23.3  0.588  2.443 
  2004  LA10  1.043  3.953  0.03019  25.1  0.582  2.498 
  2004  LA6  1.091  2.294  0.23752  21.8  0.356  1.692 
  2004  LZ5  1.177  4.029  0.23533  18.2  0.548  2.603 
  2004  LX5  1.028  1.581  0.0149  25.6  0.212  1.305 
  2004  LU3  1.019  3.331  0.06921  18.4  0.532  2.175 
  2004  LD2  1.257  4.43  0.27426  21.2  0.558  2.844 
  2004  LK  1.019  3.161  0.06944  22.7  0.513  2.09 
  2004  LH  1.187  2.342  0.18859  18.8  0.327  1.764 
  2004  KG17  1.025  1.995  0.01287  27.1  0.321  1.51 
  2004  KE17  1.057  4.491  0.04553  21.5  0.619  2.774 
  2004  KF15  1.181  2.479  0.19203  20.8  0.355  1.83 
  2004  KZ14  1.056  2.018  0.10349  20.7  0.313  1.537 
  2004  KN10  1.107  2.944  0.10213  23.6  0.454  2.025 
  2004  KF1  1.186  3.054  0.17409  20.8  0.441  2.12 
  2004  KE1  1.064  1.535  0.07374  21.6  0.181  1.299 
  2004  KD1  1.152  2.288  0.13855  18  0.33  1.72 
  2004  KA  1.03  2.979  0.12606  20.8  0.486  2.004 
  2004  JU20  1.083  1.904  0.09897  25.3  0.275  1.494 
  2004  JO12  1.035  1.739  0.03404  23.8  0.254  1.387 
  2004  JB12  1.057  3.32  0.06661  18.9  0.517  2.189 
  2004  JR1  1.169  4.6  0.16251  17.6  0.595  2.885 
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  2004  HS56  1.03  1.849  0.03162  22.4  0.285  1.439 
  2004  HB39  1.052  2.806  0.09428  22.7  0.454  1.929 
  2004  HT38  1.08  2.384  0.09919  23.6  0.376  1.732 
  2004  HH33  1.216  1.527  0.20989  20.8  0.113  1.372 
  2004  HC33  1.007  2.533  0.0183  26  0.431  1.77 
  2004  HH20  1.032  2.527  0.03077  25.1  0.42  1.78 
  2004  HO1  1.056  3.357  0.33226  18.5  0.521  2.207 
  2004  HL  1.016  2.093  0.01508  26.5  0.346  1.554 
  2004  HD  1.032  2.807  0.03215  24.8  0.462  1.919 
  2004  GD28  1.157  4.166  0.44119  17.3  0.565  2.662 
  2004  GD2  1.012  3.052  0.021  24.3  0.502  2.032 
  2004  GY  1.133  1.764  0.12349  20.2  0.218  1.448 
  2004  GA  1.028  4.608  0.05308  20.1  0.635  2.818 
  2004  FC32  1.27  2.575  0.25728  18.8  0.339  1.922 
  2004  FB18  1.052  2.281  0.05932  24  0.369  1.666 
  2004  FN17  1.094  2.164  0.1091  21  0.328  1.629 
  2004  FB16  1.05  2.532  0.05255  25.5  0.414  1.791 
  2004  FH11  1.252  3.262  0.46306  16.8  0.445  2.257 
  2004  FZ5  1.283  3.028  0.35305  20.1  0.405  2.156 
  2004  FK5  1.006  3.485  0.01159  26.8  0.552  2.245 
  2004  FP4  1.06  2.935  0.05462  23.1  0.469  1.998 
  2004  FE4  1.064  1.717  0.07663  23.3  0.235  1.391 
  2004  FD4  1.278  2.504  0.40835  21.3  0.324  1.891 
  2004  FK2  1.024  1.642  0.03772  24.3  0.232  1.333 
  2004  FG1  1.252  2.251  0.26708  19.4  0.285  1.751 
  2004  FE  1.148  3.544  0.18163  21.9  0.511  2.346 
  2004  ET21  1.104  2.161  0.27577  20.5  0.324  1.633 
  2004  EO20  1.152  1.287  0.16194  22.1  0.055  1.219 
  2004  EN20  1.158  2.574  0.34525  18.4  0.379  1.866 
  2004  EJ1  1.066  2.756  0.07715  21.7  0.442  1.911 
  2004  EB  1.09  5.183  0.22244  17.2  0.653  3.136 
  2004  DK1  1.087  2.511  0.08329  21.2  0.396  1.799 
  2004  CP49  1.116  3.377  0.30395  19.3  0.503  2.247 
  2004  CD39  1.201  3.772  0.21376  20.4  0.517  2.487 
  2004  CR2  1.15  3.79  0.14845  19.2  0.534  2.47 
  2004  CS  1.136  2.584  0.14815  20.2  0.389  1.86 
  2004  CQ  1.025  3.049  0.03807  24.7  0.497  2.037 
  2004  BG121  1.06  2.165  0.07214  18.9  0.343  1.613 
  2004  BS102  1.049  2.367  0.19264  19.6  0.386  1.708 
  2004  BJ86  1.177  2.333  0.34234  18.9  0.33  1.755 
  2004  BE86  1.099  1.783  0.10725  20.9  0.237  1.441 
  2004  BE85  1.29  4.092  0.54235  17.9  0.521  2.691 
  2004  BB75  1.021  2.674  0.03556  23.1  0.447  1.848 
  2004  BX58  1.065  4.582  0.08972  19.7  0.623  2.823 
  2004  BY21  1.271  3.57  0.27432  18.8  0.475  2.421 
  2004  BZ18  1.05  2.683  0.22962  21.2  0.437  1.867 
  2004  BW18  1.025  1.72  0.0459  22.5  0.253  1.372 
  2004  BK11  1.255  2.874  0.27547  22.4  0.392  2.065 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2004  BJ11  1.054  2.448  0.09086  21.7  0.398  1.751 
  2004  BF11  1.124  2.661  0.14023  24  0.406  1.892 
  2004  BE11  1.044  1.459  0.08461  19.3  0.166  1.252 
  2004  BW1  1.108  3.533  0.13068  19.4  0.522  2.321 
  2004  AM  1.193  1.95  0.3778  19.3  0.241  1.572 
  2004  AH  1.151  2.841  0.26003  19.3  0.423  1.996 
  2004  XP164  1.279  3.076  0.37748  17.4  0.413  2.177 
  2004  HM1  1.287  4.233  0.27506  16.6  0.534  2.76 
  2004  FU64  1.163  2.512  0.34223  17.6  0.367  1.837 
  2004  RM251  1.049  4.175  0.24043  17.7  0.598  2.612 
  2004  HE62  1.107  4.008  0.11511  17.3  0.567  2.557 
  2004  BD85  1.28  1.94  0.39061  18.7  0.205  1.61 
  2004  TY16  1.181  2.786  0.19334  17  0.404  1.984 
  2004  QE20  1.196  1.814  0.22099  20.1  0.205  1.505 
  2004  PT42  1.175  2.85  0.16446  17.2  0.416  2.013 
Doloreshill  2004  MF6  1.275  2.954  0.27828  20  0.397  2.115 
  2004  LZ11  1.286  2.953  0.29193  19.3  0.393  2.12 
  2004  FN18  1.005  2.397  0.11272  17.6  0.409  1.701 
  2004  YJ32  1.199  3.848  0.22231  16.3  0.525  2.524 
  2004  JW6  1.149  3.159  0.1384  17.9  0.466  2.154 
  2004  PP97  1.014  1.954  0.14674  18.3  0.316  1.484 
  2004  DV24  1.011  1.835  0.00719  16.6  0.29  1.423 
  2005  YS165  1.093  2.843  0.11414  17.4  0.445  1.968 
  2005  YT128  1.122  4.109  0.32131  20.8  0.571  2.615 
  2005  YW93  1.184  4.09  0.2185  19.4  0.551  2.637 
  2005  YV55  1.19  2.726  0.22216  20.2  0.392  1.958 
  2005  YT55  1.215  3.288  0.22639  20.6  0.46  2.252 
  2005  YP55  1.286  3.28  0.3174  19  0.437  2.283 
  2005  YY36  1.146  2.643  0.16777  19.5  0.395  1.894 
  2005  YT8  1.035  4.046  0.0589  21.6  0.593  2.54 
  2005  YN3  1.128  2.414  0.39952  19.4  0.363  1.771 
  2005  YC  1.254  5.214  0.39756  18.5  0.612  3.234 
  2005  XW77  1.041  2.19  0.22067  20.8  0.356  1.616 
  2005  XP66  1.167  4.424  0.18959  20.1  0.583  2.795 
  2005  XK8  1.202  2.02  0.22021  19.8  0.254  1.611 
  2005  XM4  1.22  1.388  0.23824  19.6  0.064  1.304 
  2005  XL4  1.234  4.458  0.2506  22.8  0.566  2.846 
  2005  XE1  1.23  1.669  0.28833  18.9  0.152  1.449 
  2005  XD1  1.124  2.117  0.15046  19.4  0.307  1.62 
  2005  XC1  1.036  3.99  0.05575  23.9  0.588  2.513 
  2005  XY  1.269  3.045  0.54987  18.7  0.412  2.157 
  2005  XN  1.024  2.489  0.06116  24.3  0.417  1.756 
  2005  XC  1.004  3.566  0.01502  22.7  0.56  2.285 
  2005  WP57  1.095  2.62  0.11031  23.3  0.41  1.857 
  2005  WH57  1.079  2.337  0.2153  19.3  0.368  1.708 
  2005  WF57  1.113  4.188  0.18224  19.1  0.58  2.65 
  2005  WZ55  1.049  2.389  0.0672  24.4  0.39  1.719 
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  2005  WE55  1.049  2.437  0.31321  21.6  0.398  1.743 
  2005  WR54  1.151  2.735  0.19479  19.2  0.408  1.943 
  2005  WH4  1.131  3.317  0.15911  20.6  0.491  2.224 
  2005  WF4  1.158  1.861  0.18222  22.8  0.233  1.509 
  2005  WP3  1.031  3.546  0.04388  24.9  0.55  2.289 
  2005  WO3  1.015  2.135  0.10765  23.5  0.355  1.575 
  2005  WM3  1.016  4.337  0.03005  27.7  0.621  2.676 
  2005  WC2  1.208  3.76  0.23902  22.4  0.514  2.484 
  2005  WD1  1.226  3.173  0.49558  16.7  0.442  2.2 
  2005  WZ  1.07  3.754  0.07734  22.8  0.557  2.412 
  2005  WF  1.029  2.528  0.04165  23.7  0.422  1.779 
  2005  WD  1.008  3.573  0.03758  22  0.56  2.291 
  2005  VO118  1.081  4.023  0.09081  24.6  0.576  2.552 
  2005  VY17  1.113  2.856  0.29343  17.3  0.439  1.984 
  2005  VD7  1.017  3.617  0.02265  22.4  0.561  2.317 
  2005  VB7  1.176  2.428  0.23034  19.5  0.347  1.802 
  2005  VT5  1.071  1.829  0.1127  19.3  0.261  1.45 
  2005  VS5  1.052  2.869  0.17222  22  0.463  1.961 
  2005  VZ3  1.126  3.196  0.23127  20.7  0.479  2.161 
  2005  VY3  1.095  2.249  0.28642  20.4  0.345  1.672 
  2005  VT2  1.011  3.635  0.03049  22.6  0.565  2.323 
  2005  VC2  1.141  4.39  0.15931  17.8  0.587  2.765 
  2005  VM1  1.189  1.767  0.20668  22.8  0.195  1.478 
  2005  VJ1  1.251  4.029  0.33351  19.9  0.526  2.64 
  2005  VH1  1.133  4.794  0.16276  23  0.618  2.963 
  2005  VF  1.015  3.112  0.0483  24.7  0.508  2.063 
  2005  VA  1.067  3.886  0.07247  23  0.569  2.477 
  2005  UO157  1.131  4.5  0.14732  18.3  0.598  2.815 
  2005  UW64  1.198  3.363  0.21026  18.9  0.475  2.281 
  2005  UR64  1.062  2.333  0.09191  23.6  0.374  1.698 
  2005  UQ64  1.016  2.209  0.02024  24.4  0.37  1.612 
  2005  UP64  1.128  4.244  0.37256  19.5  0.58  2.686 
  2005  UF7  1.033  3.94  0.04329  26.5  0.584  2.486 
  2005  UU6  1.236  3.721  0.2464  22.9  0.501  2.478 
  2005  UZ5  1.068  1.749  0.09889  23.6  0.242  1.408 
  2005  UY5  1.299  3.157  0.31945  18.6  0.417  2.228 
  2005  UN5  1.041  2.558  0.05634  24.4  0.421  1.799 
  2005  UK5  1.299  1.557  0.29187  22.8  0.09  1.428 
  2005  UH5  1.015  1.479  0.0403  25.4  0.186  1.247 
  2005  UF5  1.133  3.972  0.13743  24.3  0.556  2.552 
  2005  UW3  1.027  1.35  0.03584  24.2  0.136  1.189 
  2005  UG3  1.002  3.074  0.02609  25.5  0.508  2.038 
  2005  UF3  1.141  2.577  0.21365  21.8  0.386  1.859 
  2005  UE3  1.241  3.259  0.24847  20.1  0.448  2.25 
  2005  UL1  1.052  1.683  0.09695  23  0.231  1.367 
  2005  UJ1  1.193  2.794  0.27815  20.4  0.402  1.993 
  2005  UG1  1.113  2.769  0.12084  22.5  0.426  1.941 
  2005  UF1  1.242  3.129  0.25273  20.5  0.432  2.185 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2005  UC1  1.11  1.825  0.29274  21.8  0.244  1.467 
  2005  UQ  1.017  3.466  0.03821  24.1  0.546  2.241 
  2005  UN  1.015  1.797  0.02071  25.9  0.278  1.406 
  2005  UH  1.006  2.246  0.06135  23.5  0.381  1.626 
  2005  UG  1.127  4.491  0.13804  23.7  0.599  2.809 
  2005  UE  1.28  3.484  0.29259  20.5  0.463  2.382 
  2005  UC  1.115  3.466  0.1253  20  0.513  2.291 
  2005  TZ51  1.214  3.038  0.27048  17.9  0.429  2.126 
  2005  TY51  1.141  4.048  0.15714  17.6  0.56  2.594 
  2005  TF49  1.015  1.068  0.03187  19.1  0.025  1.042 
  2005  TD49  1.014  4.362  0.01923  26.4  0.623  2.688 
  2005  TS45  1.285  3.416  0.29037  21.3  0.453  2.35 
  2005  TR45  1.067  3.274  0.10816  18.8  0.509  2.17 
  2005  TP45  1.131  1.971  0.1363  21  0.271  1.551 
  2005  TO45  1.237  3.902  0.24089  19.8  0.519  2.569 
  2005  TF45  1.071  1.242  0.07816  23  0.074  1.156 
  2005  TE45  1.104  2.571  0.11382  23.4  0.399  1.838 
  2005  TR15  1.203  3.032  0.19851  18.6  0.432  2.117 
  2005  TR  1.085  2.03  0.08934  23.1  0.303  1.557 
  2005  TN  1.234  2.296  0.28365  22.4  0.301  1.765 
  2005  TL  1.287  3.449  0.28283  21.2  0.456  2.368 
  2005  TG  1.229  4.11  0.24376  18.5  0.54  2.67 
  2005  TF  1.07  2.858  0.09361  20.1  0.455  1.964 
  2005  TC  1.038  6.301  0.09704  23.7  0.717  3.669 
  2005  SD71  1.076  2.011  0.08404  23.2  0.303  1.543 
  2005  SC71  1.179  2.641  0.33245  18.3  0.383  1.91 
  2005  SA71  1.023  2.213  0.2091  18.7  0.368  1.618 
  2005  SY70  1.051  3.504  0.05307  26.8  0.539  2.277 
  2005  SJ26  1.036  3.916  0.04344  23.9  0.582  2.476 
  2005  SG26  1.01  3.945  0.03441  25.9  0.592  2.477 
  2005  SM25  1.1  3.204  0.11072  19.5  0.489  2.152 
  2005  SG19  1.081  4.17  0.28312  16.6  0.588  2.626 
  2005  SX4  1.162  4.297  0.18565  20.4  0.574  2.73 
  2005  SW4  1.25  4.159  0.2902  20  0.538  2.705 
  2005  ST4  1.044  3.674  0.08009  22.4  0.557  2.359 
  2005  SR4  1.148  3.22  0.14902  23.5  0.474  2.184 
  2005  SR1  1.117  3.327  0.10994  19.2  0.497  2.222 
  2005  SQ1  1.021  2.451  0.02569  25.3  0.412  1.736 
  2005  RC34  1.001  3.122  0.03867  19.7  0.514  2.062 
  2005  RO33  1.139  2.712  0.16524  20.1  0.408  1.926 
  2005  RN33  1.289  2.179  0.32134  19.6  0.257  1.734 
  2005  RQ6  1.125  3.887  0.13422  18.8  0.551  2.506 
  2005  RK3  1.016  1.479  0.01591  23.7  0.185  1.248 
  2005  RJ3  1.074  3.509  0.07296  23.4  0.531  2.292 
  2005  RD1  1.298  3.978  0.28352  18.4  0.508  2.638 
  2005  RB  1.155  3.236  0.16155  20.2  0.474  2.196 
  2005  QS176  1.164  3.272  0.1712  21.6  0.475  2.218 
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  2005  QX151  1.211  3.383  0.23158  20.5  0.473  2.297 
  2005  QF88  1.219  3.292  0.21541  20.7  0.46  2.256 
  2005  QR87  1.225  3.048  0.22121  20.4  0.426  2.136 
  2005  QP87  1.017  1.449  0.00737  27.7  0.175  1.233 
  2005  QL76  1.234  3.189  0.25286  19.9  0.442  2.211 
  2005  QG30  1.223  1.884  0.21491  22.3  0.213  1.553 
  2005  QQ11  1.188  3.153  0.19936  22.4  0.453  2.17 
  2005  QO11  1.203  3.696  0.33815  19  0.509  2.449 
  2005  QN11  1.296  3.052  0.30389  20  0.404  2.174 
  2005  QS10  1.259  3.58  0.32059  18.8  0.48  2.42 
  2005  QA5  1.096  1.683  0.15087  21.3  0.211  1.39 
  2005  QL  1.214  3.675  0.29006  18.8  0.503  2.445 
  2005  PX16  1.19  3.172  0.18591  21.7  0.454  2.181 
  2005  PA5  1.022  1.621  0.0342  21.7  0.227  1.321 
  2005  PP  1.152  3.231  0.13809  21.4  0.474  2.191 
  2005  OK3  1.068  3.22  0.05808  21.5  0.502  2.144 
  2005  OJ3  1.253  4.168  0.26241  18.2  0.538  2.711 
  2005  OH3  1.029  1.445  0.01564  26  0.168  1.237 
  2005  OG3  1.115  3.23  0.11521  19.7  0.487  2.172 
  2005  OT2  1.067  3.031  0.10933  21.9  0.479  2.049 
  2005  OX1  1.088  3.245  0.1025  22.4  0.498  2.167 
  2005  OV1  1.076  2.035  0.14219  21.7  0.308  1.556 
  2005  OW  1.062  4.27  0.05855  20.8  0.602  2.666 
  2005  NY39  1.163  3.353  0.14894  20.7  0.485  2.258 
  2005  ND7  1.018  2.91  0.19196  17.8  0.482  1.964 
  2005  NQ1  1.107  3.081  0.09238  24  0.471  2.094 
  2005  NP1  1.285  2.369  0.37155  18.6  0.297  1.827 
  2005  MP13  1.18  3.121  0.16553  19.8  0.451  2.151 
  2005  MN13  1.1  2.214  0.13368  20.8  0.336  1.657 
  2005  MM13  1.155  2.234  0.31088  19.1  0.318  1.695 
  2005  MG5  1.163  3.129  0.17125  20.5  0.458  2.146 
  2005  ME5  1.054  2.97  0.03974  25.5  0.476  2.012 
  2005  MX1  1.013  3.358  0.05245  19.4  0.537  2.186 
  2005  MW1  1.255  4.474  0.2452  19.5  0.562  2.865 
  2005  MR1  1.044  3.67  0.06586  23.3  0.557  2.357 
  2005  MC  1.066  4.167  0.2239  16.4  0.593  2.617 
  2005  LZ42  1.058  3.139  0.0799  21.3  0.496  2.098 
  2005  LA37  1.277  2.079  0.32063  20.4  0.239  1.678 
  2005  LY19  1.218  1.986  0.33401  16.4  0.24  1.602 
  2005  LW19  1.168  3.123  0.15305  19.6  0.456  2.146 
  2005  LH8  1.205  4.121  0.19058  18.6  0.547  2.663 
  2005  LV7  1.075  3.782  0.06206  19.2  0.557  2.428 
  2005  LV3  1.24  3.177  0.2277  19.7  0.439  2.208 
  2005  LS3  1.09  1.889  0.17904  19.6  0.268  1.49 
  2005  LO3  1.186  3.3  0.1717  23.6  0.471  2.243 
  2005  LM3  1.024  3.104  0.01105  26.5  0.504  2.064 
  2005  LC  1.018  1.249  0.01656  26.8  0.102  1.133 
  2005  KP9  1.069  2.275  0.15705  21.1  0.36  1.672 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2005  JU108  1.144  3.106  0.17426  19.7  0.461  2.125 
  2005  JZ93  1.002  1.638  0.00689  24.7  0.241  1.32 
  2005  JJ91  1.126  4.461  0.14718  21.5  0.597  2.794 
  2005  JT81  1.187  4.513  0.18076  20  0.584  2.85 
  2005  JP81  1.134  2.346  0.22947  19.8  0.348  1.74 
  2005  JY80  1.143  4.121  0.17022  16.7  0.566  2.632 
  2005  JF46  1.252  4.136  0.25424  19  0.535  2.694 
  2005  JB46  1.043  1.628  0.03394  24.4  0.219  1.335 
  2005  JA45  1.037  4.506  0.03233  24.6  0.626  2.771 
  2005  JA22  1.077  1.993  0.19104  18.4  0.298  1.535 
  2005  JF21  1.033  3.416  0.04723  17  0.536  2.224 
  2005  JN3  1.063  3.289  0.11128  20.9  0.511  2.176 
  2005  JV1  1.022  2.8  0.01695  25.7  0.465  1.911 
  2005  JS1  1.29  3.136  0.2954  19.6  0.417  2.213 
  2005  JB  1.096  2.911  0.09019  18.9  0.453  2.003 
  2005  HA8  1.243  2.238  0.2284  19.2  0.286  1.74 
  2005  HD4  1.062  1.819  0.05814  20.6  0.262  1.44 
  2005  HB4  1.046  1.664  0.03866  24.4  0.228  1.355 
  2005  HM3  1.158  2.198  0.15497  19.8  0.31  1.678 
  2005  HC3  1.24  2.725  0.43299  17.8  0.375  1.982 
  2005  HB  1.062  4.342  0.12119  21.1  0.607  2.702 
  2005  GM162  1.135  3.354  0.12639  22.4  0.494  2.245 
  2005  GC141  1.193  1.786  0.23664  19.5  0.199  1.49 
  2005  GP128  1.151  4.262  0.1618  18.6  0.575  2.706 
  2005  GX119  1.007  2.526  0.01448  25.7  0.43  1.766 
  2005  GW119  1.258  2.023  0.27325  18.5  0.233  1.641 
  2005  GX110  1.09  2.08  0.11418  24.3  0.312  1.585 
  2005  GG81  1.056  3.172  0.05302  25.2  0.5  2.114 
  2005  GF81  1.074  3.766  0.10199  20  0.556  2.42 
  2005  GP33  1.011  3.808  0.05344  24.3  0.58  2.409 
  2005  GN22  1.02  1.557  0.02027  26.5  0.208  1.289 
  2005  GM22  1.07  2.851  0.09396  22.9  0.454  1.96 
  2005  GQ21  1.119  1.734  0.16091  18.3  0.216  1.426 
  2005  GP21  1.014  1.602  0.01486  19.9  0.225  1.308 
  2005  GL1  1.216  3.803  0.21328  22.7  0.515  2.51 
  2005  GT  1.015  2.15  0.0348  26.9  0.359  1.582 
  2005  GJ  1.053  2.571  0.05252  22.2  0.419  1.812 
  2005  GH  1.137  3.217  0.24584  21.2  0.478  2.177 
  2005  FJ  1.02  1.162  0.04175  24.6  0.065  1.091 
  2005  FE  1.19  3.468  0.18798  21.1  0.489  2.329 
  2005  ED318  1.02  2.676  0.01097  20.8  0.448  1.848 
  2005  EE224  1.094  2.396  0.12091  19.9  0.373  1.745 
  2005  EY223  1.168  2.436  0.2137  18.7  0.352  1.802 
  2005  EZ169  1.033  1.599  0.03959  24.9  0.215  1.316 
  2005  EY169  1.003  1.613  0.0697  22.2  0.233  1.308 
  2005  EX169  1.098  1.37  0.10475  23.8  0.11  1.234 
  2005  EW169  1.024  3.758  0.04317  19.1  0.572  2.391 
  2005  EL169  1.202  1.683  0.20991  21.9  0.167  1.442 Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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  2005  ET95  1.085  2.638  0.29761  20.7  0.417  1.861 
  2005  ER95  1.028  1.418  0.03274  25.4  0.159  1.223 
  2005  EK94  1.032  2.926  0.04366  19.3  0.479  1.979 
  2005  EJ94  1.141  3.805  0.17912  19.2  0.539  2.473 
  2005  EC71  1.093  3.28  0.1003  22.9  0.5  2.187 
  2005  EQ70  1.263  3.545  0.2935  19.9  0.474  2.404 
  2005  EO70  1.096  5.185  0.13968  20.8  0.651  3.141 
  2005  EN70  1.127  2.441  0.13649  20.6  0.368  1.784 
  2005  EO30  1.028  1.424  0.03836  23  0.162  1.226 
  2005  EN30  1.176  2.127  0.19145  23  0.288  1.652 
  2005  EB30  1.082  3.236  0.09399  22.9  0.499  2.159 
  2005  EZ29  1.081  2.678  0.09446  20.3  0.425  1.879 
  2005  EZ  1.2  3.477  0.28071  19.3  0.487  2.339 
  2005  EJ  1.222  1.668  0.32377  19.9  0.154  1.445 
  2005  EF  1.006  1.408  0.14689  20.7  0.167  1.207 
  2005  CV38  1.065  2.715  0.16313  20.2  0.437  1.89 
  2005  CR37  1.013  2.796  0.06228  18.8  0.468  1.904 
  2005  CA7  1.023  2.632  0.03772  24.8  0.44  1.828 
  2005  CS6  1.185  4.053  0.45085  18.1  0.547  2.619 
  2005  CM  1.03  3.522  0.04673  23.7  0.548  2.276 
  2005  CK  1.004  1.201  0.02285  26  0.09  1.102 
  2005  BL1  1.029  1.993  0.05276  24.6  0.319  1.511 
  2005  BD  1.022  2.823  0.03804  25.1  0.469  1.922 
  2005  AT42  1.095  4.606  0.16438  16.5  0.616  2.85 
  2005  AQ19  1.231  2.242  0.26093  21.4  0.291  1.737 
  2005  AO19  1.108  2.265  0.12453  24.2  0.343  1.686 
  2005  AN19  1.286  2.583  0.39188  18  0.335  1.935 
  2005  AJ3  1.019  1.533  0.0571  23.2  0.201  1.276 
  2005  AD3  1.204  3.614  0.33253  17.2  0.5  2.409 
  2005  AB  1.111  5.328  0.17191  17.5  0.655  3.22 
  2005  WS55  1.108  2.95  0.14677  16  0.454  2.029 
  2005  LR3  1.099  2.208  0.13924  17.1  0.335  1.654 
  2005  EA60  1.209  3.824  0.22784  19.4  0.519  2.517 
  2005  UP156  1.125  3.108  0.13502  16.9  0.468  2.117 
  2005  TJ174  1.221  3.255  0.22689  16.5  0.454  2.238 
  2005  CA  1.123  4.336  0.15156  15.5  0.588  2.73 
  2005  EC224  1.26  2.852  0.25219  18.1  0.387  2.056 
  2005  YW55  1.233  2.041  0.29289  19.3  0.247  1.637 
  2005  CP  1.003  2.137  0.17639  20.9  0.361  1.57 
  2005  CO  1.214  2.04  0.25594  20.5  0.254  1.627 
  2005  UK  1.119  2.654  0.12958  17.4  0.407  1.887 
Vinciguerra  2005  BX26  1.155  2.255  0.19544  18.5  0.323  1.705 
  2005  CK38  1.252  3.012  0.25898  17.3  0.413  2.132 
  2006  YH14  1.072  2.633  0.08884  23.2  0.421  1.853 
  2006  YD12  1.021  2.699  0.04247  22.6  0.451  1.86 
  2006  YY2  1.182  2.802  0.38347  17.8  0.407  1.992 
  2006  YR2  1.037  3.923  0.05112  21.5  0.582  2.48 
  2006  YJ2  1.031  2.51  0.09304  22.1  0.418  1.77 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2006  YH2  1.085  2.868  0.10261  25.4  0.451  1.977 
  2006  YU1  1.189  4.12  0.20668  20.9  0.552  2.655 
  2006  YN  1.145  1.81  0.21759  19.6  0.225  1.478 
  2006  YB  1.006  3.108  0.05158  24.1  0.511  2.057 
  2006  YA  1  2.475  0.0472  23.1  0.424  1.738 
  2006  XQ4  1.037  1.91  0.05305  26.1  0.296  1.473 
  2006  XN4  1.026  4.197  0.04584  24  0.607  2.612 
  2006  XY2  1.147  1.905  0.18231  22.5  0.248  1.526 
  2006  XJ2  1.093  2.238  0.1163  24  0.344  1.666 
  2006  XG2  1.153  1.53  0.14087  20.4  0.14  1.342 
  2006  XF2  1.115  3.263  0.22063  19.7  0.491  2.189 
  2006  XJ1  1.06  1.465  0.11359  21.5  0.161  1.262 
  2006  XH1  1.292  3.433  0.30859  20.5  0.453  2.362 
  2006  XG1  1.001  3.921  0.02262  18.5  0.593  2.461 
  2006  XX  1.062  4.014  0.08127  23.4  0.582  2.538 
  2006  XW  1.061  1.143  0.05952  23.6  0.037  1.102 
  2006  WH130  1.069  1.54  0.09023  23.8  0.181  1.304 
  2006  WG129  1.013  2.509  0.0619  20.4  0.425  1.761 
  2006  WF129  1.242  4.052  0.36289  19.2  0.531  2.647 
  2006  WB30  1.05  2.232  0.06446  25.9  0.36  1.641 
  2006  WU29  1.242  3.999  0.28289  18.3  0.526  2.62 
  2006  WT29  1.18  2.254  0.21432  19.6  0.313  1.717 
  2006  WR29  1.072  3.665  0.0962  24.1  0.547  2.368 
  2006  WL3  1.031  1.685  0.15983  20  0.241  1.358 
  2006  WK3  1.148  2.145  0.2776  20.1  0.303  1.646 
  2006  WJ3  1.009  2.496  0.02032  20  0.424  1.752 
  2006  WB3  1.035  1.702  0.0484  24.4  0.244  1.369 
  2006  WZ2  1.135  2.254  0.27659  16.9  0.33  1.694 
  2006  WU1  1.104  3.356  0.1416  22.8  0.505  2.23 
  2006  WQ1  1.12  1.829  0.121  19.4  0.24  1.475 
  2006  WO1  1.299  4.228  0.33629  18.8  0.53  2.763 
  2006  WN1  1.153  3.046  0.1624  18.8  0.451  2.1 
  2006  WU  1.153  2.426  0.15903  19.1  0.356  1.79 
  2006  WA  1.28  1.706  0.42466  19.9  0.143  1.493 
  2006  VB45  1.021  1.423  0.03424  24.7  0.164  1.222 
  2006  VY13  1.171  4.764  0.18276  17.3  0.605  2.967 
  2006  VP13  1.009  1.342  0.06824  23.6  0.142  1.176 
  2006  VD13  1.005  2.891  0.03179  18.9  0.484  1.948 
  2006  VB3  1.282  4.387  0.29718  21.2  0.548  2.835 
  2006  VU2  1.046  3.579  0.05445  26  0.548  2.313 
  2006  VD2  1.03  4.124  0.11398  19.2  0.6  2.577 
  2006  VC2  1.217  2.993  0.26951  21.1  0.422  2.105 
  2006  VA2  1.298  3.715  0.32134  20.9  0.482  2.507 
  2006  VJ  1.172  1.764  0.18566  21.7  0.202  1.468 
  2006  UR217  1.061  4.414  0.18371  19.8  0.613  2.738 
  2006  UQ217  1.245  4.762  0.36727  16.5  0.586  3.004 
  2006  UN216  1.223  5.187  0.24152  18.9  0.618  3.205 
  2006  UM216  1.287  4.076  0.32901  16  0.52  2.682 Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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  2006  UH185  1.056  2.43  0.07234  25.1  0.394  1.743 
  2006  UE185  1.17  3.438  0.17667  24.5  0.492  2.304 
  2006  UG64  1.196  2.6  0.20602  18.6  0.37  1.898 
  2006  UF63  1.176  3.39  0.33439  20.2  0.485  2.283 
  2006  UD63  1.263  3.179  0.26408  19.3  0.431  2.221 
  2006  UC63  1.057  1.888  0.08252  19.8  0.282  1.473 
  2006  UT17  1.078  3.612  0.09508  24.2  0.54  2.345 
  2006  UQ17  1.005  2.242  0.02186  21.9  0.381  1.623 
  2006  UD17  1.114  5.318  0.16053  18.4  0.654  3.216 
  2006  UB17  1.022  1.258  0.02901  26.3  0.103  1.14 
  2006  UY16  1.024  3.425  0.02907  24.5  0.54  2.224 
  2006  UX1  1.036  2.386  0.25733  22.1  0.395  1.711 
  2006  UR  1.116  2.923  0.13571  19.2  0.448  2.019 
  2006  UP  1.108  2.067  0.11312  22.9  0.302  1.587 
  2006  UN  1.037  2.061  0.04414  25.5  0.331  1.549 
  2006  UM  1.029  3.438  0.15067  18.5  0.539  2.233 
  2006  UL  1.025  1.783  0.03304  26.1  0.27  1.404 
  2006  UJ  1.129  3.328  0.13135  23.9  0.493  2.229 
  2006  UF  1.155  3.757  0.1717  22.3  0.53  2.456 
  2006  UE  1.196  4.419  0.20354  22.5  0.574  2.808 
  2006  TT7  1.249  4.466  0.32819  19.5  0.563  2.857 
  2006  TJ7  1.03  2.535  0.03928  24.2  0.422  1.782 
  2006  TB7  1.002  1.501  0.01768  23.7  0.199  1.251 
  2006  TF1  1.011  4.118  0.06954  20.5  0.606  2.565 
  2006  TD1  1.211  2.576  0.22384  21  0.361  1.894 
  2006  TC1  1.074  2.366  0.09168  18.9  0.376  1.72 
  2006  TO  1.172  3.664  0.18459  22.9  0.515  2.418 
  2006  TN  1.022  2.101  0.09865  19.6  0.345  1.562 
  2006  TK  1.056  3.268  0.11219  19.7  0.511  2.162 
  2006  TF  1.021  3.617  0.02101  25.9  0.56  2.319 
  2006  TB  1.055  2.069  0.04967  20  0.325  1.562 
  2006  SF281  1.013  1.973  0.01283  27.1  0.322  1.493 
  2006  SZ217  1.195  2.151  0.21753  17.4  0.286  1.673 
  2006  SY217  1.081  2.775  0.12543  21.6  0.439  1.928 
  2006  SP198  1.249  4.616  0.27643  21.8  0.574  2.932 
  2006  SM198  1.103  3.632  0.10482  21.6  0.534  2.367 
  2006  SL198  1.127  2.472  0.15964  18.4  0.374  1.8 
  2006  SJ198  1.137  3.043  0.15501  17.9  0.456  2.09 
  2006  SV189  1.285  2.501  0.3724  19.8  0.321  1.893 
  2006  SB142  1.269  3.202  0.27635  22.1  0.432  2.236 
  2006  SR134  1.011  2.755  0.027  23.1  0.463  1.883 
  2006  SJ134  1.154  3.255  0.2998  18  0.476  2.204 
  2006  SU131  1.044  2.411  0.03433  18.6  0.396  1.728 
  2006  ST131  1.005  1.935  0.25218  21.4  0.316  1.47 
  2006  SS131  1.005  2.241  0.0134  25.7  0.381  1.623 
  2006  SQ131  1.196  2.247  0.19727  22.6  0.305  1.722 
  2006  SN131  1.017  3.223  0.01532  26.3  0.52  2.12 
  2006  SG77  1.188  4.439  0.20214  20.7  0.578  2.813 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2006  SK61  1.016  1.745  0.0155  26.1  0.264  1.38 
  2006  SD25  1.018  2.814  0.01615  24  0.469  1.916 
  2006  SS19  1.194  4.412  0.21317  18.8  0.574  2.803 
  2006  SR19  1.241  4.367  0.24675  21.9  0.557  2.804 
  2006  SQ19  1.149  3.56  0.14888  23.2  0.512  2.355 
  2006  SH7  1.131  3.833  0.14666  19.8  0.544  2.482 
  2006  SA7  1.269  2.707  0.55162  19.5  0.362  1.988 
  2006  SD6  1.058  1.973  0.29635  20.2  0.302  1.516 
  2006  SA6  1.059  4.516  0.09939  19.3  0.62  2.788 
  2006  SW5  1.108  2.558  0.16382  19.4  0.395  1.833 
  2006  SV5  1.021  1.869  0.03667  23.1  0.293  1.445 
  2006  RH120  1.008  1.059  0.01773  29.5  0.024  1.033 
  2006  RA55  1.218  3.65  0.2359  19.4  0.5  2.434 
  2006  RG7  1.225  2.545  0.22862  18.9  0.35  1.885 
  2006  QW89  1.136  4.101  0.13551  19.2  0.566  2.618 
  2006  QU89  1.111  1.95  0.24248  21.6  0.274  1.531 
  2006  QS89  1.128  2.429  0.19734  21.1  0.366  1.778 
  2006  QR89  1.197  2.582  0.27214  19.9  0.367  1.889 
  2006  QB58  1.099  3.133  0.10171  23.9  0.481  2.116 
  2006  QA58  1.034  1.466  0.16541  20.4  0.173  1.25 
  2006  QM33  1.243  2.361  0.23506  20.7  0.31  1.802 
  2006  QK33  1.05  4.108  0.04889  23.9  0.593  2.579 
  2006  QY5  1.249  2.548  0.2506  21.3  0.342  1.899 
  2006  QX5  1.159  3.086  0.14943  23.9  0.454  2.122 
  2006  QS  1.244  3.851  0.23612  19.9  0.512  2.547 
  2006  QA  1.041  4.565  0.05735  23.2  0.629  2.803 
  2006  PB1  1.226  4.8  0.36841  19.2  0.593  3.013 
  2006  OH15  1.066  1.957  0.27708  18.9  0.295  1.512 
  2006  OF15  1.297  2.72  0.42371  18.4  0.354  2.008 
  2006  OU10  1.14  2.368  0.15255  17.8  0.35  1.754 
  2006  OE10  1.06  2.244  0.0495  24.8  0.358  1.652 
  2006  OD7  1.113  1.557  0.10601  19.4  0.166  1.335 
  2006  OC7  1.04  3.355  0.04206  22.7  0.527  2.197 
  2006  OB7  1.031  3.19  0.03184  23.9  0.512  2.11 
  2006  OV5  1.151  4.251  0.16384  19.3  0.574  2.701 
  2006  OS5  1.17  4.557  0.31134  18.3  0.591  2.863 
  2006  OF5  1.273  4.231  0.2665  19.3  0.537  2.752 
  2006  OD5  1.21  4.124  0.23984  19.5  0.546  2.667 
  2006  OB5  1.198  1.868  0.19299  20.1  0.219  1.533 
  2006  OY4  1.089  3.637  0.08649  23.6  0.539  2.363 
  2006  OX4  1.181  2.028  0.17522  21.1  0.264  1.605 
  2006  OM1  1.066  2.415  0.10638  21.6  0.388  1.741 
  2006  OA1  1.015  1.744  0.10105  22.3  0.264  1.379 
  2006  OZ  1.175  3.229  0.18328  18.6  0.466  2.202 
  2006  NM  1.071  4.498  0.09318  16.3  0.615  2.784 
  2006  MA14  1.076  3.163  0.07999  21.5  0.492  2.119 
  2006  MX13  1.161  3.187  0.16557  19.8  0.466  2.174 
  2006  MH10  1.052  1.44  0.12658  22.3  0.156  1.246 Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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  2006  MF10  1.281  3.162  0.27229  19.4  0.423  2.221 
  2006  MT6  1.274  4.353  0.26178  19.3  0.547  2.814 
  2006  MS6  1.135  4.14  0.12218  19.2  0.57  2.637 
  2006  MY1  1.158  2.943  0.15114  22.2  0.435  2.05 
  2006  MW1  1.167  3.671  0.15411  19.8  0.517  2.419 
  2006  MB  1.021  1.206  0.06336  22.6  0.083  1.114 
  2006  MA  1.243  4.052  0.47224  18.8  0.531  2.647 
  2006  LK  1.033  4.684  0.03434  19.6  0.639  2.858 
  2006  LD  1.107  1.355  0.09544  23.5  0.101  1.231 
  2006  LB  1.136  2.218  0.12391  23.8  0.323  1.677 
  2006  KY112  1.078  1.797  0.06682  21.3  0.25  1.437 
  2006  KL103  1.037  1.86  0.02675  25.5  0.284  1.449 
  2006  KK103  1.141  3.118  0.14181  22.5  0.464  2.13 
  2006  KF100  1.175  3.147  0.28935  19.8  0.456  2.161 
  2006  KM89  1.159  2.041  0.14803  23.6  0.276  1.6 
  2006  KL89  1.241  4.242  0.24455  18.7  0.547  2.741 
  2006  KJ89  1.092  3.682  0.0949  23.9  0.543  2.387 
  2006  KF89  1.292  2.448  0.47854  18.5  0.309  1.87 
  2006  KA40  1.209  3.492  0.21907  19.6  0.486  2.351 
  2006  KT38  1.2  4.177  0.47028  19.4  0.554  2.689 
  2006  KZ37  1.017  1.553  0.09732  19.1  0.209  1.285 
  2006  KQ21  1.236  3.376  0.23156  19  0.464  2.306 
  2006  KL21  1.047  1.354  0.04953  20.7  0.128  1.2 
  2006  KS1  1.007  1.93  0.02486  25.4  0.314  1.469 
  2006  KQ1  1.026  1.463  0.04876  22  0.175  1.244 
  2006  KP1  1.07  3.227  0.12809  20.9  0.502  2.149 
  2006  KE  1.107  3.267  0.26145  19.4  0.494  2.187 
  2006  JE42  1.079  4.201  0.11767  19.9  0.591  2.64 
  2006  JU41  1.211  3.035  0.22767  19.3  0.43  2.123 
  2006  JT41  1.045  2.458  0.05433  24.5  0.403  1.752 
  2006  JZ25  1.087  3.727  0.14361  19  0.548  2.407 
  2006  JX25  1.221  3.082  0.21512  20.1  0.433  2.151 
  2006  JN6  1.156  2.253  0.15935  20.5  0.322  1.705 
  2006  JM6  1.039  3.068  0.03357  23.7  0.494  2.054 
  2006  JX  1.243  2.175  0.29548  19.9  0.273  1.709 
  2006  JU  1.147  3.169  0.16644  19.6  0.469  2.158 
  2006  JT  1.235  3.568  0.25013  19  0.486  2.401 
  2006  JP  1.159  2.241  0.15306  23.6  0.318  1.7 
  2006  HY57  1.149  4.191  0.14788  20.8  0.57  2.67 
  2006  HW57  1.028  3.261  0.04613  20.4  0.521  2.144 
  2006  HV57  1.166  4.32  0.15355  18.5  0.575  2.743 
  2006  HZ51  1.045  2.751  0.03691  18.6  0.45  1.898 
  2006  HX30  1.022  1.935  0.01901  26.1  0.309  1.478 
  2006  HS30  1.011  3.719  0.0115  28  0.573  2.365 
  2006  HQ30  1.05  4.178  0.03528  21.2  0.598  2.614 
  2006  HA6  1.188  5.311  0.21391  20.2  0.634  3.249 
  2006  HY5  1.159  2.338  0.42199  20.1  0.337  1.748 
  2006  HX5  1.231  2.054  0.30621  19.3  0.25  1.643 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2006  HW5  1.032  3.765  0.03001  24.3  0.57  2.399 
  2006  HC  1.028  1.193  0.02519  25.4  0.074  1.111 
  2006  HB  1.207  3.368  0.20022  18.9  0.472  2.287 
  2006  GT3  1.1  2.342  0.12891  21.5  0.361  1.721 
  2006  GW2  1.172  1.725  0.20949  20.3  0.191  1.448 
  2006  GU  1.133  4.274  0.16686  17.6  0.581  2.703 
  2006  FD51  1.07  3.262  0.0935  18.6  0.506  2.166 
  2006  FG36  1.043  3.494  0.06996  18.9  0.54  2.269 
  2006  FY35  1.161  2.465  0.1816  19.4  0.36  1.813 
  2006  FC35  1.076  2.366  0.19374  21.1  0.375  1.721 
  2006  FV33  1.067  3.367  0.30917  20  0.519  2.217 
  2006  FL10  1.074  2.014  0.28028  21.5  0.304  1.544 
  2006  FK9  1.076  2.148  0.14881  20.9  0.332  1.612 
  2006  FJ9  1.145  2.353  0.1506  19.3  0.345  1.749 
  2006  FV  1.052  1.687  0.10832  23.1  0.232  1.37 
  2006  FH  1.041  3.154  0.04842  24.3  0.504  2.098 
  2006  EF71  1.131  3.764  0.12698  19  0.538  2.448 
  2006  EJ53  1.244  3.121  0.28811  22.4  0.43  2.182 
  2006  EW52  1.127  1.365  0.14528  22.1  0.096  1.246 
  2006  EB1  1.027  3.234  0.03618  23.4  0.518  2.13 
  2006  EY  1.034  1.817  0.04913  25.1  0.275  1.425 
  2006  EX  1.047  1.176  0.06913  25  0.058  1.111 
  2006  EH  1.031  4.331  0.30048  20.7  0.615  2.681 
  2006  EE  1.046  2.373  0.06019  23.6  0.388  1.71 
  2006  EA  1.163  5.163  0.21189  19.2  0.632  3.163 
  2006  DT63  1.259  3.51  0.26791  22.3  0.472  2.385 
  2006  DW62  1.159  5.32  0.1672  21.2  0.642  3.24 
  2006  DR62  1.09  2.886  0.10515  25.3  0.452  1.988 
  2006  DD42  1.116  2.859  0.1281  23.9  0.439  1.987 
  2006  DB1  1.198  4.036  0.22533  20.9  0.542  2.617 
  2006  DZ  1.287  3.313  0.32847  21  0.44  2.3 
  2006  DU  1.008  2.952  0.02555  24.7  0.491  1.98 
  2006  DM  1.068  1.643  0.07879  24.1  0.212  1.355 
  2006  CY10  1.01  2.911  0.01207  20.3  0.485  1.96 
  2006  CX10  1.233  3.877  0.23151  17.7  0.517  2.555 
  2006  CN10  1.099  4.503  0.10397  21.1  0.608  2.801 
  2006  CV9  1.289  4.169  0.33926  19  0.528  2.729 
  2006  CL9  1.028  1.665  0.04021  22.8  0.237  1.346 
  2006  CX  1.206  2.222  0.22484  18.9  0.296  1.714 
  2006  CW  1.132  3.324  0.15464  22.4  0.492  2.228 
  2006  CG  1.214  2.444  0.22255  19.1  0.336  1.829 
  2006  CE  1.137  2.421  0.2576  18.6  0.361  1.779 
  2006  CD  1.061  2.669  0.14319  20.5  0.431  1.865 
  2006  BX139  1.219  2.7  0.23858  20  0.378  1.959 
  2006  BG99  1.008  1.812  0.0378  25.7  0.285  1.41 
  2006  BR98  1.003  1.392  0.01892  26.7  0.162  1.197 
  2006  BO55  1.123  1.88  0.28455  20.2  0.252  1.501 
  2006  BL55  1.005  1.899  0.02712  24.3  0.308  1.452 Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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  2006  BF55  1.031  2.367  0.0472  25.7  0.393  1.699 
  2006  BB27  1.027  1.697  0.05134  19.6  0.246  1.362 
  2006  BX26  1.143  3.318  0.17144  23.4  0.488  2.23 
  2006  BA8  1.161  2.512  0.17624  24.1  0.368  1.836 
  2006  BY7  1.021  2.729  0.0406  25.9  0.456  1.875 
  2006  BU7  1.049  1.301  0.0666  26.3  0.107  1.175 
  2006  BQ7  1.001  1.694  0.02814  26.5  0.257  1.347 
  2006  BO6  1.023  4.668  0.06399  22.5  0.641  2.845 
  2006  BH  1.155  5.327  0.39786  18.2  0.644  3.241 
  2006  AX44  1.101  2.054  0.11657  24.8  0.302  1.578 
  2006  AW44  1.087  3.883  0.10332  23.4  0.563  2.485 
  2006  AN8  1.158  1.883  0.17588  24.4  0.238  1.52 
  2006  AK8  1.015  1.299  0.11106  21.3  0.123  1.157 
  2006  AO4  1.098  4.162  0.20502  15.5  0.582  2.63 
  2006  AN4  1.064  2.953  0.13442  20.6  0.47  2.008 
  2006  AL4  1.032  3.964  0.05195  24.8  0.587  2.498 
  2006  AJ4  1.293  1.637  0.36618  21.1  0.117  1.465 
  2006  AH4  1.016  2.817  0.03201  26.3  0.47  1.917 
  2006  AG4  1.202  3.883  0.22133  23.1  0.527  2.543 
  2006  AF4  1.04  3.562  0.0939  23.8  0.548  2.301 
  2006  AT3  1.061  3.506  0.07758  24.4  0.535  2.284 
  2006  AP3  1.08  2.364  0.09842  23.8  0.373  1.722 
  2006  AL3  1.203  1.552  0.23523  19.9  0.127  1.377 
  2006  AC3  1.01  3.667  0.03864  24.2  0.568  2.339 
  2006  AB3  1.011  2.417  0.03026  26.8  0.41  1.714 
  2006  AV2  1.253  3.564  0.26782  20.6  0.48  2.408 
  2006  AT2  1.089  4.331  0.16614  16.7  0.598  2.71 
  2006  AX  1.107  1.473  0.16262  23.9  0.142  1.29 
  2006  SV19  1.035  3.231  0.02006  17.6  0.515  2.133 
  2006  KT1  1.211  3.399  0.20137  16.6  0.475  2.305 
  2006  AQ  1.054  3.053  0.09819  18  0.487  2.054 
  2006  SA218  1.121  1.835  0.28632  18.2  0.242  1.478 
  2006  SK198  1.119  3.091  0.10667  16.3  0.468  2.105 
  2006  DZ169  1.203  2.865  0.22648  17.1  0.409  2.034 
  2007  YY59  1.019  3.969  0.03333  24.1  0.592  2.494 
  2007  YU56  1.02  3.719  0.04873  22  0.57  2.37 
  2007  YX1  1.167  4.541  0.20532  17.4  0.591  2.854 
  2007  YM1  1.142  3.777  0.15871  20.8  0.536  2.46 
  2007  YJ1  1.039  1.489  0.06049  25.3  0.178  1.264 
  2007  YF1  1.167  4.001  0.32755  18.6  0.548  2.584 
  2007  YK  1.269  2.472  0.49985  17.5  0.322  1.87 
  2007  XA51  1.154  1.609  0.16905  23.3  0.165  1.381 
  2007  XF25  1.027  1.339  0.06783  21.4  0.132  1.183 
  2007  XT23  1.074  4.542  0.12024  22.6  0.618  2.808 
  2007  XA23  1  2.211  0.09602  23  0.377  1.606 
  2007  XJ16  1  3.512  0.02465  18.9  0.557  2.256 
  2007  XK11  1.051  4.492  0.052  19.2  0.621  2.772 
  2007  XC10  1.253  1.986  0.41043  19.4  0.226  1.62 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2007  XA10  1.038  2.181  0.11996  22.9  0.355  1.609 
  2007  XQ3  1.147  2.824  0.18786  21.9  0.422  1.986 
  2007  XO3  1.116  3.761  0.14334  22.9  0.542  2.438 
  2007  XN3  1.066  4.161  0.12903  20.6  0.592  2.613 
  2007  WF55  1.134  3.667  0.30253  19.1  0.528  2.4 
  2007  WX4  1.239  2.309  0.47322  20  0.302  1.774 
  2007  WU4  1.257  3.85  0.50381  18.7  0.508  2.553 
  2007  WT4  1.292  3.183  0.30961  22.5  0.422  2.237 
  2007  WW3  1.087  5.146  0.09877  23.9  0.651  3.117 
  2007  WQ3  1.124  1.617  0.22493  20.9  0.18  1.371 
  2007  WK3  1.006  2.284  0.03528  26.2  0.388  1.645 
  2007  WE  1.083  6.996  0.32122  19.6  0.732  4.04 
  2007  WC  1.026  3.498  0.03764  25.8  0.547  2.262 
  2007  VO243  1.104  2.583  0.14194  19.4  0.401  1.843 
  2007  VF191  1.127  2.698  0.17215  22.4  0.411  1.912 
  2007  VC191  1.093  2.106  0.14918  20.8  0.317  1.599 
  2007  VG189  1.046  3.251  0.10005  19.1  0.513  2.149 
  2007  VA188  1.094  4.855  0.13373  19.4  0.632  2.975 
  2007  VH186  1.264  1.884  0.28128  20.2  0.197  1.574 
  2007  VL184  1.026  1.56  0.03984  24.1  0.206  1.293 
  2007  VH184  1.024  4.093  0.06597  21.9  0.6  2.559 
  2007  VE184  1.045  3.08  0.05461  26  0.493  2.063 
  2007  VR183  1.013  4.358  0.18763  17.5  0.623  2.685 
  2007  VC138  1.064  3.167  0.08236  19.3  0.497  2.116 
  2007  VA138  1.201  1.625  0.22722  21.7  0.15  1.413 
  2007  VX137  1.263  3.151  0.26276  18.5  0.428  2.207 
  2007  VA85  1.115  7.34  0.17514  15.1  0.736  4.227 
  2007  VO84  1.065  1.552  0.15044  23.6  0.186  1.309 
  2007  VM84  1.052  1.544  0.06266  23.3  0.19  1.298 
  2007  VJ8  1.116  4.524  0.12742  24.9  0.604  2.82 
  2007  VH8  1.112  4.306  0.21399  21.8  0.589  2.709 
  2007  VE8  1.036  3.932  0.04628  25.4  0.583  2.484 
  2007  VX7  1.171  2.581  0.31285  19.5  0.376  1.876 
  2007  VW7  1.027  1.631  0.05775  25.1  0.227  1.329 
  2007  VW6  1.103  2.228  0.23068  21.2  0.338  1.666 
  2007  VV6  1.019  1.813  0.03776  24.8  0.28  1.416 
  2007  VQ4  1.273  4.001  0.51395  16.2  0.517  2.637 
  2007  VK3  1.005  1.244  0.06635  21.9  0.106  1.125 
  2007  VH3  1.12  2.824  0.13739  22.7  0.432  1.972 
  2007  VG3  1.006  5.619  0.01496  24.6  0.696  3.313 
  2007  VF3  1.129  3.5  0.13976  24.8  0.512  2.314 
  2007  VB3  1.094  2.203  0.10656  25.1  0.336  1.649 
  2007  UT65  1.07  3.045  0.11292  24.2  0.48  2.058 
  2007  US65  1.267  4.051  0.25467  19.8  0.524  2.659 
  2007  UQ51  1.045  3.241  0.05395  20.2  0.512  2.143 
  2007  UM12  1.055  2.411  0.07814  21.6  0.391  1.733 
  2007  US6  1.227  3.215  0.28173  18.3  0.447  2.221 
  2007  UG6  1.051  2.694  0.07086  23  0.439  1.872 Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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  2007  UB6  1.199  1.678  0.27477  19.7  0.166  1.439 
  2007  UW3  1.262  3.88  0.27014  19.3  0.509  2.571 
  2007  UR3  1.117  2.003  0.13464  21.2  0.284  1.56 
  2007  UC2  1.078  2.252  0.08528  23  0.352  1.665 
  2007  UB2  1.054  1.856  0.1198  21.5  0.276  1.455 
  2007  UA2  1.119  2.831  0.137  21.1  0.433  1.975 
  2007  UX1  1.261  3.625  0.29102  20.4  0.484  2.443 
  2007  UR  1.082  4.532  0.09615  23.9  0.614  2.807 
  2007  UG  1.042  2.334  0.05469  23.8  0.383  1.688 
  2007  TO74  1.13  3.193  0.16288  19.7  0.477  2.161 
  2007  TE71  1.011  1.477  0.07956  24.3  0.188  1.244 
  2007  TW68  1.184  3.684  0.1751  19.3  0.514  2.434 
  2007  TV68  1.121  4.091  0.1261  23  0.57  2.606 
  2007  TU68  1.012  3.653  0.02268  25.7  0.566  2.333 
  2007  TS68  1.266  3.229  0.26264  19.6  0.437  2.248 
  2007  TF68  1.033  1.772  0.15157  23  0.264  1.402 
  2007  TG25  1.279  3.35  0.27656  18.9  0.448  2.314 
  2007  TB25  1.02  3.585  0.12069  22.2  0.557  2.303 
  2007  TA25  1.038  3.613  0.12081  19.9  0.554  2.326 
  2007  TY24  1.053  3.938  0.05444  25.3  0.578  2.495 
  2007  TX24  1.074  3.553  0.07789  24.9  0.536  2.313 
  2007  TT24  1.037  1.843  0.04137  27  0.28  1.44 
  2007  TC23  1.061  4.519  0.08055  20.5  0.62  2.79 
  2007  TB23  1.013  1.512  0.00695  18.7  0.198  1.262 
  2007  TA23  1.039  1.726  0.04299  24.9  0.248  1.383 
  2007  TJ19  1.032  1.819  0.19899  20.9  0.276  1.426 
  2007  TH19  1.264  3.765  0.24849  17.8  0.497  2.514 
  2007  TZ18  1.119  3.284  0.12653  20.9  0.492  2.202 
  2007  TY18  1.272  3.036  0.29031  18  0.409  2.154 
  2007  TX18  1.248  3.026  0.23562  17.2  0.416  2.137 
  2007  TU18  1.01  4.054  0.02729  25  0.601  2.532 
  2007  TK15  1.098  2.72  0.08592  21.2  0.425  1.909 
  2007  TJ15  1.075  3.036  0.07378  25.3  0.477  2.056 
  2007  TH15  1.119  2.55  0.1938  24  0.39  1.834 
  2007  TG15  1.182  3.324  0.20352  19.5  0.475  2.253 
  2007  TF15  1.062  1.154  0.0616  25  0.042  1.108 
  2007  TD14  1.261  3.467  0.25869  18.8  0.467  2.364 
  2007  TK8  1.258  1.736  0.26312  21  0.16  1.497 
  2007  TG1  1.06  3.076  0.07845  24.4  0.487  2.068 
  2007  TD1  1.048  3.728  0.04743  25.4  0.561  2.388 
  2007  SE11  1.26  2.656  0.27273  17.8  0.357  1.958 
  2007  SP6  1.161  3.962  0.19701  18.2  0.547  2.561 
  2007  SO6  1.018  1.621  0.0282  25.2  0.228  1.32 
  2007  SV2  1.004  2.764  0.10579  21.2  0.467  1.884 
  2007  SS1  1.034  3.375  0.04402  23.6  0.531  2.204 
  2007  RT147  1.212  3.363  0.22858  18.2  0.47  2.287 
  2007  RT146  1.012  2.66  0.22436  19.2  0.449  1.836 
  2007  RP133  1.203  4.024  0.21537  20.8  0.54  2.613 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2007  RO133  1.022  2.837  0.01865  24.9  0.47  1.929 
  2007  RM133  1.238  3.184  0.22263  18.3  0.44  2.211 
  2007  RL133  1.1  3.811  0.24318  20.3  0.552  2.456 
  2007  RD20  1.089  3.736  0.102  21  0.549  2.413 
  2007  RZ19  1.196  3.318  0.19024  22.3  0.47  2.257 
  2007  RV19  1.186  5.326  0.18937  18.8  0.636  3.256 
  2007  RU19  1.019  2.413  0.01777  26.6  0.406  1.716 
  2007  RT19  1.161  2.564  0.38285  18.3  0.377  1.862 
  2007  RW17  1.16  3.416  0.16282  21.4  0.493  2.288 
  2007  RS17  1.089  1.854  0.1462  22.9  0.26  1.472 
  2007  RR17  1.025  3.318  0.01897  23.6  0.528  2.171 
  2007  RP17  1.075  3.096  0.07147  24.2  0.485  2.085 
  2007  RV12  1.018  2.317  0.01475  25.6  0.389  1.667 
  2007  RU12  1.262  3.319  0.27478  20  0.449  2.291 
  2007  RS12  1.171  3.103  0.16563  23.2  0.452  2.137 
  2007  RP12  1.142  3.415  0.13889  24.6  0.499  2.278 
  2007  RY9  1.076  1.462  0.07406  23.4  0.152  1.269 
  2007  RS9  1.053  2.439  0.07505  24.6  0.397  1.746 
  2007  RA9  1.228  4.128  0.34297  19.8  0.541  2.678 
  2007  RZ8  1.101  1.604  0.09521  23.8  0.186  1.353 
  2007  RN7  1.152  1.443  0.17721  21.6  0.112  1.298 
  2007  RG2  1.031  3.403  0.03211  23.8  0.535  2.217 
  2007  RE2  1.062  3.491  0.05804  22.8  0.533  2.277 
  2007  RH1  1.135  1.695  0.12655  22.6  0.198  1.415 
  2007  RG1  1.052  2.249  0.04961  25.8  0.363  1.65 
  2007  RE1  1.007  4.266  0.02359  22.1  0.618  2.637 
  2007  RD1  1.157  3.494  0.17955  21.6  0.502  2.326 
  2007  QX14  1.276  3.43  0.2786  18.1  0.458  2.353 
  2007  QK2  1.17  3.087  0.16659  20.6  0.45  2.128 
  2007  QA2  1.218  3.096  0.20832  20.7  0.435  2.157 
  2007  PU11  1.262  4.384  0.27505  16.2  0.553  2.823 
  2007  PR9  1.175  3.722  0.19888  20.6  0.52  2.448 
  2007  PQ9  1.083  1.771  0.09521  22.2  0.241  1.427 
  2007  PP9  1.068  3.623  0.07608  21.3  0.545  2.346 
  2007  PE8  1.09  3.241  0.08238  19.4  0.497  2.165 
  2007  PD8  1.09  3.135  0.1074  22.6  0.484  2.112 
  2007  PQ  1.159  3.13  0.16709  20.6  0.46  2.145 
  2007  OR9  1.198  2.052  0.23511  22.1  0.263  1.625 
  2007  OH3  1.05  2.84  0.03558  24.4  0.46  1.945 
  2007  OG3  1.125  3.205  0.12384  18.3  0.48  2.165 
  2007  OY  1.098  3.301  0.12742  20.9  0.501  2.199 
  2007  OV  1.28  3.678  0.28646  19.3  0.484  2.479 
  2007  NT4  1.081  2.226  0.06844  23.8  0.346  1.653 
  2007  NQ  1.178  3.246  0.1677  19.4  0.467  2.212 
  2007  MC24  1.155  3.42  0.29363  19.5  0.495  2.287 
  2007  ML13  1.187  1.408  0.19415  20.1  0.085  1.298 
  2007  ML6  1.191  3.274  0.21359  18.5  0.467  2.233 
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  2007  LR32  1.271  3.982  0.32066  17.2  0.516  2.626 
  2007  LT19  1.031  1.909  0.02288  25.3  0.298  1.47 
  2007  LA15  1.069  2.385  0.05923  19.6  0.381  1.727 
  2007  LV8  1.133  2.483  0.15641  20.2  0.373  1.808 
  2007  LV  1.285  2.24  0.4077  18.1  0.271  1.763 
  2007  LU  1.02  3.335  0.01169  23.4  0.531  2.177 
  2007  KF7  1.055  2.422  0.04444  24.9  0.393  1.739 
  2007  KN4  1.23  5.449  0.27315  16.9  0.632  3.339 
  2007  KE4  1.022  3.756  0.01932  25.2  0.572  2.389 
  2007  KW2  1.09  3.496  0.08947  22  0.525  2.293 
  2007  KD2  1.116  4.436  0.11211  23.1  0.598  2.776 
  2007  KK  1.075  1.845  0.10957  23.4  0.264  1.46 
  2007  KJ  1.007  3.783  0.09834  18.8  0.58  2.395 
  2007  KD  1.139  2.778  0.20233  20.6  0.418  1.959 
  2007  JE40  1.209  2.647  0.33047  20  0.373  1.928 
  2007  JJ35  1.233  2.315  0.27625  18.4  0.305  1.774 
  2007  JF22  1.285  4.904  0.40929  16.1  0.585  3.094 
  2007  JG16  1.064  2.25  0.07236  23.6  0.358  1.657 
  2007  JW9  1.134  2.926  0.13224  24.3  0.441  2.03 
  2007  HD84  1.137  3.775  0.12953  23.5  0.537  2.456 
  2007  HX82  1.202  4.097  0.24497  20.4  0.546  2.65 
  2007  HD70  1.115  3.117  0.14606  21  0.473  2.116 
  2007  HH44  1.042  3.794  0.0422  25  0.569  2.418 
  2007  HF44  1.096  2.105  0.117  19.2  0.315  1.6 
  2007  HY15  1.118  1.727  0.11677  24.1  0.214  1.423 
  2007  HF15  1.281  4.444  0.3089  20.8  0.553  2.863 
  2007  HL4  1.018  1.218  0.03336  24.2  0.089  1.118 
  2007  HY3  1.045  1.724  0.04307  25.6  0.245  1.384 
  2007  HX3  1.05  2.004  0.05433  20  0.312  1.527 
  2007  HZ  1.14  1.518  0.20232  20.2  0.142  1.329 
  2007  HB  1.269  2.948  0.44883  19.7  0.398  2.109 
  2007  GD49  1.279  3.804  0.45986  16.8  0.497  2.541 
  2007  GZ5  1.06  1.875  0.19858  21.1  0.278  1.467 
  2007  GW5  1.031  1.865  0.21415  21.5  0.288  1.448 
  2007  GG  1.173  4.135  0.20693  17.6  0.558  2.654 
  2007  GC  1.088  2.919  0.1378  21.3  0.457  2.004 
  2007  FV42  1.147  3.204  0.13213  17.9  0.473  2.176 
  2007  FS35  1.172  2.672  0.15718  19.5  0.39  1.922 
  2007  FE20  1.275  2.232  0.30941  19.7  0.273  1.754 
  2007  FL18  1.203  4.962  0.319  19.7  0.61  3.083 
  2007  FQ3  1.057  3.497  0.05966  25.6  0.536  2.277 
  2007  FK3  1.263  3.359  0.28729  18.8  0.453  2.311 
  2007  FD3  1.034  3.409  0.11239  20  0.535  2.221 
  2007  FL1  1.167  3.54  0.15691  18.7  0.504  2.353 
  2007  FK1  1.054  3.911  0.06627  20.2  0.576  2.483 
  2007  FJ1  1.076  2.522  0.0922  23.8  0.402  1.799 
  2007  FH1  1.061  2.397  0.14959  20.5  0.386  1.729 
  2007  FG1  1.015  2.86  0.02188  24.6  0.476  1.937 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2007  EM88  1.209  2.093  0.2222  19.4  0.268  1.651 
  2007  EK88  1.127  2.347  0.15776  21.5  0.351  1.737 
  2007  EG88  1.01  2.217  0.01259  26.9  0.374  1.613 
  2007  EF88  1.055  3.879  0.09177  23.3  0.572  2.467 
  2007  EM26  1.146  1.787  0.16117  22.7  0.219  1.466 
  2007  EL26  1.124  1.416  0.16242  23.2  0.115  1.27 
  2007  EJ26  1.2  2.083  0.26146  18.4  0.269  1.641 
  2007  EG26  1.001  1.369  0.01769  24.6  0.155  1.185 
  2007  EA26  1.012  4.458  0.10961  20.3  0.63  2.735 
  2007  EY  1.085  3.612  0.20335  19.8  0.538  2.348 
  2007  EW  1.123  4.143  0.4024  18.8  0.573  2.633 
  2007  EU  1.002  1.89  0.03142  24.6  0.307  1.446 
  2007  EO  1.034  2.779  0.03941  22.8  0.457  1.906 
  2007  EN  1.068  4.125  0.30735  21.2  0.589  2.596 
  2007  EM  1.216  2.709  0.22646  20.7  0.38  1.962 
  2007  EL  1.084  1.91  0.19853  19.5  0.276  1.497 
  2007  DU103  1.229  3.698  0.37688  17.5  0.501  2.463 
  2007  DS84  1.034  2.699  0.03268  20.8  0.446  1.867 
  2007  DB83  1.226  2.276  0.22315  18.3  0.3  1.751 
  2007  DX60  1.16  1.537  0.20568  22.2  0.14  1.349 
  2007  DB56  1.298  2.761  0.33778  19.2  0.36  2.029 
  2007  DJ8  1.04  2.216  0.07656  24.3  0.361  1.628 
  2007  DH8  1.059  1.816  0.07074  24.9  0.264  1.437 
  2007  DX  1.199  4.034  0.20691  22.7  0.542  2.617 
  2007  CZ49  1.086  4.787  0.11863  21.1  0.63  2.936 
  2007  CB27  1.05  1.187  0.06232  23.3  0.061  1.118 
  2007  CS26  1.007  3.654  0.04809  21.1  0.568  2.33 
  2007  CO26  1.071  4.525  0.10466  21.3  0.617  2.798 
  2007  CF19  1.102  4.868  0.25305  18.8  0.631  2.985 
  2007  CB19  1.035  2.215  0.25565  20.9  0.363  1.625 
  2007  CJ15  1.002  1.913  0.03688  24.4  0.312  1.457 
  2007  CQ5  1.097  1.985  0.11563  22.1  0.288  1.541 
  2007  CP5  1.062  2.24  0.14279  21.6  0.357  1.651 
  2007  CO5  1.16  2.195  0.21326  20  0.309  1.677 
  2007  BF72  1.124  1.741  0.13513  19.7  0.216  1.433 
  2007  BB50  1.261  4.89  0.30797  18.5  0.59  3.075 
  2007  BG49  1.253  2.436  0.28208  18.7  0.321  1.844 
  2007  BB49  1.167  3.19  0.36783  19.6  0.464  2.179 
  2007  BA49  1.06  4.371  0.07729  24.8  0.61  2.715 
  2007  BC8  1.023  3.076  0.03718  22.5  0.501  2.049 
  2007  BT7  1.001  3.344  0.16119  19.6  0.539  2.172 
  2007  BT2  1.267  1.998  0.29139  17.1  0.224  1.633 
  2007  BS2  1.117  2.037  0.13424  23.2  0.291  1.577 
  2007  BA  1.171  2.225  0.19988  18.8  0.31  1.698 
  2007  AS12  1.141  1.878  0.31467  19.2  0.244  1.51 
  2007  AH12  1.117  2.97  0.13265  20.5  0.453  2.044 
  2007  AC12  1.253  4.301  0.26397  17.8  0.549  2.777 
  2007  AT2  1.057  2.329  0.10915  19.6  0.376  1.693 Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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  2007  VZ30  1.293  1.917  0.31212  21  0.195  1.605 
  2008  YV148  1.183  1.676  0.25791  20.6  0.173  1.429 
  2008  YW32  1.024  3.633  0.0383  25.2  0.56  2.328 
  2008  YU30  1.04  3.931  0.05845  23.2  0.581  2.486 
  2008  YG29  1.055  3.404  0.07611  24.1  0.527  2.229 
  2008  YE29  1.075  4.544  0.08923  20.4  0.617  2.81 
  2008  YD29  1.231  4.533  0.26048  22.1  0.573  2.882 
  2008  YA29  1.059  3.089  0.07575  24.9  0.489  2.074 
  2008  YS27  1.002  1.933  0.02226  21.1  0.317  1.468 
  2008  YO27  1.16  1.952  0.27248  20.9  0.255  1.556 
  2008  YG26  1.026  3.324  0.07964  21.7  0.528  2.175 
  2008  YG3  1.123  4.061  0.14442  22  0.567  2.592 
  2008  YF3  1.036  2.041  0.25318  21.3  0.327  1.538 
  2008  YE3  1.106  1.993  0.1322  20.9  0.286  1.549 
  2008  YD3  1.039  3.337  0.05503  26.2  0.525  2.188 
  2008  YR2  1.281  3.244  0.29187  18.9  0.434  2.262 
  2008  YP2  1.032  2.03  0.09553  23.3  0.326  1.531 
  2008  YM2  1.045  3.613  0.06113  24  0.551  2.329 
  2008  YK2  1.116  3.271  0.22847  19.6  0.491  2.194 
  2008  XE3  1.176  4.046  0.1944  16.3  0.55  2.611 
  2008  XX2  1.172  3.93  0.21624  21.5  0.541  2.551 
  2008  XV2  1.261  3.083  0.33126  20.5  0.419  2.172 
  2008  XP2  1.234  2.543  0.24606  18.5  0.347  1.888 
  2008  XO2  1.152  2.221  0.1481  18.6  0.317  1.686 
  2008  XE2  1.274  3.83  0.30574  19.3  0.501  2.552 
  2008  XC2  1.005  2.917  0.05469  23.4  0.488  1.961 
  2008  XL1  1.14  1.709  0.21443  22.8  0.2  1.425 
  2008  XK1  1.112  1.539  0.16689  23.6  0.161  1.326 
  2008  XS  1.003  1.551  0.01768  27.1  0.215  1.277 
  2008  XP  1.265  2.646  0.29552  21.4  0.353  1.956 
  2008  XO  1.024  2.981  0.04261  24.2  0.489  2.002 
  2008  XG  1.086  1.786  0.11009  24.4  0.244  1.436 
  2008  XF  1.126  1.484  0.20167  23  0.137  1.305 
  2008  XB  1.039  1.995  0.05512  22.5  0.315  1.517 
  2008  WF96  1.042  3.928  0.05556  23.8  0.581  2.485 
  2008  WE96  1.056  2.748  0.07134  23.7  0.445  1.902 
  2008  WL61  1.074  3.443  0.13353  19.5  0.525  2.259 
  2008  WL60  1.073  3.739  0.29051  18  0.554  2.406 
  2008  WJ60  1.132  2.064  0.15023  21.2  0.291  1.598 
  2008  WH60  1.151  1.967  0.19127  20.9  0.262  1.559 
  2008  WW32  1.081  3.205  0.09794  21.2  0.496  2.143 
  2008  WJ14  1.045  6.689  0.05732  26.3  0.73  3.867 
  2008  WH14  1.036  1.749  0.0491  26.3  0.256  1.392 
  2008  WF14  1.072  2.008  0.08884  24.9  0.304  1.54 
  2008  WC14  1.109  5.328  0.13423  20  0.655  3.218 
  2008  WB14  1.031  3.891  0.04536  25.5  0.581  2.461 
  2008  WQ1  1.049  3.588  0.08077  21.6  0.548  2.318 
  2008  WP1  1.264  3.178  0.28192  20.4  0.431  2.221 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2008  WK  1.018  1.816  0.04872  23.2  0.282  1.417 
  2008  WE  1.017  3.578  0.02733  25.9  0.557  2.298 
  2008  WB  1.253  1.517  0.26882  21.2  0.095  1.385 
  2008  VA15  1.009  1.894  0.03966  23.6  0.305  1.452 
  2008  VH14  1.01  4.69  0.03609  23.6  0.646  2.85 
  2008  VG14  1.244  4.383  0.30248  20.3  0.558  2.814 
  2008  VT4  1.283  1.565  0.31613  22.4  0.099  1.424 
  2008  VS4  1.066  2.873  0.07663  24.4  0.459  1.97 
  2008  VQ4  1.168  2.331  0.23388  19.3  0.332  1.75 
  2008  VA4  1.004  1.567  0.0205  24.9  0.219  1.285 
  2008  VN  1.081  5.013  0.23462  16.9  0.645  3.047 
  2008  VH  1.124  3.259  0.14644  20  0.487  2.192 
  2008  UE202  1.299  3.738  0.30168  22.4  0.484  2.519 
  2008  UD202  1.108  2.674  0.13816  23.9  0.414  1.891 
  2008  UB202  1.282  3.705  0.28919  23.2  0.486  2.493 
  2008  UZ201  1.164  3.492  0.1711  21.8  0.5  2.328 
  2008  UU99  1.081  3.596  0.08896  25.1  0.538  2.338 
  2008  UT99  1.064  2.015  0.07083  24.4  0.309  1.539 
  2008  UC95  1.135  3.283  0.15498  18.6  0.486  2.209 
  2008  UB92  1.008  2.062  0.05166  24.7  0.343  1.535 
  2008  UA92  1.026  4.028  0.03345  27.4  0.594  2.527 
  2008  UZ91  1.139  1.962  0.19684  22.4  0.265  1.551 
  2008  UX91  1.134  1.723  0.16313  24  0.206  1.428 
  2008  UO90  1.247  3.146  0.26002  20.5  0.432  2.196 
  2008  UN90  1.228  1.581  0.2662  19.9  0.126  1.404 
  2008  UM90  1.018  2.692  0.07058  20.9  0.451  1.855 
  2008  UK90  1.259  2.748  0.56166  18.7  0.372  2.003 
  2008  UG7  1.11  1.34  0.16391  21.1  0.094  1.225 
  2008  UA7  1.033  2.19  0.06431  24.9  0.359  1.612 
  2008  UW5  1.118  2.545  0.14359  18.1  0.39  1.832 
  2008  UV5  1.027  4.052  0.04217  26.1  0.596  2.54 
  2008  UU5  1.222  3.746  0.22891  23.3  0.508  2.484 
  2008  UT5  1.016  3.545  0.03357  24.5  0.554  2.281 
  2008  US5  1.212  2.402  0.346  21.3  0.329  1.807 
  2008  UM3  1.093  1.824  0.1225  24.9  0.251  1.458 
  2008  UL3  1.005  1.583  0.07099  25.4  0.223  1.294 
  2008  US2  1.102  1.953  0.11306  23.8  0.279  1.528 
  2008  UE1  1.142  3.324  0.14937  24.2  0.489  2.233 
  2008  UV  1.077  2.182  0.08314  24.8  0.339  1.63 
  2008  UU  1.07  4.493  0.10138  24.7  0.615  2.782 
  2008  UF  1.037  2.263  0.04172  26.2  0.372  1.65 
  2008  UC  1.081  2.871  0.10965  18.9  0.453  1.976 
  2008  UB  1.261  1.736  0.27318  22.2  0.158  1.499 
  2008  TK157  1.16  3.625  0.182  20.6  0.515  2.392 
  2008  TJ157  1.248  4.276  0.28626  21  0.548  2.762 
  2008  TE157  1.029  4.446  0.05662  20.8  0.624  2.737 
  2008  TB27  1.133  2.408  0.15357  18.2  0.36  1.77 
  2008  TL26  1.117  4.144  0.12243  24.7  0.575  2.631 Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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  2008  TS10  1.004  1.511  0.0039  29  0.202  1.257 
  2008  TR10  1.13  3.109  0.12697  20.5  0.467  2.119 
  2008  TQ10  1.196  3.251  0.34255  20.5  0.462  2.224 
  2008  TY9  1.032  1.834  0.04564  24.9  0.28  1.433 
  2008  TF9  1.185  3.927  0.25183  20.8  0.536  2.556 
  2008  TF4  1.289  2.5  0.42526  19.3  0.32  1.894 
  2008  TB4  1.007  2.566  0.08844  21  0.436  1.786 
  2008  TY3  1.119  2.569  0.11889  24.1  0.393  1.844 
  2008  TR2  1.242  2.174  0.24798  19.9  0.273  1.708 
  2008  TQ2  1.069  2.62  0.10173  20.9  0.42  1.844 
  2008  TE2  1.009  1.974  0.01004  27.3  0.324  1.492 
  2008  TD2  1.019  2.042  0.04066  21.7  0.334  1.53 
  2008  TB2  1.055  3.077  0.05818  24.5  0.489  2.066 
  2008  TE1  1.025  2.867  0.0257  25.4  0.473  1.946 
  2008  TD1  1.115  3.286  0.11864  25.2  0.493  2.201 
  2008  TB1  1.116  4.369  0.25228  22.2  0.593  2.743 
  2008  TK  1.026  3.201  0.03056  23.6  0.514  2.114 
  2008  TJ  1.066  2.044  0.06383  26.7  0.314  1.555 
  2008  TG  1.181  3.876  0.17681  23  0.533  2.528 
  2008  TC  1.031  3.059  0.04866  23.7  0.496  2.045 
  2008  SS251  1.236  3.82  0.23438  21  0.511  2.528 
  2008  SX245  1.077  2.908  0.18493  17.7  0.46  1.992 
  2008  SV150  1.051  1.258  0.05235  26.3  0.09  1.154 
  2008  SU150  1.2  2.752  0.20199  22.8  0.393  1.976 
  2008  SY148  1.008  1.488  0.01398  21.8  0.192  1.248 
  2008  SG148  1.074  1.617  0.08032  22.6  0.202  1.346 
  2008  SC85  1.156  3.685  0.17087  19.4  0.522  2.42 
  2008  SJ82  1.002  3.753  0.04752  20.6  0.578  2.378 
  2008  SH82  1  3.885  0.02714  21.4  0.591  2.443 
  2008  SF8  1.12  4.453  0.11625  23.7  0.598  2.786 
  2008  SX7  1.258  3.614  0.25383  18.4  0.484  2.436 
  2008  SW7  1.047  2.179  0.04585  24.3  0.351  1.613 
  2008  SV7  1.087  2.163  0.0965  21.6  0.331  1.625 
  2008  SR7  1.068  1.576  0.13642  19.9  0.192  1.322 
  2008  SP7  1.289  4.202  0.2987  18.9  0.53  2.745 
  2008  SZ1  1.034  3.341  0.03202  24.6  0.527  2.188 
  2008  SW1  1.152  3.808  0.15341  21.9  0.536  2.48 
  2008  SQ1  1.235  4.683  0.2556  18.5  0.583  2.959 
  2008  SO1  1.148  4.609  0.24972  19.8  0.601  2.878 
  2008  SN1  1.3  4.026  0.32091  19.6  0.512  2.663 
  2008  SR  1.193  2.811  0.2083  21.8  0.404  2.002 
  2008  SQ  1.058  2.222  0.09999  19.6  0.355  1.64 
  2008  SP  1.099  2.283  0.16794  23.2  0.35  1.691 
  2008  SO  1.02  1.641  0.09027  20.9  0.233  1.33 
  2008  SE  1.214  3.508  0.2247  19.4  0.486  2.361 
  2008  RP108  1.241  3.009  0.23801  20.2  0.416  2.125 
  2008  RE80  1.117  1.846  0.13651  18.2  0.246  1.482 
  2008  RT26  1.213  3.279  0.22197  19.4  0.46  2.246 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2008  RS26  1.242  4.802  0.37186  18  0.589  3.022 
  2008  RY24  1.2  3.236  0.22073  17.8  0.459  2.218 
  2008  RX24  1.28  3.295  0.27466  21.4  0.44  2.288 
  2008  RT24  1.056  2.578  0.07449  24.4  0.419  1.817 
  2008  RQ24  1.241  3.105  0.24416  20.8  0.429  2.173 
  2008  RK1  1.202  4.38  0.19551  22.2  0.569  2.791 
  2008  RJ1  1.146  3.189  0.22908  17.9  0.471  2.167 
  2008  RE1  1.074  3.455  0.07272  23  0.526  2.265 
  2008  RT  1.074  3.895  0.08559  19.8  0.568  2.485 
  2008  QW11  1.06  3.575  0.06672  23.3  0.543  2.318 
  2008  QM2  1.061  2.028  0.0545  23.8  0.313  1.545 
  2008  QD1  1.247  3.261  0.27168  19  0.447  2.254 
  2008  QC1  1.034  4.271  0.02127  24.2  0.61  2.652 
  2008  QA1  1.079  3.369  0.10973  22.5  0.515  2.224 
  2008  QZ  1.25  3.089  0.24738  20.4  0.424  2.17 
  2008  QF  1.293  2.862  0.28726  21.6  0.378  2.078 
  2008  QC  1.093  3.455  0.16664  20.7  0.519  2.274 
  2008  PH9  1.284  4.543  0.51658  16.5  0.559  2.914 
  2008  PL3  1.265  3.294  0.25945  19.3  0.445  2.279 
  2008  PH3  1.146  3.109  0.16277  21.7  0.461  2.128 
  2008  PG2  1.09  1.187  0.10586  22.6  0.042  1.139 
  2008  PF2  1.051  3.867  0.03958  23.7  0.573  2.459 
  2008  PE1  1.069  3.268  0.05607  24.1  0.507  2.169 
  2008  OX8  1.201  2.005  0.18917  21.6  0.251  1.603 
  2008  OQ8  1.235  3.378  0.22347  22.1  0.465  2.306 
  2008  OO8  1.012  3.089  0.00751  25.2  0.507  2.05 
  2008  ON8  1.064  2.209  0.05089  25.3  0.35  1.636 
  2008  OM8  1.159  3.039  0.1597  22  0.448  2.099 
  2008  OA6  1.068  3.215  0.09323  22.7  0.501  2.142 
  2008  OV2  1.013  3.747  0.10777  20.3  0.574  2.38 
  2008  ON  1.157  1.764  0.14643  20.3  0.208  1.461 
  2008  OM  1.159  3.777  0.14434  22.2  0.53  2.468 
  2008  NQ3  1.026  3.878  0.04379  20.3  0.582  2.452 
  2008  NX  1.047  1.592  0.0317  25.1  0.207  1.319 
  2008  NU  1.261  4.203  0.25352  17.5  0.538  2.732 
  2008  NB  1.094  3.822  0.28864  19.3  0.555  2.458 
  2008  MU1  1.069  2.723  0.20246  19.7  0.436  1.896 
  2008  MR1  1.217  3.331  0.21653  18.4  0.465  2.274 
  2008  MQ1  1.035  1.749  0.0225  24.2  0.257  1.392 
  2008  MN1  1.036  1.717  0.14221  20.1  0.248  1.376 
  2008  MH1  1.126  4.264  0.11675  18.3  0.582  2.695 
  2008  MZ  1.032  4.208  0.11854  18.6  0.606  2.62 
  2008  LN16  1.238  3.044  0.26869  19.9  0.422  2.141 
  2008  LW8  1.016  2.335  0.14318  17.3  0.394  1.675 
  2008  LE  1.07  3.52  0.05353  23.6  0.534  2.295 
  2008  LC  1.008  3.142  0.02479  24.6  0.514  2.075 
  2008  KV28  1.041  2.367  0.18429  20.3  0.389  1.704 
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  2008  KF6  1.039  3.574  0.03904  23.5  0.55  2.306 
  2008  KZ5  1.006  2.673  0.00423  20  0.453  1.84 
  2008  KX2  1.073  3.728  0.06021  25.1  0.553  2.4 
  2008  KQ  1.042  2.013  0.17714  20.6  0.318  1.528 
  2008  JT35  1.06  4.082  0.05059  21.3  0.588  2.571 
  2008  JD33  1.004  3.299  0.03543  26.1  0.533  2.151 
  2008  JZ30  1.216  3.95  0.48589  18.5  0.529  2.583 
  2008  JS26  1.057  3.253  0.05334  23.7  0.51  2.155 
  2008  JR26  1.147  1.642  0.27572  19.9  0.178  1.394 
  2008  JO24  1.276  2.324  0.30795  18.7  0.291  1.8 
  2008  JO20  1.293  5.312  0.31061  17.2  0.609  3.302 
  2008  JT19  1.178  2.856  0.2581  19.8  0.416  2.017 
  2008  JR14  1.028  2.263  0.04094  25  0.375  1.646 
  2008  JQ14  1.186  3.737  0.19513  19.2  0.518  2.461 
  2008  JA8  1.15  3.483  0.24525  18  0.504  2.316 
  2008  JV2  1.002  3.165  0.02769  24.8  0.519  2.084 
  2008  JU2  1.068  3.397  0.05668  22.8  0.522  2.232 
  2008  JJ  1.083  2.402  0.1388  19.2  0.378  1.743 
  2008  JF  1.158  2.657  0.24471  17.9  0.393  1.907 
  2008  HE66  1.174  1.605  0.19103  21.7  0.155  1.39 
  2008  HA38  1.286  1.684  0.30374  20.5  0.134  1.485 
  2008  HY37  1.111  2.33  0.11589  18.2  0.354  1.721 
  2008  HV4  1.03  1.823  0.17468  19.4  0.278  1.426 
  2008  HU4  1.013  1.173  0.00932  28.2  0.073  1.093 
  2008  HT4  1.09  1.74  0.12822  23.2  0.23  1.415 
  2008  HS3  1.046  1.656  0.03749  21.7  0.226  1.351 
  2008  HE2  1.095  2.955  0.08902  23.6  0.459  2.025 
  2008  HB2  1.043  2.334  0.03817  25.5  0.383  1.688 
  2008  HA2  1.049  2.483  0.05813  24.4  0.406  1.766 
  2008  HK  1.068  3.742  0.06889  22.2  0.556  2.405 
  2008  HG  1.035  3.159  0.0337  23.8  0.506  2.097 
  2008  GE110  1.248  2.886  0.24645  22.1  0.396  2.067 
  2008  GB110  1.237  2.438  0.31534  19.6  0.327  1.838 
  2008  GA110  1.215  4.495  0.21197  22.1  0.574  2.855 
  2008  GX21  1.114  2.701  0.11645  22.7  0.416  1.907 
  2008  GU20  1.13  2.716  0.13081  23.1  0.412  1.923 
  2008  GP20  1.095  2.825  0.40435  19.4  0.442  1.96 
  2008  GB4  1.003  1.757  0.03361  23.2  0.273  1.38 
  2008  GZ3  1.051  3.063  0.04891  25.2  0.489  2.057 
  2008  GY3  1.256  3.891  0.28604  20.7  0.512  2.573 
  2008  GU3  1.193  3.666  0.19668  22.3  0.509  2.43 
  2008  GR3  1.055  2.01  0.04863  24.9  0.311  1.533 
  2008  GQ3  1.044  3.351  0.11651  18.9  0.525  2.198 
  2008  GG2  1.146  2.029  0.14493  22.7  0.278  1.587 
  2008  GF2  1.164  2.536  0.16787  24  0.371  1.85 
  2008  GE1  1.242  2.061  0.27361  19.3  0.248  1.652 
  2008  GX  1.172  3.377  0.16571  19.5  0.485  2.275 
  2008  GV  1.064  4.401  0.06395  23.2  0.611  2.732 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2008  GQ  1.066  2.336  0.07533  24.9  0.373  1.701 
  2008  GJ  1.039  2.889  0.05698  20.6  0.471  1.964 
  2008  GE  1.006  1.538  0.12485  23.3  0.209  1.272 
  2008  FL7  1.006  3.15  0.03325  24.5  0.516  2.078 
  2008  FK7  1.145  2.63  0.13645  23.1  0.393  1.888 
  2008  FY6  1.112  2.515  0.30666  20.3  0.387  1.813 
  2008  FT6  1.229  3.049  0.29989  17.5  0.426  2.139 
  2008  FS6  1.104  1.485  0.10469  22.3  0.147  1.295 
  2008  FN6  1.052  2.227  0.10543  21.3  0.358  1.64 
  2008  FJ  1.036  3.716  0.10762  24.8  0.564  2.376 
  2008  FE  1.036  2.817  0.04271  24.1  0.462  1.927 
  2008  FB  1.043  2.898  0.05627  23.3  0.471  1.971 
  2008  EZ97  1.255  3.555  0.24487  17.9  0.478  2.405 
  2008  ER90  1.295  1.849  0.30232  24.2  0.176  1.572 
  2008  EX84  1.052  3.632  0.09553  22.3  0.551  2.342 
  2008  EN82  1.119  3.887  0.13242  15.6  0.553  2.503 
  2008  EC69  1.049  4.456  0.03371  17.2  0.619  2.752 
  2008  EV68  1.045  1.876  0.08061  23.5  0.285  1.46 
  2008  EE68  1.296  1.524  0.36566  20.3  0.081  1.41 
  2008  EB32  1.152  2.78  0.16095  19.3  0.414  1.966 
  2008  EJ9  1.274  2.426  0.32223  21  0.311  1.85 
  2008  EB9  1.223  1.902  0.34504  20.4  0.217  1.563 
  2008  EB8  1.193  2.561  0.31724  22.6  0.364  1.877 
  2008  ET7  1.226  1.62  0.33798  21  0.138  1.423 
  2008  EQ7  1.096  1.724  0.13332  22.6  0.223  1.41 
  2008  EO6  1.142  2.666  0.24077  19.6  0.4  1.904 
  2008  EZ5  1.024  3.151  0.07512  19.5  0.509  2.088 
  2008  EW5  1.091  2.912  0.10564  24.1  0.455  2.001 
  2008  EH1  1.078  1.725  0.13499  23.1  0.231  1.402 
  2008  DH23  1.227  2.084  0.45496  19.8  0.259  1.655 
  2008  DW22  1.08  2.419  0.08538  25.6  0.382  1.75 
  2008  DG17  1.011  2.663  0.08026  19.8  0.45  1.837 
  2008  DY  1.046  4.345  0.14903  20.9  0.612  2.695 
  2008  DX  1.149  3.462  0.16214  23.7  0.502  2.305 
  2008  DW  1.269  2.707  0.27633  21.4  0.362  1.988 
  2008  DE  1.006  2.424  0.00409  19.6  0.413  1.715 
  2008  DD  1.04  2.843  0.04733  20.4  0.464  1.942 
  2008  DC  1.048  1.688  0.09897  19.9  0.234  1.368 
  2008  CB175  1.023  1.66  0.04087  25.4  0.237  1.342 
  2008  CK119  1.008  1.381  0.06224  24.5  0.156  1.194 
  2008  CJ119  1.202  2.446  0.21791  21.8  0.341  1.824 
  2008  CC119  1.18  3.983  0.26883  18.6  0.543  2.581 
  2008  CA119  1.018  2.211  0.06097  23.1  0.37  1.615 
  2008  CZ118  1.287  3.134  0.50291  18.4  0.418  2.21 
  2008  CX118  1.104  1.186  0.08919  24.4  0.035  1.145 
  2008  CW118  1.044  2.433  0.06308  25  0.4  1.739 
  2008  CS116  1.001  4.556  0.09569  20.8  0.64  2.778 
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  2008  CP116  1.064  3.881  0.07897  22.9  0.57  2.473 
  2008  CJ116  1.155  2.341  0.19791  19.1  0.339  1.748 
  2008  CG116  1.017  3.93  0.03732  24.2  0.589  2.474 
  2008  CL72  1.29  3.263  0.3194  19.9  0.433  2.276 
  2008  CJ70  1.192  1.619  0.28277  21.3  0.152  1.406 
  2008  CP23  1.202  3.211  0.2078  19.6  0.455  2.206 
  2008  CJ22  1.041  1.845  0.07822  25.5  0.279  1.443 
  2008  CD22  1.067  2.084  0.08036  22.1  0.323  1.576 
  2008  CZ21  1.225  1.639  0.29799  20.2  0.144  1.432 
  2008  CM20  1.015  1.596  0.08432  21  0.223  1.306 
  2008  CY4  1.065  2.635  0.14508  22.4  0.424  1.85 
  2008  CQ1  1.243  3.143  0.23861  19.4  0.433  2.193 
  2008  CJ1  1.133  2.208  0.18397  23.5  0.322  1.67 
  2008  CP  1.033  1.208  0.04976  24.1  0.078  1.121 
  2008  CO  1.163  1.19  0.16154  22.8  0.012  1.176 
  2008  CJ  1.034  3.678  0.04813  27.4  0.561  2.356 
  2008  CF  1.02  2.82  0.03501  26.5  0.469  1.92 
  2008  BC22  1.209  3.181  0.21099  19.7  0.449  2.195 
  2008  BQ16  1.247  2.666  0.28044  19.4  0.363  1.956 
  2008  BV2  1.221  2.847  0.2428  22.8  0.4  2.034 
  2008  BT2  1.079  1.268  0.08648  24.3  0.081  1.173 
  2008  BE  1.159  2.797  0.1796  22.9  0.414  1.978 
  2008  AZ110  1.273  4.028  0.27198  18.3  0.52  2.65 
  2008  AM33  1.094  2.629  0.10231  21.3  0.412  1.862 
  2008  AL33  1.25  3.835  0.26343  22.7  0.508  2.542 
  2008  AJ33  1.13  5.436  0.19953  20  0.656  3.283 
  2008  AF32  1.076  1.345  0.18394  21  0.111  1.211 
  2008  AB31  1.089  2.115  0.2933  20.2  0.32  1.602 
  2008  AX28  1.29  3.211  0.30025  19.9  0.427  2.251 
  2008  AW28  1.15  2.336  0.32142  22.1  0.34  1.743 
  2008  AT28  1.229  3.189  0.2896  18.5  0.444  2.209 
  2008  AU26  1.252  1.538  0.26917  20.9  0.102  1.395 
  2008  AE4  1.027  3.644  0.05715  23.9  0.56  2.335 
  2008  AE  1.109  1.443  0.13275  19.8  0.131  1.276 
  2009  VK24  1.033  2.461  0.07343  24.1  0.409  1.747 
  2009  VB1  1.115  2.047  0.1761  23.7  0.295  1.581 
  2009  VA1  1.045  4.323  0.15815  18.6  0.611  2.684 
  2009  VQ  1.006  3.807  0.01627  26.3  0.582  2.407 
  2009  UV87  1.058  4.004  0.06456  24.8  0.582  2.531 
  2009  UU87  1.014  2.336  0.05076  25.5  0.395  1.675 
  2009  UT87  1.118  4.06  0.13614  22.9  0.568  2.589 
  2009  US87  1.249  2.045  0.26312  21.7  0.242  1.647 
  2009  UM28  1.074  2.708  0.08362  23.6  0.432  1.891 
  2009  UK28  1.285  3.071  0.33001  19.8  0.41  2.178 
  2009  UL20  1.11  3.845  0.10859  23.8  0.552  2.477 
  2009  UZ19  1.009  2.24  0.01731  26.2  0.379  1.624 
  2009  UV19  1.001  2.409  0.02991  24.8  0.413  1.705 
  2009  UU19  1.113  1.808  0.13498  24.8  0.238  1.461 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2009  UE19  1.223  4.052  0.23486  20.4  0.536  2.637 
  2009  UB19  1.056  2.808  0.05795  23.3  0.453  1.932 
  2009  UA19  1.238  2.301  0.41033  18.2  0.3  1.769 
  2009  UV18  1.167  5.187  0.2246  15.5  0.633  3.177 
  2009  UX17  1.09  1.288  0.15009  21.6  0.083  1.189 
  2009  UJ14  1.052  5.54  0.43242  20.5  0.681  3.296 
  2009  UQ5  1.105  3.052  0.11439  24.5  0.468  2.078 
  2009  UP5  1.184  2.444  0.18738  19.2  0.347  1.814 
  2009  UJ5  1.003  3.842  0.01665  25.3  0.586  2.423 
  2009  UO3  1.027  3.873  0.03112  23  0.581  2.45 
  2009  UW2  1.057  3.897  0.12783  20  0.573  2.477 
  2009  UF2  1.035  4.631  0.06252  24.3  0.635  2.833 
  2009  UN1  1.061  3.795  0.071  25.3  0.563  2.428 
  2009  UN  1.19  4.531  0.19884  21.4  0.584  2.861 
  2009  UK  1.025  2.931  0.06077  20  0.482  1.978 
  2009  UF  1.01  2.52  0.10115  22.6  0.428  1.765 
  2009  UA  1.062  2.343  0.07307  23.7  0.376  1.702 
  2009  TM10  1.289  3.578  0.30493  19.4  0.47  2.434 
  2009  TG10  1.137  2.812  0.13948  17.4  0.424  1.974 
  2009  TF10  1.094  2.236  0.1073  22.1  0.343  1.665 
  2009  TP8  1.053  1.509  0.06178  26.2  0.178  1.281 
  2009  TN8  1.036  2.036  0.04986  24.2  0.326  1.536 
  2009  TL8  1.083  3.828  0.1072  22.2  0.559  2.456 
  2009  TG8  1.216  2.408  0.33365  18.9  0.329  1.812 
  2009  TV4  1.065  2.315  0.06756  23.4  0.37  1.69 
  2009  TL4  1.136  2.571  0.1425  21.6  0.387  1.854 
  2009  TB3  1.03  1.609  0.11941  21  0.22  1.319 
  2009  TK  1.041  1.576  0.04182  22.1  0.205  1.308 
  2009  SD229  1.24  2.957  0.22628  19.1  0.409  2.099 
  2009  SC229  1.132  3.158  0.12631  19.1  0.472  2.145 
  2009  SS172  1.007  2.134  0.07598  23.4  0.359  1.571 
  2009  SQ172  1.293  3.857  0.50282  18.3  0.498  2.575 
  2009  SW171  1.021  1.641  0.02574  26.1  0.233  1.331 
  2009  SV171  1.081  4.184  0.17338  19.6  0.589  2.633 
  2009  ST171  1.013  4.146  0.02871  26.8  0.607  2.579 
  2009  SS171  1.091  2.181  0.10382  24.8  0.333  1.636 
  2009  SQ171  1.082  1.974  0.08113  25.7  0.292  1.528 
  2009  SS104  1.283  3.941  0.29541  21  0.509  2.612 
  2009  SO104  1.066  1.516  0.07172  26  0.174  1.291 
  2009  SN104  1.136  3.029  0.14529  22.4  0.455  2.082 
  2009  SK104  1.067  4.416  0.08849  19  0.611  2.741 
  2009  SQ103  1.071  3.487  0.08462  25  0.53  2.279 
  2009  SM103  1.252  4.413  0.25557  16.8  0.558  2.832 
  2009  SC100  1.033  3.932  0.09085  23.6  0.584  2.482 
  2009  SB100  1.055  2.711  0.05667  23.7  0.44  1.883 
  2009  SN98  1.176  2.791  0.21543  19.1  0.407  1.983 
  2009  SV19  1.039  3.358  0.03862  26  0.527  2.198 
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  2009  SV17  1.117  4.289  0.14221  19.6  0.587  2.703 
  2009  SK15  1.01  1.239  0.01454  25.3  0.102  1.124 
  2009  SJ15  1.027  1.744  0.05596  23.1  0.259  1.385 
  2009  SH15  1  2.644  0.01923  24.5  0.451  1.822 
  2009  SC15  1.038  1.491  0.05585  21.6  0.179  1.265 
  2009  SJ2  1.234  3.818  0.23037  23.7  0.511  2.526 
  2009  SF2  1.241  3.262  0.26816  20.8  0.449  2.251 
  2009  SN1  1.022  2.89  0.0425  25.7  0.477  1.956 
  2009  SM1  1.09  3.289  0.08066  25  0.502  2.19 
  2009  SL1  1.01  2.767  0.07001  24.3  0.465  1.888 
  2009  SK1  1.252  1.97  0.40637  18  0.223  1.611 
  2009  SJ1  1.023  2.136  0.03193  26  0.353  1.579 
  2009  SW  1.137  2.902  0.14945  22.1  0.437  2.02 
  2009  SV  1.065  1.887  0.06792  20  0.279  1.476 
  2009  SU  1.159  3.444  0.17147  23  0.496  2.301 
  2009  ST  1.236  2.676  0.32812  19.6  0.368  1.956 
  2009  SP  1.125  3.316  0.35073  19.5  0.493  2.221 
  2009  SM  1.176  2.367  0.37337  19.4  0.336  1.771 
  2009  SL  1  1.696  0.03302  26.7  0.258  1.348 
  2009  SK  1.051  4.312  0.04997  25.1  0.608  2.682 
  2009  SH  1.071  3.86  0.12829  24.1  0.565  2.465 
  2009  SG  1.168  3.621  0.24335  19.6  0.512  2.395 
  2009  SF  1.088  1.991  0.0916  25.1  0.293  1.54 
  2009  SA  1.145  3.268  0.1459  24.4  0.481  2.206 
  2009  RX4  1.067  1.567  0.07265  26.2  0.19  1.317 
  2009  RD4  1.096  4.36  0.10152  20.5  0.598  2.728 
  2009  RB4  1.146  2.132  0.21116  18.1  0.301  1.639 
  2009  RA4  1.251  3.284  0.24616  21.6  0.448  2.268 
  2009  RH2  1.226  3.512  0.22163  21.4  0.483  2.369 
  2009  RT1  1.033  1.28  0.03884  23.6  0.107  1.156 
  2009  RD1  1.191  3.952  0.18705  20.5  0.537  2.572 
  2009  RN  1.098  4.584  0.11679  20  0.614  2.841 
  2009  RM  1.244  4.329  0.24694  18.3  0.553  2.786 
  2009  QB35  1.142  3.427  0.15038  19.9  0.5  2.284 
  2009  QA35  1.167  4.132  0.16675  22.4  0.56  2.649 
  2009  QZ34  1.011  2.535  0.03447  22.5  0.43  1.773 
  2009  QH34  1.011  3.575  0.00683  24.9  0.559  2.293 
  2009  QF34  1.212  3.087  0.20248  22.6  0.436  2.15 
  2009  QD34  1.237  3.632  0.25931  18  0.492  2.435 
  2009  QY33  1.057  1.89  0.22529  19.5  0.283  1.473 
  2009  QF31  1.272  1.697  0.28617  18.3  0.143  1.485 
  2009  QC23  1.01  3.177  0.01369  24.8  0.518  2.093 
  2009  QJ9  1.047  4.399  0.06182  19.4  0.615  2.723 
  2009  QR8  1.161  3.073  0.14889  21.8  0.451  2.117 
  2009  QQ8  1.183  1.786  0.19499  21.3  0.203  1.485 
  2009  QO8  1.239  2.526  0.46141  19.1  0.342  1.882 
  2009  QE8  1.225  3.182  0.25452  18  0.444  2.204 
  2009  QZ6  1.223  1.967  0.28238  17.7  0.233  1.595 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2009  QJ6  1.065  1.7  0.0574  22.6  0.23  1.382 
  2009  QO5  1.216  1.975  0.20664  22.1  0.238  1.595 
  2009  QM5  1.243  2.979  0.23375  22.5  0.411  2.111 
  2009  QL2  1.064  4.155  0.09182  20.9  0.592  2.61 
  2009  QK2  1.148  4.947  0.28273  17.9  0.623  3.047 
  2009  QJ2  1.037  2.52  0.04579  23.5  0.417  1.779 
  2009  QH2  1.162  3.508  0.17836  21.2  0.502  2.335 
  2009  QW1  1.229  4.144  0.21697  21.4  0.543  2.687 
  2009  QT  1.067  1.598  0.07668  23.4  0.199  1.333 
  2009  QO  1.258  3.027  0.27109  20  0.413  2.143 
  2009  QC  1.092  3.125  0.09526  22.3  0.482  2.109 
  2009  PR1  1.024  1.953  0.0169  24.6  0.312  1.489 
  2009  PN  1.277  3.165  0.28651  20.3  0.425  2.221 
  2009  PH  1.217  3.175  0.2138  22.1  0.446  2.196 
  2009  PD  1.051  1.48  0.03758  24.2  0.17  1.266 
  2009  OP9  1.059  2.981  0.11469  19.4  0.476  2.02 
  2009  OZ7  1.236  1.789  0.22986  21  0.183  1.513 
  2009  OW6  1.012  2.901  0.00168  25.4  0.483  1.957 
  2009  OX5  1.001  2.642  0.0556  19.7  0.45  1.821 
  2009  OS5  1.034  1.255  0.03006  24.2  0.097  1.144 
  2009  OC3  1.086  3.018  0.07494  22.3  0.471  2.052 
  2009  OB3  1.261  3.234  0.30566  18.9  0.439  2.248 
  2009  OC  1.182  3.089  0.17918  20.2  0.446  2.135 
  2009  ND1  1.191  4.302  0.28058  16.7  0.566  2.747 
  2009  NH  1.118  3.233  0.13324  18.8  0.486  2.176 
  2009  NA  1.188  4.129  0.26628  17.5  0.553  2.658 
  2009  MC9  1.178  3.221  0.17037  18.1  0.465  2.199 
  2009  MN8  1.019  3.438  0.02725  22.7  0.543  2.228 
  2009  MM8  1.04  2.673  0.03101  24.8  0.44  1.856 
  2009  MZ6  1.263  3.357  0.25333  20.6  0.453  2.31 
  2009  MM1  1.19  3.564  0.20902  21.7  0.499  2.377 
  2009  ML1  1.215  3.092  0.21524  19.5  0.436  2.154 
  2009  MX  1.124  2.158  0.11205  23  0.315  1.641 
  2009  MD  1.099  3.554  0.08904  23  0.528  2.327 
  2009  MA  1.034  2.997  0.06554  21.6  0.487  2.016 
  2009  LQ1  1.118  1.738  0.10775  22  0.217  1.428 
  2009  LX  1.126  4.539  0.11684  19.3  0.602  2.833 
  2009  KJ22  1.187  3.015  0.19015  20  0.435  2.101 
  2009  KT21  1.116  2.225  0.17114  19.7  0.332  1.67 
  2009  KM7  1.15  3.329  0.35024  17.7  0.487  2.239 
  2009  KC7  1.231  4.054  0.21808  19.5  0.534  2.643 
  2009  KT4  1.019  1.535  0.06525  21.8  0.202  1.277 
  2009  KQ4  1.127  1.931  0.14446  20.4  0.263  1.529 
  2009  KO4  1.087  3.822  0.07976  24.4  0.557  2.455 
  2009  KW2  1.016  1.707  0.00447  26.6  0.254  1.362 
  2009  KV2  1.289  2.932  0.29623  19.9  0.389  2.11 
  2009  KL2  1.168  3.232  0.1655  18  0.469  2.2 
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  2009  JR2  1.027  1.484  0.1315  22.7  0.182  1.256 
  2009  JQ2  1.046  2.044  0.19727  21.3  0.323  1.545 
  2009  JK1  1.12  2.772  0.16395  19.9  0.425  1.946 
  2009  JG1  1.262  2.491  0.26598  20.8  0.327  1.876 
  2009  HF88  1.255  3.895  0.47051  19.5  0.512  2.575 
  2009  HB82  1.111  4.412  0.17612  17.8  0.598  2.762 
  2009  HV77  1.041  2.755  0.05313  20.7  0.451  1.898 
  2009  HU77  1.129  2.258  0.12258  23.5  0.333  1.693 
  2009  HM73  1.179  3.626  0.1721  23.1  0.509  2.403 
  2009  HX67  1.046  2.625  0.34824  20.8  0.43  1.836 
  2009  HT58  1.06  1.631  0.0572  25.2  0.212  1.345 
  2009  HY51  1.187  2.235  0.31465  20.7  0.306  1.711 
  2009  HW44  1.084  4.281  0.30817  17.5  0.596  2.683 
  2009  HJ36  1.014  2.131  0.0174  27.9  0.355  1.572 
  2009  HH21  1.033  1.776  0.0287  26.9  0.264  1.405 
  2009  HF21  1.014  3.675  0.01045  26.2  0.567  2.345 
  2009  HB21  1.005  2.461  0.08319  22.9  0.42  1.733 
  2009  HW2  1.054  3.366  0.05218  24  0.523  2.21 
  2009  HU2  1.085  2.116  0.08915  18.4  0.322  1.601 
  2009  HT2  1.056  4.291  0.05196  26.5  0.605  2.673 
  2009  HG  1.061  1.673  0.05248  24.5  0.224  1.367 
  2009  HD  1.078  3.782  0.07571  22.8  0.556  2.43 
  2009  FF44  1.223  3.469  0.22556  23.5  0.479  2.346 
  2009  FR32  1.062  2.502  0.06484  25.1  0.404  1.782 
  2009  FN32  1.176  3.526  0.18984  22.1  0.5  2.351 
  2009  FR30  1.199  2.665  0.28749  20.4  0.379  1.932 
  2009  FY29  1.049  2.331  0.28722  20  0.379  1.69 
  2009  FP29  1.089  2.18  0.09637  24.3  0.334  1.635 
  2009  FN28  1.268  4.006  0.39573  19.3  0.519  2.637 
  2009  FV23  1.018  2.495  0.01998  25.9  0.42  1.757 
  2009  FS23  1.054  3.028  0.0595  25.3  0.483  2.041 
  2009  FE19  1.002  1.489  0.03726  26.9  0.195  1.245 
  2009  FB5  1.133  2.913  0.13849  22.7  0.44  2.023 
  2009  FA5  1.024  3.616  0.02984  26  0.559  2.32 
  2009  FT4  1.207  4.138  0.2538  20.7  0.548  2.672 
  2009  FS4  1.028  3.908  0.02544  25.1  0.584  2.468 
  2009  FQ  1.027  2.644  0.03709  25.7  0.441  1.836 
  2009  FA  1.175  4.063  0.19986  18.6  0.551  2.619 
  2009  EQ2  1.221  3.622  0.2295  20.8  0.496  2.421 
  2009  EM1  1.092  3.969  0.10023  22.8  0.569  2.531 
  2009  EE1  1.069  3.556  0.0761  25.4  0.538  2.313 
  2009  ED1  1.193  2.822  0.19848  19.7  0.406  2.007 
  2009  EA1  1.064  2.185  0.0806  25.8  0.345  1.625 
  2009  EZ  1.133  3.538  0.23092  20.5  0.515  2.336 
  2009  EX  1.008  2.328  0.11906  23.4  0.396  1.668 
  2009  ET  1.006  1.879  0.02378  27.3  0.303  1.442 
  2009  ER  1.005  2.781  0.0293  25  0.469  1.893 
  2009  EQ  1.044  4.597  0.22552  18.7  0.63  2.82 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2009  EC  1.124  2.412  0.20557  18.7  0.364  1.768 
  2009  DL46  1.011  1.901  0.01305  21.6  0.305  1.456 
  2009  DK46  1.282  3.97  0.53064  18.2  0.512  2.626 
  2009  DN45  1.025  2.872  0.03313  24.7  0.474  1.948 
  2009  DB45  1.168  3.075  0.35058  19.1  0.45  2.121 
  2009  DA45  1.276  3.225  0.28466  22.4  0.433  2.25 
  2009  DZ42  1.019  3.871  0.03605  19.6  0.583  2.445 
  2009  DV42  1.17  2.059  0.19411  18.6  0.275  1.615 
  2009  DS36  1.028  1.715  0.04588  25.7  0.251  1.372 
  2009  DG9  1.237  4.67  0.30283  21.1  0.581  2.953 
  2009  DO4  1.142  4.234  0.18865  21.3  0.575  2.688 
  2009  DO1  1.059  2.858  0.06992  23.1  0.459  1.959 
  2009  DN1  1.031  1.854  0.06139  20.3  0.286  1.442 
  2009  DM1  1.045  4.748  0.11418  17.1  0.639  2.897 
  2009  DL1  1.198  3.284  0.19833  19  0.465  2.241 
  2009  DF1  1.175  2.785  0.18532  20.6  0.407  1.98 
  2009  DD1  1.141  1.342  0.19703  20.3  0.081  1.242 
  2009  DZ  1.014  1.89  0.04425  21.4  0.301  1.452 
  2009  DX  1.031  3.815  0.06061  24.7  0.575  2.423 
  2009  DW  1.011  2.786  0.02362  26  0.467  1.899 
  2009  DD  1.023  3.034  0.03439  25.4  0.496  2.028 
  2009  CV5  1.003  2.974  0.00889  24.8  0.496  1.988 
  2009  CO5  1.086  2.228  0.09603  21.8  0.345  1.657 
  2009  CR4  1.02  2.488  0.07032  21.7  0.419  1.754 
  2009  CC3  1.026  3.383  0.03474  19.1  0.535  2.205 
  2009  CR2  1.105  5.038  0.10531  16.7  0.64  3.071 
  2009  CY1  1.229  1.618  0.24546  22.9  0.137  1.423 
  2009  CX1  1.182  4.435  0.20076  23.4  0.579  2.808 
  2009  CW1  1.172  3.418  0.21911  21.7  0.489  2.295 
  2009  CU1  1.198  3.305  0.2079  22.5  0.468  2.251 
  2009  CT1  1.051  3.196  0.07137  24.2  0.505  2.124 
  2009  CR1  1.014  2.411  0.0619  24.6  0.408  1.712 
  2009  CQ1  1.048  3.017  0.11498  20.7  0.484  2.033 
  2009  CR  1.072  2.358  0.09121  25.7  0.375  1.715 
  2009  BJ81  1.009  2.695  0.09973  18.4  0.455  1.852 
  2009  BH81  1.183  2.08  0.40534  19.6  0.275  1.632 
  2009  BK71  1.134  2.51  0.36798  19.5  0.378  1.822 
  2009  BA71  1.218  2.061  0.23022  20.7  0.257  1.64 
  2009  BN58  1.03  1.702  0.04707  25.8  0.246  1.366 
  2009  BM58  1.045  4.033  0.07135  24.2  0.588  2.539 
  2009  BC58  1.187  3.417  0.19911  18.8  0.484  2.302 
  2009  BD11  1.053  4.21  0.07026  26.1  0.6  2.632 
  2009  BB11  1.171  1.578  0.26524  19.4  0.148  1.375 
  2009  BT5  1.153  1.494  0.25247  20.6  0.129  1.324 
  2009  BM2  1.183  4.278  0.20281  19.9  0.567  2.731 
  2009  BL2  1.035  3.97  0.09393  19.5  0.586  2.503 
  2009  BE2  1.008  2.111  0.0593  18.9  0.353  1.559 
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  2009  BF  1.265  2.388  0.2568  18.6  0.308  1.826 
  2009  AF16  1.182  3.193  0.19781  21.2  0.46  2.188 
  2009  AD16  1.059  4.186  0.08485  20.6  0.596  2.622 
  2009  AL15  1.093  1.509  0.20648  21.3  0.16  1.301 
  2009  AU  1.155  1.897  0.24146  20.9  0.243  1.526 
  2009  AT  1.209  7.314  0.28386  21  0.716  4.262 
  2009  AS  1.201  3.372  0.22887  18.2  0.475  2.287 
  2009  AN  1.027  3.785  0.28127  20.6  0.573  2.406 
  2009  AM  1.249  4.758  0.26901  21.4  0.584  3.003 
Rees  3239  T‐2  1.296  4.011  0.52853  15.6  0.511  2.653 
  4788  P‐L  1.155  4.105  0.24639  16.5  0.561  2.63 
ATENS3 
 
Name  Designation  q  Q  E‐ MOID  H  e  a 
Hathor  1976  UA  0.465  1.224  0.00714  19.2  0.45  0.844 
Aten  1976  AA  0.79  1.143  0.11253  16.8  0.183  0.967 
Ra‐Shalom  1978  RA  0.469  1.195  0.15024  16.05  0.437  0.832 
Khufu  1984  QA  0.526  1.453  0.01396  18.3  0.469  0.989 
Cruithne  1986  TO  0.484  1.511  0.07211  15.6  0.515  0.998 
Amun  1986  EB  0.701  1.247  0.25089  15.82  0.28  0.974 
  1989  VA  0.295  1.162  0.15556  17.9  0.595  0.728 
  1989  UQ  0.673  1.158  0.01406  19.4  0.265  0.915 
  1990  VA  0.71  1.261  0.12188  19.7  0.279  0.986 
  1991  VE  0.299  1.483  0.05788  18.2  0.665  0.891 
Sekhmet  1991  JY  0.667  1.228  0.11344  16.5  0.296  0.947 
  1992  BF  0.661  1.155  0.06285  19.8  0.272  0.908 
  1992  FE  0.551  1.302  0.03419  16.4  0.405  0.927 
  1993  VD  0.393  1.359  0.01692  21.6  0.551  0.876 
  1993  DA  0.848  1.023  0.03395  26.4  0.093  0.936 
  1994  XL1  0.318  1.024  0.03613  20.9  0.526  0.671 
  1994  WR12  0.457  1.057  0.00182  22  0.397  0.757 
  1994  GL  0.339  1.028  0.01264  24.4  0.504  0.683 
  1994  TF2  0.711  1.275  0.25544  19.2  0.284  0.993 
  1995  CR  0.119  1.696  0.01298  21.5  0.869  0.907 
  1996  XZ12  0.49  1.472  0.00605  25.5  0.501  0.981 
  1996  BG1  0.645  1.15  0.02627  23.5  0.281  0.897 
  1997  UH9  0.436  1.224  0.22416  18.7  0.475  0.83 
                                                           
 
3 IAU Minor Planet Centre, List of Aten Minor Planets (2009), at 
<http://www.cfa.harvard.edu/iau/lists/Atens.html>, 19 November 2009, last accessed on 19 
November 2009. Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  1997  AC11  0.577  1.249  0.10315  20.5  0.368  0.913 
  1997  NC1  0.685  1.046  0.01849  17.9  0.208  0.866 
Selqet  1997  MW1  0.613  1.262  0.11369  19.1  0.346  0.938 
  1998  XN17  0.776  1.188  0.05608  22.8  0.21  0.982 
  1998  XX2  0.469  1.014  0.01593  19.9  0.367  0.741 
  1998  VF32  0.473  1.229  0.03652  21.1  0.444  0.851 
  1998  SZ27  0.448  1.358  0.00817  20.5  0.504  0.903 
  1998  ST27  0.385  1.254  0.0101  19.5  0.53  0.819 
  1998  SD9  0.348  1.057  0.01  24.2  0.505  0.703 
  1998  SV4  0.292  1.341  0.33699  18.1  0.642  0.816 
  1998  SO  0.22  1.242  0.19956  20.6  0.699  0.731 
  1998  HD14  0.662  1.265  0.03367  20.9  0.313  0.963 
  1998  HE3  0.491  1.265  0.00344  21.8  0.441  0.878 
  1998  DK36  0.392  0.98  0.00879  24.9  0.428  0.686 
  1998  VR  0.597  1.154  0.15198  18.6  0.318  0.876 
  1998  SD15  0.611  1.254  0.1119  19.1  0.345  0.933 
  1998  DG16  0.575  1.218  0.18813  19.8  0.358  0.897 
  1998  XE12  0.229  1.527  0.11158  19.1  0.739  0.878 
  1998  XB  0.589  1.227  0.11428  16.2  0.351  0.908 
  1998  UP1  0.654  1.343  0.0848  20.5  0.345  0.998 
  1998  TU3  0.406  1.168  0.07287  14.5  0.484  0.787 
  1998  RO1  0.277  1.704  0.09204  18.1  0.72  0.991 
  1998  WT24  0.418  1.019  0.01005  17.9  0.418  0.718 
  1999  VX25  0.774  1.026  0.00619  26.7  0.14  0.9 
  1999  VW25  0.825  1.033  0.04301  25.3  0.112  0.929 
  1999  MN  0.226  1.122  0.00555  21.4  0.665  0.674 
  1999  LK1  0.605  1.209  0.02866  22.1  0.333  0.907 
  1999  AO10  0.81  1.013  0.02129  23.9  0.111  0.912 
  1999  AQ10  0.714  1.154  0.0058  20.4  0.236  0.934 
  1999  YK5  0.366  1.292  0.1144  16.6  0.558  0.829 
  1999  HF1  0.44  1.198  0.17328  14.5  0.462  0.819 
  1999  JD6  0.324  1.441  0.04776  17.1  0.633  0.883 
  1999  FK21  0.219  1.258  0.07059  18.1  0.703  0.739 
  1999  LT7  0.366  1.345  0.05894  19.7  0.572  0.855 
  1999  KW4  0.2  1.084  0.01422  16.5  0.688  0.642 
  2000  YS134  0.664  1.05  0.02859  23.1  0.225  0.857 
  2000  WP19  0.608  1.101  0.00385  22.6  0.289  0.854 
  2000  WC1  0.648  1.111  0.00305  22.3  0.263  0.88 
  2000  UR16  0.508  1.301  0.01293  23.9  0.439  0.904 
  2000  UK11  0.663  1.102  0.00427  25.3  0.249  0.883 
  2000  SG344  0.912  1.043  0.00081  24.7  0.067  0.977 
  2000  SZ162  0.774  1.086  0.00215  27.3  0.168  0.93 
  2000  SP43  0.433  1.19  0.0184  18.6  0.467  0.811 
  2000  RN77  0.648  1.254  0.10824  19.4  0.318  0.951 
  2000  RH60  0.371  1.281  0.17602  20  0.551  0.826 
  2000  OK8  0.767  1.202  0.13599  20.2  0.221  0.985 
  2000  LG6  0.816  1.019  0.00447  29  0.111  0.917 
  2000  HO40  0.345  1.137  0.04006  22.1  0.535  0.741 Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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  2000  HB24  0.465  1.166  0.01591  23.3  0.43  0.815 
  2000  EZ106  0.515  1.358  0.06581  20.5  0.45  0.937 
  2000  EW70  0.637  1.239  0.00991  21.2  0.321  0.938 
  2000  EM26  0.433  1.199  0.01908  22.4  0.47  0.816 
  2000  ED14  0.362  1.308  0.03579  20.8  0.567  0.835 
  2000  EB14  0.449  1.343  0.03069  23  0.499  0.896 
  2000  CH59  0.498  1.229  0.02328  19.9  0.423  0.863 
  2000  AZ93  0.478  1.016  0.02192  20.6  0.36  0.747 
  2000  AC6  0.609  1.098  0.04632  21.3  0.286  0.854 
  2000  UH11  0.503  1.238  0.22529  19.6  0.422  0.87 
  2000  PJ5  0.547  1.199  0.17697  17.5  0.374  0.873 
  2000  ET70  0.83  1.064  0.0299  18.3  0.124  0.947 
  2000  BM19  0.475  1.007  0.08305  18.1  0.359  0.741 
  2000  AF6  0.517  1.239  0.02368  20.2  0.411  0.878 
  2000  WO107  0.2  1.623  0.00332  19.3  0.781  0.911 
  2000  EA107  0.506  1.353  0.16132  16.2  0.456  0.93 
  2000  GD2  0.397  1.119  0.07196  19.1  0.477  0.758 
  2000  EE14  0.309  1.015  0.02291  17  0.533  0.662 
  2000  BD19  0.092  1.661  0.09074  17.2  0.895  0.876 
  2000  NL10  0.167  1.661  0.35571  15.8  0.817  0.914 
  2000  SY2  0.307  1.411  0.04552  16.1  0.643  0.859 
  2000  QP  0.455  1.24  0.20372  17.6  0.463  0.847 
  2000  FO10  0.348  1.37  0.13306  17.4  0.595  0.859 
  2000  CK33  0.566  1.37  0.12545  18.2  0.415  0.968 
  2001  YE4  0.311  1.043  0.0315  20.9  0.541  0.677 
  2001  XY10  0.534  1.209  0.0582  19.2  0.387  0.872 
  2001  WF49  0.471  1.031  0.04382  22.1  0.373  0.751 
  2001  UP  0.63  1.138  0.00681  25.7  0.287  0.884 
  2001  TD45  0.177  1.416  0.02656  20  0.777  0.797 
  2001  TX44  0.397  1.352  0.00894  19.1  0.546  0.875 
  2001  TW1  0.432  1.39  0.14945  19.2  0.526  0.911 
  2001  TD  0.796  1.113  0.00621  25.1  0.166  0.954 
  2001  SQ263  0.482  1.414  0.03189  22.6  0.491  0.948 
  2001  RY47  0.55  1.263  0.08275  19.5  0.393  0.906 
  2001  RV17  0.601  1.227  0.09791  20.2  0.342  0.914 
  2001  RU17  0.728  1.19  0.10939  21.1  0.241  0.959 
  2001  OT  0.632  1.236  0.06348  21.6  0.323  0.934 
  2001  HC  0.438  1.311  0.10512  18.9  0.499  0.875 
  2001  FO127  0.747  1.03  0.01781  27.5  0.159  0.889 
  2001  FR85  0.955  1.01  0.00189  24.8  0.028  0.983 
  2001  FZ57  0.374  1.515  0.15751  18.6  0.604  0.944 
  2001  ED18  0.932  1.046  0.02435  24.5  0.057  0.989 
  2001  CQ36  0.774  1.105  0.01388  22.6  0.176  0.94 
  2001  CP36  0.424  1.006  0.01116  23.7  0.407  0.715 
  2001  CK32  0.448  1.003  0.07686  18.9  0.382  0.726 
  2001  BB16  0.707  1.002  0.00476  23.2  0.172  0.854 
  2001  BA16  0.811  1.07  0.00038  26  0.138  0.94 
  2001  BE10  0.519  1.127  0.0415  19.1  0.369  0.823 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2001  HY7  0.537  1.29  0.03558  20.5  0.412  0.914 
  2001  XU1  0.362  1.233  0.0568  19.3  0.546  0.797 
  2001  QP153  0.701  1.082  0.0718  17  0.214  0.892 
  2001  TD2  0.499  1.425  0.18572  19  0.481  0.962 
  2001  AF2  0.386  1.522  0.17252  19.1  0.595  0.954 
  2001  KB67  0.597  1.328  0.01347  19.9  0.38  0.963 
  2002  XS90  0.613  1.005  0.02113  22.8  0.242  0.809 
  2002  XY38  0.712  1.108  0.00335  23.1  0.218  0.91 
  2002  XP37  0.612  1.298  0.10344  20.7  0.359  0.955 
  2002  XB  0.691  1.121  0.12985  21.7  0.237  0.906 
  2002  VX91  0.786  1.183  0.00142  24.3  0.201  0.984 
  2002  VE68  0.427  1.021  0.02663  20.3  0.411  0.724 
  2002  VV17  0.472  1.203  0.08729  20  0.437  0.837 
  2002  UA31  0.41  1.188  0.19302  19  0.487  0.799 
  2002  TZ66  0.818  1.042  0.00514  25.9  0.121  0.93 
  2002  SP  0.361  1.448  0.19538  20.7  0.601  0.905 
  2002  RW25  0.589  1.062  0.01595  18.9  0.286  0.825 
  2002  RR25  0.667  1.267  0.14101  20.9  0.31  0.967 
  2002  QY6  0.246  1.388  0.10554  19.5  0.699  0.817 
  2002  OA22  0.709  1.164  0.0355  19.4  0.243  0.936 
  2002  LT38  0.58  1.11  0.03481  20.4  0.314  0.845 
  2002  LT24  0.363  1.077  0.01137  22.1  0.496  0.72 
  2002  LY1  0.593  1.317  0.01165  21.9  0.379  0.955 
  2002  JR100  0.649  1.2  0.01839  24.4  0.298  0.925 
  2002  JW15  0.659  1.138  0.11644  20.2  0.266  0.899 
  2002  JX8  0.535  1.005  0.01941  20.3  0.305  0.77 
  2002  GQ  0.477  1.057  0.00205  26.3  0.378  0.767 
  2002  FT6  0.531  1.445  0.04103  22.4  0.463  0.988 
  2002  FT5  0.677  1.258  0.16463  21.9  0.3  0.967 
  2002  FW1  0.542  1.105  0.00845  24  0.342  0.823 
  2002  EM7  0.587  1.256  0.00002  24.4  0.363  0.921 
  2002  CC14  0.489  1.15  0.01026  24.8  0.403  0.82 
  2002  CW11  0.67  1.061  0.01105  26.1  0.226  0.865 
  2002  BN  0.397  1.353  0.08983  20.4  0.546  0.875 
  2002  AA29  0.98  1.006  0.01216  24.1  0.013  0.993 
  2002  AO11  0.768  1.066  0.00275  22.4  0.162  0.917 
  2002  AB2  0.515  1.167  0.04939  23.3  0.388  0.841 
  2002  AY1  0.438  1.12  0.00758  20.8  0.438  0.779 
  2002  AX1  0.403  1.357  0.15995  19.6  0.542  0.88 
  2002  MQ3  0.663  1.164  0.13598  18.2  0.274  0.914 
  2002  AU4  0.536  1.175  0.08915  19  0.374  0.856 
  2002  JC  0.499  1.139  0.09123  17.3  0.391  0.819 
  2002  NN4  0.496  1.257  0.00723  20  0.434  0.877 
  2002  FB3  0.303  1.22  0.00353  16.3  0.602  0.761 
  2002  GB  0.467  1.517  0.28077  19  0.529  0.992 
  2002  EZ16  0.4  1.444  0.17686  18.3  0.566  0.922 
  2002  DB4  0.541  1.174  0.15281  16.4  0.369  0.858 
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  2002  CD  0.807  1.152  0.07302  20.5  0.177  0.98 
  2003  YG136  0.625  1.312  0.01199  25.3  0.355  0.969 
  2003  YN107  0.975  1.003  0.00548  26.5  0.014  0.989 
  2003  YS17  0.639  1.222  0.03046  21.7  0.313  0.931 
  2003  YX1  0.645  1.114  0.01182  20.9  0.267  0.88 
  2003  YR1  0.494  1.303  0.06619  22.2  0.45  0.898 
  2003  YJ  0.745  1.116  0.12052  20.4  0.199  0.931 
  2003  WT153  0.735  1.053  0.00178  28  0.178  0.894 
  2003  WU21  0.414  1.405  0.06963  22  0.545  0.909 
  2003  UT55  0.834  1.125  0.00784  26.8  0.149  0.979 
  2003  UC20  0.518  1.044  0.03432  18.1  0.337  0.781 
  2003  UY12  0.294  1.113  0.01216  23.6  0.582  0.703 
  2003  TL4  0.48  1.073  0.02501  19.4  0.382  0.777 
  2003  TG2  0.621  1.195  0.19503  21.6  0.316  0.908 
  2003  SW130  0.615  1.152  0.00107  29.1  0.304  0.884 
  2003  RU11  0.726  1.052  0.00656  25.5  0.183  0.889 
  2003  NZ6  0.403  1.184  0.06538  19  0.492  0.793 
  2003  LN6  0.677  1.037  0.00047  24.7  0.21  0.857 
  2003  LH  0.817  1.104  0.00583  25.2  0.15  0.96 
  2003  KZ18  0.635  1.262  0.16017  21  0.33  0.949 
  2003  KO2  0.356  1.099  0.00204  20.2  0.511  0.727 
  2003  HT42  0.602  1.028  0.01316  24.8  0.262  0.815 
  2003  HM  0.593  1.033  0.00775  22.2  0.27  0.813 
  2003  HB  0.526  1.173  0.04563  19.7  0.381  0.85 
  2003  GQ22  0.714  1.031  0.02526  21.5  0.182  0.872 
  2003  GS  0.698  1.088  0.0873  19  0.218  0.893 
  2003  FY6  0.305  1.155  0.00355  22.4  0.582  0.73 
  2003  FU3  0.52  1.197  0.08238  20.9  0.394  0.858 
  2003  FK1  0.363  1.051  0.01398  23  0.486  0.707 
  2003  EO16  0.701  1.168  0.137  20.6  0.25  0.935 
  2003  EM1  0.908  1.007  0.01046  24.5  0.052  0.958 
  2003  CA4  0.81  1.03  0.04138  23.6  0.12  0.92 
  2003  AF23  0.502  1.248  0.03285  20.7  0.426  0.875 
  2003  AK18  0.54  1.213  0.0568  19.7  0.384  0.876 
  2003  WP25  0.87  1.11  0.02299  24.2  0.121  0.99 
  2003  SD220  0.654  1.002  0.01832  17  0.21  0.828 
Atira  2003  CP20  0.502  0.98  0.20713  16.4  0.322  0.741 
  2004  YA5  0.375  1.243  0.05199  22.6  0.537  0.809 
  2004  YD  0.64  1.045  0.05582  24  0.24  0.843 
  2004  YC  0.596  1.14  0.00341  25.6  0.313  0.868 
  2004  XY60  0.13  1.15  0.1943  18.9  0.797  0.64 
  2004  XN14  0.683  1.18  0.00328  20  0.266  0.932 
  2004  XL14  0.448  1.071  0.02741  21.2  0.41  0.76 
  2004  XK14  0.424  1.073  0.02539  22.3  0.434  0.749 
  2004  XJ  0.736  1.038  0.04255  24  0.17  0.887 
  2004  XG  0.587  1.087  0.01324  24.2  0.298  0.837 
  2004  WC1  0.71  1.003  0.01515  26.1  0.171  0.857 
  2004  VJ1  0.788  1.099  0.01376  24.3  0.165  0.944 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2004  VZ  0.711  1.171  0.00373  24.6  0.245  0.941 
  2004  UT1  0.751  1.178  0.00558  26.6  0.221  0.965 
  2004  UH1  0.575  1.333  0.00214  28.1  0.397  0.954 
  2004  TN20  0.702  1.191  0.02248  24.9  0.258  0.946 
  2004  TP13  0.818  1.134  0.08184  23.1  0.162  0.976 
  2004  TR12  0.707  1.083  0.09465  18.2  0.21  0.895 
  2004  TD10  0.419  1.083  0.01212  22.1  0.443  0.751 
  2004  TA1  0.681  1.135  0.09118  23.1  0.25  0.908 
  2004  SC56  0.438  1.096  0.01102  22.9  0.429  0.767 
  2004  SB56  0.66  1.072  0.05194  19.2  0.238  0.866 
  2004  SW26  0.431  1.045  0.04237  25.7  0.416  0.738 
  2004  SD20  0.468  1.282  0.18027  18.1  0.465  0.875 
  2004  ST2  0.776  1.133  0.04763  24.2  0.187  0.955 
  2004  RO111  0.645  1.278  0.02333  23.4  0.329  0.961 
  2004  RX10  0.597  1.243  0.05207  21.3  0.351  0.92 
  2004  RU10  0.31  1.498  0.10527  18.2  0.657  0.904 
  2004  QA22  0.835  1.067  0.0043  27.9  0.122  0.951 
  2004  QD14  0.624  1.261  0.01385  20.6  0.338  0.942 
  2004  QG13  0.784  1.118  0.10503  21.4  0.175  0.951 
  2004  QB3  0.554  1.346  0.02067  24.4  0.417  0.95 
  2004  MD6  0.416  1.486  0.0079  20.5  0.563  0.951 
  2004  LO2  0.593  1.237  0.01427  25  0.352  0.915 
  2004  KH17  0.357  1.067  0.0028  22  0.499  0.712 
  2004  KH15  0.798  1.125  0.10714  19.7  0.17  0.961 
  2004  KG1  0.492  1.169  0.00357  24.1  0.407  0.83 
  2004  JX20  0.662  1.141  0.09571  19.5  0.266  0.901 
  2004  JW20  0.418  1.488  0.09922  20.6  0.561  0.953 
  2004  JG6  0.298  0.973  0.03862  18.9  0.531  0.635 
  2004  HT59  0.761  1.199  0.00703  27.2  0.223  0.98 
  2004  HC  0.317  1.262  0.09318  19.9  0.599  0.789 
  2004  GP  0.356  1.037  0.21172  19.4  0.488  0.697 
  2004  FU162  0.503  1.151  0.00006  28.7  0.392  0.827 
  2004  FJ29  0.595  1.232  0.13254  21.4  0.349  0.913 
  2004  FG29  0.446  1.311  0.00984  26  0.493  0.879 
  2004  FM17  0.665  1.107  0.06023  19.3  0.25  0.886 
  2004  FH  0.581  1.055  0.00002  25.7  0.289  0.818 
  2004  ER21  0.746  1.054  0.04143  24.4  0.171  0.9 
  2004  EL20  0.594  1.034  0.00702  26.7  0.27  0.814 
  2004  EU9  0.436  1.325  0.16795  18.9  0.505  0.88 
  2004  DA53  0.593  1.174  0.00261  28  0.329  0.884 
  2004  DH2  0.566  1.322  0.12558  20.3  0.4  0.944 
  2004  BT58  0.591  1.331  0.07848  22.1  0.385  0.961 
  2004  BY1  0.688  1.08  0.02132  24.5  0.222  0.884 
  2004  XZ130  0.337  0.898  0.09413  20.4  0.454  0.618 
  2004  EW  0.713  1.266  0.02451  20.8  0.28  0.989 
  2004  VG64  0.334  1.603  0.02884  18.3  0.655  0.968 
Apophis  2004  MN4  0.746  1.099  0.00003  19.2  0.191  0.922 
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  2005  YU128  0.524  1.02  0.02282  25.3  0.322  0.772 
  2005  YO128  0.578  1.065  0.01447  24.6  0.297  0.821 
  2005  YQ96  0.496  0.992  0.01905  20.5  0.333  0.744 
  2005  YR3  0.595  1.041  0.01115  23.1  0.273  0.818 
  2005  YO3  0.477  1.043  0.01687  25.1  0.372  0.76 
  2005  YS  0.32  1.102  0.03028  19.7  0.55  0.711 
  2005  XV77  0.459  1.109  0.09652  20.7  0.414  0.784 
  2005  XT77  0.617  1.065  0.02651  20.9  0.266  0.841 
  2005  XZ7  0.658  1.278  0.04907  24.2  0.32  0.968 
  2005  WS3  0.285  1.058  0.06544  21.2  0.576  0.672 
  2005  VN5  0.724  1.165  0.00032  27  0.233  0.945 
  2005  VL1  0.69  1.091  0.00002  27  0.225  0.891 
  2005  VK1  0.425  1.058  0.06665  22.6  0.426  0.741 
  2005  UV64  0.847  1.069  0.02604  26.5  0.116  0.958 
  2005  UL5  0.403  1.471  0.00586  20.2  0.57  0.937 
  2005  UE1  0.741  1.045  0.00195  26.2  0.17  0.893 
  2005  TH50  0.65  1.026  0.00149  28  0.225  0.838 
  2005  TG50  0.8  1.047  0.014  24.8  0.134  0.924 
  2005  TE49  0.599  1.298  0.00857  26.7  0.368  0.949 
  2005  TQ45  0.634  1.02  0.02014  25.6  0.233  0.827 
  2005  TG45  0.428  0.935  0.19578  17.6  0.372  0.681 
  2005  TM  0.49  1.192  0.02393  24.7  0.417  0.841 
  2005  SP9  0.326  1.405  0.05038  21.2  0.624  0.866 
  2005  RB3  0.532  1.223  0.04942  22.6  0.394  0.877 
  2005  QQ87  0.697  1.302  0.08052  22.7  0.303  0.999 
  2005  QP11  0.804  1.147  0.01077  26.4  0.176  0.976 
  2005  QC5  0.568  1.219  0.04738  19.7  0.365  0.893 
  2005  OU1  0.664  1.288  0.12793  20.1  0.32  0.976 
  2005  NJ63  0.502  1.236  0.21966  21  0.422  0.869 
  2005  NW44  0.403  1.156  0.05421  20.4  0.483  0.779 
  2005  NE21  0.398  1.181  0.05703  21.3  0.496  0.789 
  2005  MO13  0.509  1.218  0.04263  20.7  0.411  0.864 
  2005  MR5  0.601  1.105  0.08138  20.5  0.296  0.853 
  2005  MF5  0.496  1.111  0.08225  21.7  0.382  0.804 
  2005  MB  0.204  1.766  0.06746  17.1  0.793  0.985 
  2005  KA  0.66  1.021  0.01135  24.7  0.215  0.84 
  2005  HN3  0.568  1.142  0.079  21.2  0.335  0.855 
  2005  GZ128  0.822  1.081  0.01843  25.8  0.136  0.952 
  2005  GB120  0.479  1.104  0.07305  20.5  0.395  0.791 
  2005  GE60  0.723  1.195  0.00475  22.1  0.246  0.959 
  2005  GR33  0.48  1.078  0.01247  22  0.383  0.779 
  2005  GO21  0.497  1.009  0.0428  16.4  0.34  0.753 
  2005  FN  0.625  1.241  0.00102  26.9  0.33  0.933 
  2005  FC  0.669  1.168  0.02418  24.4  0.272  0.918 
  2005  ES70  0.468  1.058  0.05288  23.6  0.387  0.763 
  2005  EP1  0.206  1.575  0.01256  23.7  0.768  0.891 
  2005  CN61  0.922  1.057  0.02123  25.3  0.068  0.989 
  2005  BO1  0.611  1.287  0.15041  21.7  0.356  0.949 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2005  BU  0.592  1.101  0.01488  26.7  0.301  0.847 
  2005  BE  0.512  1.256  0.23208  20.1  0.421  0.884 
  2005  AY28  0.375  1.37  0.03574  21.6  0.57  0.872 
  2005  WJ56  0.813  1.105  0.02256  18.1  0.152  0.959 
  2005  EK70  0.83  1.09  0.09639  17.4  0.135  0.96 
  2005  SG  0.703  1.259  0.20275  19  0.283  0.981 
  2006  YF13  0.548  1.29  0.08141  20  0.403  0.919 
  2006  YM  0.787  1.009  0.02314  24.4  0.123  0.898 
  2006  XP4  0.686  1.059  0.00411  23.9  0.214  0.872 
  2006  XO4  0.586  1.092  0.02755  23.4  0.301  0.839 
  2006  XX2  0.681  1.288  0.01708  25.1  0.308  0.984 
  2006  WR127  0.566  1.248  0.19115  20.5  0.376  0.907 
  2006  WE4  0.641  0.928  0.10103  18.8  0.183  0.785 
  2006  WO3  0.442  1.158  0.13233  21.4  0.447  0.8 
  2006  WY2  0.656  1.311  0.25391  18.5  0.333  0.983 
  2006  WX1  0.642  1.192  0.02882  19.6  0.3  0.917 
  2006  WV1  0.589  1.068  0.00996  25.9  0.289  0.828 
  2006  WB  0.696  1.003  0.00532  22.8  0.181  0.85 
  2006  VB14  0.444  1.09  0.07864  18.5  0.421  0.767 
  2006  VG13  0.569  1.066  0.04551  21.4  0.304  0.818 
  2006  VY2  0.556  1.229  0.07552  22.7  0.377  0.892 
  2006  VX2  0.662  1.206  0.02268  24.9  0.291  0.934 
  2006  UZ215  0.706  1.074  0.01096  25.5  0.207  0.89 
  2006  UL185  0.421  1.268  0.20326  21.3  0.502  0.844 
  2006  UY64  0.785  1.078  0.05477  19.5  0.158  0.931 
  2006  TU7  0.451  1.251  0.02262  21.9  0.47  0.851 
  2006  TS7  0.398  1.496  0.01549  21.2  0.58  0.947 
  2006  TL  0.566  1.314  0.04531  24  0.398  0.94 
  2006  SU217  0.813  1.158  0.02606  25.4  0.175  0.986 
  2006  SF77  0.619  1.225  0.06198  21.6  0.329  0.922 
  2006  SP19  0.623  1.139  0.04547  24.2  0.293  0.881 
  2006  SF6  0.683  1.215  0.01897  19.9  0.281  0.949 
  2006  SE6  0.527  1.083  0.03719  22.9  0.345  0.805 
  2006  RO36  0.697  1.115  0.11028  17.9  0.231  0.906 
  2006  RJ1  0.665  1.237  0.00142  22.2  0.301  0.951 
  2006  QQ56  0.94  1.03  0.01642  25.9  0.046  0.985 
  2006  QQ23  0.575  1.032  0.03304  20  0.285  0.804 
  2006  NL  0.36  1.336  0.05733  19.7  0.576  0.848 
  2006  MD12  0.331  1.346  0.22812  19.4  0.605  0.839 
  2006  KZ39  0.292  0.939  0.06855  20.2  0.525  0.616 
  2006  JF42  0.281  1.063  0.00266  19  0.582  0.672 
  2006  HV50  0.627  1.07  0.03327  23.6  0.261  0.849 
  2006  HR29  0.726  1.245  0.09448  20.7  0.263  0.985 
  2006  HV5  0.576  1.116  0.01519  19.2  0.32  0.846 
  2006  GB  0.787  1.131  0.01043  20.3  0.179  0.959 
  2006  FH36  0.765  1.144  0.01657  22.9  0.198  0.955 
  2006  FK  0.606  1.239  0.19391  21.3  0.343  0.922 
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  2006  DS14  0.573  1.155  0.15614  20.3  0.337  0.864 
  2006  CJ  0.166  1.187  0.02551  20.1  0.755  0.676 
  2006  BX147  0.259  1.313  0.03748  21.4  0.67  0.786 
  2006  BQ147  0.474  1.166  0.07044  18.9  0.422  0.82 
  2006  BA9  0.578  1.247  0.07254  22.7  0.366  0.913 
  2006  AM4  0.345  1.619  0.01103  21.8  0.649  0.982 
  2006  US216  0.278  0.995  0.04368  19.8  0.563  0.637 
  2007  YS56  0.675  1.21  0.00288  25.7  0.284  0.942 
  2007  YF  0.839  1.067  0.01471  24.8  0.12  0.953 
  2007  XP  0.719  1.255  0.02006  23.7  0.271  0.987 
  2007  WC5  0.768  1.178  0.01561  27.3  0.21  0.973 
  2007  WM3  0.454  1.134  0.02264  23.1  0.428  0.794 
  2007  VL243  0.262  1.668  0.39009  17.8  0.729  0.965 
  2007  VB188  0.684  1.08  0.04064  26.3  0.225  0.882 
  2007  VB138  0.44  1.105  0.02415  26.1  0.431  0.772 
  2007  VY137  0.551  1.246  0.04365  24.2  0.386  0.899 
  2007  VW83  0.704  1.098  0.06557  24.1  0.219  0.901 
  2007  VV83  0.872  1.061  0.04036  24.7  0.098  0.966 
  2007  VL8  0.6  1.273  0.11085  21.2  0.359  0.936 
  2007  VU6  0.888  1.065  0.01199  26.5  0.091  0.976 
  2007  VD3  0.826  1.118  0.12954  22.2  0.15  0.972 
  2007  VZ2  0.802  1.171  0.02087  24.7  0.187  0.987 
  2007  US12  0.44  1.372  0.01413  22.1  0.515  0.906 
  2007  UP6  0.877  1.059  0.01592  23  0.094  0.968 
  2007  UT3  0.464  1.081  0.00032  25.9  0.399  0.772 
  2007  UY1  0.784  1.117  0.00563  22.9  0.175  0.95 
  2007  UW1  0.798  1.017  0.00049  22.7  0.121  0.907 
  2007  US  0.408  1.505  0.09708  22.7  0.573  0.956 
  2007  TN74  0.625  1.167  0.04968  25.6  0.303  0.896 
  2007  TR68  0.65  1.101  0.02788  25.9  0.258  0.875 
  2007  TD66  0.667  1.266  0.21939  21.8  0.31  0.966 
  2007  TQ24  0.365  1.222  0.01726  22  0.54  0.793 
  2007  TA19  0.468  1.44  0.01854  19.4  0.509  0.954 
  2007  TL5  0.351  1.385  0.01271  25.9  0.595  0.868 
  2007  TH3  0.851  1.086  0.01524  24.7  0.121  0.968 
  2007  TD  0.321  1.058  0.00611  24.4  0.535  0.69 
  2007  SG11  0.628  1.043  0.02676  22.6  0.249  0.835 
  2007  SW2  0.487  1.336  0.1066  21.3  0.466  0.912 
  2007  SV1  0.47  1.043  0.01139  24.7  0.378  0.757 
  2007  RC20  0.767  1.146  0.01148  26.6  0.198  0.957 
  2007  RO17  0.751  1.105  0.02497  25.8  0.191  0.928 
  2007  RP15  0.474  1.418  0.02775  22.8  0.499  0.946 
  2007  RF1  0.639  1.035  0.01211  26.1  0.237  0.837 
  2007  PS25  0.422  1.036  0.01143  25.5  0.421  0.729 
  2007  PB8  0.489  1.272  0.15985  20.9  0.445  0.881 
  2007  ML24  0.486  1.031  0.02186  19.2  0.359  0.758 
  2007  MC4  0.803  1.141  0.12582  21.1  0.174  0.972 
  2007  MF  0.935  1.033  0.01719  26.2  0.05  0.984 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
770  |  Page     
Name  Designation  q  Q  E‐ MOID  H  e  a 
  2007  LB15  0.567  1.309  0.00559  19.4  0.395  0.938 
  2007  LL  0.81  1.152  0.08539  20.4  0.174  0.981 
  2007  JB21  0.879  1.094  0.00321  25.4  0.109  0.987 
  2007  HA  0.473  1.312  0.01564  20.4  0.47  0.892 
  2007  FN3  0.729  1.257  0.14706  23.3  0.266  0.993 
  2007  EP88  0.096  1.579  0.14212  18.5  0.886  0.837 
  2007  EB26  0.119  0.98  0.11321  19.6  0.783  0.55 
  2007  EX  0.508  1.235  0.1244  17  0.418  0.871 
  2007  EG  0.478  1.032  0.00882  24.6  0.367  0.755 
  2007  EF  0.484  1.157  0.02484  20.8  0.41  0.821 
  2007  EC  0.745  1.109  0.02392  22.2  0.196  0.927 
  2007  DB61  0.516  1.107  0.01334  23.6  0.364  0.811 
  2007  DM8  0.625  1.351  0.01532  26.2  0.367  0.988 
  2007  DE8  0.601  1.147  0.05104  23.3  0.312  0.874 
  2007  DD  0.875  1.105  0.00642  25.8  0.116  0.99 
  2007  CA27  0.568  1.163  0.13218  21.1  0.344  0.866 
  2007  CT26  0.524  1.186  0.00237  23.4  0.387  0.855 
  2007  CM26  0.773  1.112  0.0615  25.1  0.18  0.942 
  2007  CS5  0.811  1.15  0.00065  24.6  0.173  0.98 
  2007  BG29  0.554  1.111  0.08713  18  0.335  0.833 
  2007  BU7  0.627  1.263  0.00991  24.1  0.337  0.945 
  2007  BG  0.526  1.047  0.05207  19.6  0.331  0.787 
  2007  BD  0.481  0.986  0.00216  25.4  0.345  0.733 
  2007  BB  0.8  1.064  0.00129  27.8  0.142  0.932 
  2007  AA9  0.497  1.219  0.01526  22.3  0.42  0.858 
  2007  AM  0.426  1.172  0.09691  21.6  0.467  0.799 
  2007  AG  0.451  0.99  0.00375  20.1  0.374  0.72 
  2008  YC29  0.486  1.229  0.00746  25.2  0.433  0.858 
  2008  WT62  0.568  1.2  0.08613  22.8  0.358  0.884 
  2008  WK60  0.531  1.029  0.01692  22.4  0.32  0.78 
  2008  WQ2  0.673  1.02  0.02783  24.3  0.205  0.846 
  2008  VR4  0.565  1.279  0.00203  23  0.388  0.922 
  2008  VY3  0.645  1.334  0.03571  24.8  0.348  0.989 
  2008  VF  0.611  1.201  0.21018  19.4  0.326  0.906 
  2008  UB95  0.724  1.256  0.00041  24.7  0.269  0.99 
  2008  UL90  0.431  0.959  0.0263  18.5  0.38  0.695 
  2008  UX  0.261  1.375  0.07848  20.7  0.681  0.818 
  2008  TC4  0.348  1.213  0.00351  21.5  0.555  0.78 
  2008  TF2  0.635  1.346  0.01221  25.1  0.359  0.99 
  2008  TZ  0.575  1.331  0.00369  25.4  0.397  0.953 
  2008  TF  0.46  1.454  0.07787  21.9  0.519  0.957 
  2008  TD  0.593  1.199  0.02526  25.4  0.338  0.896 
  2008  SD85  0.523  1.242  0.10194  22.8  0.407  0.883 
  2008  ST  0.843  1.085  0.00182  27.1  0.126  0.964 
  2008  SS  0.483  1.373  0.04536  22.2  0.479  0.928 
  2008  QV11  0.501  1.316  0.09731  21.2  0.449  0.908 
  2008  QU3  0.654  1.084  0.06302  20.5  0.248  0.869 
  2008  PR9  0.462  1.424  0.02205  22.4  0.51  0.943 Creating a Practical Legal Framework for the Commercial Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Outer Space 
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  2008  OC6  0.739  1.107  0.0294  18.4  0.199  0.923 
  2008  NA  0.671  1.252  0.02605  23.7  0.302  0.962 
  2008  MG1  0.141  1.426  0.07335  19.8  0.82  0.783 
  2008  LH2  0.709  1.249  0.003  24.4  0.276  0.979 
  2008  LG2  0.659  1.05  0.00429  25.2  0.229  0.854 
  2008  LD  0.754  1.03  0.00362  28.9  0.155  0.892 
  2008  KV2  0.5  1.198  0.04335  21.4  0.411  0.849 
  2008  KS  0.821  1.127  0.08983  24.7  0.157  0.974 
  2008  JV19  0.741  1.23  0.04221  20.7  0.248  0.986 
  2008  JE  0.892  1.076  0.03241  25.8  0.093  0.984 
  2008  GL20  0.713  1.074  0.00729  26.6  0.202  0.894 
  2008  GS3  0.534  1.175  0.16571  22.1  0.375  0.855 
  2008  FX6  0.807  1.04  0.01315  25  0.126  0.923 
  2008  EY68  0.179  1.311  0.03959  22.1  0.76  0.745 
  2008  EA32  0.428  0.804  0.17967  16.5  0.305  0.616 
  2008  EA8  0.315  1.6  0.00542  22.2  0.671  0.957 
  2008  EY5  0.234  1.019  0.07894  20.1  0.626  0.627 
  2008  EV5  0.878  1.039  0.01427  20  0.084  0.959 
  2008  EE5  0.877  1.012  0.02071  19.7  0.072  0.945 
  2008  EP  0.624  1.061  0.03953  24.2  0.259  0.842 
  2008  EG  0.246  1.64  0.25325  20  0.739  0.943 
  2008  EE  0.774  1.19  0.13792  19.7  0.212  0.982 
  2008  DY22  0.636  1.007  0.01537  24.2  0.226  0.821 
  2008  DF5  0.704  1.047  0.02644  23.4  0.196  0.876 
  2008  DL4  0.815  1.044  0.00882  26.9  0.123  0.929 
  2008  CC175  0.476  1.434  0.11704  21.4  0.501  0.955 
  2008  CH116  0.273  1.052  0.2245  19  0.588  0.663 
  2008  CN70  0.529  1.175  0.09031  19.2  0.38  0.852 
  2008  CH70  0.58  1.126  0.06661  24.4  0.32  0.853 
  2008  CY21  0.724  1.215  0.04637  24.9  0.253  0.97 
  2008  CL20  0.522  1.011  0.01588  25.3  0.319  0.766 
  2008  CT1  0.5  1.324  0.00026  27.7  0.451  0.912 
  2008  CN1  0.502  1.039  0.0344  20.6  0.348  0.771 
  2008  CL1  0.829  1.093  0.10096  19.5  0.137  0.961 
  2008  BP16  0.29  1.366  0.09415  21.7  0.649  0.828 
  2008  BX2  0.565  1.149  0.03126  23.6  0.341  0.857 
  2009  VS25  0.709  1.245  0.03676  24.4  0.274  0.977 
  2009  UZ87  0.75  1.098  0.01199  25.9  0.188  0.924 
  2009  UT19  0.292  1.49  0.02929  22.5  0.672  0.891 
  2009  UY17  0.56  1.077  0.01513  20.9  0.316  0.819 
  2009  UR5  0.491  1.056  0.02397  25.7  0.365  0.774 
  2009  UM1  0.377  1.557  0.06501  23.4  0.61  0.967 
  2009  UG  0.494  1.085  0.01281  23.2  0.374  0.79 
  2009  UC  0.497  1.024  0.02473  26.6  0.346  0.76 
  2009  TK8  0.613  1.246  0.07469  20.2  0.34  0.929 
  2009  TD8  0.67  1.1  0.02129  26.9  0.243  0.885 
  2009  SM104  0.621  1.343  0.06728  23.6  0.368  0.982 
  2009  SZ99  0.64  0.99  0.05614  19.1  0.214  0.815 Appendix A: Lists of Near Earth Asteroids 
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  2009  SJ18  0.84  1.05  0.04705  24.6  0.112  0.945 
  2009  SH2  0.905  1.093  0.00241  24.9  0.094  0.999 
  2009  SS  0.726  1.09  0.0634  26.7  0.2  0.908 
  2009  PY  0.667  1.223  0.18124  21.2  0.294  0.945 
  2009  PC  0.657  1.335  0.03823  23.2  0.34  0.996 
  2009  ME9  0.461  1.386  0.16216  21.3  0.501  0.923 
  2009  MW  0.64  1.186  0.1136  20.7  0.299  0.913 
  2009  LD  0.84  1.138  0.00294  26.2  0.151  0.989 
  2009  KR4  0.642  1.045  0.02691  25  0.239  0.844 
  2009  JO2  0.461  1.308  0.05518  19.2  0.479  0.885 
  2009  HE60  0.733  1.262  0.01538  25.6  0.265  0.998 
  2009  HU44  0.295  1.365  0.00663  22.6  0.644  0.83 
  2009  HG21  0.574  1.242  0.01632  25  0.368  0.908 
  2009  FG44  0.856  1.074  0.07154  22.5  0.113  0.965 
  2009  FW25  0.6  1.165  0.04126  23.4  0.32  0.882 
  2009  FU23  0.601  1.073  0.03333  20  0.282  0.837 
  2009  FL  0.523  1.437  0.03034  24.4  0.466  0.98 
  2009  EP2  0.597  1.257  0.04176  21.6  0.356  0.927 
  2009  DC1  0.632  1.115  0.03117  24  0.276  0.873 
  2009  CQ5  0.847  1.018  0.04708  17.6  0.092  0.933 
  2009  CE  0.725  1.065  0.0682  24.6  0.19  0.895 
  2009  CD  0.659  1.137  0.10261  22.7  0.266  0.898 
  2009  BL71  0.688  1.183  0.01102  22  0.265  0.935 
  2009  BO58  0.46  1.213  0.09161  21.9  0.45  0.836 
  2009  BE58  0.414  1.457  0.00409  21.6  0.558  0.936 
  2009  BJ2  0.682  1.211  0.01104  27.1  0.279  0.947 
  2009  BH2  0.427  1.201  0.0004  22.4  0.476  0.814 
  2009  AM15  0.417  1.208  0.05252  18.7  0.487  0.812 
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